Diego Chaves-González
Natalia Delgado
A Winding Path to Integration
Venezuelan Migrants’ Regularization
and Labor Market Prospects
A Winding Path to Integration
Venezuelan Migrants’ Regularization
and Labor Market Prospects
Diego Chaves-González
Natalia Delgado
October 2023
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN INITIATIVE
Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 1
1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................................3
2 Regular and Irregular Migrants and Their Economic Integration ....................6
A. Formal and Informal Economies .......................................................................................................................7
B. Dierent Routes to Irregular Status .................................................................................................................9
C. Regularization Mechanisms .............................................................................................................................. 10
3 Venezuelans’ Regularization and Labor Market Integration
in Colombia ..............................................................................................................................................
16
4 Venezuelans’ Regularization and Labor Market Integration
in Other Quito Process Countries ...........................................................................................
25
5 Final Remarks and Recommendations .............................................................................. 34
About the Authors ........................................................................................................................................ 38
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................... 39
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Executive Summary
The scale of displacement from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since 2015, with more than 6 million
Venezuelan refugees and migrants moving to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, has
challenged governments across the region to rethink how they manage movement across their borders
and the integration of immigrants within them. With many Venezuelans expressing the intention to stay
permanently in their new countries of residence, those countries have used various policy tools to grant
newcomers access to basic services and to support their integration into local communities.
Most notable among these are the registration and regularization mechanisms used to register Venezuelans
who have entered a country and provide them with regular status. Governments in Latin America and the
Caribbean have opted to regularize large segments of this population for a combination of economic, social,
and security-related reasons. When well-planned and properly executed, these tools have opened pathways
that allow Venezuelans to access basic services and formal labor market opportunities and promoted their
long-term integration and socioeconomic inclusion. Yet despite these eorts, many Venezuelans still lack a
regular immigration status, shutting them out of services and integration opportunities and pushing them
into the informal market and often vulnerable living conditions.
As recognition has grown that Venezuelan migration will not be a short-term phenomenon, governments
in the region are increasingly acknowledging that eectively supporting newcomers and the communities
in which they settle requires a long-term, whole-of-government, and multistakeholder approach that links
migrant integration to broader development strategies.
Bringing this longer-term perspective into regularization
policies and tackling barriers to integration will be important
parts of this shift. To do so, countries will need to critically
assess their institutions and policies for governing migration
and integration, and ensure that stakeholders ranging from
the private sector and civil society to dierent levels of
government can coalesce around shared goals.
An important rst step is understanding how registration and regularization mechanisms have aected
Venezuelans’ economic integration to date. Measuring their direct implications is challenging, given the
wide range of factors that inuence integration and uneven data across the region. This study compiles the
evidence available on the links between providing regular status and the economic benets for migrants
and for receiving countries. Colombia—which has received the most Venezuelans and operated the region’s
largest and most-studied regularization mechanism—oers an important case study. The Colombian
experience is then compared to ndings from the other Latin American and Caribbean countries that make
up the Quito Process, which has named Venezuelans’ socioeconomic integration as a top priority. The report
uses that evidence to identify observations that may be generalizable across most countries in the region
and those that are unique to a specic country or subregion.
An important rst step is
understanding how registration
and regularization mechanisms
have aected Venezuelans’
economic integration to date.
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This study’s comprehensive mapping suggests the following factors have been critical to how regularization
mechanisms are shaping migrants’ labor market opportunities:
► The scale and ongoing nature of Venezuelan migration. While many countries have introduced
regularization measures, Venezuelan migration continues across the region and has often outpaced
Quito Process Member States’ capacity to grant regular status. Thus, even as notable numbers of
Venezuelans have been able to regularize their status, many remain irregular.
► Temporary versus permanent regular status. The most generous regularization mechanisms in the
region have granted Venezuelans a pathway to permanent residence, in addition to permission to
work and access public services. Other temporary regularization mechanisms, by contrast, generally
do not lead to longer-term residency permits and thus entail a greater degree of uncertainty for both
Venezuelan workers and employers who may be wary of hiring someone who may not remain in the
country or legally employable for long. Still, many Venezuelan irregular migrants have established
strong labor market and social ties in their host countries and are working in steady, if informal, jobs.
► Venezuelans’ relatively high levels of human capital. Venezuelans, especially those who arrived in
earlier periods and have stayed in their host countries for longer, tend to have high levels of education.
Their skills represent a signicant human capital asset that could contribute to receiving-country
economic and development goals, if Venezuelans can access jobs in their elds and career-building
opportunities. To date, migrants’ salaries are generally lower than those of the native population. After
regularization, however, there is some evidence of an increased dierentiation among Venezuelan
workers, with a stronger correlation between human capital characteristics and income level.
► The prevalence of labor informality. Venezuelan migrants are more likely to be employed informally
compared to most countries’ nationals, even as many of these countries have high overall rates of
labor informality. In this context, regularization might help migrants nd work with better labor
conditions, but it does not necessarily mean they will enter the formal sector.
► The existence and enforcement of labor regulations. In some cases, complex labor laws that make
it more costly to formally hire workers may disincentivize employers and migrants (even if they have
regular status) from moving toward a formal employment arrangement. The manner in which labor
regulations and rules against hiring irregular migrants are (or are not) enforced also plays a role in
whether regularization leads to formal work, and to migrants fullling related obligations such as
paying taxes and contributing to social security systems.
With these considerations in mind, the study presents recommendations that could help Latin American
and Caribbean countries follow through on their commitments to reduce Venezuelans’ socioeconomic
vulnerability and maximize this population’s contributions to the economies of their host countries.
► Strengthening registry mechanisms and better leveraging the data they collect. There are
numerous ways in which migrants can fall into irregular status, and policymakers should consider the
administrative distinctions—the “demography” of irregular migration—when designing regularization
mechanisms. It is equally fundamental to ensure that registry mechanisms produce timely and
relevant data for operational, analytical, and policy purposes. Improving these data systems,
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including through partnerships with external entities to support data analysis, is critical to enhancing
government regularization and integration policies in the long term.
► Reinforcing the links between regularization and employment. Most current regularization
programs oer status that is explicitly temporary, lasting for a year or two. However, creating permits
with a longer duration (and that allow migrants to work, where that is not already the case) and a
pathway to permanent residence could form the foundation for a longer-term strategy focused on
how regularization can support both migrant integration and host-country development goals.
► Increasing dialogue between government and the private sector. Private-sector actors play an
important role in migrants’ labor market integration, but their involvement in integration policy
conversations is often limited. Governments could seek to more fully engage them and tap their
expertise for initiatives that aim to better match migrants’ skills and employer needs, increase migrant
participation in the formal sector, and raise awareness of rules around hiring migrants and of migrant
workers’ rights.
► Supporting Venezuelan migrants’ economic mobility. While Venezuelans have relatively high
levels of human capital, many have been unable to apply their skills in the countries where they have
settled. Opportunities to develop or strengthen technical skills and streamlined systems to recognize
credentials earned abroad could help more newcomers nd work in their elds and potentially help
close the native-migrant earnings gap.
► Building on opportunities for regional exchanges of ideas and support. The Quito Process
has helped countries coordinate their responses to Venezuelan migration, and it could be further
leveraged to exchange best practices and provide support as countries rene their regularization
measures.
1 Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuelan (R4V), “Venezuelan Refugees and
Migrants in the Region” (fact sheet, August 2023).
As Latin American and Caribbean countries move away from short-term emergency responses and look to
long-term integration, there are real opportunities to link regularization mechanisms with eorts to meet
labor demands. These policy tools can help countries design regularization programs that reect evolving
migration trends, connect these with tangible economic benets for migrants and the communities in
which they live, and support broader strategies to address complex development challenges in the region.
1 Introduction
As of August 2023, 7.7 million Venezuelans had left their home country, with 6.5 million moving to other
countries within Latin America and the Caribbean. More than one-third of all displaced Venezuelans were
thought to be in Colombia (2.9 million), followed by 1.5 million in Peru and roughly half a million each
in Brazil, Ecuador, and Chile. The rest of the region hosts an estimated 700,000 Venezuelan migrants and
refugees.
1
The scale of this displacement crisis, which began around 2015, has challenged Latin American and
Caribbean countries to nd better ways to manage increased movement across their borders. In this,
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registration and regularization mechanisms
2
have become key policy tools. Most countries in the region
have sought to regularize Venezuelans’ status in one (or more) of the following ways: using existing
regional mobility and residence agreements; adapting visa systems to allow displaced Venezuelans to apply
more easily for existing residency visas; or creating ad hoc regularization programs, either specically for
Venezuelans or for a broader population of migrants with irregular status. Finally, a few countries (such as
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico) have used their asylum systems to grant Venezuelans temporary status, and
some (such as Costa Rica
3
) have introduced forms of complementary protection.
Importantly, the Venezuelan migrant population—both across and within individual receiving countries—is
far from monolithic. Displaced Venezuelans vary in terms of their economic background, level of education,
professional training and skills, age, social networks, and date of entry. Each of these characteristics aects
the extent of Venezuelans’ labor market integration. Registration is a rst, necessary step that can enable
receiving-country authorities to understand the characteristics of newcomers within their territory and
provide a sound statistical basis for regularization and integration policy planning.
4
Some countries,
such as Colombia
5
and Ecuador,
6
have used their
registration exercise to collect such vital information.
However, interviews with members of civil society and
representatives of UN agencies suggest that although
registration initiatives have been an essential milestone
for regularization processes, countries could still make
better use of the information gathered as they design
integration policies, tailoring them to the dierent
needs of registered migrants.
7
Regularization mechanisms usually come with the promise of economic and labor market benets for both
the receiving society and the newcomers involved. In general, regularized migrants are incorporated into
the formal economy and, thus, increase contributions to tax and social security systems. Regularization
can also potentially increase immigrant workers’ productivity by allowing them to have their skills and
qualications recognized, to seek out positions that let them apply these skills and for which they will be
paid fairly, and to access training and education—all things that can contribute to a country’s medium-
and long-term development goals. However, there is no guarantee that regularization on its own will
produce these benets. If the skills of regularized Venezuelans are not identied in the registration phase,
do not match formal labor market needs, or if Venezuelan workers and/or receiving-country employers
have insucient incentives to engage with one another in the formal sector, large numbers of migrant
2 Registration mechanisms aim to collect and update information about migrants to inform policy design and to identify those
migrants who may wish to access temporary protection measures. Regularization mechanisms, meanwhile, allow migrants to
apply for a regular immigration status and, if they fulll requirements set by the country’s government, to receive permission
to stay for a certain period of time and engage in specied activities, such as accessing education, receiving health care, and
pursuing formal employment.
3 Government of Costa Rica, “Categoría Especial Temporal de Protección Complementaria,” updated July 13, 2022.
4 Ginetta Gueli, Regional Knowledge Management Strategy and Action Plan 2022–2027 of IOM in South America (Buenos Aires:
International Organization for Migration, 2022).
5 Migración Colombia, “RUMV,” accessed November 7, 2022.
6 Government of Ecuador, Ministry of Government, “Registro Migratorio de Ciudadanos Venezolanos en Ecuador,” accessed
November 7, 2022.
7 Authors’ interviews with representatives of civil-society organizations working across the region and UN agencies, August 2022.
Regularization mechanisms usually
come with the promise of economic
and labor market benets for
both the receiving society and the
newcomers involved.
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workers may remain unemployed or in the informal sector, slowing their inclusion. This is a particularly
relevant concern in the many Latin American and Caribbean countries with society-wide high rates of labor
informality and unemployment.
Little research has been done to date on how providing regular status to Venezuelan migrants aects their
economic prospects in Latin American and Caribbean countries. This report looks specically at Venezuelans
in countries that are Member States of the Quito Process (see Box 1) to gather evidence on the potential
impacts of regularization mechanisms on migrants’ access to socioeconomic opportunities. While some
other studies have examined this issue in certain countries, this report brings together information and data
from across all Quito Process countries where sucient evidence exists on the eects of migrants’ regular
status on their economic outcomes.
The report uses a mix of sources to explore this topic, including a review of existing data and research
as well as unique insights gathered from policy and regional experts, migrants, integration-focused
organizations, and private-sector stakeholders through 18 interviews and 3 focus groups conducted
between July and December 2022. It analyses whether registration and regularization mechanisms have
successfully increased Venezuelans’ participation in the formal sector, reduced their rates of informality, and
allowed them to become more integrated and productive in their receiving countries. The report also draws
out observations that may be generalizable across Quito Process Member States and identies those that
are unique to a specic country or context.
BOX 1
What Is the Quito Process, and How Does It Support Migrants’ Socioeconomic Integration?
The Quito Process is an intergovernmental initiative established in Latin America and the Caribbean in
2018 to coordinate responses to the Venezuelan migration crisis through nonbinding commitments and
technical assistance. The Quito Declaration on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Citizens in the Region,
signed September 2018, urges governments to reinforce reception policies for Venezuelans; coordinate
eorts through international organizations; ght discrimination, intolerance, and xenophobia; strengthen
regulation mechanisms to promote and respect the rights of migrants; amongst other things. As of mid-
2023, the Member States of the Quito Process are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
The socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan migrants is one of the Member States’ priorities, as evidenced
by their joint declarations following the fourth technical meeting in Buenos Aires in 2019. This focus can
also be seen in the 2021 Regional Socioeconomic Integration Strategy, which describes registration and
regularization as a central axis of the socioeconomic integration of migrants.
Sources: Quito Process, “What We Do?,” accessed October 11, 2022; Quito Process, “Declaración de Quito sobre Movilidad Humana
de ciudadanos venezolanos en la Región,” September 4, 2018; Quito Process, “Joint Statement by the Fourth International Technical
Meeting on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Nationals” (statement, Buenos Aires, July 22, 2019); Quito Process, Regional Inter-Agency
Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), International Labor Organization (ILO), and United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), Migration from Venezuela: Opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional Socio-Economic
Integration Strategy (Geneva: ILO and UNDP, 2021); Quito Process, “Socio-Economic Insertion,” accessed June 26, 2023.
