Penn State Law Review Penn State Law Review
Volume 124 Issue 2 Article 8
4-1-2020
Uber Techs., Uber Tort? The Impact of Transportation Network Uber Techs., Uber Tort? The Impact of Transportation Network
Companies on Pennsylvania's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Companies on Pennsylvania's No-Fault Automobile Insurance
System System
Amber N. Morris
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Morris, Amber N. (2020) "Uber Techs., Uber Tort? The Impact of Transportation Network Companies on
Pennsylvania's No-Fault Automobile Insurance System,"
Penn State Law Review
: Vol. 124 : Iss. 2 , Article
8.
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr/vol124/iss2/8
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587
Uber Techs., Uber Tort? The Impact of
Transportation Network Companies on
Pennsylvania’s Choice No-Fault
Automobile Insurance System
Amber N. Morris*
ABSTRACT
The rise of Uber and other transportation network companies
(“TNCs”) has created a puzzling question: At what point in time does a
TNC driver’s personal vehicle become a commercial vehicle? This
question is of the utmost importance when a party disputes liability after a
motor vehicle accident in which one of the drivers was a TNC driver.
Automobile insurance, however, fluctuates between states. In
Pennsylvania, for example, drivers elect to be insured by either full tort or
limited tort coverage, with full tort drivers exchanging higher premium
rates for more comprehensive coverage. A commercial vehicle exception
in Pennsylvania’s statute, however, upgrades a less-covered, limited tort
driver to full tort status if the driver was a passenger of a vehicle “other
than a private passenger vehicle.”
This Comment first explains automobile liability insurance in the
United States, with a focus on Pennsylvania liability law. This Comment
then proceeds to discuss the rise of TNCs and laws addressing TNCs in
Pennsylvania. Next, this Comment analyzes the overlap of Pennsylvania
TNC and liability laws to determine when a TNC driver’s personal vehicle
becomes commercial and how this distinction affects the driver’s tort
election status.
Ultimately, this Comment suggests that a TNC vehicle is commercial
any time the TNC driver is logged into the digital network. Thus, a limited
tort TNC driver should be upgraded to full tort status if an accident occurs
any time the driver is logged onto the digital network. Finally, this
Comment recommends that choice no-fault jurisdictions should amend
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020. The
author gratefully acknowledges the advice and guidance of Professor Christopher C.
French, Professor of Practice at Penn State Law. Additionally, the author thanks her family
and friends for their continuous support and encouragement throughout the writing process.
588 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
their TNC insurance laws to explicitly address the issue of tort status and
unambiguously confirm that a TNC vehicle is always commercial when
the TNC driver is logged onto the digital network.
Table of Contents
I.INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 588
II.BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 592
A. Automobile Insurance Systems in the United States .................... 592
1. Tort Systems .......................................................................... 592
2. No-Fault Systems ................................................................... 593
B. Choice No-Fault Systems ............................................................. 594
C. The Rise of Transportation Network Companies ......................... 595
1. The Beginning of State Legislation ........................................ 596
2. Pennsylvania TNC Laws ........................................................ 597
III.ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 600
A. When is a TNC Vehicle a Commercial Vehicle? ......................... 600
1. Furthering the Business of the TNC ....................................... 601
2. Bennett v. Mucci .................................................................... 603
B. Choice No-Fault Jurisdictions Should Create a Unified
Definition of a Commercial Vehicle Regarding TNCs ................ 605
IV.CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 607
I. I
NTRODUCTION
The automobile insurance scheme in the United States is divided into
two systems: tort and no-fault.
1
Both systems vary across the United
States, depending on the laws of each state.
2
This Comment will focus on
Pennsylvania’s “choice” no-fault statute.
3
Specifically, this Comment will
discuss Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle exception
4
to the statute and
how this exception should apply to transportation network companies
1. See Background on: No-fault auto insurance, NO-FAULT AUTO INS. (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2SymFXz [hereinafter No-Fault Auto Insurance]. Tort insurance systems
generally allow an injured party to sue an “at-fault” party for both economic and non-
economic damages. See id. Conversely, no-fault insurance systems allow an injured party
to sue for non-economic damages only if the injured parties meet the state’s threshold
limitation on lawsuit. See id.
