University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
/'.2$*',-$%+
Disrupting Regulation, Regulating Disruption: e
Politics of Uber in the United States
Veena B. Dubal
UC Hastings College of the Law /'0/$-.%)#-! /
Ruth Berins Collier
Christopher L. Carter
*''*1.$%-) %.%*)'1*,&-. $5+-,!+*-%.*,2/$-.%)#-! /"/'.2-$*',-$%+
4%-,.%'!%-,*/#$..*2*/"*,",!!) *+!)!--2-.%)#-$*',-$%+!+*-%.*,2.$-!!)!+.! "*,%)'/-%*)%)/'.2$*',-$%+
2)/.$*,%3! (%)%-.,.*,*"-.%)#-$*',-$%+!+*-%.*,2*,(*,!%)"*,(.%*)+'!-!*).. 1)#)#!'/$-.%)#-! /
!*((!) ! %..%*)
!!)/'/.$!,%)-*''%!,) $,%-.*+$!,,.!, Disrupting Regulation, Regulating Disruption: e Politics of Uber in the
United States Persp. on Pol.
0%''!.$5+-,!+*-%.*,2/$-.%)#-! /"/'.2-$*',-$%+
1
Disrupting!Regulation,!Regulating!Disruption:!
The!Politics!of!Uber!in!the!United!States!
Ruth!Berins!Collier!
University!of!California,!Berkeley!
V. B.!Dubal
University!of!California,!Hastings!College!of!the!Law!
Christopher!Carter!
University!of!California,!Berkeley!
FORTHCOMING!IN!PERSPECTIVES!ON!POLITICS!
2
Disrupting!Regulation,!Regulating!Disruption:!
The!Politics!of!Uber!in!the!United!States!
Platform! companies! disrupt! not! only! the! economic! sectors! they!
enter,!b ut!also!the!regulatory!regimes!that!g overn!those!sectors.!We!
examine! Uber! in! the! United! States! as! a! case! of! regulating! this!
disruption!in!different!arenas:! cities,! state! legislatures,!and!judicial!
venues.! ! W e! find! that! the! p olitics! of! Uber! regulation! does! not!
conform! to! existing! models! of! regulation.! We! describe! instead! a!
pattern! of! disrupted! regulation,! characterized! by! a! consistent!
challenger-incumbent! cleavag e,! in! two! s te p s.! ! First ,! an! ex isting!
regulatory! re gim e!is! n ot!deregulated !but!successfully!disregarded !by!
a! new! entrant.! Second,! the! politics! of! subsequently! regulating! the!
challenger! leads! to! a! dual! regulatory! regime .! ! In! the! case! of! Uber,!
disrupted!regulation!takes!the! form! of! challenger! cap tu re,! an ! elite-
driven! pattern,! in! which! the! challenger! has! largely! prevailed.! It! is!
further! characte rize d ! by! t he ! surrogate ! represen ta tio n! of! d isp e rse d !
actors—customers! and! drivers—who! do! not! have! autonomous!
power! and! who! rely! instead! on! alignment! w ith! the! challenger! and!
incum b en t.! In ! its! s u rro g at e! c ap a cit y! in ! city ! an d ! st at e! re g u lat io n,! U b e r!
has!frequently!mobilized! large!numbers!of!customers!and!drivers! to!
lobby!for!p o licy ! o u tco mes!th a t!allow!it!to ! c on tin u e!to! pr ov id e!service!
on! terms! it! finds! a c ce pt ab le .! ! B ec a us e! d r ive rs! have! rea pe d ! le ss!
advantage!from!these!alignments,! labor! issues! have!been! taken! up ! in!
judicial! venues ,! again! p r im a ril y! by! su r ro g at es ! (usually ! plaintiffs’!
attorneys)!but!to!date!have!not!been!successful.!
The!disruption!brought!by!the!new!labor!platform!econo m y!has!bee n!both!w elcom e d!as!a!
process!of!creative!destruction!and!resisted!as!trampling!on!well-established!regulations!
that!protect!the!intere sts!of!w ork ers!an d!the !pub lic.!Pl a tform!co mpan ie s !in c r e a s e !e ffic ie ncy!
in!the!provision!of!services.!They!may!also!disrupt!the!economic!sectors!they!enter!and!
existing!regulatory!regimes.!Regulators!must!classify!and!create!rules!for!the!new!
phenomenon!of!platform!companies.!This!article!examines!Uber!as!a!case!of!this!disruption!
to!analyze!the!po litics!of!regula tory !respo nse .!We!argue!that!the!main!extant!models!of!the!
politics!of!regulation!do!not!fit!the!Uber!ca se,!which!we!analyze!instead!as!a!case!of!
challenger!capture:!!a!form!of!“disrupted!regulation”!in!which!the!new !entrant!largely!
prevails.!!
Uber!is!one!of!the!most!successful!hi-tech! co m pa nies!and!is! the !domina nt!player !in! the!ride-
hailing! sector.! Within! 3! years! of! its! launch! in! 2012,! UberX,! Uber’s! most! popular! service,!
grew! rem arkably,! reaching! nearly! h alf! a! m illion! active! drivers!in! 150! cities! in! the! United!
3
States.
1
!It! disr up ted ! a! centu ry-old! taxi! industry,! resulting! in! a! sharp! decline! in! m edallion!
values,! taxi! driver! income,! and ! taxi! ridership! in! US! cities.
2
!Uber! entered! urban! markets!
claiming! to! be! a! “technology! co mp any”! and! ope rated! in! disregard! of! taxi! reg ulations.! It!
thereby!disrupted!the!ride-hailing!market!and!challenged!regulations!that!both!controlled!
entry! a nd!fares!an d!im posed!consumer!protection!and!safety!requirements.!!How,!then,!did!
government!respond?!!
Existing! analyses! of! regulation! generally! conform! to! what! w e! may! call! the! industrial!
capture,!public!interest!regu lation,!and!deregulatory!mod els.!The!industrial!capture!model,!
pioneered!by!Stigler,!puts! in! opposition!the! private!vs.!public!(or!producer! vs.!consumer)!
interests .
3
!! It! argues! that! concentrated! private! actors! with! high! s tak es! use! a! va riety! of!
strategies!to!influence!policy!and!thwart!regu lation!in!the!public!interest.!!Trum bull,!to!the!
contrary,! argues! that! state! regulation! can! serve! the! public!interest!w hen! d iffuse!interests!
are!represented!by!advocacy!groups! or! activists,!such!as!consumer! rights!organizations!that!
form! allia nc e s! w it h! t he ! sta te .
4
!!The!third!model!responds!in!part!to!the!deregulatory!tur n!
since! the! 1980s.! Carpen ter! and! M oss! present! a! model! of! “corrosive! ca pture,”! in! which!
regulated! “firms! push! the! regulatory! pro cess! in! a! ‘we aker’! direction”! through ! re duc ed!
“formulation,!application,!or!enforcemen t”!of!existing!regulations.
5
!
Each!of!these!models!has!proposed!answers!to!a!number!of!questions:!what!are!the!m ain!
interest! c le av a ge s;! which! in te re st s! te n d ! to ! b e ! se rv ed ;! a n d ! ho w.!The ! U b e r! model! o f! dis ru p te d !
regulation! pre sents! a! different! com bina tion! of! answers! th an! is! suggested! b y! any! one ! of!
these! models.! ! Far! from! a! unitary! acto r,! the! private! interest! m ust! be! disag greg ated .! ! One!
cleavage! pits! pro-regulation! incumben ts! against! anti-regulation! challengers,! as! noted! by!
Vogel.
!6
!! ! A! second! is! the! classic! intra-challenger! cleavage! betw een! labor! and! c apital.! ! ! In!
addition,!the! relationship! of! private! and! p ublic! interests!is! characterized! by! neither! their!
opposition,!prominent!in!the! capture!literature,!nor!their!congruity,!as! in! the! pro-consumer,!
free-market! approach! that! underlies! some! anti-rent-seeking! deregulation! assum ptions.!
The!pattern!is!similar!to!what!Carpenter!and!Moss!call!“weak!capture,”!in!that!“firms!render!
regulation!less!robust!than…wh at!the!public!interest!would!recom m e nd,”!but!“the!public!is!
still!served.”
7
!!However,!Uber!regulation!differs!from!their!model!of!“corro siv e!capture ”!in!
that!th e!regulated!industry!(taxis)!does!not!favo r!deregulation .!!Inste ad,!the!anti-regulation!
disrupter!is! a! competitor! that! defines!itself!as! a! different!industry! and! not! subject! to! the!
extant! regulatory! regime.! ! Further,! to! the! extent! the! overall! ride-hailing! sector! can! be!
considered! deregulated,! the! politics! is! quite! different:! the! state! does! not! act! primarily!
through! adm inistra tive! agen cies! nor! thro ugh ! the! other! chan ne ls! Carpe nter ! and! Mo ss!
discuss.
8
!Finally,! contra! Trumbull,! though! the! public! interest! is! served! by! providing! a!
1
The Uber company began operations earlier in 2009 as UberCab, an app for licensed black car and
limousine drivers. We analyze here the “peer-to-peer” UberX model, launched in 2012 and refer to it as Uber
and UberX interchangeably.
2
Madhani 2017. Berger et al. 2017.
3
Stigler 1971.
4
Trumbull 2006, 2012. In analyzing regulatory policies that may produce pro-consumer outcomes, Trumbull
(2012:23-25) focuses on three key actors (the state, industry, and social activists) and outlines three types of
coalitions composed of combinations of two. Two of these produce private arrangements (industry self-
regulation, and consumer-industry arrangements), and only a coalition between the state and consumer
activists (or mobilized NGOs, which the government supports or even helps to form) is said to produce pro-
consumer state regulatory policy.
5
Carpenter 2014, 154; Carpenter and Moss 2014, 17.
6
Vogel 2018.
7
Carpenter and Moss 2014, 12, 16.
8
Carpenter and Moss 2014, 17.
4
desired!service,!social!activists!and!public!interest!advocacy!organizations!play! almost!no!
part,! and! the! industry-consumer! coalition! (o r! the! mobilization! of! consumers! by! and! on!
behalf!of! Uber)! is! activated!to! oppose! a! pro-consum er! regulation! that! Uber! argues! would!
cause!it!to!leave!the!market.!!
!
We!analyze!Uber!as!a!model!of! disrupted!regulation,!which!has!two!phases.!In!the!first,!an!
existing!regulatory!regime,!in!this!case!for! ta xis ,! w a s! n o t! d e re gu la te d!but!d is re ga rd e d!by!th e !
challenger,! Uber,! who! flouted! entry! and! price! controls,! often! triggering! cease! and! de sist!
orders! from! city! regulators.! A! subsequent! phase! involves! regulation! and! has! occurred! at!
both! city! and! state! levels—in ! le gis la tiv e! and! some times! regu l at or y! bodies—and! also! in!
judicial! venu e s .! ! It! conforms ! to! an! elite- dom inated! model! of! contending! incumbent! vs.!
challenger!interests,!in!w hich! the! latter!has!largely! prevailed.!!In!this! mode l!of!challenger!
capture,! Uber! has!been! able! to! defend! its! core! interests!of! low! prices,!high!driver! supply!
(with!no!labor!regu lation),!and !cons um er!tru st.!W hile!Ub er!initially!rejected!all!regu lation,!it!
has!most!vigorously!opposed! those! central! to! its!business!model!of!low-cost!service! with!
dynamic!pricing,!frictionless!entry!of!drivers,!and!no!vehicle!caps.!
!
Uber! regulation! follows! a! pattern! of! elite-driven! politics! in! which! dispersed! actors!
(consumers ! an d! drivers)! are! weak! and! are! represente d! primarily! by! surrogate s.! ! It! is! a!
model!of!challenger!capture,!with!the!following!traits:!!
!
• Rather! than! deregulation! per! se,! the! hi-tech! disrupter! disregard s! existing!
regulations,!including!barriers!to!entry!and!price!con trols.!
• Concentrated!interests!dominate!the!subsequent!politics! of!regulation,!in!which!the!
disrupter! has! both! substantial! structural! pow er! and! novel—as! well! as!
conventional—forms!of!ins tru mental!po wer!and!h a s!d efe n de d !its!co re !in ter es ts.!!
• Dispersed! consumers! depend! on! shifting! alignments! with! concentrated! interests.!!
Consumers!are!aligned!w ith!challengers! on!high!supply!an d!low!cost!of!service—on!
which!Uber!acts!as!a!surrogate!and!mobilizes!their!support.!!They!are!aligned!with!
taxi! incum b en ts,! w h o! fight! for! c on sum e r! protection! a nd ! safety! regula tions.!
Consumer!interests!have!been!addressed!in!legislative!venues!in!a!pattern!of!elite-
driven!politics.!
• Dispersed! drivers! are! aligned! w ith! Uber! on! issues! concerning! Uber’s! on-going!
presence!in!a!city,!but,!given! any! further!lack! of! alignment! with! concentrated!actors,!
labor!issue s!h av e!b ee n !ad d res se d!p rimarily!by!su rr og a te!a cto rs!in !co u rts.!!
• A! dual! regulatory! regime! has! emerged,! which! preserves! extensive! regulations! for!
the! incumbent! taxi! industry! while! cre ating ! much! weaker ! regulations! for! the!
challenger,!Uber.!
!
Uber! is! a! particularly! good! case! for! analysis.! To! date,! it! has! been! subject! to! the! most!
regulatory!attention!and!thus! provides! a!good!basis!for!empirical!exam ination.!Also,! U ber! is!
a!“most!likely”!case!for!high!regulation!in!at!least!two!ways.!First,!it!enters!a!sector!w ith!a!
strong! regulatory! regim e! and! one! tha t! is! defend ed! by! entrenched! rent-seeking! interests.!