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This study should be seen as a preliminary step toward understanding the relationship between registering
migrants, providing them a regular status, and their economic outcomes in societies that generally
have high levels of informal work, which does not generally require legal documentation. Since there
are signicant information gaps in this research area, it is dicult to draw rm conclusions about the
relationship; this report attempts to provide an overview of what the available evidence suggests. The nal
section of this report sketches a roadmap of recommendations for Quito Process countries as they continue
to rene how they register Venezuelan migrants, design and implement mechanisms to grant them regular
status, and foster their integration.
To inform these recommendations, Section 3 of this report examines the case of Colombia’s Special
Stay Permit (PEP) and Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan Migrants (TSPV)—the largest and
most studied regularization eort in the region, and one that can be seen as a strategic decision by the
Colombian government that supporting Venezuelans’ integration would serve the country’s medium- and
long-term development goals.
8
The TSPV was administrated at a relatively low cost and led to the approval
of nearly 1,181,000 Temporary Protection Permits (PPT) within the rst year.
9
Section 4 of this report then
explores evidence from regularization mechanisms launched by other Quito Process Member States,
comparing and contrasting them to the Colombian experience. Together, this analysis oers a window into
what has and has not worked in the region to date, and where opportunities for future policy improvements
lie.
2 Regular and Irregular Migrants and eir Economic
Integration
Assessing how registration and regularization mechanisms aect migrants’ labor market integration, and
what the costs and benets are, requires consideration of the labor dynamics in each country. Overall,
Venezuelan migrants bring substantial economic benets to receiving countries in their capacity as workers,
especially when regularized. For example, their labor can bring down the cost of goods and services for
consumers and make companies (and sometimes entire sectors) more competitive.
10
Evidence in the region
also suggests Venezuelan migration has expanded the general economic activity from which taxes and
public contributions are drawn.
11
8 Authors’ interview with a representative of the Colombian Border Manager’s Oce, August 2022.
9 Jordan Flores, “Casi el 16 % de los migrantes venezolanos en Colombia aún no recoge su Permiso de Protección Temporal,” El
Diario, May 25, 2022.
10 Fedesarrollo and ACRIP, Informe Mensual del Mercado Laboral (Bogotá: Fedesarrollo and ACRIP, 2018).
11 World Bank, Migración desde Venezuela a Colombia: Impactos y Estrategia de Respuesta en el Corto y Mediano Plazo (Bogotá: World
Bank, 2018); World Bank, An Opportunity for All: Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees and Peru’s Development (Lima: World Bank, 2019);
World Bank, Retos y oportunidades de la migración venezolana en Ecuador (Quito: World Bank, 2020).
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However, the economic benets linked to regularization tend to be stronger in receiving countries where
migration and labor regulations not only exist on paper but are also enforced in practice. In most Quito
Process Member States, there is a high level of regulation surrounding formally hiring employees, but
some countries do not rigorously enforce these employment laws. Where regulations are strict but poorly
enforced, employers have few incentives to invest the extra time and money in formally hiring their
employees, and native-born and immigrant workers alike
may nd it easier to secure work informally. Although
informally hired workers tend to be paid less, the
Venezuelan migrants and representatives of integration-
focused organizations who participated in this study’s
focus groups
12
described how informal work is often
seen as a win-win situation for employers and migrant
employees. One participant explained that, since they
are unlikely to be detected by authorities, “there are
economic gains on both sides because paying for social
security [as is required in formal employment] means less money in the pocket of everyone.” In such cases,
the benets of regularization for migrants and of migrant workers for receiving-country economies are less
straightforward and often harder to quantify.
Consequently, across Quito Process Member States, factors such as the size of a country’s informal economy,
how migrants fall into irregularity, and how the country is implementing regularization mechanisms are
all relevant when analyzing the potential benets of regularization. Balancing these three considerations
is crucial for the sustainability of regularization processes as well as their success in promoting formal
employment among migrants.
A. Formal and Informal Economies
Broadly, the “informal economy” refers to all economic activities that, in law or in practice, are not
(suciently) regulated.
13
The prevalence of informal employment varies across Latin American and
Caribbean countries. As such, providing migrants with a regular status may do more in some national
contexts than others in terms of helping them access formal employment and opportunities to earn a better
income.
Analysis of survey-based studies and national data suggest that the informal economy accounts for, on
average, an estimated 33.9 percent
14
of GDP in Quito Process Member States. However, the share is far
larger—between 42 and 52 percent of GDP—in Peru, Paraguay, and Panama (see Table 1).
12 Participant comments during Migration Policy Institute (MPI) online focus groups with Venezuelan migrants and integration-
focused organizations in Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, August 18 and 22, 2022.
13 See International Labor Organization (ILO), “Informal Economy,” accessed February 6, 2023.
14 This regional gure was calculated using the national data in Table 1.
The economic benets linked to
regularization tend to be stronger
in receiving countries where
migration and labor regulations
not only exist on paper but are
also enforced in practice.
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TABLE 1
GDP and the Formal and Informal Economies in Quito Process Member States, 2022
Country GDP (billions of
U.S. dollars)
Informal % of
Employment
Formal % of
Employment
Informal Economy
as a % of GDP
Argentina 630.7 37.4% 62.6% 27.3%
Brazil 1890.0 38.9% 61.1% 33.2%
Chile 310.9 34.5% 65.5% 19.3%
Colombia 342.9 58.2% 41.8% 33.3%
Costa Rica 68.5 43.9% 56.1% 26.6%
Dominican Republic 112.4 52.1% 47.9% 33.9%
Ecuador 115.5 53.4% 46.6% 37.2%
Guyana* 14.8 48.5–52.9% 51.5–47.1% 29.1%
Mexico 1420.0 54.9% 45.1% 29.2%
Panama 71.1 48.2% 51.8% 51.6%
Paraguay 41.9 63.5% 36.5% 46.5%
Peru 239.3 76.1% 23.9% 42.2%
Uruguay 71.2 20.0% 80.0% 31.7%
* Informal employment data are from 2022 and were obtained from ocial government sources. The only exception is Guyana, for
which this table shows a 2021 gure that was in the last bulletin published on the Guyanese government’s website.
Sources: World Economics, “Informal Economy Size,” accessed February 10, 2023; International Monetary Fund (IMF), “World Economic
Outlook (October 2022) - GDP, Current Prices” (dataset, October 2022); Argentine National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC),
Mercado de trabajo. Tasas e indicadores socioeconómicos (EPH): Tercer trimestre de 2022 (Buenos Aires: INDEC, 2022); Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Indicadores IBGE: Trimestre Móvel set. - nov. 2022 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2023); Chilean National Statistics
Institute (INE), “Boletín Estadístico: Informalidad Laboral” (bulletin, February 2, 2023); Colombian National Administrative Department
of Statistics (DANE), “Ocupación informal: Trimestre móvil septiembre - noviembre 2022” (technical bulletin, Bogotá, January 16, 2023);
Costa Rican National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), “Encuesta Continua de Empleo - Indicadores generales de la condición
de actividad según país de nacimiento - IV Trimestre 2022” (dataset, 2022); Guyanese Bureau of Statistics, Guyana Labour Force Survey
November 2021 (Georgetown: Bureau of Statistics, 2021); Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, “Boletín trimestral del mercado
laboral: julio-septiembre 2022” (bulletin, 2022); Ecuadorian National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC), “Encuesta nacional de
empleo, desempleo y subempleo (ENEMDU): indicadores laborales diciembre 2022” (technical bulletin, January 24, 2023); Mexican
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), “Indicadores de ocupación y empleo: Diciembre 2022” (press release, January
26, 2023); Panamanian National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), “Situación de la población ocupada, ” updated April 2022;
Paraguayan National Statistics Institute (INE), “Boletín trimestral de empleo – 3er trimestre 2022” (bulletin, November 2022); Peruvian
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), “Comportamiento de los indicadores de mercado laboral a nivel nacional: julio-
agosto-septiembre 2022” (technical brief, November 2022); Uruguayan National Statistics Institute (INE), “Encuesta Continua de
Hogares – No Registro y Subempleo” (dataset, 2022).
The relatively small size of the informal economy in Chile, for example, likely translates to greater economic
benets from regularization than is the case in many other Quito Process Member States. The country has
a comparatively low rate of informal employment, and its rigorous enforcement of rules against hiring
irregular migrants makes it particularly dicult for Venezuelans without regular status to nd formal
employment.
15
For years, Chile did not have a migrant regularization mechanism, and the mechanism
implemented in 2021 excluded migrants who did not arrive in the country through authorized entry
15 LuicyPedroza, Pau Palop-García, and Young Chang,Migration Policies inChile 2017-2019(Hamburg, Germany: GIGA, 2022).
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points. The combination of a relatively small informal economy and strong labor practices suggests that
regularization could present important economic benets for those who qualify, but also that those who do
not qualify are likely to face heightened economic precarity.
Migrants in countries such as Peru
16
and Ecuador
17
seem much more likely to nd work in the informal
sector, due to the larger size of those countries’ informal economies. Complex labor laws in Andean
countries that require high social security contributions raise the costs of formal employment in these
countries, incentivizing employers and workers (native-born and immigrant alike) to instead make informal
arrangements.
18
This is particularly true in the many countries in the region that have limited capacity to
enforce rules around labor formality.
19
Because of the large size of the informal economy in most Quito Process Member States, both irregular and
regular migrants often work informally (as do many native-born workers). Therefore, when Member States
consider implementing regularization mechanisms, it is important that policymakers understand how
immigrants interact with the economy and how gaining regular status and the right to work may or may not
change that. Regularization may still yield other benets (in terms of service access and social cohesion, for
example) but alone may not be enough to connect migrants with the formal economy.
B. Dierent Routes to Irregular Status
A signicant portion of the Venezuelan migrant population in Latin America and the Caribbean consists of
individuals with an irregular immigration status. However, dierent circumstances can lead individuals to
irregular status, and this can ultimately aect the extent to which migrants can access benets and whether
they are eligible for regularization programs.
For example, a Venezuelan migrant who
entered a country through an unauthorized
border crossing and one who entered the
same country with a visa or permit but
overstayed it may have dierent levels of
access to assistance and regularization
options.
While Southern Cone countries can expect the overwhelming majority of their irregular Venezuelan
migrants to have overstayed permits, Andean countries that share long, porous borders experience frequent
16 In the case of Peru, the absence of labor contracts is widespread among employed refugees and migrants. Only 19.2 percent of
employed workers have some type of contract. However, this represents an increase of 7.7 percent compared to the rate recorded
by the Survey of the Venezuelan Population Living in the Country (ENPOVE) survey in 2018 (11.5 percent). See Peruvian National
Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), Condiciones de Vida de la Población Venezolana que reside en el Perú (Lima: INEI Peru,
2022); R4V, GTRM Perú -Análisis conjunto de necesidades para el RMRP 2022 (Lima: R4V, 2022).
17 In June 2022, the informality rate was 50.6 percent, according to the National Survey of Employment, Unemployment, and
Underemployment (Enemdu) for the second trimester of 2022. See Ecuadorian National Institute of Statistics and Census
(INEC), Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo - ENEMDU (Quito: INEC Ecuador, 2022); R4V, Evaluación conjunta de
necesidades: Informe de resultados de Ecuador-mayo 2022 (Quito: R4V, 2022).
18 Center for Social and Labor Studies (CESLA) and National Businessmen’s Association of Colombia (ANDI), Nuevas políticas de
empleo para la región andina (Bogotá: CESLA and ANDI, 2021).
19 ILO, Panorama Laboral 2021: América Latina y El Caribe (Lima: ILO, 2021).
Dierent circumstances can lead individuals
to irregular status, and this can ultimately
aect the extent to which migrants can
access benets and whether they are eligible
for regularization programs.
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irregular border crossings. In Central America and Mexico, irregular border crossings are also common; many
Venezuelans cannot access a visa, and the number of Venezuelan nationals traveling northward through
Central America via land routes has increased in recent years. In 2022, for example, more than 150,000
Venezuelan nationals entered Panama by irregularly crossing the Darién Gap, with the intention of reaching
the United States.
20
These trends in how Venezuelans become irregular migrants should guide policymakers as they design and
implement regularization measures, and help them set realistic expectations regarding the impact of these
mechanisms.
C. Regularization Mechanisms
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have almost all made responding to Venezuelan migration
a high priority on their policy agendas. However, the ways in which they have done so have varied. Some
countries (such as Uruguay and Argentina) have relied on established legal frameworks to facilitate
Venezuelans’ access to regular status, while others (such as Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil) have
created specic mechanisms to regularize Venezuelan migrants.
21
And some countries have used a mix of
policy tools (including existing temporary and permanent visas, mobility and residence agreements, special
regularization campaigns, and in some cases, asylum procedures) to grant Venezuelans status.
22
Estimates of the share of Venezuelans who have regular status vary greatly across data sources, both at the
regional and country level. One such estimate, published by the Migration Policy Institute in early 2023,
found that at least half and as many as three-fourths of displaced Venezuelans across the top 15 receiving
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had obtained some type of regular status.
23
The wide variation
in data on this topic has made it dicult to achieve a comprehensive, up-to-date understanding of the
situation that would support more eective policy design and implementation. Ongoing eorts to improve
data collection and coordination are thus critical.
Even with this varied data landscape, one thing is clear: the regularized share of Venezuelans varies
considerably from country to country. This reects dierences in what paths to regular status exist,
how widely accessible they are, and the nature of the status they grant. Most of these regularization
mechanisms have oered temporary status, meaning Venezuelans must renew it periodically to avoid
falling into irregular status. Most also do not provide a path to permanent residence. This has emerged as a
fundamental limitation as it has become increasingly clear that many Venezuelans are likely to stay in their
20 Government of Panama, Migración Panama, “Irregulares en tránsito por Darién por país 2022” (data table, 2022).
21 Luciana Gandini, Victoria Prieto Rosas, and Fernando Lozano-Ascencio, “Nuevas movilidades en América Latina: la migración
venezolana en contextos de crisis y las respuestas en la región,” Cuadernos Geográcos 59, no. 3 (July 21, 2020): 103–21.
22 In this section, “regularization” refers to the provision of all kinds of regular migration status. Although asylum is one such route to
regular status, other mechanisms have played a larger role in facilitating Venezuelans’ access to regular status in most countries
in the region. As such, this section largely focuses on other regularization measures. For information about eorts to strengthen
Quito Process Member States’ asylum systems, see Quito Process, “Asilo,” accessed May 10, 2023.