2. See id.
3. See infra Section II.B. “Choice” no-fault insurance systems allow consumers to
choose how they are insured—through either the typical tort system or the no-fault system.
See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
4. Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle exception reads: “An individual otherwise
bound by the limited tort election shall retain full tort rights if injured while an occupant
of a motor vehicle other than a private passenger motor vehicle.” 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1705(d)(3) (West 2019).
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 589
(“TNCs”)
5
like Uber and Lyft.
6
Further, this Comment will address
whether the commercial vehicle exception should apply to Phase I
7
of a
transportation network ride.
8
Unlike Pennsylvania, which is a no-fault state, parties injured in an
automobile accident in a state that follows a tort system may sue an “at-
fault” party
9
to recover two types of damages: economic
10
and non-
economic.
11
Conversely, in a state employing a no-fault system, parties
injured in an automobile accident may sue an at-fault party for non-
economic damages only if the injured parties meet the state’s limitation on
lawsuit.
12
Unless an exception applies, persons injured in a no-fault state
may only sue an at-fault party for non-economic damages if the injured
party meets the state’s statutory threshold.
13
The statutory threshold can be
either verbal or monetary.
14
Thus far, 12 states have adopted no-fault systems,
15
3 of which have
adopted choice no-fault systems.
16
A choice no-fault system allows
5. A transportation network company is “a person or entity that obtains a license to
operate a transportation network service . . . and uses a digital network to facilitate
prearranged rides.” 53 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A01 (West 2019).
6. See infra Section III.A.
7. Phase I of a transportation network ride refers to the time at which the
transportation network driver is logged into the digital network but is neither driving a
passenger to the destination nor on the way to pick up a passenger. See Auto insurance to
help protect you, U
BER, https://www.uber.com/drive/insurance/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020)
[hereinafter Uber Insurance Policy]; see also Insurance, L
YFT, https://lft.to/2oNtqnj (last
visited Jan. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Lyft Insurance Policy]. During Phase I, the driver is
waiting to receive a notification that someone on the digital transportation network is
requesting a ride. See Uber Insurance Policy, supra; see also Lyft Insurance Policy, supra.
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. An “at-fault” party is the party that is legally liable for the automobile accident and
resulting injuries. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
10. Economic damages, or actual damages, are those damages that carry provable
monetary value, such as medical expenses, lost wages, and property damage. See Ending
the Confusion: Economic, Non-Economic, and Punitive Damages, A
M. C. SURGEONS,
https://bit.ly/2n39Uqm (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
11. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1. Non-economic, or general damages,
are those damages that stem from subjective, non-monetary losses, such as loss from pain
and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of consortium. See A
M. C. SURGEONS, supra
note 10.
12. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1. A limitation on lawsuit is a verbal or
monetary threshold that must be met before an injured party may bring a lawsuit against a
third party. See generally id. (discussing the variations on the no-fault automobile
insurance approach). Limitations on lawsuits are discussed further in Section II.A.2. of this
Comment.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. The states that have adopted no-fault systems are Florida, Hawaii, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, and Utah. See id.
16. Of the states that have adopted no-fault statutes, the states that have adopted a
choice no-fault system are Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See id.; see also K
Y.
590 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
individuals to elect their tort status, i.e., whether to be treated as an insured
in a tort system or as an insured in a no-fault system.
17
Insureds that elect
the tort system may sue an at-fault party for both economic and non-
economic damages without proving that the insured suffered serious
injuries.
18
Conversely, insureds electing the no-fault system may sue an at-
fault party for economic damages only if the insureds prove they suffered
serious injuries.
19
Because they elect for less coverage, insureds choosing
the no-fault system typically pay less in premiums for less coverage under
their insurance policy.
20
State legislatures implemented choice no-fault insurance systems in
an effort to decrease premiums and personal injury litigation.
21
Personal
injury litigation in traditional tort systems was typically drawn-out and
often failed to adequately compensate the injured party.
22
As with many
complex legal systems, issues arose that created questions for both the
legislature and the judiciary.
23
For example, the legislatures in choice no-
fault states carved out exceptions to the general rule if the general rule
would be prejudicial or unfair.