Second,!Uber!exercises!a!high!degree!of!control!over!work!conditions,!a!defining!condition!
of! employee! status,! and! it! is! thereby! m ost! susceptible! to! labor! regulation! and!
misclassification! lawsuits! and! rulings.
9
!To! the! extent! regulations! are! limited! in! the! Uber!
case,!they!are!unlikely!to!be!enacted!for!other!labor!platforms.!Strikingly,!we!find!that!this!
“most!likely”!case!has!experienced!only!w eak !regulation.!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
Collier, Dubal, and Carter 2017.
5
!
The!primarily!qualitative!analysis!that!follows!uses!several! sources!of!data,!including!news!
coverage! and! interviews! w ith! taxi! interests,! Uber! d rivers,! Uber! em ployees,! plaintiffs’!
attorneys,! defense! attorneys,! labor! advocates,! legislators,! and! legislative! aides.
10
!! We! use!
case!studies!to!examine!the!politics!of!city-level!r eg ula tio n.!We !then!turn!to!reg ula tion!by!
the!states,!analyzing!an!original!database !of!all!regulations!passed!betw e en!201 4!and!201 6!
and!a!case!study!of!California,!the!first!site!of!UberX!as!well!as!the!first!state!to!regulate!it!
and! a! particularly! influential! case! of! regulation.
11
!Finally,! we! examine! judicial! regulation!
using!a!database!of!court!dockets!from!2012-2016!in!federal!and!state!courts!in!California,!
Texas,!and!New! York,!and!focus!our!discussion!on!the! key!“test”! cases!filed! against! Uber.!!It!
should! be! noted! that! regulations! generally! refer! to! TNCs,! or! transportation! network!
companies,!as!platform-based!ride-hailing!companies!have!come!to!be!called.!!!!!!!!
!
!
REGULATORY!AGENDA!!
!
With!the!advent!of!Uber,!a!number!of!regulatory!issues!have!been!raised!by!stakeholders!
and!policy!advocates,!including!taxi!companies,!foundations,!NGOs,!bloggers,!and!scholars.!
Public! officials! have! taken! action! on! only! a! subset! of! these! issues.! Regulatory! inaction!
occurs! either! because! of! a! failure! to! pass! a! proposed! law! or! obtain! a! ruling! in! court,! or!
because!issues!have!not!even! made!it!to!the!agenda! in!legislatures!or!brought!to!trial.!To!
assess! the!areas!in!w hich!pu blic!officials!have!and! have!not! acte d,!we!com p ile!a!“regulato ry!
agenda”! of! the! issues! that! have! been! proposed! or! enacted.! ! We! group! them! into! five!
categories!(Table!1).!!
!
The! first! two! categories! reflect! their! labels:! “safety”! and! “consumer! protection.”! These!
regulations!aim!to!protect!U be r’s!custom ers!an d!the!ge nera l!public.!Beca use!U ber’s!busin ess!
model! depends! on! customer! trust,! the! company! has! always! provided! its! own! driver!
training,! required! backgro un d! check s,! and! insisted! on! minim u m ! vehicle! standa rds.!
However,!these!items!remain!on!the!regulatory!agenda!because!regulators!consider!the!self-
impos ed !p ra ct ice s!in a d eq u a te !
!
In!addition!to!the ir!state d!p urp ose ,!con sumer!protection !an d!sa fety!re gu lation s!also!re flect!
competitive!issues!in!tha t!they!“level! the!playing! field”!between!Uber!and!taxis.!Indeed,!taxi!
interests !ofte n!de mand!such !reg u la tio n s!on !competitive !gro u n ds .!!Uber !vigo ro u sl y!op p o se s!
some!o f!these!regulations,!most!notab ly!fingerprint-based!background!checks,!as!a!rigidity!
in!e a sy !drive r!ent ry .!Oth er !issue s!are !uniq u el y!rela te d !to!com petition!between! Uber! and! the!
taxi!sector.!We!inclu de!the se!reg ulatio ns!as!“o ther!co m p etition.”!!
!
!
! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
We conducted more than two dozen interviews with taxi interests in San Francisco and New York, 215
surveys with Uber drivers in San Francisco, 25 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Uber drivers in San
Francisco, more than two dozen interviews with labor advocates from California and New York, 5 interviews
with legislators and legislative aides at the city level (San Francisco and Seattle) and the state level
(California).
11
The name “Transportation Network Company,” or TNC, was first officially used by California state
regulators.
6
Table!1.!Regulatory!Agenda!
!
Category!
Issue!add re sse d !
Groups!benefitted!
Safety!
Background!checks!
Consumers,!taxis!
Commercial!licenses!!
Driver!training!
Decal!visibility!
Vehicle!inspection!regulations!
Consumer!
Protection!
Non-discrimination!
Fare!disclosure!
Accurate!fare!calculation!
Accessibility!
Insurance!re qu irem e nts !
!
Limit!TNC!sharing!of!consumer!data!!
!
Other!Competition!
Permits!and!fees!
Taxis!
!
Airport!fees!
Limits!on!surge!pricing!
Caps!on!number!of!vehicles!
Ban!ride-pooling!
Ban!leasing!of!vehicles!
Prohibit!cash!payments!
Ban!street!hails!
Worker!protection!
!
Employee!status!!
Drivers!!
!
Right!to!organize/bargain!collectively!
Income!(w a ge s!and !stab ility)!
Transparent!rankings!&!process!of!deactivation!!
Transparent!earnings!calculation!
Dispute!resolution!mechanism!
Driver!privacy!
Ban!penalizing!drivers!who!organize/protest!
Prohibit!discrimination!against!drivers!
Public!goods!
Pollution!
Public!!
Reporting!requirements!
Congestion!
Coordination!with!public!transit!!
Ride-pooling!!
Taxation!
!
Data!security!and!sharing!
!
7
Labor! issues!are!also!contentious,! m ost!saliently! drivers’! legal!classification!as!independent!
contractors!rather!than!em ployees!who!are!p rotected!by!w ork!laws,!su ch!as!the!minimum !
wage,!social!security,!right!to!unionize,!and!overtime!pay.!Those!advocating!employee!status!
point!to!Uber’s! significant!control!over!conditions!of!work,! the!legal! condition!for!employee!
status.! Opposing! reclassification! an d! other! lab or! regulation,! U ber! argues! that! it! is! not! an !
employer!or!even!a!transportation!compan y,!but!a!technology!company!that!simply!offers!
the! softw a re! that! matches! riders! w ith ! drivers.! Im p orta ntly ,! some! labor! issu es! can! be!
addressed! without! reclassification.! Finally,! we! include! a! category! of! regulations! that!
address!public!goods,!like!congestion!and!public!transit.!!
!
In! the! analysis! tha t! follows,! we ! analyze! th e! politics! of! regulating! th ese ! categories! in !
different!policy-making!venues.!!
!
!
REGULATION!BY!CITY!GOVERNMENTS!
!
After!taxis!replaced!for-hire!horse!carriages!at!the!end! of! the! 19
th
! ce ntury,! city! gov ernm ents!
took! prim ary ! res pon sibility! for!regulating! the! industry .
12
!!A!century!later,!when!Uber!and!
other!TNCs!were!launched! in!cities!across! the!country,! city! officials!debated!the! best!way!to!
address! these! entrants,! w hich! were! structured! differently! from! the! tax i! sector! and! yet!
provided! the!same!service.!!In!this!section,! w e!examine!the!way!Uber!enters!markets!using!
an! “act! first,! apologize! later”! strategy! that! flouts! existing! regulations.! We! then! turn! to! a!
number!of!hypotheses!that!relate!city! “types”!to!the!regulatory!response!to!this!disruption.!!
Finally,! we! examine! the! strategies! that! Uber! has! employed! to! achieve! its! preferred!
regulatory!outcome s.!!!
!
We!examine!eight!cities!using!data!gathered!from!an!exhaustive!review!of!online!sources!for!
each!city.
13
!Rather!than!a!representative!sample!of!cities,!w e!select!three!types!of!cities!to!
explore!hyp otheses!about!city!characteristics.!!We!examine!three!steps:!initial!response!to!
Uber’s!entry,!subsequent!regulations,!and!Uber’s!response.!
!
The!first!city!type!includes!San!Francisco,!Seattle,!and!Austin:!politically!progressive!cities!
that!are!innovation!hubs!(Figure !1 ).!T he se!two!traits!(i.e.,!p rogr essive !and!hi-tech)!give!rise!
to! two! c on trad ictory! hypoth eses.! Such! cities! might! be! friend ly! to! hi-tech! interests,! given!
that! hi-tech! firm s! hold! influ enc e! an d! acc oun t! for! a! gre at! dea l! of! local! eco no m ic! activity.!
Alternatively,! as! progressive! cities,! they! may! be! m ore! likely! to! regulate,! especially! with!
respect! to! c onsu m er! protection,! safety,! and! worker! protection! issues! as! w ell! as! public!
goods.!!
!
The! second! group! of! cities—New! York! City,! Chicago,! and! Philadelphia—have! historically!
strong! 1)! regulatory! a gencies! and! 2)! incumbent! taxi! sectors.! ! They! are! also! older,! large,!
industria l! citie s! w it h! de n se ! ur b an ! co re s! an d ! cap tu r ed! regulatory! regimes! for! the! ride-
hailing!industry.
14
!Therefore,! they! might!be! expected! to! do! m ore! to! prevent!Uber’s!initial!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
Dubal 2017.
13
An internet search of Uber regulation in our cities yielded online versions of local and national newspapers
and other online publications/media sources as well as blogs.
14
San Francisco also has an entrenched taxi industry, but it is a smaller city and from the late 1970s-2009,
medallions were non-transferable and had no monetary value. Without medallions as high-value assets,
taxis had less lobbying power. See Dubal 2017.
8
entry!and!to!enact!regulations!that!level!the!playing! field,!restrict!supp ly,!and!inhibit!driver!
entry.!!
!
Finally,! Houston! and! San! Antonio! are! Sunbelt! cities! in! the! conservative! state! of! Texas,! a!
category! in! w hich! we! can! again! consider! Austin.!Given! their! relatively!recent!growth! and!
lower! density,! we! might! ex p ec t! them! to! ha v e! a! less! entrenc h ed ! taxi! sec to r! and! do! less! to!
halt!Uber’s!initial!entry,!res tric t!ca r!a n d !dr ive r!s u p p ly,!o r!p u rs u e !lev e lin g!with!taxis.!
!
!
!
!
Figure!1.!City!and!State!Ideology!(Public!Preferences)!!
!Source:!Tausanovich!and!Warshaw!2013!
!
!
Step!1:!Disrupting!regulation!
!
Uber! enters! urban! markets! extra-legally,! ignoring ! an ! ext en s ive ! reg u la to ry ! reg ime,! which !
include s,! am o ng ! oth er s,! barr ier s! to! entr y! and ! price ! con tro ls ;! drive r! regis tr at ion ,! licen sin g ,!
and!insurance!requirements;!and!consumer!protection!and!safety!regulations.!Uber’s!entry!
thereby!forces !loca l!or!state!governments!to!respond!reactively!to!a!fait!accompli,!after!Uber!
has!established!a! base! of! customers! and! drivers.
15
!! City! officials!are! thus! confronted!with!
two! option s:! a llow ! U b er! to ! o per ate! or! ban! it— th rou gh ! ce ase! and! desist! orders! and! law!
enforcement—until!regulations!are!enacted.!!
!
The!first!issue! for!regulators! is!whether!TN Cs!are!technology!companies,! as!TNCs!insist,!or!
transportation ! comp an ies,! as! the! taxi! sector! insists.! ! As! tech! compa nies,! TNC s! provide!
software!to!m atch !riders!with!private!drivers.!!As! tran sportation !co m panies,!they!challenge !
the!incu m b en t! ta xi!sector,! w hich !has! be nefited !from! th e!classic! reg ula tions!of! en try!barriers!
and!price!controls,!thereby!restricting!supply,!maintaining!“high”!prices,!and!supporting!!
driver!income.!!How,!then,!do!cities!respond,!when!Uber!intr od u c es !its!ap p ,!allow in g!drivers !
in!their!own!cars!to !b e !alg o rith mically!m a tc he d !w it h !a!rid e r? !
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15
Griswold and Murphy 2016.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
New York City
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Austin
San Antonio
Houston
Seattle
San Francisco
Chicago
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Conservatism score
●●
City
State
9
We!find!that!timing,!more!than!city!traits,!seems!to!be!the!stronger!predictor!of!responses!to!
Uber!entry!(Table!2).!Where!Uber!launched!in!2012!or!2013—San!Francisco,!Seattle,!New!
York,! and! Chicago—cities! did! little! to! preven t! Uber’s! operation! upon! entry.! In! the! three!
Texas!cities!and!Philadelphia,!Uber!launched!later—in!20 1 4 —after!other!cities!and!states!!
!
!
!!
Table!2.!!Regulatory!Steps!by!Cities!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
City!
Step!1!
Step!2!
Step!3!
Pre-Regulation:!
Initial!Response!!
!
Regulation:!Notable!features
!
Post-Regulation:!Uber!response!
!
San!Francisco!
!
No!action!
None!
NA!
Seattle!
No!action!
Vehicle!caps;!Driver!
unionization!
Successful!Uber!protest!of!cap;!
formal!ch a llen g e!o f!u nio n iza tio n!
ordinance!!
Austin!!
Police-enforced!
ban!
Fingerprinting!
Leaves!city!after!organizing!and!
losing!pub lic !refe ren d u m !o n!
fingerprin tin g .!Su cc es sfu lly!
lobbies!sta te!to !ov er tu rn .!
Houston!
Police-enforced!
ban!
Fingerprinting!
Initially!accepts;!then !thre ate ns!
to!leave!city!but!rem ain s.!
Successfully!lobbies!state!to!
overturn.!!
San!Antonio!
Police-enforced!
ban!
