How Tinder and Facebook make stalkers’ life easier
T. Delemazure - P. Bourhis - R. Rouvoy - W. Rudametkin
Abstract
Edit: Tinder patched this breach and does not use Face-
book informations anymore. Everything explained here
is outdated. Launched in 2012, Tinder is the first mo-
bile app in several countries with more than 100 mil-
lions download. This dating app enable its users to meet
people with close geographical proximity. In this paper,
we’ll use tools given by Facebook and Tinder to show
that it is possible to find on Facebook almost every Tin-
der user who linked is Tinder account with his Facebook
account.
1 Introduction
Tinder is a free dating app available on Android and iOS
with more than 100 millions downloads on the play store.
The challenge of this kind of app is to enable date be-
tween persons with common interests, and for that, Tin-
der use an easy solution : The Facebook profile of the
user. Indeed, Facebook profiles say a lot about who we
are : Where do we live, who are our friends, what are my
interests, what pictures I liked, who are my classmates,
etc.
By promoting the connection between your Tinder ac-
count and Facebook account, Tinder get a lot of informa-
tion about you, and consequently every Tinder user do.
Stalkers know that more than other, they even have a
tool for stalking their matches on Tinder [1].
Today people are more concerned by their personal in-
formation, by who have access to them, and by data gath-
ering more globally. However, they rarely secure these
data and social networks like Facebook don’t really help
them.
2 Tools
To create a Tinder account, people have two possibilities
: Use their phone number, or use their Facebook account.
In any case, they have to give a phone number to the app.
We are interested in the case where the user use his
Facebook account to log in. In that case, we may have
access to several information about the user, according
to his privacy settings : The first name is mandatory and
unchangeable, the age and the distance from me are often
displayed but can be hidden by the user. The gender can
be chosen by the user and we can deduce it from our own
settings (interested in). We also have access to some pic-
tures, very often those picture are taken from the user’s
Facebook account. The user can show where he studies /
where he works and add a personal description. Finally,
a user can link is Tinder account to an Instagram account
and a Spotify account. An example of what a Tinder pro-
file look like is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A Tinder profile
All these information can be shared publicly, even
with people you don’t match with.
In our experiment we will use Facebook interests. This
information contains the 100 last Facebook pages liked
by the users and display the intersection of my 100 in-
terests and the 100 interests of the user of who I see the
Tinder profile.
In its side, Facebook give to the stalkers a lot of useful
tools. First of all, Facebook enable precise queries on its
Search bar tool. To simplify the queries, we will use the
Facebook Query Language 2 [5].
This tool enables to select Facebook users with their
first name, their gender, their interests (if they like a
page), their work place, their university, their city. Most
importantly, one can do the intersection of several selec-
tion like these.
Since the first name is a part of the public profile, we
are sure to find the user on the result of a query selecting
only according to the first name. But there is billions
users on Facebook and their might be too many results
for a stalker. We can then use Facebook interest, job,
studies and city, but the user have the possibility to hide
those information on Facebook.
Finally, we want to know how Facebook choose in
which order it will display results of your query. We
will see that it shows you people you may know first.
Those people are : your friends, friends of friends
and people with whom you have a common attribute
(city/job/study/interests). We also want to know if this
order is done even if those attributes are hidden.
3 The restrictive power of interests
It is known that our Facebook interests (i.e. pages we like
on Facebook) tells many things about us. Actually, they
can also say who we are, like a fingerprint. To be precise
enough, we don’t need to know every page you like on
Facebook. Indeed, with your first name and around 10
interests, there is a really high probability to find you.
First of all, what happen if we assume probabilities of
like are random and independents ?
3.1 A bit of probabilities
Let F be the number of Local users of Facebook (targets
of the page). Let P be a set of local Facebook pages,
each page P P have φ(P) likes. Let N be a set of
first name.
If we assume every like is independent, the probabil-
ity that a user u like a page P P is P(u, P) =
φ(P)
F
.
If we assume that F > 30000000 and P P,φ (P) <
5000000, then
φ(P)
F
< 1/6.