24
One such exception to the general rule
applies when an occupant of a vehicle “other than a private passenger
motor vehicle”—a commercial vehicle—is injured.
25
This Comment will focus on Title 75, Section 1705(d)(3) of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, otherwise known as the commercial
vehicle exception.
26
In Pennsylvania, there is currently an unresolved
question as to whether TNC vehicles are considered private passenger
motor vehicles under Title 75, Section 1705(d)(3) of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes.
27
A TNC is a company that hires drivers as
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-060 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5H-10 (West 2019); 75
P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705 (West 2019).
17. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
18. See 5 JEFFREY O’CONNELL & SAMUEL H. MCCOY, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
§ 48.01, [2] (Matthew Bender & Co. ed. 2018). Pennsylvania law defines a “serious injury”
as an injury that resulted in “death, serious impairment of bodily function or permanent
disfigurement.” 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 2019).
19. See O’C
ONNELL & MCCOY, supra note 18.
20. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
21. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 30 (2019); see also Rump v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 710 A.2d 1093, 1096 (Pa. 1998); Walton v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
666 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (N.Y. 1996).
22. See Automobile Insurance, supra note 21.
23. See generally No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1 (discussing the effectiveness
of no-fault insurance regimes and the prevalence of fraudulent claims and fraud rings in
those states).
24. See, e.g., 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d)(1)–(3) (West 2019).
25. § 1705(d)(3).
26. See infra Section III.A.
27. See Daniel E. Cummins, Quandary on Whether Limited Tort or Full Tort Applies
to Uber Drivers, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 27, 2019, 11:42 AM), https://bit.ly/2EiRp5Y
(“One such issue is whether an Uber or Lyft driver who has elected the limited tort option
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 591
independent contractors
28
to provide pre-arranged car rides to customers
of the TNC through digital, application-based software.
29
In providing
these pre-arranged car rides, TNCs hire drivers to use the drivers’ personal
vehicles as the means of transporting customers.
30
This Comment addresses whether TNC drivers’ private vehicles are
considered “private passenger motor vehicles” under Pennsylvania’s
commercial vehicle exception.
31
First, this Comment details the tort and
no-fault systems in the United States.
32
Then, this Comment specifically
addresses Pennsylvania liability law regarding choice no-fault automobile
insurance.
33
This Comment discusses the rise of TNC laws throughout the
United States and in Pennsylvania, as well as TNC insurance requirements
under Pennsylvania law.
34
Next, this Comment analyzes the question of
when a TNC vehicle is a commercial vehicle under Pennsylvania choice
no-fault automobile insurance laws.
35
This Comment argues that a TNC
driver’s personal vehicle is commercial any time the driver is logged into
the TNC’s digital network.
36
Thus, Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle
exception should apply to TNC drivers, and these drivers should be
considered full tort insureds when they are logged into the TNC’s digital
network.
37
Finally, this Comment recommends that legislators in
Pennsylvania and other choice no-fault jurisdictions amend their state’s
statutory language regarding TNC automobile insurance.
38
Statutory
amendments regarding TNCs must provide clear and unambiguous
language that explicitly applies the commercial vehicle exception to TNC
drivers.
39
Failure to amend TNC statutes could lead to unjust
compensation and an increase in litigation, which would frustrate the
purpose of no-fault automobile insurance.
40
under his own personal automobile insurance policy will be deemed to be a full tort plaintiff
if he is involved in in an accident while driving as an Uber or Lyft driver.”).
28. See Daniel Wiessner, Uber drivers are contractors, not employees, U.S. labor
agency says, R
EUTERS (May 14, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://reut.rs/38HJD3R; see also
Lawrenz Fares, Federal court holds that Uber drivers are independent contractors, J
URIST
(Apr. 12, 2018, 8:36 PM), https://bit.ly/38EiBKw (reporting that the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that Uber drivers are independent
contractors).
29. See 53 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A01 (West 2019).
30. See id.
31. See infra Section III.A.
32. See infra Section II.A.
33. See infra Section II.B.
34. See infra Section II.C.
35. See infra Section III.A.
36. See infra Section III.A.
37. See infra Section III.A.
38. See infra Section III.B.
39. See infra Section III.B.
40. See infra Section III.B.
592 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
II. BACKGROUND
The effect of Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle exception on TNCs
encompasses two overlapping areas of law: automobile insurance and
TNC regulation.