Fingerprinting!
Leaves!city!in!response!to!
fingerprin tin g .!City !ch a n ge s!
regulation!to!make!
fingerprin tin g !op tio n al.!!
Philadelphia!
Poorly!enforced!
UberX!ban!
Ban;!earmarked!taxes!for!
education!!(state-imposed) !
Continues!operating!UberX!
service!despite!ban.!Successfully!
lobbies!sta te!to !ov er tu rn .!
New!York!
City!
Brief!ban!
Extensive!leveling!(e.g.,!
commercial!licenses;!
fingerprin tin g ;!driv e r!
training;!permits/ fees)!
Successful!mobilization!against!
vehicle!caps!proposed!by!mayor!
but!does!not!mobilize!against!
proposals!enacted!by!regulatory!
agencies.!
Chicago!
No!action!
Extensive!leveling!(e.g.,!fees!
that!are!higher!than !taxis)!
Successful!mobilization!against!
fingerprin tin g .!!
10
had!begun!to!regulate;!there,!Uber’s!entry!w as!met!with!a!ban.!In!Austin!and!Philadelphia,!
Uber!nevertheless!continued!to!operate,!aided!by!software!that!produced!a!fake!version!of!
the!Uber!app !to!thw art!re gu lators!a nd!law!enforcem ent.
16
!
!
Step!2:!Regulating!disruption!!
!
Cities!must!next!decide!how !they!will!regulate!Uber.!As!discussed!above,!we!expect!hi-tech!
progressive!cities!to!face!counter-pressures;!old,!industrial!cities!to!do!more!to!harmonize!
TNC! regulations! with! those! on! taxis;! and! Texas! cities! to! be! Uber! friendly.! ! We! focus! on!
regulations!that!have!been!particularly!contentious!for!Uber.!
!
Consistent!with!the!contradictory!predictions!of!hi-tech,!progressive!cities,!the!three!cities!
differ.! ! San! Francisco! has! taken! a! laissez-faire,! tech-frien d ly ! a pp r oa ch ! with! virtu a lly! n o !
regulation.
17
!! Seattle! has! attempted! two! regulations! that! are! central! to! Uber’s! business!
model.!!First,!it!imposed!vehicle!caps.!!However,!it!quickly!backtracked!following!a!strong!
lobbying ! effor t! by ! Ub er.
18
!! Second,! alone! among! US! cities,! it! enacted! labor! regulations,!
specifically! the! right! of! drivers! to! bargain! collectively.! This! ordinance! remains!
unimplemented,! as! its! legality! is! contested! in! court.
19
!! Austin! has! adopted! relatively! high!
levels! of! consu m e r! pro te ctio n! reg u lat ion ! inclu d ing ! finge rp rin ting ,! in! a! patte rn ! tha t!
conforms!to!the!other!Texan!cities.!!
!
As! hypothesized,! regulatory! agencies! play! a! strong! role! in! the! old! industrial! cities,!
particularly! New! York! and! Philadelphia.! ! By! contrast,! regulatory! attempts! by! elected!
officials!have!been!mostly!unsuccessful.!In!New!York,!Mayor!De!Blasio!was!unable!to!impose!
regulations!(e.g.,!vehicle!caps)!that!went!beyond!the!extensive!leveling!rules!passed!by!the!
Taxi!and!Limousine! Com mission! (TLC).
20
!Politicians! in!Philadelphia!also!had!a!difficult!time!
contesting!the!authority!of! the!Philadelphia!Parking! Authority!(PPA),! a! longstanding!agency!
that! has! regulated! taxis.! The! PPA! was! constrained ! only! when! the! state! legislatu re!
interven e d! in! 20 1 6 ! to! end ! the ! ba n! an d ! pre empt!furth er ! city-level!regulatio n .
21
!In!Chicago,!
ride-hailing!is!regulated!by!the!Departmen t!of! Bu siness! Affairs! and !C onsu m er! Protection ,!an !
agency!with!a!b roader!mandate!than!New!York’s!TLC!or!Philadelphia’s!PPA.!!This!Chicago!
agency!has!played!a!lesser!role!an d!the!elected!city!coun cil!and!mayor,! a!greater!regulatory!
role.!!!
!
Also! as! hypothesized,! regulations! in! the! industrial! cities! have! do ne ! the! mo st! to! level! the!
playing! field! with! taxis.! New! York! went! furthest,! with! TNCs! facing! many! of! the! same!
requirements! as! taxicab s,! includin g! d river! tra ining,! finge rprint-based! background! checks,!
and! commercial! licenses! for! drivers.
22
!Chicago! adopted! some! regulations! for! TNCs! that!
exceeded!those!of!taxicabs,!such!as!higher!city!taxes!on!pick-ups!and!drop-offs!at!popular!
tourist! destinations.
23
!As! mentioned,! TNCs! were! banned! in! Philadelphia—albeit!
ineffectively—until!late!2016.
24
!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16
Isaac 2017a.
17
Rayle and Flores 2016.
18
Soper 2014.
19
Levy 2017.
20
Jorgensen and Bredderman 2016.
21
Laughlin 2017.
22
Sanchez 2015.
23
Barnes 2017.
24
Tanenbaum 2016.
11
Finally,!the! Texas! Sunbelt!cities!were! predicted!to! be! the! least! likely!to! regulate.!Yet,!San!
Antonio,!Austin,! and!Houston! all!implemented!fingerprint-based!background!checks,!w hich!
Uber!vehemently! opposed.
25
!! Below,! we! discuss!the!oppositional!tactics!of! Uber,!but!note!
here! that! in! San! Antonio,! U ber’s! extensive! mobilization! was! effective,! and! the! regulation!
was! overturned! (as! it! was! in! the! other! two! cities! when! state! legislation! was! passed! to!
preempt!local!regulations).
26
!!!
!
City! regulation! of! Uber! thus! varies! substantially.! ! These! cases! mostly! support! our!
hypotheses:! the! “cross-pressured”! hi-tech,! prog ress ive! cities! did! no t! follow ! a! con sisten t!
pattern.!The!old,!industrial!cities!did!not!extend!the!taxi!regulatory!regime!to!TNCs,!but!they!
did!implement! the!most! extensive! leveling!regulations,!with! specialized!regulatory!agencies!
leading!the!way.!The!Texas!cities!departe d!from !the!hypoth es ized !patter n!in!passing!one!of!
the!most!conte ntiou s!reg ulatio ns—finge rp rin tin g.!
!
Uber!has!accepted!certain!consumer!protection!and!safety!regulations!that!are!consistent!
with!its! need!to! build!customer! trust.! All! of! our!cities,! with!the!notable! exception! of! San!
Francisco,! have!implemented!such!basic! regulations.!However,!other! regulations!have!been!
more! contentious,! and! Uber! has! vigorously! opposed! those! it! fears! will! restrict! the! easy!
entry! of! drivers! and ! the! supply! of! cars! on! the! road,! like! fingerprint-based! background!
checks,!vehicle!caps,!and,!in!the!most!extreme!case,!full!ban s.!Ea ch!of!our!cities,!except!San!
Francisco,
!27
!imple mented!at!least !one!of!these!co n te n tio u s!regulatio n s;!howev e r,!in!almo s t!
every! case!these!regu lations!have!been!subsequently! overturned!following!Ub er!opposition!
at! the! city! or! state! level.! Also! contentious! are! labor! regulations,! which! only! Seattle! has!
addressed! through! legislation.! Like! labor! issues,! public! goods! regulations! have! also! been!
largely!ignored .!How ev er ,!it!sho uld !be!noted!that!labor!and!pub lic!good s!are!beginnin g !to!
receive!some! attention:! in! late! 2 0 1 7! a n d! e ar ly! 2 0 18 ! N ew!York! City ! re gu la tor s! a nn o un c ed !
that!they! are! p ursu ing !a !w a ge! floo r!fo r!d rivers !a nd !a !v ehicle! ca p! to! de crea se! con ge stion;! Sa n!
Francisco’s!m ayor!reached! a!deal!with!U ber!and!Lyft!to!create! designated!pick-up!points! to!
decrease! congestion;! and! Chicago! imposed! an! additional! tax! on! Uber! to! fund! public!
transit.
28
!!
!
Step!3:!Uber!strategies!to!influence!city-level!re g u la t io n!
!
Uber!has!tried!to!influence!or!change!regulatory!outcomes!through!a!combination!of!insider!
(i.e.!directly!lobbying!elected!officials)!and!outsider!(i.e.!mobilizing!drivers,!customers,!and!
the! public)! strategies.! The! outsider! strategies! are! particularly! novel,! taking! advantage! of!
technological!featu res !of!the!platfo rm !eco no m y.!!
!
The! app! provides! both! a! list! of! drivers! and! customers! and! an! efficient! w ay! of!
communicating!w ith!them .!!It!has!been !a!p ow erful!tool!in!m obilizing!customers!an d!drivers!
to!advo cate ! for! U be r’s! po sition!on!re gula tory ! m atte rs! b y! m e rely!clicking! a! link .! For ! instan ce ,!
in!Ne w !York!and!Au s tin ,!Uber!p r esen ted!a! new !“view”!of!its!app ,!designed !to!target!officials!
who!had!proposed! vehicle!caps!and!fingerprinting,!respectively.
29
!When! customers! opened!
the!app,!a !p op -up!m essage! appeared,! asserting!that!New!York!City! Mayor!Bill! De!Blasio! and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
Wear 2015.
26
Griswold and Grabar 2015.
27
The San Francisco city government issued a short-lived cease and desist order for UberCab in 2010 but
not on UberX.
28
Barone 2018. Rodriguez 2017; Flegenheimer 2015. Small 2017.
29
Tepper 2015; McGlinchy and Weber 2015.
12
Austin! Councilwoman! Ann! Kitchen! w ere! proposing! regulations! that! would! make! it!
impos sib le ! for! U b e r! to! o p er at e.! Cu s to mers! wer e! th en ! p ro vid e d ! a! link ! to! re gis te r! th eir !
opposition!to!the!regulations.!!
!
In!addition! to! this! “clicktiv ism ,”! Ub er! ha s! m ad e! ex ten sive! us e! of! onlin e! petitions,!which!it!
has! publicized! to!drivers! and!customers.! For!example,!to!oppose!the! Philadelphia! ban,!Uber!
organized! a! petition,! which! garnered! 127,000! signatures.
30
!Uber! also! used! the! contact!
informa tio n ! from! petition! sign a to rie s! to ! auto matically ! gen erate! emails! that! opposed!
regulations! and! that! were! se nt! to! policym ake rs.
31
!The! company! has! even! initiated! public!
referenda,!a!strategy!that!resu lted!in!the!suspension!of!v ehicle!caps!in!Seattle!but!failed!to!
overturn! fingerprint-based! background! checks,! a! consumer! protection! issue,! in! A ustin.!
These!strategies!have!been!enhanced!by!Uber’s!extensive!use!of!m edia.!The!company!has!
taken!out!ads!in!new spa pe rs!and !on!television !to!target!pu blic!officials,!like!Counc ilwo m an !
Kitchen!and!Mayor!De!Blasio,!and!to!publicize!its!refe re n d a!and!online !petition s.
32
!Finally,!
outside!of!traditional!mobilizing!efforts,!Uber!has!directly—and!d eceptively—manipulated!
public!opinion!data!available!to!local!regulators.!In!some!cities,!the!company!has!asked!its!
employees! to! devise! computer! programs! that! automatically! respond! to! city-administered!
surveys!in!a!way!favorable!to!the!comp any .
33
!!
!
Uber’s!strategies! have! been! employed! primarily! against! elected! officials! and! have! mostly!
been!successful.!While!the!direct!effects!of!these!efforts!cannot!be!meaningfully!measured,!
Uber’s! goals! were! ultimately! accomplished! in! defeating! vehicle! caps! in! Seattle! and! New!
York! City,! in! legalizing! UberX! in! Philadelphia,! and! in! eliminating! fingerprint-based!
background!checks!in!the!Texas!cities.!!
!
Uber!calculates!strategically,!and!in !its!large st!marke ts,!it!has!ultimate ly!accepted !even!the!
regulations! it! most! opposes.! In! the! largest! ride-hailing!city,!N ew! York,!Uber! has! accepted!
fingerprin tin g ! and! other! regulations! that! are! sub st an tia lly! equiva len t! to! those! on! taxis—
with!the! important!exceptions! of! vehicle! caps!and! fare!control.! ! In!Austin,!Uber!followed!
through! on! its! threat! to! leave! in! re spo nse ! to! fingerp rintin g,! but! in! Housto n,! the! co m pa ny !
remained! in! the! larger! ma rket,! despite! sim ilar! threats.
34
!However,! in! both! cities,! the!
requirement!w as!subse que ntly!overturn ed!by !Uber - su ppo rted!state!legislation.
35
!!
!
In!other!cities,!Ub er’s!threats!to !leave!a!marke t!have!b ee n!an!effectiv e!tool!of!overturning !
regulations.!Officials!in!San!Antonio!retracted!a!fingerprinting!ordinance!after!Uber!left!the!
city!in!protest,!and!in!2016,!C hicago!pulled!a!prop osed!fingerprinting!ordinance!following!
Uber’s!threat!to!leave!the!city.
36
!Regulatory!agencies!comprised!of!appointed!officials,!like!
the!T LC !in!N ew !York!and—for!a!while—the!PPA!in!Philadelphia,! have!been!less!affected! by!
pressure! brought! by! Uber! and! more! prone! to! adopt! and! maintain! regulations! that! Uber!
opposes.!
!
Thus,! Uber! succeeded! everywhere! in! disrupting! city! ride-hailing! regulatory! regimes! of!
entry!and!price!controls.!!In!th e! su bse qu ent! p roc ess! of! re gu lating! th is! disrup tion ,!cities! h ave !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30
Moore 2016.