If we assume every like is independent and we know
for a user u 10 liked pages, then we have P(u,P
1
,..P
10
) <
1
6
10
< 1,6 × 10
8
.
In France, the most common first name is ”Marie” and
there is less than 3% french citizen with this name. Then
the probability for n N is P(u, n,P
1
,..., P
10
) < 3.5 ×
10
10
It means that the probability that 2 french citizen have
the first name n and that their interests contains P
1
,..., P
10
is around 1 (1 P(u,n, P
1
,..., P
10
))
50000000
= 1,7%.
With 15 interests, there is almost no probability of false
positive.
3.2 What happen in reality ?
Unfortunately, we can’t say that every like is indepen-
dent. Indeed, some pages have really similar communi-
ties. For instance, if one likes the page of a rap group,
there is more probability that he also likes the page of
a rap singer than the page of reality show. The figure 2
summarize this example by doing the intersection of au-
diences of different pages with users named ”Manon” (in
order to reduce the number of results)
Figure 2: Intersection of audiences
In the second example shown Figure 3, we can see that
it is useless to do the intersection between pages with
identical audiences, for instance between a Youtuber 1
(2M Likes) and a Youtuber 2 (4,5M Likes). At the oppo-
site, the intersection with a different kind of audience is
very restrictive, for instance between the same Youtuber
1 (2M Likes) and a newspaper (4,2M Likers).
Figure 3: Intersection of identical/opposite audiences
2
Moreover, first name are not equally distributed. For
instance, a page with 96K likes will have ten times more
likers named ”Alexandre” (668) than ”Marcel” (59). An-
other issue with the Facebook search tool when you
search user by name is that it return not only user who
have exactly this first name but also user who have this
name as last name or who have a name similar to this
one. For instance, with the same page with 96K likes,
if you want likers named ”Jean”, the Facebook tool will
return more than 2,2K results, because of every ”Jean-
Pierre”, ”Jean-Jacques”, etc., even if the actual number
of ”Jean” who liked this page does not exceed 300.
Another important point is to adapt the selection of
pages to the kind of audience we want to target. Two
important criteria are the gender and the age range. For
instance, some pages have 90% of their like which are
from women or from people under 25 years old. It is
an important point because in Tinder you can choose the
gender and the age range of your target.
Finally, if we choose pages with audiences which are
not so similar, we estimate that 15 interests are sufficient
to reduce the results to 1 output. We can also do a func-
tion that map to each first name an estimation of the min-
imal number of page required to reduce the number of
result to one output.
4 The Facebook Query Language 2
This query language uses Facebook Graph Search which
enables to ask complicated query on the Facebook query.
From the search bar, Facebook Graph Search is available
to the user only in the US, but it is actually possible to
use Facebook Graph Search with the url.
For instance, if you want to sees photos liked
by you this week, you just have to type this url
: http://facebook.com/search/me/photos-liked/this-
week/date/photos/intersect. The FQL2 language get an
understandable code as input and output a link like this
one.
Here, we are going to use some possibilities offered
by this language and formilize them.
A view of users with a particular first name : In FQL2,
we write users named "name", the corresponding link
is str/name/users-named.
A view of likers of a particular page : In FQL2 we
write id(page
id) likers, the corresponding link
is page id/likers
A view of users having a particular job : In FQL2 we
write pages named "job name" employees,
the corresponding link is str/job name/pages-
named/employees
A view of users from a particular profession :
In FQL2 we write workers (profession code),
the corresponding link is profession code/job-liker-
union/employees
An intersection of same-type views : In FQL2 we
write view
1
INTER view
2
, the corresponding link is
view
1
/view
2
/intersect-2. To be more understandable,
we will write it V
1
T
V
2
.
An union of same-type view : In FQL2 we
write view
1
UNION view
2
, the corresponding link is
view
1
/view
2
/union-2. To be more understandable, we
will write it V
1
S
V
2
.
variable corresponding to a view : In FQL2 it is VIEW
?view name = view code then we can use the view
?view name in following queries/view declarations.