41
Automobile insurance and TNC regulation are further
complicated by the distinction between Phase I and Phase II
42
of a
transportation network ride.
43
Given the complex nature of these areas of
law, this Comment will first introduce automobile insurance systems in
the United States and insurance regulations regarding TNCs.
44
A. Automobile Insurance Systems in the United States
Every state in the United States employs automobile insurance
statutes differently.
45
The automobile insurance system in the United
States is broken into tort systems and no-fault systems.
46
The no-fault
system can be further broken down into add-on states and choice no-fault
states.
47
1. Tort Systems
Historically, most states employed the traditional tort liability system
of automobile insurance.
48
Although some states changed their laws to
reflect no-fault language, most states continue to operate as tort systems.
49
In states employing tort systems, insured individuals who are injured in an
automobile accident may sue an at-fault party for both economic and non-
economic damages without first proving they suffered serious injuries.
50
Economic damages, or actual damages, are those damages that carry
provable monetary value, such as medical expenses, lost wages, and
property damage.
51
Non-economic, or general damages, are those damages
that stem from subjective, non-monetary losses.
52
Examples include loss
41. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A01 (West 2019).
42. Phase II of a transportation network ride refers to the time in which the
transportation network driver accepts a ride request and is driving to pick a up a passenger.
See Uber Insurance Policy, supra note 7. Phase II lasts until the passenger reaches the final
destination. See id.
43. See infra Section II.C.2.
44. See infra Section II.A–C.
45. See generally No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1 (discussing the different
automobile insurance systems in the United States).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See O’C
ONNELL & MCCOY, supra note 18. Although tort systems allow insureds
to sue third-party drivers, various state laws and judicial doctrines, such as contributory
and comparative negligence, may limit the amount of damages an insured may recover.
See id.
51. See AM. C. SURGEONS, supra note 10.
52. See id.
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 593
from pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of consortium.
53
In
states that implement tort systems, the injured party must prove that an at-
fault party was at least negligent in causing the accident before the injured
party may recover damages.
54
2. No-Fault Systems
Although many states continue to use a tort system of automobile
insurance, state legislatures began a movement toward the no-fault system
in the 1960s.
55
Since the birth of this movement, 12 states have adopted a
no-fault system.
56
No-fault automobile insurance utilizes first-party
benefits
57
as the main source of recovery for an injured insured.
58
States
employing a no-fault insurance system require a minimum amount of
personal injury protection (“PIP”) that an insured must purchase to cover
first-party benefits.
59
Additionally, states employing a no-fault system cite
different thresholds that a first-party insured must meet before bringing a
tort action against a third party.
60
These thresholds can be either verbal or
monetary.
61
Verbal thresholds are thresholds that require prerequisite
circumstances to occur before bringing suit against a third party.
62
For
example, Pennsylvania prohibits insureds with no-fault insurance to
recover for non-economic damages unless they prove that they suffered a
“serious injury.”
63
A “serious injury” is an injury that resulted in “death,
serious impairment of bodily function or permanent disfigurement.”
64
On
the other hand, monetary thresholds are restrictions on lawsuits based on
the number of medical bills an injured party accrues.
65
For example,
53. See id.
54. See O’C
ONNELL & MCCOY, supra note 18.
55. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
56. The states that have adopted no-fault systems are Florida, Hawaii, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, and Utah. See id.
57. First-party benefits, often referred to as personal injury protection (“PIP”), are
payments made by the insured’s own insurance company, regardless of fault in the
accident. See id. First-party coverage varies by state and is usually limited based on medical
expenses, lost wages, and other out-of-pocket expenses. See id. An injured party generally
sues an at-fault party for additional funds once first-party benefits are exhausted. See
generally id. (explaining the role of first-party benefits in states with no-fault laws).
58. See Automobile Insurance, supra note 21.
59. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have enacted verbal
thresholds. See id.