31
Isaac 2017b.
32
Theis 2015; Hunte 2015; Laughlin 2016.
33
Isaac 2017b.
34
Bennett 2016.
35
Herkovitz 2017.
36
Madhani 2016.
13
varied! with! respect! to! consumer! protection,! safety,! and! other! com petition! regulations,!
which! were! also!initially! violated.! !These!have! been!less!contentious!because! Uber!depends!
on!consumer!trust,!which!these!regu lation s!enhance.!The!high!priority!issues!for!Uber !have!
been!those!that!challenge!its!business!model!of!high!and! flexible!supply,!particularly!vehicle!
caps,! fingerprint-based! background! checks,!and! drivers’! rights!as! w orkers.! As! a! powerful!
player!with!significant!instrumental!and!structural!power,!Uber!has!prevented!or!defeated!
almost!all!of!these!regulations.!!
!
!
REGULATION!BY!S TATE!GOVERNMENTS!
!
States,! which!have!historically! played!a!limited!role!in! regulating!the!taxi!sector,!have!often!
interven e d! to ! reg u la te ! TN C s .! ! In! fact,! m an y ! sta te s,! ha vin g ! be e n! lo b b ied ! b y! U b er ,! hav e !
wrested! control! from! cities,! preempting! municipal! regulation.
37
!! By! December! 2016,! 38!
states! ha d! passed! TNC! legislation.! ! W e! analyze! an! original! database! of! all! state-lev el!
legislation! passed! betwe en ! 2 0 1 4! and! 2 0 16 ,! drawn ! fr om!the! O p e n! States! website.! We! test!
several!hypotheses! ab out! state- le ve l! c ha ra ct erist ics! a n d ! re gu la tor y!outcomes.!!We!th en ! tu r n!
to!a!case!study!of!Californ ia.!!
!
Like!cities,!states!have!generally!acted!in!only!three!categories!of!the!regu latory!agenda —
consumer!protection,!safety,!and!other!competition.!States!have!not!diverged!significantly!in!
the!em p has is! giv en!to!e ach ! o f! th ese!categories,! with!a!high! cor relation ! in ! re gu lations ! p asse d!
across!categories!(Table!3).!!
!
!
Table!3.!Correlation!of!percent!of!regulations!passed!by!category!
!
!
!
!
!
Consumer!
protection!
!
!
Other!
competition!
!
!
Safety!
!
!
Consumer!
Protection!
!
1!
!
0.88!
0.76!
!
Other!
competition!
!
!
1!
0.81!
!
Safety!
!
!
!
1!
!
!
States! tend! to! cluster! into! groups! of! “high”! and! “low”! regulators! (Figure! 2).! A! number! of!
“usual!suspects”!m igh t!explain!this!v ariation.!A!first!pair!of!hypotheses!is!tha t!ideology!and!
partisanship!may! influence!regulatory!outcomes,!with!liberal,!democratic!states!expected ! to!
regulate!more.!A !th ird!hy poth esis!is!tha t!m ore! urba n!state s!w ill!regulate! m ore! beca use! Ub er!
serves! a! larger! share! of! the! state’s! population.! Measures! of! ideo lo g y,! partisan sh ip ,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37
See also Borkholder, Montgomery, Chen, and Smith 2018.
14
urbanization! do! not! appear! to! be! associated! with! level! of! re gulation! (Figures! A1-A3).!
Notably,!regulations!pass!as!bipartisan!processes,!with!most!bills!garnering!over!70! percent!
support!from!both!parties!(Figure!3).!!
!
!
Figure!2.!Histogram!of!Total!Number!of!Regulations!(states!that!have!regulated)!
!
!
!
Figure!3.!Bipartisan!Support!of!TNC!Regulation!
!
!
An! examination! of!the!content! of!regulations! indicates!that!even!“high”! regulators!are!quite!
moderate! in! the! regulations! they! enact.! Fingerprint-based! background! checks! have! been!
passed!in! only! one! state,!Kansas,! which! subsequently! repealed! the! requirement.! No ! s t a te !
has!mandated! vehicle!caps,!imposed! a!ban,!or! reclassified!drivers!as!employees.!Sometimes,!
these! reg ula tions! simply! institutionalize! practices! U ber ! already! follows! (e.g.,! no! cash!
payment).!!As!in!cities,!states!primarily!legislate!on!those!consumer!protection!and!safety!
Total number of regulations
Number of states
0 2 4 6 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Proportion of Democrats Supporting
Proportion of
Republicans Supporting
15
requirements! that! U ber! a ccepts! b ecau se! they! are ! thoug ht! to! increa se! consu m er! trust! at! a!
minimal!cost.!!
!
!
CALIFORNIA:!!THE!F IR S T !STATE!TO!REGULATE!
!
To!illustrate!the!politics!of!Uber!regulation,!w e!examine!the!particularly!contentious!initial!
regulation!of!T N Cs!in!California,!the!first!state!to!regulate.!This!instance!of!TNC!regulation!
demonstrates!many!of!the!political!dynamics!that!have!characterized!subsequent!regulatory!
efforts,!particularly!the!strength!of!concentrated!private!in t er es ts ,!the!we a kn e ss !of!drive rs!
and!customers!as!autonomous!actors,!and!the!strategies!Uber!uses!to!fight!regulation.!!!
!
The! California! Public! Utilities! Com mission! (CPUC)! took! the! first! step! in! 2013! by! passing!
insuran ce ! require ments! for! d riv er s! with! passenge rs,! am on g! other! minim al! consumer!
protection!and!safety!regulations.
38
!Regulation!then!moved!to!the!state!legislature!following!
the!hig hly!publicized !death!of!s ix-year-old!Sophia!Liu,!w ho! was! struck! and! killed!by! an! U ber!
driver! in!January! 2014.
39
!!The!driver! was!logged! into!the!app!but!not!engaged! in!a!ride!and!
thus!n ot!required!by!the !CPUC!to!be!covered!by!U be r’s!comm ercial!insurance!policy.!Since!
the!driver!was!using!his!car!for!commercia l!purposes,!h is!personal!in sur anc e!policy!w ou ld!
not! cover! th e! a ccide nt.! In ! resp on se! to! this! “gap”! in! insura nc e! co ve rage ,! the! chair! of! the!
Business! and! Consumer! Protection! Committee! in! the! California! State! Assembly,! Susan!
Bonilla,!proposed!a!law!requiring!commercial!insurance!whenever!drivers!were!logged!onto!
the!app.
40
!!
!
Private!interests! w ere!active!participants! in!the! policy!process.! Taxi!companies! weighed!in,!
issuing! written! statem en t s! a n d ! lo b b y in g! legislato rs! to! regu la te ! T N C s ! a s! t h ey ! r eg u la te ! ta x i!
companies! on! issues! o f! consumer! protection,! safety,! and! public! goods.
41
!However,! they!
were!unable!to!achieve!any!leveling!regulations!beyond!insurance!requirements,!an!issue!
on! which! they! w ere! aligned! with! insurance! companies,! w hich! organized! a! coalition! w ith!
consumer! advocates! and! person al! injury! lawyers! in! support! of! Bonilla’s! bill! and!
participated! in! its! drafting.
42
!Although! influential,! insurance! companies! are! essentially! a!
one-issue!a ct o r.!
!
Uber! w as! extremely! active! in! opposing! the! Bonilla! bill.! While! it! ultimately! accepted!
insuran ce !regulation s ,!it!initially!ar gu e d !that! p erso na l!insu ran ce!should!cover!drivers!when !
they! have! the! a pp ! on! b ut! a re! no t! eng ag ed! in! a ! ride.! Ub er! op po sed! th e! req uirem e nt! o f!
commercial! insurance!either! as!a! cost!to! itself!o r! on e!to! drivers! that!would!pose! a ! b arrier! to!
their!entry.!!
!
Uber!employed!the!dual!insider-outsider!strategy!outlined!above.!It!used!its!vast!financial!
resources!to!hire!14! o f!the!top! 15 !lob bying !firms!in! Sacra m ento,!a nd!it!h ired!former!Obam a!
campaign! mana ger! Dav id! Plouffe! “to! m ake! sure… the! right! ou tcome s! happe n.”
43
!! Uber!
enlisted! the! support! of! n on pro fit! public! in teres t! groups,! most! n ota bly ! Mothers! Against!
Drunk! Driving! (MADD),! to! which! Uber! has! donated! a! percentage! of! fares! on! major!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38
Ha 2013.
39
Constine 2014.
40
Lieber 2014.
41
Interview, California legislative aide 2015.
42
Interview, California legislative aide 2015.
43
Interview, California legislative aide 2015; Badger and Goldfarb 2014.
16
holidays.
44
!MADD! sent! letters! to! the! governor! and! legislature! opposing! the! Bonilla! bill,!
arguing!that!T N Cs!decrease!d run k!driving!and !that!the!pr opo sed !regulations!w ou ld!inhibit!
the! op eration !of!this! ser vice.
45
!!Uber! also!successfully!sought!lobbying!assistance!from!high-
profile!Silicon!Valley!investors,!like!Ron!Burkle!and!John!Doerr,!as!well!as!celebrities,!like!
Ashton!Kutcher,!who!bombarded!Assembly!members!with!phone!calls.
46
!!
!
Uber’s! outsider!strategy!to!shape!and!mobilize!public!opinion! w as!also!m ulti-pronged.!The!
company! hired! n early! all! of! Sacram ento’s! pub lic! relations! firms! to! improv e! its! image! and!
sent! p ro-Uber! material! to! newspapers! throughout! California.
47
!As! part! of! this! public-
oriented!strategy,! Uber! also! targeted! legislators!who! supported! or! were! undecided! about!
the!b ill.!In!o ne!of!the!clearest!in stan ces!of!such!a!stra tegy ,!Uber!targeted!the!bill’s!sponsor!
and!launched!a!p ublic!campaign!in! the!district!where!she!planned! to!run!for! state!Senate!in!
2015,!claiming!that!she!was!anti-technology!an d!a!stoo ge!o f!the!insur an ce!indu stry .
48
!!
!
As! in! cities,! Uber! used! app-en abled! clicktivism! to! mobilize! consumers! and ! drivers! in! a!
campaign!of! pressure! po litics.!Just!before! the! vote! on! the ! California!bill,!Uber! u sed! its!app ! to!
tell! custome rs! that! the! pr opo sed ! re gula tions! threatened ! its! o pe ration ! in ! the ! sta te! and!
initiated!a !p e titio n !th ro u g h !th e !ap p .
49
!The!company!then!contacted!local!news!outlets!to!film!
boxes!of!petitions!being!delivered!to!Assemblywoman!Bonilla’s!office.
50
!!
!
The! California! case! illustrates! the! elite-driven! policymaking! pattern! typical! of! Uber!
regulation.! Concentrated! private! interests! we re! influential,! particularly! incumbents! and!
challengers,!but!also! in!this! case,! the !insurance! com pan ies.! Althou gh!a! m ore!comp rehensive!
bill! w as!initially!proposed,!the!final! legislation! included!only!weakened!insurance!coverage!
requirements!that!c orrespo nd! to!a!compromise!amenable!to!both!Uber!and!the!insurance!
industry .! Customers! and! d riv er s,! disperse d ! and! unorganiz ed ,! did! not! ha ve ! autono mous!
input!into!the!p ol icy !proces s.!!To !the!extent!they!were!participa nt s,!they!were!mobiliz e d!by!
Uber! on! the! basis! of! maintaining! service! and! w ork.! ! But! they! were! mobilized! against!
regulations!that!may!have!benefited!both!group s:!more!extensive!consu m er!protection!for!
consumers!and!Uber-provided!commercial!insurance!for!drivers.
51
!
!
The! case! of! California! also! illustrates! Uber’s! structural! power.! Policymakers! value! Uber’s!
presence!as!a!source!of!service!and!work,!and!fear!disinvestment!or!w ithdrawal!from!the!
market.! ! Many! also! see! regulatory! policy! as! signaling! either! their! welcoming! or! hostile!
attitude! toward! innovation! and! hi-tech! com panies! more! generally.! The! fear! of! appearing!
“anti-tech”! an d! p ossib ly! losin g! fu ture ! op po rtun ities! to! a ttract! and! spur! po st-in d u st ria l!
economic!activity!may!be!observed!in!the!CPUC’s!explicit!initial!regulatory!language:!“The!
purpose!of!this!Rulemaking!is!not! to!stifle!innovation!and!the!provision!of!new! services!that!
consumers!want.”
52
!!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44
Kalanick and Withers 2014.
45
Griffin 2014.
46
Hoge 2014.
47
Kirkham and Lien 2015.
48
Dillon 2016.
49
Lien 2015.
50
Young 2014.
51
Helderman 2014.
52
California Public Utilities Commission 2013.
17
City-State!Comparison!
!
In! gen er al,! states! have! becom e! new ! regulato rs! of! for-hire!transportation!operating! at! the!
municipal!level.!Typically!more!conservative!than!cities,!states! have! regulated! Uber! more!
lightly! th an ! cities! ha ve .! ! A! lar ge ! numb er! have! preem p ted ! munic ipa l! regulatio n,! and! many!
have!introduced!model!legislation!advocated!by!Uber.
53
!!Only!a!few!state!legislatures!have!
passed!regulations!that!explicitly!allow!cities!to!regulate!TNCs.!!
!
That!said,! w hile! cities! have!been!somewhat! bolder,! disrupted! regulation!has!been!generally!
Uber! friendly! in! both! cities! and! states.! ! With! the! exception! of! insurance! regulation! in!
California! and! a! short-lived! fingerprinting ! ordina n ce ! in! Kansas,! states ,! more ! than! cities,!
have!avoided!regulations!that!Uber!most!opposes.!W e!find!that!cities!have!implemented!a!
number! of! these! regulations,! although! m ost! have! been! overturned! in! cities! or! states!
following !e xte n siv e!mobilizatio n !by !U b er .!!!