5 Attacks
5.1 Past attacks
In several papers about privacy on social network [2], the
main attack was reverse search on Google Image. This
attack seems to don’t work anymore.
Another attack presented on the paper [2] seems to be
a little more efficient : it consists in just getting keywords
appearing on the Tinder profile and search them together
on Google. We were able to link less than 10% of Tinder
profiles to a last name with this attack.
We tried these attack on 30 women profiles, none of
them where found with the ”search by image” tool pow-
ered by Google. In 4 cases the person linked an Insta-
gram account (and it often contains the last name). In 2
other cases we found the LinkedIn profiles of the person
with the job and studies keyword and the first name. And
in one other case we found the Facebook profile because
the name of an associations appeared on one picture and
the person seems to be part of this association (See Fig-
ure 4). However, this attack does not work really well
and seem harder to implement because there is often a
lot of results when you search by keywords.
Figure 4: Statistics on 30 Tinder profiles
3
Reasons why this attack does not work anymore is
probably the recent changes on Google reverse search al-
gorithm, or maybe the improvement in security of social
networks against indexing bots.
There exists other attacks presented on [3], [4] which
seems to have been solved, but anyway attacks we will
present here are available for any stalker with a Facebook
account.
5.2 Stalker attack
The first attack we will present could be done manually
by every stalker. It enables to find Tinder users on Face-
book. We didn’t save any personal data during the fol-
lowing experiments.
The protocol is the following : First of all, we need
to create a Facebook account and localize it at the city
where we want to do the attack (here, the city was Lille,
France). In a second time, we liked with this profile 100
popular/rising Facebook pages which might be liked by
many people of the target age-range/localization. We use
for that website with data about Facebook pages popu-
larity. (https://www.socialbakers.com/).
Indeed, we chose the pages according to 3 criteria :
First, the page must have between 100K and 5M likes on
Facebook. If there is more, then it will not reduce the
number of results as much as wanted. If there is less, the
probability that we find a user who liked this page is too
low. Second, the page must be specific to a country (For
instance, famous singer of the country), and if possible, a
state/county (For instance a local newspaper). Third, the
pages must be in an upward slope, because Tinder uses
the last 100 pages liked, so the page of a famous singer
who did nothing since 2012 will be useless.
Actually, we can sometimes Notwithstanding those
rules with around 10% of the pages liked. If we add
pages with more than 5M likes, we will probably have
more users with common interest and if we add pages
with less than 100K likes, maybe they will not appear
often, but they will be useful when appeared. If we use
only local pages, tourists/foreigners will not be found.
Finally, we have to take in account that it is the last 100
pages liked when the Tinder account was created, so if
one create his account in 2012, the interest shown will
probably be famous pages of 2012.
When the Facebook account was ready, we created a
Tinder account linked to this Facebook account. Mean-
while, a script get the Facebook id of our 100 liked pages
and create one FQL view for each : VIEW ?page
name
= id(123456789)->likers;
Once the Tinder account is created, we can begin to
link Tinder profile to Facebook account : For each Tinder
profile shown, we looked at the common interests (i.e.
common Facebook pages liked, see Figure 5). If there
were no common interests, we did nothing (even if the
user was probably vulnerable, if he linked his Instagram
account for instance). If there were at least one common
interests, then it mean that the user linked his Facebook
account to his Tinder account. We can try to find him.
To find the user, we need his first name (public), his
gender (public) and every common interests (sometimes
private). With those information we can then do a
Facebook query like this one : SEARCH users named
"Alice" INTER women INTER ?stromae INTER
?macron INTER ?griezmann;. A can also add job
and studies if they are given.
Formally, we write
SEARCH user named(name
user
)
(
\
iinterests
user
i > likers)
If the target gives his location to Facebook, then it will
probably appear on top of the results, making the work
of the stalker easier. If their is too many results for a
human stalker, then we can also add a selection on the
job, studies and city (but their is more probability for
those information to be private)
If the target does not appear in the results, then he
probably secure his account on one of the criteria used.