23 Luciana Gandini and Andrew Selee, Betting on Legality: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to the Venezuelan Displacement
Crisis (Washington, DC: MPI, 2023).
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A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION
host countries.
24
Without a way to apply for a longer-
term or permanent status, hundreds of thousands of
Venezuelans risk sliding back to irregularity and losing
access to basic services and formal employment. This
state of play can also lead to bubbling frustration in
host communities. Other countries (such as Ecuador
25
,
Argentina,
26
Uruguay,
27
and Brazil
28
) allow migrants
to apply for permanent residence, generally after rst
holding a temporary residence permit.
The criteria Venezuelans must meet to be eligible to regularize also vary from country to country and
program to program (see Table 2 for an overview). In a few cases, countries have linked regularization
initiatives to applicants’ employment. For example, Colombia’s Special Permit to Stay for the Promotion of
Formalization (PEPFF) required Venezuelan applicants to be employed and provide proof of a formal job
oer. Meanwhile, Costa Rica’s Special Category of Temporary Workers (CETTSA) set eligibility criteria based
on migrants’ labor sector, rather than their nationality or other characteristics.
29
This process gave migrants
who entered the country between January 2016 and January 2020 and who worked in the agricultural,
agro-export, or agro-industrial sectors a chance to regularize their migration status. When regularization
initiatives oer status only to migrants who can demonstrate their participation in the formal economy,
governments can argue to their constituents that only “productive” or “needed” migrants are being allowed
to stay.
30
However, in places with large informal economies and relatively limited formal employment
opportunities, such mechanisms likely do little to disincentivize migrants from seeking informal work and
employers from hiring them.
Many regularization programs for Venezuelans set a cuto date, allowing only those who entered the
country before a particular date to qualify. This type of requirement generally aims to prevent the
regularization mechanism from becoming a “pull factor,” encouraging further migrants to travel to the
country with the explicit intention of regularizing. Colombia’s TSPV, for example, required Venezuelan
24 Diego Chaves-González, Jordi Amaral, and María Jesús Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees:
The Cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (Washington, DC, and Panama City: MPI and International Organization for
Migration, 2021).
25 Government of Ecuador, Executive Decree 436 2022 (June 2022).
26 Decree no. 616/2010 regulates the Permanent Mercosur Residency pathway in Argentina for nationals of Mercosur and associated
states, including Venezuelans. See Government of Argentina, “Radicaciones Mercosur - Residencia Permanente,” accessed May 10,
2023.
27 Visa Mercosur allows nationals of Mercosur and associated states, including Venezuelans, to apply for permanent residence in
Uruguay. See Venezolanos en Uruguay, “Residencia permanente Mercosur en Uruguay,” updated September 6, 2020.
28 Interministerial Decree n. 9/2018 regulated the authorization of residence permits to migrants in Brazilian territory and nationals in
a border country, including Venezuelans. Interministerial Decree n. 15/2018 suspended some requirements that applicants present
certain identication documents and accepted self-declaratory statements from Venezuelans. See Government of Brazil, Portaria
Interministerial N
o
9 (March 14, 2018); Government of Brazil, Portaria Interministerial Nº 15 (August 27, 2018).
29 Cristobal Ramón, Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, María Jesús Mora, and Ana Martín Gil, Temporary Worker Programs in Canada, Mexico, and Costa
Rica: Promising Pathways for Managing Central American Migration? (Washington, DC: MPI, 2022).
30 For a discussion of these dynamics, see Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Kevin O’Neil, and Maia Jachimowicz, Observations on
Regularization and the Labor Market Performance of Unauthorized and Regularized Immigrants (Hamburg: HWWA Migration
Research Group, 2004), 9.
Without a way to apply for a longer-
term or permanent status, hundreds
of thousands of Venezuelans risk
sliding back to irregularity and
losing access to basic services and
formal employment.
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A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION
irregular migrants to show proof of residency in the country before January 31, 2021.
31
Countries such as
Ecuador
32
and Chile
33
have similarly established entry date requirements for migrants seeking to regularize
their status.
Migrants who entered a country with documentation but have since fallen out of regular status are more
likely to have established employment and social networks, increasing their potential productivity and
other post-regularization integration prospects. In part for this reason, some regularization mechanisms
require applicants to prove that they entered the country regularly. However, since most Venezuelans have
ed their country without a passport or other legal documents, many have been unable to enter another
country legally. As a result, such requirements often exclude the vast majority of the Venezuelans who
might otherwise seek to regularize their status.
Apart from creating large-scale regularization mechanisms, countries such as Mexico and the Dominican
Republic have awarded regular status to some Venezuelans based on marriage or other family relationships.
One study of regularization programs in Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, published
by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), found that having family ties was one of the
most common criteria for regularization processes in the studied countries.
34
This type of regularization
mechanism often operates on a “rolling” basis (rather than within a limited time period), which can help
avoid sharp spikes in demand for application processing and mean governments do not need to announce
(to a potentially skeptical public) their creation of a separate, large-scale regularization measure.
Some countries have sought to regularize Venezuelans who may need some sort of humanitarian protection
but who do not necessarily qualify for refugee status.
35
For instance, Mexico has an Ordinary Migratory
Regularization Mechanism for Humanitarian Reasons, available to people who have petitioned for political
asylum or refugee status, did not receive it, but who nonetheless demonstrate a need for humanitarian
assistance.
36
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Paraguay also have regulations granting status for humanitarian
purposes. Paraguay, for example, granted one-year temporary residency (with the possibility to renew
twice) to Venezuelans due to their vulnerable situation.
37
31 Grupo Interagencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos (GIFMM) and R4V, “Preguntas y respuestas: Estatuto temporal de protección
para venezolanos” (information sheet, 2021).
32 The Exceptional Temporary Residence Visa (VIRTE) prioritized those Venezuelan migrants who entered the country through
authorized entry points.
33 Chilean Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Ley de Migración y Extranjería, Ley 21325 (April 20, 2021).
34 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Regional Study: Migratory Regularization Programmes and Processes (San Jose: IOM,
2021).
35 The denition of a refugee is “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” See
UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” July 28, 1951. Both Mexico and Brazil have implemented
the Cartagena Declaration’s more expansive criteria for who qualies as a refugee when considering Venezuelans’ asylum cases.
This denition includes “persons who have ed their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have
seriously disturbed public order.” See “Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,” Conclusion III, No. 3, November 22, 1984.
36 IOM, Regional Study: Migratory Regularization Programmes and Processes.
37 Paraguayan General Directorate of Migration, Resolución D.G.M. N° 062 (February 1, 2019); Government of Paraguay, Ley de
Migraciones, Ley N° 978/96 (November 8, 1996).
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Several countries (such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru) have designed mass
regularization mechanisms specically targeting Venezuelans, while other regularization initiatives are open
to migrants of several nationalities. Chile, for instance, established a special visa for Venezuelans known
as the Democratic Responsibility Visa.
38
Peru
39
expanded its regularization process to migrants of other
nationalities, and Ecuador
40
has announced it will similarly extend its regularization mechanism to migrants
of other nationalities in a later phase of the process. Finally, Costa Rica provides legal pathways for migrants
from selected nationalities, including Nicaraguans, Panamanians, and Venezuelans.
Importantly, as noted above, regularization
mechanisms vary in terms of the length of the
status they grant and the rights they convey
to migrants during their stay. Regularization
mechanisms that grant a pathway to
permanent residence and work permits,
as is the case in Colombia, are the most
generous and provide the most support for
migrants’ longer-term integration and related
development goals. Other countries, such as Brazil and Ecuador, initially oer short-term permits but allow
migrants to access long-term residency after their regularization permit expires. In other cases, programs
only grant regular status for a matter of months or years, and there is little or no chance of transitioning
to a more permanent status. Peru’s Temporary Permit of Permanence Card (CPP), for example, only grants
temporary authorization for two years. This can result in migrants falling in and out of regular status, as most
migrants stay even after their temporary status has expired.
The region’s widespread adoption of short-term regularization measures has often resulted in bureaucratic
backlogs for governments, as well as increased obstacles for migrants’ long-term integration. As evidence
suggests that migrants become more productive the longer they spend in a country or in a particular
job, requiring migrants to leave—or allowing them to fall into irregular status—cuts into the potential
economic benets that regularization can oer.
41
At the same time, there is evidence that Venezuelans who
were not regularized at all were pushed further to informal or sometimes illegal activities.
42
Such ndings
suggest that if maximizing migrants’ labor market performance and contributions is a core policy goal, it
is important to design regularization measures in a way that makes them accessible to a broad slice of the
target population and that connects them up to longer-term residence opportunities.
43
38 María José Veiga, Revisión de los marcos normativos de Argentina, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, Chile, Perú y Uruguay: contexto del
pacto mundial para una migración segura, ordenada y regular (Buenos Aires: IOM, 2021).
39 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Nuevo CPP: Permiso Temporal de Permanencia,” accessed October 11,
2022.
40 Government of Ecuador, “Pregunta Frecuentes” (information sheet, 2022).
41 Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz, Observations on Regularization, 11–12.
42 World Bank, Migración desde Venezuela a Colombia; World Bank, An Opportunity for All; World Bank, Retos y oportunidades.
43 Soledad Álvarez Velasco, Manuel Bayón Jiménez, Francisco Hurtado Caicedo, and Lucía Pérez Martínez, Viviendo al límite: migrantes
irregularizados en Ecuador (Quito: Colectivo de Geografía Crítica de Ecuador, GIZ and Red Clamor, 2021).
Regularization mechanisms that grant
a pathway to permanent residence and
work permits, as is the case in Colombia,
are the most generous and provide the
most support for migrants’ longer-term
integration and related development goals.
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A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION
TABLE 2
Past and Present Regularization Mechanisms in Quito Process Member States
Country Regularization Mechanism
Year
Enacted
Requirements
Proof of
Formal
Employment
Entry
before
Cuto Date
Regular
Entry
Family
Ties
Applicant
Nationality
Argentina Temporary Mercosur Residency 2010 No No Yes No Yes
Permanent Mercosur Residency 2010 No No Yes Yes* Yes
Brazil** Normative Resolution CNIg No.
126/2017
2017 No No No No No
Decree No. 9.199/2017 2017 No No No No No
Interministerial Ordinance No.
9/2018
2018 No No No No Yes
Interministerial Ordinance No.
670/2022
2022 No Yes No No Yes
Ordinance No. 28/2022 2022 No Yes No No No
Chile Migratory Regularization Process 2018 No No No No No
Migratory Regularization Process 2021 No Yes Yes No No
Colombia Special Permit to Stay (PEP) 2020 No Yes Yes No Yes
Special Permit to Stay for the
Promotion of Formalization (PEPFF)
2020 Yes No No No Yes
Temporary Statute of Protection for
Venezuelan Migrants (TSPV)
2021 No Yes No No Yes
Costa
Rica**
Special Temporary Complementary
Protection Category
2020 No Yes No No Yes
Special Category for Temporary
Workers (CETTSA)
2020 Yes Yes No Yes No
Dominican
Republic
Resolution 00119-2021 2021 No Yes Yes No Yes
Ecuador Visa UNASUR 2017 No No Yes No Yes
Visa of Exception for Humanitarian
Reasons (VERHU)
2019 No Yes Yes No Yes
Exceptional Temporary Residence
Visa (VIRTE)
2022 No Yes Yes No Yes
Guyana Registration certicates 2019 No No Yes No No
Mexico** Regularization for Having an
Expired Document or Carrying out
Unauthorized Activities
2011 No No Yes No No
Regularization for Humanitarian
Reasons
2011 No No No No No
Regularization by Family
Relationship
2011 No No No Yes No
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Panama Executive Decree No. 235 2021 No No No Yes Yes
Paraguay Temporary Residence 2008 No No Yes No Yes
Peru Temporary Residence Permit (PTP) 2017 No Yes Yes No Yes
Special Resident Migratory Status 2018 No No Yes No Yes
Temporary Permit of Permanence
Card (CPP)
2020 No Yes No No No
Humanitarian Migratory Status 2021 No Yes No No Yes
Uruguay Visa Mercosur (Temporary or
permanent)
2014 No No Yes No Yes
* When applying through a relative, based on their status.
** In these three countries (Brazil, Mexico, and to a lesser extent, Costa Rica), asylum systems have been widely utilized to provide regular status and
protection to many Venezuelans. Among these countries, Brazil and Mexico have reported exceptionally high recognition rates. This is due to their
decision to apply the Cartagena Declaration’s broader denition of who is a refugee when processing asylum requests from Venezuelan nationals.