!
State!action! conforms!to! U ber’s! preference! for!uniform! regulation! rather! than!a!“patchwork!
of! local! regulations! that! [are]! in! conflict! to! [sic]! each! oth er.”
54
!Our! database!of! state-level!
regulation! revealed! that! through ! 2016,! twenty! state! law s! had! explicitly! preem p ted!
municipalities!from!implementing!regulations!on!TNCs,!both!as!a!way!to!prevent!cities!from!
implementing ! reg u lat io ns ! tha t! go ! furt he r! th an ! th e! sta te! and! to! overturn! city-level!
regulations.
55
!! For! example,! as! discussed! above,! the! Texas! legislation!used! preemption! to!
override! fingerprinting! ordinances! passed! by! Austin! and! Houston.! ! Other! states,! like!
Pennsylvania,! while! not! precluding! all! city-level! re gulations,! passed! laws! to! invalidate!
specific!city!laws.!Notably,! w hile! neither! states!nor! cities! have! ge nerally! co nsidered! labor!
regulation,! a! few! states,! inc lu ding! No r t h ! C a r o lina,! Ark a n s a s,! Michig a n ,! In diana,! West!
Virginia,! Florida,! and! Ohio,! have! codified! the! status! of! TNC! drivers! as! independent!
contractors.! Generally,! then,! preemption! of! city-le ve l! regulation! b y! state! legislatur es! has!
resulted!in!regulatory!outcom es!that!align!with!U ber’s!preferen ces.!!!
!
Finally,!the!states!have!often!passed!model!legislation!advocated!by!Uber.!!The!first!example!
pertained!to!insurance.!!After!opposing!one!another!in!the!2014!regulatory!process!in!
California,!the!major!insurance!companies!and!the!TNCs!privately!negotiated!a!compromise!
bill!as!model!legislation!for!other!states.
56
!The!insurance!companies!sought!to!prevent!
drivers!from!using!their!personal!insurance!policy!while!driving!and!to!take!advantage!of!a!
new!market!of!TNC!commercial!drivers.!After!initial!opposition!in!California,!Uber!and!Lyft!
saw!a!benefit!in!standard!insurance!requirements!across!states.!The!negotiated!model!
legislation!a dv o ca ted !d iffere n tial!in su ra nc e!re q uir ements!du rin g!th e!th re e!s tag es !of!th e!
drivers’!work!(i.e.!before!the!rider!is!assigned,!on!the!way!to!pick!up!a!rider,!and!when!a!
rider!is!in!the!vehicle)!with!TNCs !sharin g!resp on sibility!for!cov era ge!w ith!driv ers.!!Of!the!38 !
states!that!had!regulated!TNCs!by!2016,!over!75!perce nt!have!im plem ented!the!exa ct!mod el!
(Figure!4).!!Mo r e !g e n e r a ll y ,!model !le g is l a tion!add r e ss ing!othe r !is s u e s !h a s !been!p roposed!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53
The National Center for Cities puts this number at 41.
54
Hanks 2017.
55
In 2017, an additional six states passed laws explicitly preempting city-level regulation. The issue of
municipal preemption of TNC laws remains legally ambiguous in a number of states. In 2017 the National
League of Cities reported that a total of 37 cities have preempted the authority of cities, and a 2018 National
Employment Law Program report suggested that 41 states have interfered to some degree with local policy
making (DuPuis, et. al. 2017; Borkholder, et. al. 2018).
56
O’Donnell 2015.
18
and!circulated!by!TNC!lobbyists!and!the!American!Legislative!Exchange!Council!(ALEC).
57
!!
In!several!states,!inclu din g!O hio ,!Tex as,!and !Flor ida,!pu b lic!reco rds!u ne arth ed !by!th e!
National!Employment!Law!Program!indicate!that!Uber!wrote!or!co-wrote!the!state!
legislation.
58
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure!4.!Histogram!of!State!Insurance!Regulation!Relative!to!the!Model!
!
!
Uber!Strategies!
!
We!have!seen!that!Uber!has!been!successful!in!entering!markets!and!disrupting!the!ride-
hailing!regulatory!regime!and!has!also!been!influential!in!shaping!the!subsequent!regulation!
of! platform-based! ride-hailing.! ! It! has! done! this! by! deploying! a! vast! array! of! strategies,!
which!are!enabled!by!Uber’s!significant!material!resources,!unique!mobilizational!capacity!
through!the!ap p,!an d!struc tura l!pow e r!as!a!sou rce !of!jobs!an d!hi-tec h!rep uta tion.!!
!
Table! 4! summarizes! these! strategies.! Some! strategies! are! associated! with! Uber’s!
instrum e n ta l! power! while ! othe rs ! are! asso c iat ed ! w ith ! its! struc tu ra l! power.! Instrumental!
power!can!be!used!to!influence!legislators!directly!through!insider!strategies!or!indirectly!
through! outside r! strateg ies.! Insider! strateg ies! have ! been ! mo st! prominent! in! models! of!
regulatory! capture,! an d! in deed ! they ! are! key! in! Uber’s! arsenal.! Ub er! de ploys! significant!
financial!re so u rce s!to !u n de rta k e!in te n se !lob b yin g ,!pa rtic u lar ly!a t!th e!st ate !le ve l.!!
!
In!both !cities!and !states,!Ub er!employ s!a!num b er !of!outsid er!strategies,!through!which!the!
company! influences! policymakers! through! popular! mobilization.! Uber! has! mobilized! its!
drivers! and! customers! to! oppose! regulations.! While! analysts! like! Walker! have! examined!
such! mo bilizational! efforts! by! firms,! the! tech nology ! of! the! app! allows! Uber! to! go! even!
further.
59
!!The! Uber!app!is! itself!a!novel! resource! for! mobilization!of! drivers!and!customers.!
Further,!Uber!has!mobilized!the!broader!public!through!media!campaigns!and!referenda.!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57
Borkholder, et. al. 2018, 11.
58
Borkholder, et. al. 2018, 20.
59
Walker 2014.
Less Same More
Number of states
0 10 20
19
Table!4.!Uber!Strategies!
!
Structural!Power!
• Threats!to!leave!markets!
• Hi-tech!reputation!
Instrumen tal!Po w e r:!
Insider!!
Strategies!
• Hiring!of!lobbying!firms!and!celebrities!
• Alliance! formation! with! non-profit! groups!
(e.g.,!MADD)!
• Alliance! formation! with! other! interested!
actors!(e.g.,!insurance)!
Instrumen tal!Po w e r:!
Outsider!!
Strategies!
• Clicktivism!!
• Online!petitions!
• Public!relations!strategies!
• Referenda!!
• Targeting!sponsors!of!regulation!
• Manipulation!of!public!opinion!data!
!
!
Uber’s! structural! power! is! also! notable! and! derives! from! its! threa ts! to! disinvest! and! its!
perceived!economic!benefits.!!Uber!provides!“flexible”!work!that!accommodates!many!in!the!
21
st
!century!job!market.!!Go vernm ent! decision-makers!also!see!regulation!in!terms!of!the!
city’s!or!state’s!reputation!as!tech!friendly,!affecting! fut ur e! gr owth.!!The!divestment!threat!is!
a! real! one,! as! Uber! has! indeed! left! markets! in! response! to! the! imposition! of! specific!
regulations.!!Furthermore,!Uber!actively!wields!this!threat,!as!it!explicitly!threatens!that!it!
will!leave!a!market.!!!
!
!
JUDICIAL!VENUES!
!
As! noted,! regulation! in! cities! and! states,! played! out! among! regulators,! incumbents,! and!
challengers,! ha s! been! virtually! silent! on! labor! regulation.! Yet,! the! labor-capital! cleavage!
within!the!challenger!interest!is!a!prominent!one!in!the!politics!of! TNC!regulation.!Online!
driver! forums! indicate! the! many! grievances! that! drivers! have! against! U ber.! ! Drivers!
complain! of!fare! cuts,! lack!of! transparency!in! p ay!calculation,!high!expenses!associated! w ith!
driving,!fear!of!termination!associated!with!Uber’s!rating!system,!and!lack!of!training!and!
driver!support—many!of!which!could!be!addressed!through!existing!labor!and!employment!
laws.
60
!The! neglect! in! cities! and! states! of! worker! protection! issues! reflects! imbalance! of!
political!influence!and!the!collective!action!problems!of!dispersed!drivers.!!
!
Legal! analysts!have!suggested!that!politically!weak!groups!“are!almost!always!compelled!to!
resort!to!litigation,”!and!that!litigation!is!“a!technique!to!b e!em p loyed! w hen! goals! are!clearly!
unattainable! in! other! political! forums.”
61
!! The! Uber! case! comports! with! this! theory! of!
political!disadvantage.!As!atomized,!dispersed!actors,!drivers!are!unable!to!bring!effective!
claims! in! legislative! venues.! Even! in! courts,! worker! protection! issues! a re! rarely! brought!
through! the! initiative! of! group s! of! drivers .!Instead,! m ost! case s! are! bro ugh t! by! surr oga tes,!
both! plaintiffs’! attorneys! who! bring! lawsuits! against! Uber! on! behalf! of! drivers! and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60
These complaints were evident in our survey and interviews with workers and many analyses, including a
popular blog “Harry the Rideshare Guy.” See, e.g., Campbell 2016.
61
Epstein 1985, 10.
20
government!agencies!that!investigate!the!company!for!violation!of!laws!that!would!protect!
drivers.!!
!
As!a!venue!of!regulation,!judicial!processes!have!a!distinct!logic.!Unlike!legislative!venues,!
where! lawmakers! can! break! new! ground! by! passing! laws,! courts! and! administrative!
agencies! judge! compliance! with! existing! statutes,! regulations,! and! previous! judicial!
decisions.! ! Uber’s! ow n! approach! to! the! law! “as! something! to! be! tested”! has,! perhaps!
unsurprisingly,!resulted!in!much!litigation.
62
!!!
!
We!focus!here!on!lawsuits!regarding!worker!protections!and!misclassification.!These!have!
been!a!strikingly!frequent!form!of!litigation!against!Uber,!constituting!approximately!one-
third!of!a ll!lawsuits!agains t!the!compa ny ,
!
as!opposed!to!two!to!five!perce n t!of!case s!aga in st!
large!multi-national!tech!companies.
63
!!These!cases!reflect!an!intra-producer!cleavage,!the!
classic! struggle! between! labor! and! capital,! which! is! an ! important! com ponen t! of! the! Uber!
model!of!disrupted!regulation.!!
!
We!analyze!a!database!of!dockets! across!federal!and!three!state!courts!(California,!Texas,!
and! New! York)! from! 2012-2016.
64
!! These! three! states! were! chosen! because! they! include!
multiple! cities!with!large!Uber!markets;!because!key! test!cases! were!filed! in!both!California!
and!N ew!York;!and!because!they!each!represent!different!political!and!legal!regimes!with!
regard!to!worker!protection s.!!California!is!a!progressive!state!with!an!exp ansive,!em ploy ee -
friendly!lab or !cod e;!N ew! Y o rk !is!also!a!pr og re ss ive !state !bu t!ou r!rev ie w !of!state!labor! co des!
indicates !that!it!has!fe w e r!state!worker !protectio n s;!and!T e x as !is!a!conserva tiv e!state!with!
limited! state! labor! prote ctio n s.! Unsu rp risin gly ,! Californ ia! hou ses ! the! largest! number! of!
lawsuits!a ga in st!U b er!a lleg in g!w o rk e r!pr ot ect ion !vio lat ion s .!!
!
Reflecting! the!fact!that!drivers! are!an!unorganized! and!atomized!workforce,! most!cases!are!
not!brought!by!groups!of!drivers!but!by!surrogates,! w ho!typically!conceive!of!the!litigation!
and! then!recruit!worker!plaintiffs!(not!vice!versa).
65
!Prominent!am ong!these!surrogates! are!
plaintiffs’! attorneys,! who! have! brought! class! actions.! ! Like! all! surrogates,! class-action!
attorneys!act!simultaneously! “on!behalf!of”! d rivers! but!also!in!their! ow n!interests,!resulting!
in! a! biasin g ! th a t! h as ! a ffec te d ! w h a t! is su e s! have! been! litigated! and! how! the! litigation!
proceeds.
66
!Because! private! plaintiffs’! attorneys! work! on! contingency,! they! have! an!
incentive !to!brin g !case s!tha t!m a y!yie ld !signific a nt !damages!or!large !sett le m e n t!sums.
67
!We!
find!that!a s!a !re su lt,!in co m e -related!claims!a re !most!common ly !litig a te d !ag a in st!Uber,!an d !
most! cases!have!been!settled!or!dismissed!without!resolving!drivers’! employment! status.
68
!
These!settlements!are!enabled!by!Uber’s!significant!material!resources,!and!they!undermine!
any! efforts! to! regulate! Uber! through! courts.! Other! surrogate! actors! representing! drivers’!
interests !in!c o u rts !inc lu d e !go v er nment!bo d ie s!a n d!a n !N G O .!!!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62
Newcomer 2016.
63
Bloomberg Litigation Analytics (BLA) search of all litigation against Uber between 2012 and November
2016. A BLA search indicates that between November 2012 and November 2017, employment-related
cases constituted 1.4% of cases against Apple and 4.1% of cases against Amazon.
64
Bloomberg law search of federal/state cases in which Uber and/or Rasier LLC (an Uber subsidiary often
named in court documents) is listed as a defendant.
65
Interviews with 4 plaintiff attorneys representing Uber drivers in California and 6 plaintiff Uber drivers.
66
Macey and Miller 1991, 10.
67
Macey and Miller 1991, 17.
68
The exceptions include cases that are still pending and cases that are brought by individual drivers in
administrative contexts.