Another explanation can be that the user unliked this
page since he create his account. But if the first name
is not common, the stalker might find the target even if
he does not have information on the target’s interests.
Some criteria enable to reduce significantly the num-
ber of results : an uncommon first name, an uncom-
mon interest, several incompatible interests (for instance
?donaldtrump and ?hillaryclinton).
5.3 Data gathering
Now that we know it is possible for a human to stalk
manually Tinder users, what about bots ? Actually, we
can totally imagine a script which link each Tinder ac-
count with a Facebook account.
For that, we need to create hundred of Facebook ac-
count and like 100 different Facebook pages for each tin-
der account. With 100 account we can cover 10000 Face-
book pages (we know for instance that only 417 french
Facebook pages exceed one million likes). In a second
time, we create a Tinder account for each Facebook ac-
count.
For each profile shown, our bot will save in a database
the tuple (id, first name, age, first photo, bio) of the user
and in another table it will save interests of each user and
gather interests collected by each fake account.
When we have more than 10 interests for one user,
we can do a query to find this user on Facebook. The
4
Figure 5: Example of a profile with many Facebook in-
terest
probability that there is a false positive is really low (see
section 7), so if there is one result, we can assume we
have find our user.
If there is more than one result, then we have a false
positive, so we can wait to have more interests for this
user.
If there is no results, either the user have secured his
account, either he had unlike some pages and we can try
with a subset of the interests we have.
If we want to find n users on Facebook and we know
for each user enough interests to avoid false positives, we
can minimize the number of queries by doing the union
of all the queries :
SEARCH
[
user
query
user
5.4 Who would have an interest to do that
?
Actually, it is easy to found an interest on those informa-
tion. First of all, a firm can get a database of Facebook
user who have or had a Tinder account. Then they can
sell those information. They can also associated infor-
mation appearing on the Tinder account to the user and
sell those information.
It also enables stalker to found their target really eas-
ily.
We can also imagine that once you have associated a
Tinder account to a identity, thanks to the geographic lo-
cation you can have the location of someone at any time.
[7]
A more fanciful scenario can be that a firm create IA
with attractive profiles. When they have a match, they
will ask questions about him/her, like if it was part of the
seduction game but it is just to collect data.
6 Results of experiments
We did two slots of the stalker attack presented in section
3.2.
6.1 First experiment
In the first experiment we create a profile with gender
male, interested in females. No city added on Facebook,
no profile picture and 100 pages liked (see References).
We did the experiment on 300 profiles shown.
117 of the 300 profiles shown had at least one common
interest with those I chose for my fake account. 37 had
more than four (See Figure 6).
Figure 6: Number of user in term of number of common
interests
38 of those 117 profiles were easily find (32 %). At
the end, we find the Facebook id of 12% of the profiles
shown (See Figure 7).
78 of the 100 Facebook pages appeared at least one
time and 35 of them appeared on at least 1% of the profile
shown.
Actually, 12% is not bad, but we made many mistake
in this first experiment : The interests were not good
enough and we forget to provide a city of residence to
Facebook, in order to obtain people living near on the
top of the results.
5
Figure 7: Statistics on the 300 profiles shown
6.2 Second experiment
In our second experiment, we create a profile with the
gender female interested in males. We add the city where
we did the experiment as residence city and 100 new
Facebook interests (see References)
144 of the 300 profiles shown had at least one com-
mon interest (27 more than in the first experiment) and
63 of them had at least four (26 more than in the first
experiment). See Figure 8.
Figure 8: Number of users in terms of number of com-
mon interests
87 of the 144 profiles were easily found (60%), 33
were not found because of a there were too many results
(23%), 18 were not identifiable (13%) and in 6 other case
there were a doubt on the identity (4%). See Figure 9.
only 4 of the 30 profiles with at least 6 common inter-
ests where not found (success rate of 86%). See Figure
10.
Finally, we were able to find 29% of the profiles
shown.