Sources: For Argentina, Ministry of the Interior, “Tramitar residencia temporaria -radicaciones Mercosur,” accessed May 10, 2023; Ministry of the
Interior, “Radicaciones Mercosur - Residencia Permanente,” accessed May 10, 2023. For Brazil, Government of Brazil, Resolução Normativa CNIg
N
o
126 (March 3, 2017); Government of Brazil, Portaria Interministerial N
o
9 (March 14, 2018); Government of Brazil, Resolução Normativa N
o
29
(October 29, 2019); Government of Brazil, Portaria Interministerial N
o
670 (April 1, 2022); Government of Brazil, Portaria N
o
28 (March 11, 2022). For
Chile, Government of Chile, “Proceso de regularización de migrantes se inició en todo Chile,” updated April 23, 2018; Chile Atiende, “Regularización
Migratoria 2021” (information sheet, November 4, 2021); Ministry of Foreign Aairs of Chile, “Visa de responsabilidad democrática continúa apoyando
a miles de venezolanos y venezolanas,” accessed October 6, 2022. For Colombia, Migración Colombia, Resolución 2359 de 2020 (September 29, 2020);
Migración Colombia, Resolución 289 de 2020 (January 30, 2020); Centro de Estudios Regulatorios, “MinRelaciones Exteriores, Decreto 216 de 2021,”
accessed May 10, 2023; Government of Colombia, “Migrantes venezolanos podrán tramitar su permiso especial de permanencia (PEP) de manera
gratuita,” updated January 31, 2020; Grupo Interagencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos (GIFMM) and R4V, “Preguntas y respuestas: Estatuto temporal
de protección para venezolanos” (information sheet, 2021); Ministry of Labor, “Permiso especial de permanencia para el fomento de la formalización-
PEPFF,” accessed October 4, 2022. For Costa Rica, Lexology, “Costa Rica: Régimen excepcional para la regularización migratoria de trabajadores del
sector agropecuario, agroexportador o agroindustrial,” accessed July 19, 2023; Diego Chaves-González and María Jesús Mora, The State of Costa Rican
Migration and Immigrant Integration Policy (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2021); Government of Costa Rica, Decreto N° 42406-MAG-
MGP (June 23, 2022). For the Dominican Republic, Government of the Dominican Republic, Resolución 00119-2021 (January 19, 2019). For Ecuador,
Government of Ecuador, “Emisión de visa temporal Unasur” (information sheet, 2017); Government of Ecuador, “Manual de proceso para el usuario
de consulado virtual - proceso de aplicación de visas de excepción por razones humanitarias” (information sheet, 2019); Venezuela en Ecuador,
“Preguntas Frecuentes,” accessed May 10, 2013. For Guyana, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Guyana es pionera en el uso
de tecnología de avanzada para ayudar a los venezolanos,” accessed October 13, 2022. For Mexico, National Institute of Migration, “Regularización
por tener documento vencido o realizar actividades no autorizadas,” accessed May 10, 2023; Info Digna, “¿Sabías que puedes regularizar tu situación
migratoria en México?,” updated May 2022; Government of Mexico, “Regularization for Humanitarian Reasons” (information sheet, November 8, 2012);
Government of Mexico, “Regularization by Family Relationship” (Information sheet, November 8, 2012). For Panama, Government of Panama, Decreto
Ejecutivo No. 235 (September 15, 2021); Chen Lee & Asociados, “Regularización migratoria en Panamá,” accessed October 13, 2022. For Paraguay, Ley
Nº 3565 / Aprueba El Acuerdo Sobre Residencia Para Nacionales De Los Estados Partes Del Mercosur (July 17, 2013); Government of Paraguay, “Radicación
temporaria para venezolanos,” accessed October 12, 2022. For Peru, Government of Peru, Decreto Supremo N°002-2017-IN (January 3, 2017);
Government of Peru, Resolución de Superintendencia N° 043 (January 30, 2018); UNHCR, “Nuevo CPP: Permiso Temporal de Permanencia,” accessed
October 11, 2022; Government of Peru, Resolución Ministerial (June 16, 2021). For Uruguay, Venezolanos en Uruguay, “Residencia permanente
Mercosur en Uruguay,” updated September 6, 2021.
TABLE 2 (cont.)
Past and Present Regularization Mechanisms in Quito Process Member States
Country Regularization Mechanism
Year
Enacted
Requirements
Proof of
Formal
Employment
Entry
before
Cuto Date
Regular
Entry
Family
Ties
Applicant
Nationality
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3 Venezuelans’ Regularization and Labor Market
Integration in Colombia
Colombia’s most recent regularization initiative, known as the Temporary Statute of Protection for
Venezuelan Migrants (TSPV), was launched in 2021. It oers status that lasts for ten years and has been
widely praised for its comprehensive, long-term strategy to fully integrate an estimated 2.4 million
Venezuelan migrants in Colombia.
44
As such, the initiative is the largest and most-studied regularization
mechanism among those created by Quito Process Member States.
The TSPV applies to Venezuelans in several migratory situations. First, it extends the status of migrants who
had already regularized through the Special Permit to Stay (PEP). It also grants regular status to migrants in
the process of applying for a visa. Migrants with irregular status who can prove that they entered Colombia
before January 31, 2021, can also apply for TSPV. Lastly, any Venezuelan who entered the country regularly
before May 28, 2023, is eligible to apply.
45
In addition to promoting regularization, the decree that
created TSPV (Decree 216 of 2021) had the stated aim of
promoting employers’ hiring of Venezuelans to reduce
their high levels of informality compared to the local
population.
46
While 46.8 percent of labor in Colombia
overall was informal in 2021,
47
the rate of informality for
Venezuelans was much higher, between 71.9
48
and 89.6
percent.
49
This particular component of the TSPV followed previous attempts to tackle labor informality through a
specic work permit called the Special Permit to Stay for the Promotion of Formalization (PEPFF). The aim
was to provide companies with the tools to formally hire Venezuelans by enabling them to request this
permit from the Colombian Ministry of Labor.
The TSPV stipulates that, to work formally in Colombia, Venezuelans must be regularized and meet the same
professional requirements as Colombian nationals. Any title a Venezuelan migrant obtained abroad needs to
undergo a process of validation, and the worker must receive all the relevant provisional permits or licenses,
registration, professional cards, or proof of experience from the responsible professional associations or
authorities. Correspondingly, employers have a list of obligations they must follow when hiring Venezuelans.
44 As of August 2023, a total of 2,484,241 Venezuelans had been registered, but only 1,805,786 had received the permit. See
Migración Colombia, “ETPV,” accessed September 8, 2023.
45 Government of Colombia, “Abecé del Estatuto Temporal de Protección para migrantes venezolanos” (information sheet, March 5,
2021).
46 Government of Colombia, Decreto 216 (March 1, 2021).
47 Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), “Medición de empleo informal y seguridad social: trimestre
octubre - diciembre 2021” (technical bulletin, 2022).
48 Colombian National Planning Department (DNP), Informe nacional de caracterización de población migrante de Venezuela (Bogotá:
DNP, 2022).
49 R4V, “Mercado Laboral de los refugiados y migrantes provenientes de Venezuela,” accessed May 10, 2023. The authors used
Information on that site that is based on DANE, “Boletín Técnico Gran Encueta Nacional Integrada de Hogares” (survey data,
October 2021). These data measure social security coverage.
While 46.8 percent of labor in
Colombia overall was informal in
2021, the rate of informality for
Venezuelans was much higher,
between 71.9 and 89.6 percent.
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One such requirement is that employers must register foreign workers in a platform created by the Ministry
of Labor, called the Single Registry of Foreign Workers in Colombia (RUTEC). This online registration system
informs the ministry of the location and economic sector in which hired foreigners are working, with the
purpose of enabling the ministry to supervise their working conditions. Similarly, Migración Colombia has
developed the Report of Foreigners Information System (SIRE) to promote compliance with national labor
regulations.
Much of the ocial government information about Venezuelan migrants in Colombia comes from three
institutions observing the integration process of regularized migrants: the National Planning Department
(DNP)’s National Migration Observatory,
50
the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE),
51
and Migración Colombia. Each has collected data characterizing the migrant population in order to build
understanding of migrants’ living conditions and help design better, more evidence-informed policies.
Although these institutions do not have indicators that track migrants’ labor market experiences at dierent
points of the migration and integration process, their datasets do oer an overview of a population
about which it is notoriously dicult to collect reliable information. For instance, Migración Colombia’s
Characterization Survey 2021–22 collected various types of information about TSPV holders, but it did
not ask certain questions that would have shed light on how their integration was progressing (e.g., what
specic sectors they were working in). Thus, while the survey oers valuable insights into the skills these
migrants bring to the Colombian economy, the data cannot be used to gauge whether they have been able
to nd jobs that make use of those skills.
This section of the report examines these and other sources of data on both the regularized and
unregularized population, as well as on Venezuelan workers in general.
52
Based on analysis of the available
evidence on Colombia’s PEP and TSPV regularization programs, it highlights key ndings about the
programs’ impacts on the labor market outcomes of Venezuelans.
Finding 1: Venezuelans who have lived in the country for ve years or longer have a higher
employment rate than more recent arrivals, but informality among migrant workers remains
widespread.
Venezuelan migrants have generally reported lower rates of formal employment than the overall Colombian
population. However, unemployment rates for migrants in Colombia (the majority of whom are Venezuelan)
dropped in 2021 and 2022, a similar trend to that of the local population.
53
50 This is a tool of the national government to organize, analyze, and socialize information about Venezuelan migration with a
territorial approach. It is used for making decisions about and designing adequate responses to migrant needs for assistance and
integration support. See DNP, “Observatorio de migración desde Venezuela - OMV,” accessed October 6, 2022.
51 It is important to note that the analysis and data provided by DANE incorporate Colombian returnees, in addition to Venezuelan
migrants, within their gures and indicators.
52 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), Entendiendo La Mirada Empresarial Frente al Fenómeno
Migratorio En Colombia (Bogotá: KAS and FIP, 2021); ILO, IOM, and UNHCR, Estudio de mercado laboral con foco en la población
refugiada y migrante venezolana y colombianos retornados en las ciudades de Riohacha, Bucaramanga, Cali, Cúcuta, Bogotá,
Barranquilla y Medellín (Bogotá: ILO, IOM, and UNHCR, 2022); Ana María Ibáñez et al., Salir de la sombra: cómo un programa de
regularización mejoró la vida de los migrantes venezolanos en Colombia (Bogotá: Inter-American Development Bank, 2022).
53 DANE, Mercado Laboral. Principales Resultados (Bogotá: DANE, 2022).
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Data suggest that Venezuelans’ employment prospects are closely tied to how long they have been in the
country. The unemployment rate for migrants who arrived at least ve years ago is very similar to the rate
for Colombians, but unemployment is much higher among Venezuelans who arrived in the country less
than a year ago (see Table 3).
According to migrants and employers who participated in this study’s focus groups and interviews,
54
this
could be partly due to the fact that migrants who have lived in Colombia for longer are more likely to have
beneted from one of the regularization permits, which facilitated access to work.
55
Moreover, having spent
a longer time in the country has allowed them to establish support networks that can open up employment
opportunities. Some focus group participants also suggested that the economic recovery after the initial
pandemic-induced shock could have contributed to the increase in employment rates in 2021 and 2022.
TABLE 3
Unemployment Rates for Nationals vs. Immigrants in Colombia, 2021–22
Year
Nationals’
Unemployment Rate
Migrants
Years in Colombia Unemployment Rate
2021 11.1%
Less than 1 25.8%
More than 5 13.7%
2022 10.3%
Less than 1 19.8%
More than 5 11.2%
Sources: DANE, Mercado Laboral. Principales Resultados (Bogotá: DANE, 2022); DANE, “Principales indicadores del mercado laboral
diciembre de 2021” (technical bulletin, January 31, 2022).
With the TSPV, Colombia has also managed to register a signicant number of Venezuelan migrants with
social services such as the General Social Security Health System (SGSSS) and skills certication processes.
Data from June 2019 indicate that most Venezuelans registered with SGSSS were aliated with the
contributory system, under which individuals with nancial capacity or employers directly pay, while 36
percent were able to access subsidized health care due to their nancial vulnerability. Interestingly, by 2022,
many more migrants had been registered, and 68 percent were aliated with the subsidized system.
56
This
suggests that many migrants in Colombia work in informal, precarious situations. Thus, while regularization
eorts may be opening some opportunities (e.g., to access public services), they are not necessarily leading
to direct access to better jobs in the formal sector. And since the country has taken expansive steps to
regularize Venezuelan migrants,
57
those who remain irregular or are still waiting for their regularization IDs
to be issued may nd fewer assistance measures targeted to them (e.g., support nding a job or certifying
their labor competencies).
54 Participant comments during an MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 22,
2022; authors’ interviews with private-sector representatives, July and September 2022.
55 Participant comments during MPI focus groups with Venezuelan migrants, employers, and civil society, December 2022.
56 DNP, “Personas venezolanas con documento PEP y PPT aliadas al Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud (SGSSS) –
Aliados totales por cada mes del año” (dataset, 2022).
57 Authors’ interview with a representative of the Colombian Border Manager’s Oce, August 2022.
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A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION A WINDING PATH TO INTEGRATION
Finding 2: Venezuelans’ salaries vary widely, and they oen receive fewer labor benets in
comparison to their Colombian counterparts.
There are notable gaps in the labor conditions for and benets received by Colombia’s native-born and
migrant workers. Venezuelans in Colombia, for example, are more likely than Colombians to have a verbal
contract with their employer (rather than a formalized, written one), pay less in pension contributions,
and receive less income for the same jobs.
58
Moreover, Venezuelans work many more hours on average
than other workers in the country, likely resulting in lower hourly pay rates compared to their Colombian
counterparts.
However, there are signicant dierences in Venezuelans’ earnings depending on how long they have lived
in Colombia (see Table 4). The average income of Venezuelans who have been in the country for more than
ve years is higher than that of other workers (most of whom are Colombian, though the data also include
a small number of other migrants). Their income is also considerably higher than that of Venezuelans who
have been in the country for less time. A 2022 study from the Colombian research organization Dejusticia
estimated that Venezuelans who have lived in Colombia for more than ve years earn around USD 540 per
month; Venezuelans who have resided in Colombia for between one and ve years earn approximately USD
213; and those who have lived in the country for less than a year earn around USD 153.
59
TABLE 4
Labor Conditions and Income for Workers in Colombia, by Nativity and Length of Residence, 2022
Persons
not Born in
Venezuela*
Venezuelans in
Colombia for 5+
Years
Venezuelans in
Colombia for 1–5
Years
Venezuelans in
Colombia for Less
than 1 Year
% of Workers with Verbal
Contracts
35% 52% 81% 91%
% of Workers Contributing to
Pension Fund
40% 29% 10% 1%
% of Workers with a
Severance Payment
60% 37% 21% 11%
Average Income USD 313 USD 540 USD 213 USD 153
* The vast majority of non-Venezuelans in the data presented here are Colombian, though a very small minority are immigrants from
other countries. Still, these data can be used broadly to compare trends for Venezuelan vs. Colombian workers.
Note: The authors converted income gures from Colombian pesos to U.S. dollars, using the ocial exchange rate on July 31, 2021
(USD 1.00 = COP 4300.3).
Sources: Cristina Escobar Correa, Diego Escallón Arango, and Laura Cifuentes Rosales, Análisis de la garantía de derechos a La educación,
salud e inclusión laboral de la población migrante de Venezuela en Colombia (Bogotá: Danish Refugee Council, 2021); Lucía Ramírez
Bolívar, Lina Arroyave Velásquez, and Jessica Corredor Villamil, Ser migrante y trabajar en Colombia: ¿Cómo va la inclusión laboral de las
personas provenientes de Venezuela? (Bogotá: Dejusticia, 2022).
58 Cristina Escobar Correa, Diego Escallón Arango, and Laura Cifuentes Rosales, Análisis de la garantía de derechos a La educación,
salud e inclusión laboral de la población migrante de Venezuela en Colombia (Bogotá: Danish Refugee Council, 2021).