21
We!focus!below!on!the!most!important!“test”!cases!that!were!brought!primarily!in!courts!
but!also!in! adm inistrative!and!regulatory!agencies.
69
The!majority!of! these!test! cases!involve!
the!m isc lassification !of!Uber!d rivers !as!independent!contracto rs,!a!status!tha t!denies!them!
the! labor! and! emplo ym e nt! rights! available! o nly ! to ! employees.
70
!These! cases! attempt! to!
apply!existing! em ployee!law s!to!the!new!case!of!Uber.
71
!!We! group!these!cases! by!the! types!
of!rights!litigated.!!
!
Income-related!Claims!
!
The! vast! m ajority! of! w orker! protection! cases! involve! income-related! claims.! The! most!
import an t ,! O’Connor! v.! Uber,! is! a ! mis c la s s ific a t io n! ca s e ! filed ! in! 2013! by! Shannon! Liss-
Riordan!in!the!Federal!District!of!Northern!California.!Alleging!misclassification!of!drivers,!
the! ca se! certified! a! large! class! o f! drivers! and,! if! suc cess ful,! would! hav e! challeng ed! Ube r’s!
indepe nd e n t-contractor!business!mod el.
72
!Many!understood!O’Connor!as!a!test!case!for!the!
gig! economy! more! generally.
73
!However,! rather! than! take! the! case! to! trial,! in! 2016! Liss-
Riordan!attempted!to!settle!on!unfavorable!terms.
74
!Indeed,! th e!court! sub seq ue ntly ! re jected !
the! settle m ent! as! “un fair”! to! drivers .
75
!The! case! was! then! stymied! by! a! 9
th
! Circuit! ruling,!
which!decertified!a!portion!of!the!class,!greatly!diminishing!its!size!and!the!potential!impact!
of!this!case.
76
!O’Connor!has!yet!to!be!resolved.!!
!
NYTWA!v.!Uber! was!filed!in!federal!court!in!New!York!in!June!2016.
77
!The!N ew! York!Taxi!
Workers!Alliance!(NYTWA)! is!a!20-year-old!NGO!advocating!for!taxi!drivers’!interests.!The!
NYTWA’s!membership!now!includes!a!majority!of!Uber!drivers.
78
!!However,!in!many!of!its!
actions,!it!continues!to!see! Uber! as! a! central!threat.!After!h aving!lost! the! regulatory!battle!to!
extend!vehicle!caps!and !fare!controls!to!Uber!when!it!first!entered!New!York,!the!NYTW A!
turned!to!the!judicia l!proc ess.!On !beh alf!of!a!class!of!Uber! drivers,! it! alleged! m inimum!wage!
and!overtime!violations!(as!well! as!unlawful!equipment!and!tools!deductions,!and!unlawful!
tax! and! sur cha rge! d edu ction s).! Like ,! O’Connor,! these! c l a ims! cha l le n g e ! the! statu s ! o f ! Uber!
drivers!as!independent!contractors.!The!NYTW A!m aintains!that!in!the!absence!of!city!and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69
Our database captured cases filed in state and federal court. However, a number of important legal
decisions and investigations were made at administrative levels or by regulatory agencies. These were not
represented by our database because they are only reported if the agency or the parties involved release
information to the press. Such investigations and decisions were captured in online searches.
70
Very few exceptions to this rule exist; for example, in some states, independent contractor construction
workers do have access to workers’ compensation.
71
Because private arbitration clauses have been enforced against workers in a large number of states—
including California in 2016—this potential remedy has since slowed. See Tiku 2017.
72
Boston-based Liss-Riordan filed in California because the state’s judicial interpretation of “employee”
under the California Labor Code is one of the most expansive nationwide. She has filed a litany of
misclassification lawsuits in California against gig economy companies with similar business models to Uber
including Lyft, Instacart, Amazon, DoorDash, Handy, Caviar, and Grubhub. To date, only one of these
cases has been adjudicated at trial. In February 2018, a federal district court judge found a GrubHub driver
to be an independent contractor. See Lawson v. Grubhub, Case No.15-cv-05128-JSC (N.D. Cal 2018).
73
Interviews, Doug Bloch (Teamsters) 2016; Aaron Peskin (Supervisor, San Francisco Board of
Supervisors) 2017; Anonymous NLRB attorney 2016, 2017; Anonymous U.S. Department of Labor Wage
and Hour Attorney 2016; Bhairavi Desai (NYTWA) 2015, 2016.
74
For a list of some objections made by plaintiffs, See O’Connor v. Uber Technologies Inc., 836 F.3d 1102
(9
th
Cir. 2016).
75
Wong 2016.
76
The 9
th
circuit overruled the district court’s decision finding Uber’s arbitration agreement unenforceable.
See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc. 836 F.3d 1102 (9
th
Cir. 2016).
77
Wiessner 2016.
78
As of January 2018, the NYTWA represented roughly 19,000 drivers, more than half of which are Uber
drivers.
22
state!regulations!that!limit! the ! nu m ber! o f! TN C! v ehicles! an d! co ntrol! fares,! em p loyee!status!is!
the!only!way! to! lift! and! stab ilize! the! earn ing s! of! TNC ! and ! taxi! driver s.
79
!!The!NYTWA !had!
never! previously! so u g h t! to! estab lis h ! employe e ! rights! for! taxi! driv er s,! who! a re ! also!
indepe nd e n t! work e rs ,! but! rather! work ed ! throu gh ! city! and! state! regulato ry ! bodies ! to!
advance! drivers’! interests,! avoiding! the! issue! of! worker! status.
80
!By! making! themselves! a!
plaintiff!in!th is!case!alongsid e !their!Uber!driver!memb e rs ,!the!N Y T WA!sought!a!se tt le m e n t!
or! trial! adjudication! that! would! undercut! Uber’s! business! model.! ! H owever,! the! district!
court!dismissed!the!NYTW A !as!co-plaintiffs,!claiming!the!organization!lacked! standing.!The!
case!remains!undecided.!!
!
Meyer! v.! Kalanick,! a! federal! anti-trust! action! ag ains t! Uber’s! co-found er ! Travis! Kalan ic k,!
alleged!that!Uber’s!mobile!app!amounts!to!a!price-fix in g!consp ira cy ! b e ca us e!it!coo rd in a tes ! a !
uniform! price! among! U ber! drivers.! ! The! impact! of! this! law suit,! which! ultimately! put! to!
question!the!classification! of!Uber!drivers!as!independent!contractors,!was!also!stymied!by!
an!appellate!court!ruling!that!sent!the!case!to!private!arbitration.
81
!!
! !
Finally,!in! three!contexts!not!involving!a! legal! challenge!to! drivers’! status! as! indepe ndent!
contractors,!Ube r!voluntarily!agree d!to!pay!drivers!for!overcharges!o r!underpaymen t.!!On e!
was! the! result! of! a! legal! investigation! into! their! leasing! program! by! the! Massachusetts!
Attorney!General.
82
!Another! was!prompted! by!revelations! of!improper!earnings!deductions!
made! public! by! the! NYTWA.
83
!! Yet! another,! in! which! Uber! agreed! to! pay! $20! million! to!
drivers! misled! by! Uber’s! exaggerated! claims! about! earnings! and! vehicle! financing,! was!
resolved! after! an! investigation! by! the! Federal! Trade! Commission.
84
!! While! drivers! won!
monetary! gains! in! all! three,! none! shifted! the! legal! regulatory! landscape! with! regard! to!
workers’!rights.!!
!
Job!Security!a nd !Co llective !Ac tion !Claim s!
!
Two!legal!claims!against!Uber!involve! the!rights!of!drivers!to!engage!in!collective!a ction.!In!
February! 2016,! the! National! Lab or! Relations! B oard! Region! 20! began! a! national!
investiga tio n !of!Uber’s!labor!practice s !to!assess!wheth er !Uber!has!miscla ss ified !its!workers !
as! independent! contractors! under! the! N ational! Labor! R e lat ion s! Act.
85
!This! investigation!
remains! u nresolve d.! Also,! the! NYT W A! filed! a! claim! with! the! NL RB ! alleging! that! Ube r’s!
arbitration!provision!for!w orkers! is! an!unfair!labor! practice! because! it! prevents! class! action!
lawsuits.
86
!!The!Supreme!Court!took!up!this!legal!question!in!late!2017.!
!
Other!Claims!!
!
Across!the!three!states!in!this!analysis,!two!cases!against!Uber!allege!discrimination.!One!
was! dismissed.! The! other! was! filed! as! an! individual! Equal! Employment! Opportunity!
Commission! (EEO C)! complaint,! alleging! that! Uber’s! ratings! system—which! can! result! in!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79
Interview, Bhairavi Desai, 2016.
80
See Dubal 2017.
81
Meyer v. Uber Technologies, No. 16-2750 (2
nd
Cir. 2017).
82
Massachusetts Attorney General 2017.
83
Scheiber 2017.
84
Federal Trade Commission 2017.
85
Rosenblatt 2016.
86
Herzfeld 2016.
23
termination—has! a! racially! discriminatory! impact! on! minorities! because! of! passengers’!
biases.
87
!The!resulting!EEOC!investigation!has!not!been!concluded!or!made!public.!
!
Individual! Uber! drivers! in! states! across! the! country! have! filed! individual! claims! in!
administrative! bodies! alleging! their! own! misclassification! for! purposes! of! unem ployment!
insuran ce ,!workers ’!c o m p e n sa tio n ,!and!un p a id!wages.!! In d iv id u al!claim-making!is!at! most!a!
grievance! procedure! without! larger! impact.
88
!Under! re s! judicata,! adminis t ra t iv e ! decisio n s !
from! the se ! claims!do! not! fo rm!preced en t! a nd ! h av e ! no ! co ns eq u e nc es ! for! o th er ! driv e rs.! T o!
leverage!these!individua l!claims!for!bro ad e r!regulator y!purpo ses ,!in!201 6 !the!N Y T W A !sued!
the!N ew !York!State!Labor!Department!on!behalf!of!three!drivers!who!had!filed!individual!
unemployment!insurance!claims!but!did!not!receive!a! timely! response.!! A s! a! remedy,! the!
NYTWA! asked! the! Labor! Department! to! audit! Uber! to! determine! whether! drivers! are!
employees!under!New!York!state!laws.!!The!case!was!dismissed.
89
!
!
Thus,!im p o rta n t!t es t!cases!h av e !b e en !b r o u gh t!on!workers’!rights!issues!in!ju d icia l!v e nu e s,!
often! by! surrogate! actors,! inclu d in g! pla in t iff s’! attorn e y s! and! an! NGO,! who! bias!
representation! w ith!their! ow n ! in terests,!and! government! agencies,!who s e !pro -!or! anti-lab o r!
perspective! varies.!Despite!the! high! level!of! control!Uber! exercises!over!work!conditions,!to!
date,! these! judicial! processes! have! not! resulted! in! regu latory! constraint! on! Uber’s! labor!
practices.!!They!have!been!settled!withou t!resolution,!stymied!by !a rbitratio n !p rovision s ,!or!
remain!mired!in!long!proc esses.!!
!
!
Conclusion:!Elite!Politics!of!Disrupted!Regulation!and!Challenger!Capture!
!
Uber’s! brash! “act! first,! apologize! later”! entrance! into! urban! m arkets! disrupted! a! highly!
regulated!ride-hailing!sector!that!displayed!the!classic!rent-seeking !traits!described!in!th e!
Stigler! model! of! regulatory! capture.! ! Prior! to! Uber,! private! taxi! interests! enjoyed! anti-
competitive!b arriers!to!entry!and!price!controls.!!The!taxi!regulatory !regime,!howev er,!also!
include d! p u b lic ! int er es t! p ro v isio n s! in ! th e! fo rm! of! customer! and! labor! protections,! safety,!
and,!occasionally,!public! go ods.! Its! disr up tion! following! Uber’s!entry!raised ! key!questions!
for!regula tor s!about!if!an d!h o w!to!regu lat e!U b e r.!!
!
Uber! has! played! an! active! role! in! achieving! regulatory! outcomes! compatible! with! its!
business! m odel.!Uber!has!enjoyed!both!structural!and!instrumental!power!and!has!had!the!
resources!to! d eploy!a!stunn ing!array!of!insider!and!outsider!strategies.!Its!political!strength !
has! m ade! it! especially! influential! in! the! legislative! arena.! In! city! councils! and! state!
legislatures ,! it! ha s ! succee d e d! in! limitin g ! consu mer! and! s a fe t y ! regula t io n s ! to! t h o s e ! that!
conform!to!its!business!model!of!growth,!supply!and!price!flexibility,!and!low-cost!service!
provision.!In!general,!Uber!has!been!able! to!influence!regulations!and,! in!those! cases! where!
it!initially! fail s,!o ft en ! to !g e t!t h em!rever se d .!Worker!protections,!vigorously!opposed!by!Uber,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87
Because this filing was made with the EEOC and is not a lawsuit filed in federal court, it is not publically
available. As with other administrative contexts, if similar complaints have been filed with the EEOC, we
would not know unless the plaintiff or his attorney went public with the complaint, as was the case here.
88
We speculate that the numbers are relatively low; few drivers are likely aware of potential “employee”
rights or the process to obtain them. We also presume that even fewer are likely to mobilize those rights
because they are repeatedly told by Uber representatives that they are independent contractors. The
National Employment Law Project has speculated the number to be “dozens” nationally (Ruckelshaus 2016).
89
The three drivers were individually determined to be employees for purposes of unemployment insurance.
Uber is appealing these three decisions claiming the drivers were “handpicked by the NYTWA” (Griswold
2017).
24
have!rarely!made!it!to!the!agenda!in!legislative!arenas.!!Drivers’!issues!have!ins te a d! been!
taken!up!as!legal!issues!in!judicial!venu es !an d!have!not!resulted!in!broad!regulatory!change.!