63. See 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(d) (West 2019).
64. Id.
65. Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah
have enacted monetary thresholds. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
594 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
injured parties in Minnesota must accrue a minimum of $4000 in medical
bills before suing an at-fault party.
66
No-fault systems were implemented in an effort to decrease
consumer premiums and costly personal injury litigation.
67
Premiums are
usually high in traditional tort systems compared to premiums in no-fault
systems.
68
Additionally, personal injury litigation is typically drawn-out in
tort systems and may not adequately compensate the injured party.
69
B. Choice No-Fault Systems
To further decrease burdensome litigation and allow consumers to
choose their means of insurance, several state legislatures adopted choice
no-fault systems.
70
Currently, three states employ the choice no-fault
insurance scheme.
71
A choice no-fault system allows consumers to choose
how they are insured. Consumers can choose to be insured under either the
typical tort system or the no-fault system.
72
Consumers who choose the tort system
73
may sue an at-fault party as
if these consumers reside in a typical tort jurisdiction.
74
Generally,
insureds electing “full tort” status
75
need not prove severe injury to sue an
at-fault party.
76
By contrast, insureds electing the no-fault system
77
are
treated as if they reside in a no-fault jurisdiction.
78
Thus, a limited tort
injured insured may only sue an at-fault party for non-economic damages
66. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51(3)(a) (West 2019).
67. See Automobile Insurance, supra note 21.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
71. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1. States that follow a choice no-fault
regime are Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See id.; see also supra note 16 and
accompanying text for each state’s choice no-fault statute.
72. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
73. In Kentucky, a consumer is treated as a no-fault consumer unless the consumer
specifically refuses to consent to the limitations on lawsuit. See K
Y. REV. STAT. ANN. §
304.39-060(4) (West 2019).
74. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(b) (West 2019); 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1705(c) (West 2019).
75. A consumer choosing the tort system in Pennsylvania is labeled as full tort status.
See 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(c) (West 2019). A consumer choosing the
tort system in New Jersey is labeled no limitation on lawsuit status. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. §
39:6A-8(b) (West 2019).
76. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
77. A consumer choosing the no-fault system in Pennsylvania is labeled as limited
tort status. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d) (West 2019). A consumer choosing the
no-fault system in New Jersey is labeled limitation on lawsuit status.
See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:6A-8(a) (West 2019). In Kentucky, a consumer is treated as a no-fault consumer
unless the consumer specifically refuses to consent to the limitations on lawsuit. See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-060(4) (West 2019).
78. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1; see also K
Y. REV. STAT. ANN. §
304.39-060 (West 2019); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(a) (West, 2019); 75 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d) (West 2019).
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 595
if the insured meets the verbal or monetary threshold outlined by that
state.
79
Pennsylvania utilizes a verbal threshold that requires limited tort
insureds to prove they sustained a serious injury before obtaining relief
from a third party for non-economic damages.
80
A serious injury is an
injury that resulted in “death, serious impairment of bodily function or
permanent disfigurement.”
81
To meet the “serious impairment of bodily
injury” standard, the injured insured must show: (1) what body function,
if any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in the motor vehicle
accident; and (2) that the impairment was serious.
82
In determining
whether the injury was serious, courts consider the extent of the
impairment, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment
required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factor.
83
Like typical no-fault states, Pennsylvania’s choice no-fault system
also outlines specific exceptions to the general rule of limited tort status.
84
For example, if an injured insured meets one of the outlined categories in
Title 75, Sections 1705(d)(1) through (3), the party will be treated as a full
tort insured without necessarily proving serious injury.
85
Of the six exceptions outlined in Sections 1705(d)(1) through (3), this
Comment focuses on the commercial vehicle exception.
86
This exception
reads: “An individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election shall
retain full tort rights if injured while an occupant of a motor vehicle other
than a private passenger motor vehicle.”
87
In other words, injured persons
who elected Pennsylvania’s limited tort status are upgraded to full tort
status if they are occupants of a commercial vehicle at the time of the
injury.
88
C. The Rise of Transportation Network Companies
A transportation network company (“TNC”) is “[a] person or entity
that obtains a license to operate a [TNC] . . . and uses a digital network to
79. Pennsylvania and New Jersey outline verbal thresholds, whereas Kentucky
operates on a monetary threshold of $1000. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1;
see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-060 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(a)
(West 2019); 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d) (West 2019).