59 Lucía Ramírez Bolívar, Lina Arroyave Velásquez, and Jessica Corredor Villamil, Ser migrante y trabajar en Colombia: ¿Cómo va la
inclusión laboral de las personas provenientes de Venezuela? (Bogotá: Dejusticia, 2022).
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It is likely that multiple factors contribute to these income dierences among Venezuelans. Firstly, as
Venezuelans stay in the country longer and develop deeper roots, they tend to earn more. Additionally,
evidence suggests that Venezuelans who arrived in Colombia more than ve years ago had higher levels
of education than more recent newcomers, likely helping many to nd employment in professional
occupations before migration levels began to increase sharply.
60
However, the rise in Venezuelan workers’
wages over time also coincided with Colombia’s various eorts to regularize the migratory status of
Venezuelans, suggesting that regularization could play a role in increasing pay. One notable example is
the PEP RAMV (Special Permanence Permit for Venezuelan Migrants) that was implemented in 2018 to
regularize approximately half a million Venezuelan irregular migrants. A study conducted by the Inter-
American Development Bank in 2022 revealed that PEP RAMV holders had a monthly income ranging
from 1 percent to 31 percent higher than that of irregular migrants, highlighting the positive impact of
regularization on their economic well-being.
61
Finding 3: Venezuelans represent an important human capital asset for Colombia, and one
that regularization could help the country more fully leverage.
Venezuelans in Colombia are a highly educated population, even though more recent arrivals have a lower
average education level than Venezuelan migrants who arrived before them. In 2016, almost 45 percent of
the 6,356 Venezuelans who registered with the Public Employment Service (SPE) had a tertiary education
degree,
62
compared to less than 20 percent of the 18,371 who registered in 2021.
63
Still, Venezuelans’ level
of education in both periods exceeded that of the Colombian population in those same years (11 percent in
2016
64
and 16 percent in 2021
65
).
The dierences within the Venezuelan population likely reect shifting migration patterns. While
Venezuelans who arrived in earlier periods were mostly educated professionals seeking high-skilled labor
opportunities, since 2018, Colombia has received many more Venezuelans with lower socioeconomic
and education levels who have been forced to ee the severe political and economic crises in Venezuela.
Similarly, Venezuelans who overstayed their permits after entering Colombia with a passport (a more
common situation among earlier cohorts of arrivals) generally have higher levels of education than those
who entered through irregular border crossings.
Even with this variation in the educational characteristics of the Venezuelan migrant population, evidence
suggests that regularization could encourage more Venezuelans to seek educational opportunities. While
school enrollment does not necessarily require a regular immigration status, it becomes necessary for
progressing from one level to another and for enrolling in a university. From 2018 to 2021, the number of
60 Andrew Selee and Jessica Bolter, An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan
Migration (Washington, DC: MPI, 2020).
61 Ibáñez et al., Salir de la sombra.
62 DNP, “Personas venezolanas registradas en el Servicio Público de Empleo - Nivel educativo de las personas registradas en el SPE
2016” (dataset, 2022).
63 DNP, “Personas venezolanas registradas en el Servicio Público de Empleo - Nivel educativo de las personas registradas en el SPE
2021” (dataset, 2022).
64 DANE, “Fuerza laboral y educación 2016” (technical bulletin, March 24, 2017).
65 DANE, “Fuerza laboral y educación 2021” (technical bulletin, September 9, 2022).
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Venezuelan students in primary and secondary schools increased considerably, from 34,030 to 496,027.
66
Tertiary education enrollment also grew, from 1,470 in 2018
67
to 6,796 in 2021.
68
Although it is dicult to
attribute this growth solely to regularization, more Venezuelan migrants progressed toward a secondary
school degree in Colombia during the implementation of PEP and TSPV. This suggests that regularization
measures can have a positive impact on Venezuelans’ educational advancement, motivating more migrants
to pursue higher levels of education and thus beneting both their own personal development and the
development of the society in which they live.
Regularization has also helped reduce barriers to
Venezuelans’ participation in vocational training
programs. As Table 5 shows, data from the National
Planning Department show that from 2017 to 2021,
a total of 127,038 Venezuelans were enrolled with
the National Training Service (SENA), which oers
educational courses aimed at strengthening the
Colombian labor force. Because one of the enrollment
requirements is having a valid identication
document, it is likely that most of the Venezuelans
enrolled in these courses were regularized.
During this study’s focus groups,
69
Venezuelan
migrants mentioned dierent human capital and
wage dynamics before and after regularization.
Before regularization, Venezuelans on either end of
the education/skills spectrum reportedly had more similar economic outcomes. Those with high levels of
education often struggled to nd jobs in their eld and had to take jobs that were relatively unattractive to
nationals. The labor market situation for Venezuelans with the lowest education and skill levels was similar,
although because of their more limited skills, they often earned even less.
After regularization, however, Venezuelan workers’ labor market outcomes were reportedly more
dierentiated by education level, and their human capital and income were more closely correlated. In focus
groups, migrants with higher qualication levels described having less diculty applying for formal jobs,
accessing training opportunities, and getting credentials validated after gaining regular status. These well-
educated workers also saw their incomes rise (far more than those with lower skill levels) and saw noticeable
gains for each additional degree. This suggests that regularization has had a particularly important positive
impact on the employment of highly educated Venezuelans and a less pronounced impact on those with
limited education.
66 DNP, “Matrículas de estudiantes venezolanos en instituciones de eduación preescolar, básica y media - Estudiantes matriculados
2021” (dataset, 2022).
67 DNP, “Matrículas de estudiantes venezolanos en educación superior - Número de estudiantes matriculados 2018” (dataset, 2022).
68 DNP, “Matrículas de estudiantes venezolanos en educación superior - Número de estudiantes matriculados 2021” (dataset, 2022).
69 Participant comments during an MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 22,
2022.
TABLE 5
Venezuelans Enrolled in SENA Training
Programs, 2017–21
Year
Number of
Venezuelans Enrolled
2017 15,268
2018 34,023
2019 17,731
2020 30,935
2021 29,081
Total 127,038
Source: Colombian National Planning Department, “Cupos
del SENA en formación titulada y complementaria ocupados
por población venezolana 2017-2021” (dataset, 2022).
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Building connections between data registries in the country (e.g., regularization, employment, education,
and other data systems) could make it easier to get accurate, up-to-date information about migrants’
labor market experiences and skills. This would, in turn, facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of
integration processes and support the development of targeted employment policies and programs. For
example, it could be used to create policies to meet the private sector’s demand for a professional and well-
qualied labor force and to support the integration of migrants with varied educational and professional
backgrounds, in line with the country’s mid- and long-term development goals.
Finding 4: More Venezuelans are nding work in better-paid sectors, likely in part due to
regularization, but the constant arrival of large numbers of newcomers tends to obscure this
trend in employment data.
As the number of Venezuelans in Colombia has grown, so has their presence across the Colombian
economy. Employment data indicate that, between 2017–21, Venezuelans took up work in a variety of
economic sectors, including some that yield higher average earnings. Yet, it is dicult to pinpoint the role
that regularization played in this process.
According to DNP’s Observatory,
70
in June 2018, after the rst two PEP rounds of regularizations,
Venezuelans participated in a relatively narrow span of economic activities. That month, more than half
of employed Venezuelans (57.5 percent) were working in one of three areas: 1) accommodation and
food services, 2) trade and repair of vehicles, and 3) artistic activities, entertainment, recreation, and
other services. Three years later, in June 2021, these three sectors’ share of Venezuelan employment had
decreased slightly, to 53.3 percent (see Table 6).
However, when analyzing the sectoral and occupational mobility of this population, it is important to not
focus solely on the growing or decreasing share of Venezuelan workers in one sector or another. The large
number of Venezuelan newcomers who have arrived in the country and joined its workforce each year make
it dicult to track whether Venezuelans who have been there longer and gone through the regularization
process are able to transition into better-paid jobs. In fact, between the end of the PEP era (March 2020)
and the beginning of the TSPV era (July 2022), almost 1 million additional Venezuelan migrants entered the
country.
Thus, while there was relatively little change in the distribution of Venezuelan workers across industries, this
does not tell a complete story. Looking at absolute numbers, tens of thousands of Venezuelans have been
able to nd employment in sectors with higher average incomes over the 2018–21 period, in addition to the
many who have found work in lower-paid sectors. For example, while 12,306 Venezuelan migrants worked
in professional, scientic, and technological jobs in 2018, the number had risen to 47,991 by 2021—a nearly
four-fold increase. A similar trend could be seen in the public administration and defense, education, and
human health-care sectors, where the number of Venezuelan workers more than doubled, from 8,911 in
2018 to 19,831 in 2021. The fact that more Venezuelans are nding work in such sectors is likely due at least
in part of the stronger labor market position that regular status aords, even as other factors (such as the
growth of professional networks over longer periods of residence) also play a role.
70 DNP, “Personas venezolanas registradas en el Servicio Público de Empleo - Nivel educativo de las personas registradas en el SPE
2018 –2021” (dataset, 2022).
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TABLE 6
Venezuelan Migrants Employed in Colombia, by Sector, 2018–21
Sector
Average
Income
Level*
June 2018 June 2019 June 2020 June 2021
Number % Number % Number % Number %
Total – 306,481 100% 668,741 100% 756,968 100% 1,051,674 100%
Accommodation and
food services
Low 68,168 22.2% 141,158 21.1% 156,041 20.6% 177,692 16.9%
Trade and repair of
vehicles
Low 66,050 21.6% 166,152 24.8% 175,469 23.2% 258,215 24.6%
Artistic activities,
entertainment,
recreation, and other
services
Medium
low
42,010 13.7% 88,857 13.3% 90,073 11.9% 125,662 11.8%
Manufacturing
industries
Low 37,700 12.3% 71,627 10.7% 80,536 10.6% 123,597 11.8%
Construction Low 33,212 10.8% 77,121 11.5% 83,838 11.1% 114,536 10.9%
Agriculture, livestock,
hunting, forestry, and
shing
Low 17,762 5.8% 37,157 5.6% 57,993 7.7% 79,961 7.6%
Transport and storage Low 13,864 4.5% 27,960 4.2% 38,202 5.0% 73,251 7.0%
Professional, scientic,
technical activities,
and administrative
services
High 12,306 4.0% 27,829 4.2% 32,397 4.3% 47,991 4.6%
Public administration
and defense,
education, and
human health care
High 8,911 2.9% 13,751 2.1% 19,569 2.6% 19,831 1.9%
Information and
communications
High 2,585 0.8% 6,406 1.0% 8,011 1.1% 10,082 1.0%
Financial and
insurance activities**
High 1,271 0.4% 2,211 0.3% 2,214 0.3% 2,963 0.3%
Supply of electricity,
gas, water, and waste
management**
Medium
low
1,201 0.4% 2,397 0.4% 4,733 0.6% 9,361 0.9%
Real estate** High 1,155 0.4% 4,003 0.6% 4,276 0.6% 4,012 0.4%
Exploitation of mines
and quarries**
Medium
low
286 0.1% 2,052 0.3% 3,616 0.5% 4,520 0.4%
* This column is an estimated range based on the average monthly wage for professionals. La República, “Salarios promedio de
profesionales en Colombia según Talent.com,” La República, July 9, 2022.
** These estimates are based on coecients of variation greater than 15 percent.
Source: Authors’ tabulation of data from Proyecto Migración Venezuela, “Indicadores en el mercado laboral de la población migrante
venezolana,” updated August 25, 2021.
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Finding 5: Although many Venezuelans have moved into the formal economy, others have
arrived and entered the informal economy; as a result, the rate of informality for Venezuelans
in Colombia has not changed noticeably.
Despite Colombia’s laudable eorts to help Venezuelans access formal employment, the steady arrival
of more Venezuelans who tend, at least initially, to take up informal employment has kept the rate of
informality for Venezuelans in the country roughly level. In 2021, the informality rate was 71.9 percent
for Venezuelans who held a regular status
71
and 89.6 percent for Venezuelans overall,
72
compared to the
national average of 46.8 percent.
73
For the many migrants in Colombia who are employed informally, this can often lead to precarious working
conditions, including being underpaid. In comparison, migrants who join the formal sector should, in
theory, make at least the minimum wage and have access to health and other benets. A 2019 survey by
the IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) found that about 87 percent of migrant respondents in
Colombia reported being paid less than the minimum wage
74
(compared to about 44 percent for Colombian
workers
75
). In February 2022, 77.9 percent of Venezuelans worked more than the legal working hours per
week, most of them without receiving overtime compensation.
76
Moreover, in 2022, only 42 percent of
employed Venezuelans earned more than 0.9 percent of the monthly minimum wage and 4.4 percent
earned more than double the minimum wage.
77
Naturally, dierent sectors have dierent rates of informal
employment. For instance, the domestic services sector
has particularly high levels of informality. A study of
Venezuelan domestic workers by Dejusticia showed their
lower levels of remuneration, compared to others in
the sector. For each hour worked, Venezuelan domestic
workers earned around USD 2.44 while Colombians
received on average USD 3.27.
78
Employers also tend to use verbal contracts and not aliate migrant
domestic workers with the social security system.
Data that would make it possible to compare the labor informality rates of regularized and unregularized
employed Venezuelans are scarce in Colombia. However, the Colombian government’s push to regularize
Venezuelans, improve their access to formal work, and open educational and training opportunities has
likely increased the number of Venezuelans in the formal sector even as many others remain in informal
work.
71 DNP, Informe nacional de caracterización de población migrante de Venezuela.
72 R4V, “Mercado Laboral de los refugiados y migrantes provenientes de Venezuela,” accessed May 10, 2023. The authors used
information on that site that is based on DANE, “Boletín Técnico Gran Encueta Nacional Integrada de Hogares” (survey data,
October 2021).
73 DANE, “Medición de empleo informal y seguridad social.”
74 IOM, Encuesta DTM: vocación de permanencia de población venezolana en Colombia (Bogotá: IOM, 2020).
75 Colombian Ministry of Labor, “Trabajadores que ganan menos de un salario mínimo, merecen estar en el sistema” (press release,
May 2019).
76 DANE, “Encuesta pulso social: resultado para la ronda tres (January – February 2022)” (survey presentation, April 2022).