!
The!Uber! model! of! disru p t ed !re gu la tio n !is!an !e lite-driven!politics!of!challenger!capture.!The!
major!regulatory!models!in!the! literature!are!not!good!fits! for!this!model.! Most!fe a tu re !only!
two! inter ests—private! vs.! public,! or! equivalently,! producer! vs.! consumer.! Interest!
alignment!is!m ore!complex!in!the!Uber!case.!The!private!interes t!is!often !divided ,!and!the!
private!and!public!interest!is!not!always!opposed.!Intra-producer!conflict!occu rs! along!an!
incum b en t-challenger! cleavage,! whi ch! is! primarily! played! out! in! the! leg is lat ive ! a re n a,! as!
well! as! along! a! labor-capital! cleavage,! which! is! most! often! played! out! in! judicial! venues .!!
Atomized!customers! a nd!drivers!do! not! have! autonomous! pow er.!They!have!benefited!from!
their! alignmen t! w ith! pr ivate! in terests ! and ! have! participated! in! the! politics! of! regulation!
primarily! when! mobilized! by! elite! actors.! ! Consumers! and! drivers! are! aligned! with,! and!
mobilized! by,! Uber!in! the ! initial! disrup tio n ! or! “deregu la to ry ”! step! on! issues! of! entry! and!
price! controls,! which! ensu r e ! Uber’s ! contin ued! presen c e ! in! the! marke t! as! a! provider! of! a!
service!and!jobs.!!In!the!su bse qu en t!TNC!regu lator y!step,!consumers!are!aligned!with!taxis!
on! some! leveling! issues,! wh ic h ! ha s ! contribu te d ! to! regulation s! addressing! consum er!
protection! and! safety.! ! Drive rs ! lack! alignment! with! concentrated! interests! in! legislative !
arenas.!As! a!result!of!this! po litical! disadv antag e,!labor !issue s!ar e!ta ke n !up !in!ju d icia l!v en u e s!
primarily!by!surrogates,!but!to!date,!without!success.!
!
Disrupted!regu lation!has!given!rise!to!a!dual!regulatory!regime!of!the!ride-hailing! sector!in!
cities! across! the! coun try.! Ube r’s! entry! undermined! the! taxi! regulatory! regim e! not! b y! the!
adoption! of! deregulatory! policy! or! non-implementatio n ! throu g h ! “corro sio n ,”! but ! by!
disruption.! The! subsequent! regulation! bifurcated! the! ride-hailing! sector! by! creating! an!
alternative! classification! of! “TNC,”! thus! exempting! Uber! from! taxi! regulations.!
The!regulatory! regim e! on! taxi! incumbents! re m ains! intact! b ut! no! longer! operates! to! their!
advantage.! !On! the! contrary! it! pu ts! taxis! at! a! competitive ! d isadv an tage ! re lative! to! the!
regulations!(or!lack!thereof)!for !TNCs.!!The!politics!of!regulating!the!new !entran ts!has!th us!
been!one!of!challenger!capture.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
25
References!
!
Badger,!Emily!and!Zachary!A.!Goldfarb.!2014.!“Uber!hired!David!Plouffe!when!it!realized!
‘techies ’!c a n ’t!d o !p o l itic s .”!Washington!Post,!August!19,!2014.!Retrieved!May!15,!2017!
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/19/uber-hired-david-
plouffe-when-it-realized-techies-cant-do-politics/).!
Barnes,!David.!2017.!“Aldermen,!make!a!U-turn!on!ride-sharing!fees.”!Chicago!Tribune,!
October!15,!2017.!Retrieved!November!1,!2017!
(http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-uber-lyft-
fees-city-coun cil-1016-20171013-story.html).!
Barone,!Vincent.!!“TLC!mulls!base!wages!for!drivers!and!caps!on!taxis,!black!cars!amid!sharp!
growth!of!licensed!vehicles.”!AM!New!York.!!Februa ry !12.!201 8 .!!Retriev e d !on!Feb r u a r y !
12,!2018.!(https://www.amny.com/transit/tlc-black-car-taxi-1.16723002).!!
Bennett,!Adam.!2016.!“Uber!Reach es!Agreem e nt!to!Stay!in!Houston !Throu gh!Su perbo w l.”!
KHOU.com,!November!16,!2016.!Retrieved!November!20,!2017!
(http://www.khou.com/news/local/uber-reach ces-agreement-with-houston-super-
bowl/352864357).!
Berger,!Thor,!Chinchih!Chen,!and!Carl!Benedikt!Frey.!2017.!“Drivers!of!Disruption?!
Estimating!the!Uber!Effect.”!Working!Paper.!!
Borkholder,!Joy,!Mariah!Montgomery,!Miya!Saika!Chen,!and!Rebecca!Smith.!!2018.!!
“Uber!State!Interference:!!How !Tran sportation!N etw ork!Com p anies!Bu y,!Bully,!and!
Bamboozle!Their!Way!to!Deregulation.”!!!The!National!Employment!Law!Project!and!
the!Partnersh ip!for!W ork ing!Fa m ilies.!!Retrieved !Febr uar y!12 ,!2018 !
(http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Uber-State-Interferenc e- How-
Transportation-Network-Companies-Buy-Bully-Bamboozle-Their-Way-to-
Deregulation.pdf)!!
California!Public!Utilities!Commission.!2013.!Decision!13-09-045,!San!Francisco,!
California.!
Campbell,!Harry.!2016.!“Why!Do!So!Many!People!Quit!Driving!for!Uber.”!The!Ride!Share!Guy,!
July!11,!2016.!Retrieved!May!31,!2017!!(http://therideshareguy.com/why-do-so-many-
people-quit-driving-for-uber/).!
Carpenter,!Daniel!P.!!2014.!“Corrosive!Capture?!The!Dueling!Forces!of!Auton omy!and!
Industry!Influe nce !in!FD A !Ph arm a ceu tica l!Reg ulatio n.”!In! Preventing!Regulatory!
Capture,!edited!by!Dan ie l !P .!C a r p e n t e r !a n d !David!A .!Moss,!152–72.!New!York:!
Cambridge!University!Press.!
Carpenter,!Daniel!P.,!and!David!A.!Moss.!!2014.!“Introduction.”!In!Preventing!Regulatory!
Capture,!edited!by!Dan ie l !P .!C a r p e n t e r !a n d !David!A .!Moss,!1–24.!New!York:!Cambridge!
University!Press.Collier,!Ruth,!V.!B.!Dubal,!and!Christopher!Carter.!2017.!“Labor!
Platforms!and!Gig!Work:!The!Failure!to!Regulate.”!IRL E!W o rkin g!Pa per .!!
Constine,!Josh.!!2014.!!“Uber’s!Denial!of!Liability!in!Girl’s!Death!Raises!Accident!
Accountability!Questions.”!!Techcrunch.com,!January!2,!2014.!!Retrieved!November!20,!
2017!(https://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-insurance -
whenever-their-driver-app-is-open/).!!
Couloumbis,!Angela.!2016.!“Wolf!Signs!Bill!Making!Uber,!Lyft!Legal!in!Philly.”!Philly.com,!
November!4,!2016.!Retrieved!November!11,!2017!
(http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20161105_Wolf_signs_bill_making_Uber
__Lyft_legal_in_Philly.htm l).!
Cortner,!Richard!C.!1968.!"Strategies!and!Tactics!of!Litigants!in!Constitutional!Cases."!
Journal!of!P u b lic!L aw!17:28 7-307.!
26
Dillon,!Liam.!2016.!“Uber’s!approach!is!gentler!—!but!still!aggressive!—!in!Californ ia !-!LA!
Times.”!Los!Angeles!Times,!May!31,!2016.!Retrieved!October!30,!2017!
(http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-essential-poli-uber-is-gentler-but-not-
kinder-in-california-1462815163-htmlstory.html).!
Dubal,!V.B.!2017.!“The!Drive!to!Precarity:!! A! Po litical!History! of! W ork ,!Reg ulation,! and! La bor!
Advocacy! in!San! Francisco’s! Taxi!and!Uber!Economies.”! Berkeley!Journal!of!Employment!
and!Labor!Law!38:!73-135.!!
DuPuis,! Nicole,! Trevor! Langan,! Christiana! McFarland,! Angelina! Panettieri,! Brooks!
Rainwater.!!“City!Rights!in!an!Era!of!P reem ption :!!A!State-by-State!Analysis.”!!National!
League! of! Cities:! ! Center! for! City! Solutions.! ! 2017.! ! Retrieved! on! February! 14,! 2018.!
(http://nlc.org/sites/de fault/file s/ 2 0 1 7-
02/NLC%20Preemption%20Report%202017.pdf)!
Epstein,!Lee.!1985.!Conservatives!in!Court.!Knoxville:!Univer s ity !of!Tenn e s s e e !P r e s s .!
Federal! T rade! Com mission.! 2017.! “Uber! Agrees! to! Pay! $20! M illion! to! Settle! FTC! Charges!
that! it! Re cru ited! Prospec tive! Drivers! with! Exaggerated! Earnings! Claims.”! January! 19,!
2017.! Retrieved! November! 17,! 2017! (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/0 1/u ber-agrees-pay-20-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-recruited).!
Flegenheimer,!Matt.!2015.!“De!Blasio!Administration!Dropping!Plan!for!Uber!Cap,!for!Now.”!
The!New!York!Times,!July!22 ,!2 0 15.!Retrieved!November!1,!2017.!
(https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/de-blasio-administration-
dropping-plan-for-uber-cap-fo r-now.html).!
Griffin,!JT.!JT!Griffin!to!Gove rn o r!Je rry !B ro w n ,!A ug u st!2 0 ,!2014.!Retrieved!November!17,!
2017!(https://timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/rideshare-california-oppose-
letter.pdf.) !
Griswold,!Alison.!2017.!“New!York!State!Just!Dealt!Another!Blow!to!Uber’s!Business!Model.”!
Quartz,!June!13,!2 0 1 7 .!Retriev e d !November!1 8 ,!2 017!(https://qz.com/1005254/three-
uber-drivers-were-ruled-em ployees-fo r-unemployment-purposes-by-new-york-state/).!
Griswold,!Alison!and!Henry!Grabar.!2015.!“Uber’s!Siege!on!San!Antonio.”!Slate,!October!1 6 ,!
2015.!Retrie v e d !October!30!2017,!
(http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/10/uber_returns_to_san_an
tonio_after_throw ing _a_m a ssive_ta ntru m _o ver_r egu lation s.htm l).!
Griswold,!Alison!and!M ik e!Murphy .!20 1 6 .!“Ub e r’s!se lf-driving!cars!have!come!to!Pittsburgh,!
but!that!doesn’t!mean!the!driverless!era!is!here.”!Quartz,!Sept e mber!1 4 ,!2 016.!Retrieved!
September!14,!2016!(https://qz.com/7811 51/ w hy-is-uber-rushing-to-put-self-driving-
cars-on-the-road-in- pittsburgh).!
Ha,!Anthony.!2013.!“California!Regulator!Passes!First!Ridesharing!Rules,!A!Big!Win!For!Lyft,!
SideCar,!And!Uber.”!TechCrunch,!September !1 9 ,!2 0 13.!Retrieved!November!3,!2017!
(http://social.techcrunch.com/2013/09/19/cpuc-ridesharing-regulations/).!!
Hanks,!Douglas.!“It’s!up!to!Rick!Scott!Now:!Should!Local!Governments!Be!Allowed!to!
Regulate!Uber?”!Miami!Herald,!April!19,!2 0 07.!Retrieved!November!17,!2017!
(http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article145556644.html).!
Helderman,!Rosalind!S.!2014.!“Uber!pressures!regulators!by!mobilizing!riders!and!hiring!
vast!network!of!local!lobbyists!across!the!country.”!Washington!Post,!December!13,!
2014.!Retrieved!December!27,!2017!(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/uber-
pressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-riders-and-hiring-vast-lobb y ing -
network/2014/12/13/3f4395c6-7f2a-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html).!
Herkovitz,!Jon.!2017.!“Texas!lawmakers!clear!way!for!Uber,!Lyft!return!to!major!cities.”!
Reuters,!May!22,!20 17.!Retrieved!October!30,!2017!
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-ridesharing/te xas-lawma k er s-clear-way-
for-uber-lyft-return-to-major-cities-idUSKB N 1 8 H 0 IJ).!
27
Herzfeld,! John.!2016.!“NYC!Taxi!Driver!Group!Sues!Uber!on!Wages,! Arbitration.”! Bloomberg!
BNA,! June! 3,! 2 0 16.! Retr ie v e d ! November! 17,! 201 7! (https://www.bna.com/nyc-taxi-
driver-n57982073566/).!!
Hoge,!Patrick.!2014.!“Uber!plays!hardball!but!fails!to!win!the!game.”!San!Francisco!Business!
Times,!September!3 ,!2 0 1 4.!Retrieved!No v e m b e r!2 ,!20 1 7 !
(https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/09/uber-plays-
hardball-but-fails-to-win-the-gam e.html).!
Howard,!Brian.!“City!Council:!We!Want!UberX,!Lyft.”!Philadelphia!Magazine.!Retrieved !
January !30 ,!2 01 5 !(http://www.phillymag.com/news/2015/01/30/city-council-
resolves-uberx-lyft- allowed-philadelphia/).!
Hunte,!Tracie.!2015.!“Uber!Takes!on!Mayor!de!Blasio!With!TV!Ad.”!!WNYC,!July!17,!20 1 5 .!!
Retrieved!November!13,!2017!(http://www.wnyc.org/story/uber-protests-potential-
city-cap-tv-ad/).!
Isaac,!Mike.!20 17 a.!“H ow !U be r!De ce ives!th e!A uth orities!Worldwid e.”!New!York!Times,!March !
3,!201 7.!Retrieved!March!3,!2017!