83 of the 100 pages appeared at least one time
Figure 9: Statistics on the 144 profiles with common in-
terests
Common Users Found Too Not Doubt
Interests many ident
results -ifiable
0 156
1 19 10 8 0 1
2 29 15 11 2 1
3 33 16 9 8 1
4 18 12 3 2 0
5 15 8 1 4 2
6 12 9 1 2 0
7 2 2 0 0 0
8 4 4 0 0 0
9 3 3 0 0 0
10 2 2 0 0 0
11 4 3 0 0 1
12 1 1 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0
14 1 1 0 0 0
15 1 1 0 0 0
total 300 87 33 18 6
Figure 10: Statistics on the 300 profiles shown
6.3 Analysis
The first finding is that with an account with 100 inter-
ests cleverly chosen and an account localized at the good
place, it is really easy to find a Facebook account linked
to a Tinder account.
We obtained for every experiment less than 50% with
at least one common interest. There must be various ex-
planation to this. First of all, there is a large portion of
bots and other fake account on Tinder (see [6]). Those
fakes users are often not linked to a Facebook account.
Some other users did not link their Facebook account to
their Tinder account, some did not give the permission to
Tinder to see their interests (but we assume few people
do this). Finally, many users does not have common in-
6
terests with our account (which have only 100 interests).
Among the users with common interests, we were not
able to find at least 30% of users. There is some possi-
ble explanation : Sometimes there were too many results
and if the profile picture on Facebook is not the one of the
Tinder account it is really hard to find the target. Some-
times Tinder photos or Facebook photos are too unclear
to create a real link between the two. And in other cases,
people secure the access to their interests.
We assume that the number of people who secure the
access to their interest is low, because this setting does
not appear in general settings of our Facebook account
so people have to search deeply to find it.
With several pages, we queried to Facebook users
who liked this page and we did the ratio between the
number of results we obtain and the number of likes
actually shown on the page. We obtain a number of
results between 70% and 80% of the total amount of
likes on the Facebook page.
We did another experiment to estimate more precisely
access control policy of Facebook users : We did the
same query on the friends of one user with (1) this user
account, (2) an account of a friend of this user which
have not other friends and (3) with an account without
any friends. What we see is that between 70% and 75%
of Facebook users let their studies,jobs and current city
public (See Figure 11 to 13).
Figure 11: Access control policies for interests
7 Facebook and Tinder protections
It is not so easy to create a Facebook account (you need
a valid e-mail address, sometimes you have to send an
original photo) but we think that a clever script can over-
pass that.
Same thing to create a Tinder account, you need a
phone number, but you can use the same number several
Figure 12: Access control policies for cities
Figure 13: Access control policies for studies
times. Moreover, there exists a lot of ”disposable phone
number” on the net which are not detected by Tinder.
Facebook limit the number of search query per day
and per account. But there is many way to overpass it :
By doing an union of query, with the mobile version of
the site (m.facebook.com) or with a lot of accounts.
The number of like par day and per account is also
limited by Facebook. But since you do only 100 likes
with each account it is not a problem.
8 How to protect yourself from those at-
tacks
The best thing to do is to not link your Facebook account
to your Tinder account. In any case, you will need to give
a phone number so it does not simplify the registration.
If you really want to use Facebook, don’t allow Tinder
to see your interests, and set restrictive access controls
on your Facebook account for pages liked, residence city,
jobs and studies.
7
References
[1] A Tool to find your match on Tinder.
[2] C. STENSON, A. BALCELLS, M. C. Burning up privacy on Tin-
der.
[3] CHOO, M. C.-K. R. Tinder me softly – how safe are you really
on tinder?
[4] JODY FARNDEN, BEN MARTINI, K. K. R. C. Privacy Risks in
Mobile Dating Apps.
[5] T. DELEMAZURE, P. BOURHIS, R. R. W. R. Documentation
Facebook Query Language 2.
[6] TAHORA H. NAZER, FRED MORSTATTER, G. T. H. L. A Close
Look at Tinder Bots.
[7] VEYTSMAN, M. How I was able to track the location of any Tinder
user. .
8