77 Ana María Tribín-Uribe et al., Migración desde Venezuela en Colombia: caracterización del fenómeno y análisis de los efectos
macroeconómicos (Bogotá: Central Bank of Colombia, 2020).
78 Ramírez Bolívar, Arroyave Velásquez, and Corredor Villamil, Ser migrante y trabajar en Colombia, 41.
For each hour worked, Venezuelan
domestic workers earned around
USD 2.44 while Colombians
received on average USD 3.27.
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4 Venezuelans’ Regularization and Labor Market
Integration in Other Quito Process Countries
Turning to the other Member States of the Quito Process, this section considers a range of experiences with
regularization in the context of Venezuelan displacement. Although no single regularization measure in
these countries has been as large in scale or produced as robust a body of evidence as Colombia’s programs,
this analysis aims to broaden the picture of how Venezuelans’ regularization and labor market integration
are playing out across the region. In doing so, this section focuses particularly on points where Member
States’ evidence contradicts, renes, or strongly reinforces the ndings drawn from evidence on Colombia’s
PEP and TSPV. It also revisits issues for which the evidence from Colombia faced certain limitations, such as
unemployment and informal employment.
Finding 1: Regularization processes can contribute to Venezuelans’ formal labor market
inclusion, but having a regular status does not guarantee access to formal, better-paid jobs.
Although there is limited evidence to indicate that Colombia’s PEP and TSPV have (to date) aected the
formal employment rates of Venezuelans who were regularized, the gap in between Colombians’ and
Venezuelans’ unemployment rates there is relatively small compared to many other countries in the region
(see Table 7).
The size of the employment rate gaps between Venezuelans and the nationals of the other Quito Process
Member States has varied. Studies from Ecuador
79
and Brazil,
80
for instance, indicate that Venezuelans
experience considerably higher unemployment rates than nationals, while in other countries (such as
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico) the gap between nationals and migrants was smaller (see Table 7).
The variation in employment outcomes could be related to the fact that, in many countries, Venezuelans
tend to be heavily represented in sectors vulnerable to economic shocks, including the one caused by the
pandemic. For instance, a 2020 ILO study in Ecuador indicates that 27.6 percent of Venezuelan migrants with
formal jobs were working in customer service and 12.9 percent in hotels, bars, restaurants, and tourism.
81
There is also some evidence to suggest the pandemic’s eects may have been felt more acutely by irregular
than regular migrants; for example, another study in Ecuador
82
highlights the higher percentage of irregular
migrants in informal activities, services, commerce, and self-employment, while regularized migrants
worked in more professional positions.
79 R4V, Evaluación conjunta de necesidades.
80 R4V, RMRP 2022 - Plano Regional e Capítulo Brasil (Brasília: R4V, 2022); IOM, Brasil — Monitoreo de Flujo de Población Venezolana en
Roraima 6 (Brasilia: IOM, 2021).
81 ILO, Sectores económicos con potencial para la inclusión laboral de migrantes y refugiados venezolanos En Quito y Guayaquil (Quito:
ILO Oce for the Andean Countries, 2020).
82 Álvarez Velasco, Bayón Jiménez, Hurtado Caicedo, and Pérez Martínez, Viviendo al Límite.
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TABLE 7
Unemployment Rates for Venezuelans and Nationals in Quito Process Member States, Multiple Years*
Country Nationals
Venezuelans Dierence
Lower
Estimate
Upper
Estimate
Lower
Estimate
Upper
Estimate
Argentina 9.8% 15% - 5.2% -
Brazil 9% 19.0% - 10.0% -
Chile 9.4% 12.5% - 3.1% -
Colombia** 10.3% 11.2% 19.8% 0.8% 9.5%
Costa Rica*** 11.8% 10.7% - -1.1% -
Dominican Republic 5.2% 13.1% - 7.9% -
Ecuador 5.0% 19.4% 38.5% 14.4% 33.5%
Mexico 4.3% 53.0% - 48.7% -
Panama 4.9% 3.0% - -1.9% -
Paraguay 8.1% 33.0% - 24.9% -
Peru 5.7% 2.0% - -3.7% -
Uruguay 9.5% 19.0% - 9.5% -
* This table presents the latest data available for each country. The data for most countries are from 2021, with the exception of Chile
(2022), Costa Rica (2022), the Dominican Republic (2022), Mexico (2022), Peru (2022), Argentina (2020), and Panama (2018).
** The upper estimate for Venezuelan migrants in Colombia corresponds to those who have been in Colombia for less than 12 months,
while the lower estimate represents those who have been in the country for more than a year.
*** For Costa Rica, data on the unemployment rate for Venezuelans were not available, so this table shows the rate for migrants of all
nationalities.
Note: Comparable data for Guyana were not available.
Sources: ILO, Panorama Laboral 2021. América Latina y el Caribe (Lima: ILO, 2021); DANE, Mercado Laboral. Principales Resultados;
Migraciones Chile and World Bank, Encuesta Nacional de Migración 2022: Presentación de resultados (Santiago: World Bank, 2022); INEC
Costa Rica, “IV Trimestre 2022 Costa Rica: Características de la población nacida en otro país” (dataset, February 2023); IOM, Situación de
la población refugiada y migrante de venezuela en Panamá (Panama City: IOM, 2019); R4V, Evaluación conjunta de necesidades: informe
de resultados de Ecuador-mayo 2022 (Quito: R4V, 2022); Peruvian Ministry of Labor and Labor Promotion, Anual Employment Report
2021 (Lima: Ministry of Labor and Labor Promotion, 2022); INEI Peru, Condiciones de Vida de la Población Venezolana que reside en el
Perú (Lima: INEI Peru, 2022); INEC Panama, “Estadisticas del Trabajo: Encuesta del mercado laboral, agosto 2019,” updated 2021; ILO,
“COVID – 19 y el mundo del trabajo: punto de partida, respuesta y desafíos en República Dominicana” (issue brief, 2020); R4V, Refugee
and Migrant Needs Analysis (RMNA) 2022 (N.p.: R4V, 2022); R4V, Needs Assessment for the Southern Cone RMRP 2022 (N.p.: R4V, 2022);
Trading Economics, “República Dominicana – Tasa de desempleo,” updated 2022; David Licheri et al., Impacto económico de la migración
venezolana en República Dominicana: Realidad vs. Potencial (N.p.: IOM, Suecia Sverige, CADOVEN, CAVEX, and Equilibrium SDC, 2022).
The role of regularization, albeit an important policy mechanism to promote employment, is complex in
many countries. In countries such as Peru and Ecuador, where informality is extremely widespread, irregular
migrants do not appear to face obstacles to employment that are quite as large as in Argentina or Chile.
Irregular status does act as a barrier to formal employment in Ecuador and Peru, but less so for semi-skilled
workers seeking employment in the informal economy. In these two countries, estimates of the informal
employment rates of Venezuelans typically are higher than the national average. In Peru,
83
for example,
83 INEI Peru, Condiciones de Vida de la Población Venezolana; Plan International, Estudio de georreferenciación y caracterización de
la población venezolana en situación de movilidad humana y población receptora en Ecuador y Perú (Hamburg: Plan International,
2021).
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estimates suggest that between 80.8 percent and 90.8 percent of Venezuelans worked informally in 2021
versus 76.8 percent of Peruvian nationals.
84
Similarly, in Ecuador, the rates were around 70.6 percent for
Venezuelans versus 19.4 percent for nationals in 2021.
85
In Chile, where the hiring of irregular migrants is
not only illegal but also subject to strict enforcement by authorities, the level of labor formality among
migrants, including Venezuelans, is similar to that of the national population.
86
The employment experiences of Venezuelan migrants with and without regular status described during
this study’s focus groups in Peru and Ecuador
87
suggest that, in some cases, after the initial arrival period,
irregular migrants may nd it easier to secure a job than those who hold regular status and are actively
seeking formal employment.
88
This is likely due at least in part to the fact that employers who hire workers
informally can pay lower wages and do not have to contribute to social security. Venezuelans seeking jobs
in the formal sector may also face some barriers unique to formal employment. In countries such as the
Dominican Republic
89
and Chile
90
that have legal caps on the share of a company’s employees who can
be foreign workers (20 percent and 15 percent, respectively), these legal restrictions can limit employers’
capacity to hire migrant workers, even if they have a regular status. In Peru,
91
there is a legal limit on both
the share of a company’s employees who can be foreign workers (maximum 20 percent) and the share of
its payroll that can go to migrants (30 percent). In other cases, employers are unaware of regularization
processes and whether they are allowed to hire migrants into formal positions, likely discouraging some
from doing so.
The eligibility criteria for regularization mechanisms and the nature of the status provided can also aect
employment dynamics. In Ecuador, many Venezuelans have not applied for regularization because they
do not meet the necessary requirements, or cannot prove that they do (such as when they cannot provide
documentation showing their entry date into the country).
92
This unregularized population includes 30
percent of Venezuelans with a tertiary education, meaning Ecuadorian employers and communities are
not fully benetting from their skills.
93
In Peru, many Venezuelan migrants who were able to regularize
their status have fallen back into irregularity after their permits expired. One migrant worker interviewed
in the country
94
attributed this to a communication error on the part of the government. At the time of
regularization, Venezuelans were given a foreigner card valid for four years, but their permits were recorded
84 INEI Peru, Producción y Empleo Informal en el Perú: Cuenta Satélite de la Economía Informal 2017-2021 (Lima: INEI Peru, 2022).
85 Plan International, Estudio de georreferenciación.
86 Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE), “Tasa de ocupación informal descendió interanualmente y llegó a 27,4% en el trimestre
octubre-diciembre de 2022,” updated February 2, 2023; INE Chile, “Boletín Estadístico: Empleo Población Extranjera” (bulletin no.
15, February 1, 2023); Migraciones Chile and World Bank, Encuesta Nacional de Migración 2022.
87 Participant comments during MPI online focus groups with Venezuelan migrants and representatives of integration-focused
organizations in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 18 and 22, 2022.
88 Participant comments during an MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 22,
2022.
89 Government of the Dominican Republic, Law 16-92, article 135, Code of Employment (August 2007).
90 Government of Chile, Código del trabajo, articulo 19 - DT - Normativa 3.0 (January 16, 2023).
91 Government of Peru, Legislative Decree N° 689 (November 1991).
92 Participant comments during MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrant women in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 23,
2022; authors’ interview with a representative of a local organization representing Venezuelans in Ecuador, August 18, 2022.
93 ILO, “En Ecuador trabajadores independientes e informales se capacitan con metodología empresarial de OIT para recuperar sus
medios de vida,” updated April 16, 2021.
94 Authors’ interview with a Venezuelan migrant in Peru, August 2022.
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in the ocial database as being valid only for one year, thus requiring annual renewal. To regain their
regular status, Venezuelans must pay a steep penalty of USD 1.20 per day the permit has been expired.
It is important to note, however, that Venezuelan (and other) workers who are not recorded in ocial
statistics as employed are not necessarily unemployed. Venezuelan irregular migrants may be unable to
demonstrate their employment if they are employed in precarious or short-term positions, as day laborers,
self-employed, or simply have an employer who is unwilling to formalize their employment.
95
What is clear is that Venezuelan workers often face a range of barriers that extend beyond regular status.
The challenges of getting foreign-earned credentials recognized present obstacles to well-educated
migrants’ labor integration across Quito Process Member States (see Finding 2 below for more on issues
with credential recognition).
96
For migrants with fewer skills and/or facing language barriers (e.g., speakers
of Indigenous languages), having a regular status and work
authorization may not be enough to guarantee formal
employment. This is particularly likely to be the case in
countries that have a heavy tax load on low-earning workers,
higher minimum wages, and/or rigid hiring rules—costs to
employers that can disincentivize the hiring of migrants.
97
When this is the case, only migrants who have a regular
status, in-demand skills, and validated titles and credentials (a small minority of Venezuelans in most
countries) are likely to be able to secure formal employment. Data from some countries in the region
support this argument: in Chile, the average earnings of employed Venezuelan migrants are approximately
1.2 percent higher than those of native workers (likely in part due to their higher average education levels),
98
and this ratio holds even after migrants have been in the country for longer periods of time. This nding
suggests that migrants who successfully enter the Chilean formal labor market are qualied enough to have
competitive salaries.
Other factors that hinder Venezuelans’ integration into the labor market include gender inequality and
discrimination. While Venezuelans’ unemployment rates are higher than those of receiving-country
nationals in most parts of the region, this situation is particularly critical for women. A needs analysis
published in 2022 by the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from
Venezuela found that Venezuelan women are disproportionately aected by unemployment and labor
95 This dynamic has been noted in other contexts as well; see Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz, Observations on
Regularization, 24.
96 Universidad del Rosario and KAS, Retos y oportunidades de movilidad humana venezolana en la construcción de una política
migratoria colombiana (Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario and KAS, 2018); World Bank, Retos y oportunidades; Equilibrium Cende,
“Encuesta regional a población migrante y refugiada venezolana” (survey results, 2021); David Licheri et al., Impacto económico
de la migración venezolana en República Dominicana: Realidad vs. Potencial (N.p.: IOM, Suecia Sverige, CADOVEN, CAVEX, and
Equilibrium SDC, 2022).
97 Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz, Observations on Regularization, 24.
98 Ex-Ante, “Migración y xenofobia: cómo viven los más de 500 mil venezolanos que han llegado a Chile,” updated September 27,
2021.
What is clear is that Venezuelan
workers often face a range of
barriers that extend beyond
regular status.
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informality.
99
Studies in Peru,
100
Argentina,
101
Chile,
102
Ecuador,
103
and Colombia
104
similarly show women
having greater diculties nding a job. Anti-immigrant discrimination can also limit Venezuelans’ ability to
join the formal labor market, even with a regular status. This is a growing concern because, as Venezuelan
migration levels have risen, so too has xenophobia and anxieties about migration’s impacts on receiving
communities.
105
The sum of these experiences suggests that regularization mechanisms can be one important tool for
improving Venezuelans’ labor market prospects and reducing unemployment, while introducing them to
the social security system and enabling them to pay taxes. However, some regularization mechanisms have
only given Venezuelans limited or partial access to social services and support, which tends to end when
a regularization permit expires, and the short-term nature of their status can make it dicult to take steps
toward longer-term economic integration and advancement. Increased engagement between governments
and the private sector could help address sector-specic challenges (e.g., around credentialling), improve
employer understanding of which migrants are eligible for formal employment, and establish common
goals, thus strengthening Venezuelans’ formal employment prospects.