(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-
authorities.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region® ion=top -news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.!2017 b .!“ Uber’s!C .E.O.!Pla y s !with!Fir e .”! New!York!Times,!April!2 3 ,!2 017.!Retrieved!
May!15,!2017!(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-
pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html).!
Jorgense n ,!Jillian !an d !Will!Bredderman.!2016.!“Bill!de!Blasio’s!Quest!to!Cap!Uber!Ends!With!a!
Whimper.”!Observer,!January!15 ,!2 0 16.!Retrieved!November!1,!2017!
(http://observer.com/2016/01/bill-de-blasios-quest-to-cap-uber-ends-with-a-
whimper/).!
Kalanick,!Travis!and!Jan!Withers.!2014.!“Ub e r !G e t s !MADD!about!Drunk!Driv in g : !C o lumn,” !USA!
TODAY,!July!3 ,!20 1 4 .!Re trie v ed !N o ve m b e r!1 7 ,!20 1 7!!
(https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/07/03/uber-madd-drunk-driving-
column/1191017 9/).!
Kirkham,!Chris,!and!Tracey!Lien.!2015.!“Facing!regulatory!roadblocks,!Uber!ramps!up!its!
lobbying !in!C alifo rn ia.”!Los!Angeles!Times,!June!2 6 ,!2 015.! Retrieved!November!1,!2017!
(http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-california-20150726-story.htm l). !
Laughlin,!Jason.!2016.!“Philadelphia!Parking!Authority!m ake !Uber!and !Lyft!illegal!again.”!The!
Inquirer,!O c tober!5,!2016.!Retrieved!November!1,!2017!
(http://www.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/Parking-Authority-to-crack-
down-on-Uber-and-Lyft-again.html).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.!2017 .!“Philly’s!For-hire!Drivers!Vent!Their!Rage!About!Uber!and!Lyft,!but!Fixes!Not!
Likely.”!The!Inquirer,!September!1,!2017.!Retrieved!November!20,!2017!
(http://ww w .philly.com / philly/b us iness/tran sportation /pp a-uber-lyft-regulate-
20170831.html!).!
Levine,!Dan,!and!Joseph!Menn.!2017.!“Uber!Faces!Criminal!Probe!over!Software!Used!to!Evade!
Authorities.”!Reuters,!May!5,!201 7 .!Retrieved!November!17,!2017!
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-crime-exclusive/exclusive-uber-face s-
criminal-probe-over-software-used-to-evade-authorities-idUS K B N 1 8 0 2U1).!
Levy,!Nat.!2017.!“Seat t le ’s !la n dmark!Uber !u nion!law!on!hold!again!as!court!battles!continue.”!
Geek!Wire,!August!30,!2017.!Retrieved!November!20,!2017!
(https://www.geekwire.com/2017/seattles-landmark-uber-lyft-union-law-
hold-court-battles-continue/).!
28
Lieber,!Ron.!2014.!“The!Question!of!Coverage!for!Ride!Service!Drivers.”!The!New!York!Times,!
September!5,!sec.!Your!Money.!https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/your-
money/auto-insura n ce / o fflo ad in g -the-risk-in-renting-a-car-ride.html.!
Lien,!Tracey.!2015.!“Uber!mobilizes!customers!to!channel!its!message.”!Los!Angeles!Times,!July!
26,!2015 .!R e t r ie v e d !November!1 ,!2 0 17!(http://www .latimes.com/business/la-fi-0724-
uber-california-side-20150726-story.html).!
Macey,!Jonathan!R.,!Geoffrey!P.!Miller.!1991.!“The!Plaintiffs'!Attorney's!Role!in!C l a ss !A c tio n!
and!Derivative!Litigation:!Economic!Analysis!and!Recommendations!for!Reform.”!
University!of!Chicago!Law!Review!58(1):!1-118.!
Madhani,!Aamer.!2016.!“Uber,!Lyft!Threaten!to!Leave!Chicago!ahead!of!License!Vote.”!USA!
TODAY,!June!16,!2016.!Retrieved!November!15,!2017!
(https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/06/16/uber-lyft-thre aten -leave-
chicago-ahead-licen se -vote/8600227 0/ ).!
Madhani,!Aamer.!2017.!“Chicago!Cabbies!Say!Industry!is!Teetering!Toward!Collapse.”!USA!
TODAY,!June!5,!2017 .!Retriev e d !Ja n uary!3,!2018.!
(https://ww w .usato day .com /sto ry/n ew s/2 017 /06 /05 /ch icago -cab bies-sa y-in d u s try -
teetering-tow a rd-collapse/102524634/).!
Massachusetts!Attorney!General.!2017.!“AG!Healey!Recovers!$210,000!for!Drivers!From!Uber!
Subsidiary.”!Press!Release,!August!30,!2017.!!Retrieved!November!21,!2017!
(http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2017/2017 -08-30-
uber-subsidiary.html).!!
McGlinchy,!Audrey!and!Andrew!Weber.!2015.!“Uber!Launches!In-App,!Online!Campaign!
Against!Austin!City!Council!Member.”!KUT,!Novemb e r !5,!2015 .!Retrieved!November!3,!
2017!(http://kut.org/post/uber-launche s-app-online-campaign- against-austin-city-
council-member).!
Meyer!v.!Uber!Technologies,!No.!16-2750!(2
nd
!Cir.!2017).!
(https://law.justia.com /c ases/ federa l/app ellate-courts/ca2/16-2750/16-2750-2017-
08-17.html)!
Mohamed!v.!Uber!Technologies!Inc.,!!836!F.3d!1102!(9
th
!Cir.!2016).!
(https://cdn.ca9.usco urts.go v/d atasto re/o pinion s/20 16 /09/07/15- 16178.pdf)!
Moore,!Daniel.!2016.!“Pennsylvania!lawmakers!send!ride-hailing!legalization!to!governor’s!
desk.”!Pittsburgh!Post-Gazette,!October!24,!2016.!Retrieved!October!28,!2017!
(http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2016/10/25/Pennsylvania-lawma ke rs -
send-ride-hailing-legaliz at ion -to-governor-s-desk/stories/201610260018).!
Newcomer,!Eric.!2017.!“Uber!Pushed!the!Limits!of!the!Law.!Now!Comes!the!Reckoning.”!
Bloomberg,!October!1 1,!2017 .!Retriev e d !November!1 7 ,!2 0 17!
(https://ww w .bloo m be rg.com /n ew s/fea tures/ 201 7-10-11/uber-pushed-the-lim its -of-
the-law -now-comes-th e-reckoning).!
O’Connor,!Colopy,!Manahan,!and!Gurfinkel!v.!Uber!Technologies!Inc.,!836!F.3d!1102!(9
th
!Cir.!
2016).!
(http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2016/05/Dubal%20Declaration%20-
%20Uber.pdf).!
O’Donnell,!Anthony.!2015.!“Insurer-TNC!Compromise!Paves!Way!for!Rideshare!Insurance!
Regulation.”!Insurance !Inno va tion!R ep orte r,!March!31,!201 5.!Retrieved!October!29,!2017!
(http://iireporter.com /insu rer-tnc-compro mise-paves-way-for-rides h ar e-insurance-
regulation/).!
Rayle,!Lisa!and!Onesimo!Flores,!“The!3!Factors!behind!Uber!and!Lyft’s!Regulatory!Win!in!
California,”!TechCrunch,!April!17!2016.!Retrie v e d !November!1 7 ,!2 017!
(http://social.techcrunch.com/2016/04/17/the-3-factors-behind-uber-and -ly fts-
regulatory-win-in-california/).!
29
Rodriguez,!Joe!Fitzgerald.!2017.!“Mayor!Lee!Strikes!Deal!to!Allow!Uber,!Lyft!Vehicles!to!Use!SF!
Curb!Space.”!The!San!Francisco!Examiner,!November!8,!2017.!Retreived!November!10,!
2017!(http://www.sfexaminer.com/mayor-lee-strikes- deal-allow-uber-lyft-vehicles-
use-sf-curb-space/ ).!
Rosenblatt,!Joel.!2016.!“Uber!Drivers!Win!the!Backing!of!U.S.!Labor!Watchdog.”!Bloomberg,!
November!2,!2016.!!Retrieved!November!20,!2017!
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-02/u-s-labo r-panel-backs-uber-
drivers-in-class-action-fight).!
Sanchez,!Karizza.!2015.!“How!Safe!Is!Uber!in!New!York!City?”!Complex,!May!20,!201 5.!
Retrieved!!
Scheiber,!Noam.!2017.!“Uber!to!Repay!Millions!to!Drivers,!Who!Could!be!Owed!Far!More”.!The!
New!York!Times,!May!23,!20 1 7 .!Retriev e d !November!1 7 ,!2017!
(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/economy/uber-drivers-
tax.html?_r=0).! !
Shor,! Boris! and! Nolan! McCarty.! 2015,! "Aggregate! State! Legislator! Shor-McCarty! Ideology!
Data,!June!2015!update."!Harvard!Dataverse,!V1.!
Small,!Andrew.!2017.!What!Chicago!Could!Pay!for!With!Its!Uber!Tax.!The!Atlantic.!Nove mber!
28,!2017.!Retrieved!January!4,!2018!
(https://ww w .theatla ntic.com /b usin ess/a rchive/ 201 7/1 1/ch icago -uber-
tax/54684 5/) .!
Soper,!Taylor.!2014.!“Seattle!ride-sharing!regulations!suspend ed;!May or!wa nts!to!negotiate!
with!stakeholders.”!GeekWire,!April!17,!2014.!Retrieved!November!2,!2017!
(http://www.geekwire.com/2014/ride-sharing-petition-seattle/).!
Stigler,!George!J.!1971.!“The!Theory!of!Economic!Regulation.”!The!Bell!Journal!of!Economics!
and!Management!Science!2,!no.!1:!3–21.!
Tanenbaum,!Michael.!2016.!“Pennsylvania!House!passes!bill!to!legalize!Uber,!Lyft!in!Philly.”!
Philly!Voice,!Octobe r!19,!201 6 .!Retrieved!November!3,!2017!
(http://www.phillyvoice.com/pennsylvania-house-passes-bill-legalizin g -uber-lyft-
philly/).!!
Tausanovitch,!Chris!and!Christopher!Warshaw.!2013.!“Measuring!constituent!policy!
preferences!in!congress,!state!legislatures,!and!cities.”!The!Journal!of!Politics!75(2):!330-
342.!
Tepper,!Fitz.!2015.!“Uber!Launches!“De!Blasio’s!Uber”!Feature!In!NYC!With!25-Minute!Wait!
Times.”!TechCrunch,!July!16,!2 015.!Retrieved!November!3,!2017!
(http://social.techcrunch.com/2015/07/16/uber-launches-de-blasios-uber-featu re -in-
nyc-with-25-minute-wait-times/).!
Theis,!Michael.!!2015.!“Uber!Ramps!up!Pressure!on!Austin!Councilwoman!Ann!Kitchen.”!
Austin!Business!Journal,!No v e mber!6 ,!2 015.!Retrieved!November!13,!2017!
(https://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2015/11/06/uber-ramps-up-pressure-
on-austin-councilwoma n- in .h tml)!
Tiku,!Nitasha.!2017.!“Why!Aren’t!More!Employees!Suing!Uber?”!Wired,!June!23,!2017.!
Retrieved!November!17,!2017!(https://www.wired.com/story/uber-susan-
fowler-travis-kalanick-arbitration/).!Trumbull,!Gunnar.!Consumer!Capitalism:!
Politics,!Product!Markets,!and!Firm!Strategy!in!France!and!Germany.!Corne l l!Univer si ty !
Press,!2006.!
Trumbull,!!Gunnar.!2006.!Consumer!Capitalism:!Politics,!Pro d u ct !Markets ,!an d !F ir m!Strate g ie s!
in!Franc e!a n d !G er m a n y.!I th a c a ,!NY:!Co rn e l l!Univer si ty !P r e s s . !!
Trumbull,!Gunnar.!!2012!Strength!in!Numbers.!Cambridg e :!Harvar d !U niversit y !P r e ss . !
30
Vogel,!Steven.!n.d.!Marketcraft:!How!Governments!Make!Markets!Work,!Oxford!Univesity!Press,!
2018.!
Wear,!Ben.!2015.!“What’s!next!for!Uber,!Lyft!and!Austin’s!fingerprint!check!ordinance?”!My!
Statesman,!December!1 8 ,!2015.!Retrieved!October!31,!2017!
(http://www.mystatesman.com/news/local/what-next-for-uber-lyft-and-au stin-
fingerprin t-check-ordinance/yFzZSAyWaikXu39DkDl6JI/).!
Walker,!Edward!T.!2014.!Grassroots!for!hire:!Public!affairs!consultants!in!American!democracy.!
Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press.!
Wiessner,!Daniel.!2016.!“NY!Drivers!Group!Sues!Uber,!Claims!Labor!Laws!Violations.”!June!2,!
2017.!!Retrieved!November!20,!2017!(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-
lawsuit/ ne w -york-drivers-group-sues-uber-claims-labor-la w s-violations-
idUSKC N 0 Y O 2 2 1 ).!! !
Wong,!Julia!Carrie.!!2016.!!“Uber!v.!Drivers:!Judge!Rejects!‘Unfair”!Settlement!in!Class!Action!
Lawsuit.”!The!Guardian.!!August!29,!2016.!Retrieved!November!20,!2017!
(https://ww w .thegu ard ian.com /te chn ology /20 16/ aug /18 /u ber -drivers-class-action-
lawsuit-settlement-rejected ).!
Young,!Allen.!2014.!“Uber!Drives!Another!Attack!on!Proposed!Regulations.”!Sacramento!
Business!Journal.!Accessed!November!20,!2017.!
https://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2014/08/20/uber-drives-another-
attack-on-proposed-regulations.html.!
!