Finding 2: Venezuelans have brought signicant human capital to countries across the
region, but many struggle to fully apply their skills and it is frequently unclear whether
regularization will help them do so.
Among the more positive ndings from studies and data across Quito Process Member States is that
regularization increases the correlation between migrants’ skill/education levels and their labor market
success. Some studies have also pointed out that irregular status holds back even the most qualied
Venezuelans.
106
This is particularly noteworthy given Venezuelans in many countries have relatively high
levels of education—human capital assets that could benet receiving countries, if they can support
Venezuelans in accessing work in the professions for which they have been trained.
However, as the previous section notes, diculties getting credentials recognized and other obstacles
can keep migrants from fully applying their skills in a new country, even if they have regular status.
Venezuelans have often found that degrees earned in their home country are discounted—if not outright
ignored—in other countries in the region. Among the main diculties are the cost of many credential
validation processes, lack of awareness or understanding of the process, and dicult-to-meet bureaucratic
requirements (e.g., to provide apostilled or duly legalized academic documents). As a result, only a small
percentage of Venezuelans who hold a university degree have had it validated in their countries of
99 R4V, Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis (RMNA) 2022 (N.p.: R4V, 2022).
100 José Koechlin, Ximena Solórzano, Giovanna Larco, and Enrique Fernándex-Maldonado, Impacto de la inmigración venezolana en
el mercado laboral de tres ciudades: Lima, Arequipa y Piura (Lima: IOM, Peruvian Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion,
Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, ILO, 2019).
101 R4V, Diagnóstico sobre la situación de los derechos humanos de las personas migrantes y refugiadas venezolanas en la república
Argentina (Buenos Aires: R4V, 2022).
102 María Aguilar and Tamara Zuñiga, Informe Casen y Migración IV: Brechas de género dentro del mercado laboral para la población
migrante en Chile durante el primer año de pandemia (Santiago: Fundación Servicio Jesuita a Migrantes, 2022).
103 Ana Camila Vásquez, Marta Castro, and David Licheri, COVID-19 y el aumento de la brecha de género en la población migrante
venezolana (Lima: Equilibrium CenDe, 2020).
104 GIFMM and R4V, “Colombia: Reporte Situacional de Integración - Primer Trimestre 2022” (issue brief, October 4, 2022).
105 Guillermo Cruces et al., Un mundo mejor para la población migrante en América Latina y el Caribe (Washington, DC: Inter-American
Development Bank, 2023).
106 Proyecto Migración Venezuela, “Migrantes Cualicados,” updated January 4, 2022.
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residence, leaving many unable to work on their respective elds. For instance, in the Dominican Republic,
less than 5 percent of Venezuelan professionals have validated their degrees.
107
Issues related to credential recognition are particularly relevant in the health and engineering sectors,
in which professional associations have the nal say over who can work in the eld. One of the most
noteworthy eorts to address this barrier in the region is the Argentine Orientation Program, which intends
to match migrant professionals (especially doctors and engineers) with employment opportunities in
several provinces where their skills are in demand, facilitating the residence process and the validation of
the workers’ professional titles.
108
Argentina has also validated foreign-trained professionals’ tittles through
provincial universities, similarly encouraging them to settle in provinces where their skills are in high
demand.
Looking across the region, the limited recognition of Venezuelan academic credentials suggests that
signicant human capital may be going to waste. Many irregular migrants in Quito Process countries have
high levels of education. For instance, in Ecuador, 48.4 percent of Venezuelans with irregular status were
found to have completed a basic and secondary education as of 2020, and 30.0 percent had a technical or
university degree.
109
This is a higher level of educational attainment than the national average, since only
14 percent of Ecuadorians had completed a tertiary education and for 45 percent, primary school was
their highest level of education.
110
However, Venezuelans’ educational achievement does not guarantee a
formal job. In 2022, 27 percent of Venezuelans with a university degree had a formal work contract, and the
share was slightly less than 10 percent for those with a secondary education.
111
While there is considerable
evidence that irregular migrants face barriers to fully applying their human capital, it is also often unclear
whether and how regularization would enable them to do so.
Temporary regularization mechanisms (e.g., in Peru) are less likely than longer-term statuses (such as
Colombia’s TSPV) or permanent residence to activate Venezuelans’ economic potential.
112
A rst reason for
this is that oering short-stay permits may make employers think twice about hiring someone who may
only be able to work for them for a year or two, which in turn keeps migrants from acquiring substantial
work experience in the country. A second reason is that migrants and their employers are less likely to invest
time and resources in training and professional development if a migrant’s time in the country as a regular
worker is limited or uncertain.
In all of the countries examined, the salaries of regular migrants rose and the wage gap between
Venezuelans and nationals decreased over time—although at dierent rates. The limited evidence in this
107 ILO, Promoción de Medios de Vida para Personas Venezolanas en República Dominicana (Santo Domingo: ILO, 2020).
108 Martín Dinatale, “Cómo será el plan que implementará el Gobierno para los inmigrantes que buscan trabajo,” Infobae, March 9,
2019; Oswaldo Avendaño, “Son médicos venezolanos que llegaron a Buenos Aires a buscar trabajo pero el Gobierno los reinsertó y
ahora salvan vidas en zonas rurales,” Infobae, September 16, 2019; Natalio Coso, “Médicos venezolanos en el exilio, la oportunidad
de ejercer lejos de casa,” France24, April 20, 2021; Mariel Fitz Patrick, “Una nueva vida para los ingenieros venezolanos que llegan a
Argentina,” Infobae, February 24, 2019.
109 Álvarez Velasco, Bayón Jiménez, Hurtado Caicedo, and Pérez Martínez, Viviendo al Límite.
110 Chaves-González, Amaral, and Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees.
111 Ecuadorian Ministry of the Interior and IOM, Resultados del registro migratorio de ciudadanos venezolanos en el Ecuador 2019-2020:
características, condiciones, dinámicas y factores con perspectiva geográca de la población objetivo (Quito: Ecuadorian Ministry of
the Interior and IOM, 2022).
112 This has also been observed in other national and regional contexts. See Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz, Observations on
Regularization, 26.
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area does not, however, make it possible to identify what impact regularization specically may be having
on migrants’ wages in Quito Process countries, and how this may shift over time. Still, improving processes
for professional experience and credential validation, along with adjustments to regularization mechanisms
to oer workers and employers more certainty, hold promise for promoting migrants’ economic integration.
Finding 3: Informal employment is widespread for Venezuelans in many Quito Process
countries, more so than for nationals, and although regularization (together with other
measures) might improve their labor conditions, many migrants are likely to continue
working informally.
Most policymakers in the region cite combating informal employment as one of their main reasons for
enacting regularization measures, along with security, health, and education. Boosting the employability of
migrants, including through measures to help them transition to the formal sector, is described as a priority
in the Regional Socioeconomic Integration Strategy adopted by these countries in 2021.
113
The 2022 joint
declaration they issued in Brasilia in 2022 also highlights the need for employment programs and policies to
promote migrants’ socioeconomic integration, while protecting their labor rights.
114
But even with this political momentum, it is unclear whether policies to promote regularization and
formal work will have the desired eect of reducing labor informality. While there is some data on the
size of informal economies in the region (see Table 1 in Section 2.A.), this information is often incomplete.
Venezuelans’ participation in the informal economy has been dicult to track in a robust way, for example.
However, the studies that exist and that will be described in this section indicate that both regular and
irregular migrants are participating in the informal economy at higher rates compared to nationals of their
receiving countries.
In Brazil, for example, an assessment found that informal employment is widespread among Venezuelans
in the country overall (43 percent), but particularly high among those in the states of Roraima (62 percent)
and Amazonas (65 percent), which border Venezuela. The study also notes that humanitarian needs are
more acute among Venezuelans with informal sources of income compared to those with formal jobs (e.g.,
32 percent versus 25 percent were experiencing housing insecurity, 64 percent versus 48 percent were
experiencing food insecurity).
115
During government labor inspections in Roraima from 2017 to 2019,
47 percent to 65 percent of Venezuelans working for inspected workplaces were found to be working
informally, mainly in construction.
116
These ndings are particularly notable because Venezuelans in Brazil
have access to a work permit, a national document that ensures their access to the formal labor market and
all of the same labor rights envisaged in Brazilian legislation for the country’s nationals.
In some countries in the region, there is less of a gap between nationals and newcomers. Peru has the
highest rates of informality among Quito Process Member States, for both nationals and Venezuelan
113 Quito Process, R4V, ILO, and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Migration from Venezuela: Opportunities for Latin
America and the Caribbean. Regional Socio-Economic Integration Strategy (Geneva: ILO and UNDP, 2021).
114 Quito Process Member States, “Declaración conjunta de la VIII reunión técnica internacional: Proceso de Quito” (declaration,
Brasilia, July 2022).
115 R4V, RMNA 2022, 77.
116 Franknauria Guilherme da Silva and Geson Muniz Rabelo, “O reexo da migração de venezuelanos no mercado de trabalho formal
e informal no estado de Roraima,” Revista Cientíca Multidisciplinar Núcleo do Conhecimento 06 (October 1, 2019): 78–102.
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migrants. And in Chile, 28 percent of migrants (of all nationalities) work informally, which is similar to the
rate for the native-born population.
117
Venezuelans make up a sizeable proportion of informal workers across many countries in the region. In fact,
even though they represent a relatively small share of the overall workforce in most countries, Venezuelan
migrants (including those in regular and irregular status) account for a large proportion of those employed
in the informal sector of most Quito Process Member States.
118
And because Venezuelan irregular migrants
have fewer labor mobility options compared to both regular migrants and nationals, they are more likely to
remain in the informal economy.
There are also notable sectoral and employment-type patterns to Venezuelans’ informal work. Commerce
and services are among the main sectors in which Venezuelans are informally employed across the majority
of Quito Process Member States.
119
Construction is another common sector for informal employment,
among irregular migrants and other workers alike. Most of the migrants in the focus groups conducted for
this study were working in smaller rms or self-employed.
120
Interestingly, Costa Rica (which a has temporary
work program that allows circular migration) has been able to decrease the number of irregular migrants
working in its agriculture, construction, and domestic sectors.
121
The existence of regularization measures and work authorization does not, however, guarantee migrants
will move into the formal sector. In some countries (such as Peru and Ecuador) informality is so prevalent
that regularization mechanisms have generated mixed results in this regard. During the focus groups, some
Venezuelans reported choosing not to regularize their status because they thought it likely that they would
continue to nd employment primarily in the informal sector.
122
In other cases, other labor laws can create
disincentives for migrants to regularize or for employers to hire regularized migrants. In Chile, for example,
the law punishes employers more severely for hiring regular migrants without a formal contract and access
to social security than it does for informally hiring
an irregular migrant. In other cases, the likelihood of
an employer being sanctioned for hiring an irregular
migrant is so low that employers are not incentivized
to help their migrant employees formalize their
status, compared to the potential costs (e.g.,
increased wages and a potentially less compliant
workforce).
The fact that informal employment can remain attractive, and sometimes the only option when hiring
migrants, can lead to lower participation in regularization mechanisms. These dynamics may also help
117 INE Chile, “Boletín Estadístico: Empleo Población Extranjera” (bulletin no. 14, January 3, 2023).
118 Quito Process, R4V, ILO, and UNDP, Migration from Venezuela: Opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean.
119 Chaves-González, Amaral, and Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees.
120 Participant comments during an MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 22,
2022. A study by Cámara Empresarial Venezolana Peruana (CANVENPE) in Peru also found that most migrants work in small rms.
See David Licheri and Xenia Mejia, Estudio de la contribución actual y potencial de la migración venezolana en la economía peruana
(Lima: CAVENPE and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021).
121 Ramón, Ruiz Soto, Mora, and Gil, Temporary Worker Programs.
122 Participant comments during an MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 22,
2022.
The fact that informal employment
can remain attractive, and sometimes
the only option when hiring migrants,
can lead to lower participation in
regularization mechanisms.
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explain why many migrants in the region who obtain regular status do not then move into formal
employment. Others may not seek formal sector employment because they know this will depend on their
ability to maintain their regular status, which (as the previous section discusses) can be challenging with
short-term permits and the constant risk of relapses into irregularity. In Peru, for example, a considerable
number of regularized Venezuelans were unable to renew their contracts after their permit expired and they
could no longer show regular status.
123
The design of regularization mechanisms can also inuence uptake. Those that have high application costs
while oering migrants temporary status and an uncertain path to longer-term residence tend to draw less
participation.
124
In the case of Ecuador, policymakers lowered the cost of regularization to make it accessible
to more beneciaries, though cost continues to be a barrier for some Venezuelans seeking to access visas.
125
A 2021 study published by the Peruvian-Venezuelan Business Chamber (Cavenpe) similarly identied the
high cost for migrants as a major barrier to regularization in Peru.
126
Cumbersome administrative processes
can also lead to delays, lost wages for migrants who must take time out from work to apply (as happened in
Chile
127
), and the risk that migrants’ status may not be renewed before it lapses (as in Ecuador), all of which
can discourage migrant participation and employer cooperation.
The odds of migrants entering the formal economy after regularization also seem to vary by occupation.
Domestic or caregiving work, for instance, has a high incidence of informal employment, but it has received
special attention due to the high demand for domestic workers in the region. In a migrant focus group
for this study, participants described Venezuelans working in this sector, as well those in large and/or
supportive Venezuelan communities with high rates of business ownership, as more prone to continuing to
work informally after regularization.
128
In Costa Rica, meanwhile, the inux of workers under the country’s
agricultural regularization strategy was associated with growth in the percentage of registered wage-
earning migrants among all migrants authorized to work. However, while this strategy may have attracted
more migrants to the formal sector, it is unclear how many remain in formal jobs, and some observers
presume that many later transitioned back into the informal economy.
129
Despite these problems and countervailing trends, there have also been some signs that regularization
mechanisms in various parts of the region have moved some migrants into the formal sector and
encouraged occupational and sectoral mobility. A study by the Ñuble Labour Observatory, for example,
found that migrants working in small and medium-sized businesses in Chile were able to progress following
regularization of their status.
130
For policymakers seeking to promote formal employment, addressing
obstacles to participation in regularization programs (including cost and administrative complexity) should
be a priority. But so too should eorts to mitigate the chances that Venezuelans who are not regularized are
driven to further social exclusion.
123 Authors’ interview with a Venezuelan migrant in Peru, August 2022.
124 Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz, Observations on Regularization, 28.
125 Defensoría del Pueblo Ecuatoriana, “Requisitos para la Obtención de la visa Virte,” updated 2022.
126 Licheri and Mejia, Estudio de la contribución actual y potencial de la migración venezolana.
127 Daniel Carrasco, “Alcaldesa denuncia caos generado por Embajada de Venezuela en Chile,” El Pitazo, July 22, 2022.
128 Participant comments during an MPI online focus group with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, August 22,
2022.
129 Ramón, Ruiz Soto, Mora, and Martín Gil, Temporary Worker Programs.
130 Mario Andrés Diaz Llano, “Conrman discriminación salarial contra inmigrantes,” La Discusión, June 24, 2019.
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5 Final Remarks and Recommendations
Although the evidence available on how regularization mechanisms are aecting Venezuelans’ labor market
prospects oers reasons for optimism (as well as caution), it is too early to truly assess their full impact.
Migrants’ socioeconomic integration is a long process by nature. Labor market integration is also not the
sole priority in the formulation of most registration and regularization policies in the region; human rights,
law enforcement, and security are other oft-cited reasons. This diversity of purposes could help explain, in
part, why the labor market benets are still somewhat speculative.
More studies—including ones with long time
horizons—are needed to adequately measure
the labor market impacts of regularization
mechanisms. Existing studies of the TSPV in
Colombia, for instance, have lacked a control
group or a comparison framework. This large-
scale regularization measure was implemented
relatively recently and in a complex regulatory
setting in which irregular status is arguably not a
key obstacle to labor market integration, as many migrants tend to work in the informal sector regardless of
their status. In other countries, the short-term nature of many regularization mechanisms has likely limited
their labor market benets, even if they have successfully connected migrants with basic services and had
symbolic value as a marker of solidarity. The dearth of evidence in this area has also made it dicult to
evaluate the potential of regularization to support migrants’ fuller participation in society (through access
to education and the nancial or banking system, for example) and to have positive spillover eects on the
communities in which regularized migrants live.
Despite the limitations of the evidence base, this analysis identies some notable trends. For example, the
region’s regularization policies, overall, have not created strong incentives for migrants to move toward
formal sector activities. Many have also allowed Venezuelans to fall back into irregular status after a period
of a few months or years, which has limited their usefulness in integrating migrants into the formal labor
market (even if they have served other purposes). A lack of clear planning starting in the registration phase
of many of these initiatives has also generated information gaps and missed opportunities to promote labor
market inclusion. The creation of a solid professional prole database during this phase (recording migrants’
level of education, skills, and years of experience, for example) and better coordination between ministries
of labor and the private sector are two strategies that could help in this regard.
Furthermore, this report’s analysis provides additional support for the ndings of prior studies in other
national and regional contexts in that regularization mechanisms in Latin America and the Caribbean have
not altered the fundamentals of a country’s social and economic structures.
131
They cannot change the
incentives that lead large numbers of migrant and local workers alike into the informal sector, nor can they
take the place of enforcing rules around formal employment. And while regularization can indeed open
131 Papademetriou, O’Neil, and Jachimowicz, Observations on Regularization, 31.
The short-term nature of many
regularization mechanisms has likely
limited their labor market benets, even
if they have successfully connected
migrants with basic services and had
symbolic value as a marker of solidarity.
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the door to formal employment, it is not guaranteed. This is particularly true for lower-skilled migrants,
who may have relatively few formal employment options. For Venezuelans with higher levels of education,
meanwhile, regularization is only the rst step toward more stable, better-paid jobs, as matters such
as training, credential recognition, and demonstratable work experience are also necessary for career
advancement.
A. Strategic Opportunities and Recommendations
It is now time for regularization mechanisms to enter the next phase of maturation. With support from
across governments, nongovernmental stakeholders, and regional actors, these processes can be made
more timely and relevant to the reality that many Venezuelans will stay in their countries of residence,
including through links to labor market policy and national development goals.
As they look ahead, there are a number of forks in the road that policymakers and their partners must
navigate. Promising strategies include:
1. Enhancing registry data to support evidence-informed policymaking
Actors across the region are hungry for more robust data to inform government and donor responses to
migration and to strengthen understanding of phenomena such as how the human capital migrants bring
to a country can be leveraged to benet its economy and key sectors within it. In this, registration and
regularization mechanisms can provide essential baseline data that can be used to deepen understanding
of integration in all its diverse forms. Ensuring that such eorts produce timely, accessible, reliable,
disaggregated, and comparable data, as mentioned in the Quito Process Data Strategy,
132
will be important
to advancing these goals.
The information collected from registration and regularization mechanisms is a powerful resource, but a
country’s migration authorities cannot explore its potential alone. The data should be made readily available
(with appropriate safeguards) for other government entities, researchers, nongovernmental organizations,
and other stakeholders to analyze. For example, there are signicant opportunities to bring together
registry data with other data sources to triangulate population characteristics and migration patterns,
build better analytical and foresight capabilities, and rene strategies to increase migrants’ labor market
performance.
Where there are concerns about data and privacy sensitivities, such analyses could be done through
agreements with trusted partners, such as signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs). These partnerships
would be especially fruitful if researchers also have a voice in the development of the registration surveys
(e.g., to suggest questions or topics whose inclusion could shed light on a particular trend).
One option to increase the usability of registry data is to create an interactive platform that would enable
policymakers, civil-society actors, researchers, journalists, and the general public to access and explore
the data in a way that does not require specialized knowledge or data analysis skills. This tool could help
132 Quito Process, “Joint Statement of the VIII International Technical Meeting on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Citizens in the
Region” (statement, Brasilia, June 30 and July 1, 2022).
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interested stakeholders lter and sort data, and create graphs and tables that could be exported in several
formats. Such a platform could function as a force multiplier, increasing the capacity and responsiveness of
both governmental and nongovernmental responses to large-scale migration.
2. Creating extended permits and other durable pathways to regular status to support longer-
term integration and development aims
Venezuelan migration holds the potential to signicantly boost human capital in countries across the
region, not only in terms of economic gures (such as GDP growth) but also by contributing to longer-term
development. However, even as Venezuelan migration continues unabated and many Venezuelans express
their intentions to stay, most countries’ policies follow a temporary logic, granting status for one or two
years and in some cases not granting work authorization.
The temporary nature of these permits impedes migrants’ long-term economic integration and prevents
receiving societies from fully benetting from their skills. The drawbacks have been seen most in countries
where regularization measures’ short-term nature increases vulnerability, creates recurring bureaucratic
requirements, and risks migrants sliding back into irregularity after a relatively short period. As policymakers
look to the long term and seek to tap into newcomers’ skills, they should consider oering permits with a
longer duration (and the possibility to work, where it is still lacking). A forward-looking perspective such
as this should pair eorts to expand regularization with the development of more durable forms of status,
including pathways to permanence.
3. Opening up dialogue between government and private-sector stakeholders to deepen the
links between regularization and productive employment
The private sector also plays a vital role in fostering the labor market integration of migrants. As such,
engaging private-sector stakeholders (including local and international businesses) in eorts to strengthen
the links between migration, regularization, and development will be essential to their success. Although
government representatives have acknowledged in interviews the importance of nding joint solutions,
such eorts have, to date, been government driven. When they are involved, private-sector actors are
usually tapped to explore funding opportunities. In a fuller partnership, their role could evolve to include
providing expertise and leading eorts to increase the participation of migrants in the formal sector.
In practice, private-sector actors operate in ways that are considerably dierent, have diverse views on
migration, and have varied levels of interest in and capacity for collaboration with government. With the
support of international actors, governments could do a better job at conducting private-sector mapping
activities to identify promising partners and explore how both the private sector and government can use
their strengths to engage with migrants at various stages of the regularization and integration process.
This collaboration could, among other things, involve identifying job vacancies that have been dicult to
ll and determining which sectors have the greatest potential to contribute to a country’s development
goals. Governments could then adjust their recruitment, hiring, and contracting strategies accordingly and
with an eye to leveraging the inux of Venezuelan workers. For instance, leveraging digital social networks,
which are widely utilized by Venezuelans, could make it possible to locate and connect job seekers and
employment opportunities beyond traditional channels. Enhancing communication and information-
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sharing between the government, private sector, and migrants would be needed to achieve such a strategy.
This improved communication could also help ensure that employers understand processes for hiring
migrant workers and that migrant workers are aware of their rights.
4. Supporting Venezuelan migrants’ economic mobility
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have a number of approaches at their disposal to open new
labor market opportunities for migrants. This includes creating programs that would enable newcomers
to develop or strengthen technical skills, and streamlining the procedures for receiving recognition for
education and credentials earned abroad. Countries could also take steps to better align their public
education and training programs with evolving labor market needs—an approach that would benet both
native- and foreign-born workers. Such steps could help newcomers secure better-paid jobs and close the
native-migrant earnings gap, while fostering skills that are in demand in local labor markets.
This is another area in which active collaboration between the government, private sector, and community
actors could help facilitate migrants’ integration into the workforce. This could involve reviewing and
amending labor laws to reect changing workforce trends and reducing excessive regulation associated
with formal employment. In addition to increasing migrants’ employment opportunities, such eorts could
help ensure that a host country’s investments in education and training opportunities for newcomers (or all
workers) fully benet that country’s economy, stimulating growth in key sectors and promoting economic
development.
5. Building on opportunities for exchange between countries in the region
Using the Quito Process as a platform, countries in the region could exchange recommendations and
mobilize resources to support specic countries as they design and implement regularization initiatives.
Doing so would strengthen communication and collaboration among regularization mechanisms active
in the region, including by sharing knowledge, feedback, and best practices. Member States could also
receive support and guidance from international and multilateral organizations as they design, implement,
evaluate, and disseminate ndings for each phase of the regularization and integration process. Finally, this
platform could support governments’ eorts to engage more intentionally with the private sector and other
relevant stakeholders, including migrants themselves, to develop a strategy to maximize the benets of
migration while guaranteeing migrant workers fair salaries and working conditions.
B. Looking Ahead
Partnership is a key theme across all of these areas. As Latin America and the Caribbean adapt to a new era
of human mobility, stakeholders should seek to harness the power of collective action—with governments
leading the way with evidence-informed policies, the private sector driving innovation, civil society
advocating for inclusive societies, and multilateral organizations providing resources, expertise, and
coordination support. This type of joint approach is needed to create an ecosystem in which regularization
measures are more integrally connected with migrants’ economic integration. In turn, a well-integrated
migrant population can contribute more fully to the communities in which they live and to a country’s
broader economic and social development goals.
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About the Authors
DIEGO CHAVES-GONZÁLEZ @diegochavesg
Diego Chaves-González is the Senior Manager for the Latin America and Caribbean
Initiative at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). Previously, he was an expert
consultant on migration for organizations such as the World Bank Group, U.S.
Agency for International Development, United Nations Development Program,
and Organization of American States. In these roles, he supported governments
in adjusting their capacity to manage large-scale migration and comply with
international standards, and coordinated programs for Venezuelan migrants and
receiving communities in Latin America. Mr. Chaves-González also worked for the
United Nations, supporting the Oce of Border Management of the Presidency of
the Republic of Colombia in its eorts to register and regularize Venezuelan migrants
with irregular status. He has also coordinated the Displacement Tracking Matrix in
Latin America to collect information on Venezuelan migration.
Mr. Chaves-González has a master’s degree in economics and social development
from Cardi University, a master’s degree in public policy from Tecnológico de
Monterrey, and an undergraduate degree in political science and specialization in
international relations from the Ponticia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá.
NATALIA DELGADO
Natalia Delgado is an Associate Researcher with MPI, where she works with the Latin
America and Caribbean Initiative. Previously, she worked at the Ford Foundation,
leading the Special Initiative on Venezuela and the Peace and Polarization Line of
Work. She also worked for 15 years at the International Organization for Migration in
several programs focused on assisting internally displaced persons and combatting
human tracking, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
Program, and the Peace-Building Program in Colombia.
Ms. Delgado has an executive master’s in international negotiation and policymaking
from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and an
undergraduate degree in political science from the Universidad de los Andes in
Bogotá.
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Acknowledgments
The authors extend their sincere thanks to Migration Policy Institute (MPI) colleagues Andrew Selee and
Valerie Lacarte for their invaluable guidance and thorough review of this report. Special thanks also go to
Juan Sebastián Brizneda, Micaela Lincango, and Xenia Mejía for their valuable contributions to the data
analysis. Furthermore, the authors express their gratitude to Lauren Shaw and Michelle Mittelstadt for their
assistance in preparing this publication.
The research and writing of this report received support from the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) as part of a project aimed at strengthening understanding of Venezuelans’ regularization and
socioeconomic integration within the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are Quito Process
Member States. The authors acknowledge the valuable comments and support they received from the
regional team in Panama at the Oce of the DG’s Special Envoy for the Venezuelan Situation, especially from
Diego Beltrand and Vanina Modolo, as well as from the IOM focal points in country oces across the region.
MPI is an independent, nonpartisan think tank dedicated to improving immigration and integration policies
through authoritative research and analysis, opportunities for learning and dialogue, and the development
of new ideas to address complex policy questions. MPI adheres to the highest standard of rigor and integrity
in its work. The analysis, recommendations, and policy ideas put forth by MPI are solely determined by its
researchers.
IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benets migrants and society. As
an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in
meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage
social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of
migrants.
The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the document do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM or MPI concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area, or its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.
© 2023 International Organization for Migration.
All Rights Reserved.
The Migration Policy Institute holds full rights of usage.
Design: Sara Staedicke, MPI
Layout: Yoseph Hamid, MPI
Cover Photo: International Organization for Migration / Gema Cortes
A full-text PDF of this document is available for free download from www.migrationpolicy.org. Inquiries can also be directed to
communications@migrationpolicy.org.
Suggested citation: Chaves-González, Diego and Natalia Delgado. 2023. A Winding Path to Integration: Venezuelan Migrants’
Regularization and Labor Market Prospects. Panama City and Washington, DC: International Organization for Migration and Migration
Policy Institute.