80. See 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705 (West 2019).
81. Id. § 1702 (West 2019).
82. See Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
83. See id.; see also Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Graham
v. Campo, 990 A.2d 9, 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
84. See 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d)(1)-(3) (West 2019).
85. See id.
86. See infra Section III. Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle exception to limited tort
status is codified at 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d)(3) (West 2019).
87. § 1705(d)(3).
88. See id.
596 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
facilitate prearranged rides [to its customers].”
89
TNCs utilize GPS-
technology and smartphone capabilities to provide modern ride-sharing
services.
90
With the convenience of GPS and smartphone-based
technology, TNCs such as Uber and Lyft have disrupted the market and
largely displaced most traditional taxi and livery services across the
globe.
91
This displacement of traditional taxi and livery services has led to
widespread litigation.
92
1. The Beginning of State Legislation
Because the advent of TNCs was so novel, little legislation was
passed until there existed an apparent need for such laws.
93
Indeed, the
desire to pass legislation was sparked in 2014 when a California Uber
driver struck and killed a child walking in a crosswalk in San Francisco.
94
Uber denied liability for the incident because, although the driver was
logged into the digital network at the time of the accident, the driver
neither had a passenger in his vehicle nor was on his way to pick up a
passenger.
95
Uber stated that “[t]he driver in question was not providing
services on the Uber system at the time of the accident.”
96
Although the subsequent court case was settled for an undisclosed
amount of money, the tragic accident motivated California lawmakers to
increase the regulation of TNCs.
97
The 2014 California regulations
specifically mandated that TNCs provide at least secondary insurance to
their drivers whenever the driver is logged into the digital network.
98
California was one of the first states to implement stricter laws regarding
TNCs, and many other state legislatures followed suit.
99
89. 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A01 (West 2019).
90. See Erin Mitchell, Uber’s Loophole in the Regulatory System, 6 H
OUS. L. REV.
75, 76 (2015); see also How Uber Makes–And Loses–Money, CBI
NSIGHTS,
https://bit.ly/36yDHJ8 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (discussing the difference between
traditional taxi services and Uber’s double-sided marketplace business model).
91. See Mitchell, supra note 90, at 76.
92. See id.
93. See Vauhini Vara, Uber, Lyft, and Liability, N
EW YORKER (Nov. 4, 2014),
https://bit.ly/2Dtiva3 (discussing a tragic accident involving a minor pedestrian that
sparked adoption of stricter California legislation regarding TNCs).
94. See id.
95. See id. The Uber driver was in Phase I of a ride at the time of the accident. See
Uber Insurance Policy, supra note 7; see also Lyft Insurance Policy, supra note 7.
96. See Vara, supra note 93.
97. See id.; see also Fitzgerald Rodriquez, Uber Settles Wrongful Death Suit of
Sophia Liu, S.F.
EXAMR (July 14, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/1Msvu8B; Josh
Richman, New Uber, Lyft, Sidecar insurance rules signed into law by Gov. Jerry Brown,
M
ERCURY NEWS (Sept. 17, 2014, 9:44 AM), https://bayareane.ws/2MVlTyv.
98. See Vara, supra note 93.
99. See Richman, supra note 97. In 2015, the National Conference of Insurance
Legislators (“NCOIL”) adopted a model act to regulate insurance requirements for TNCs
and their drivers. NATL CONFERENCE OF INS. REGULATORS, MODEL ACT TO REGULATE
INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES AND
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 597
2. Pennsylvania TNC Laws
Roughly two years after California incorporated stricter laws
regulating TNC insurance, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf signed TNC
insurance requirements into law in 2016.
100
The law requires TNCs to
secure primary insurance for their drivers during all phases of a trip.
101
Primary insurance is defined as “[c]overage under an automobile
insurance policy . . . not . . . dependent on a personal automobile insurer
first denying a claim.”
102
Additionally, a driver’s personal insurance need
not first deny a claim before the TNC insurance triggers; a driver is
automatically covered under the commercial policy that is secured during
the specific phase of the trip.
103
The Pennsylvania TNC law addresses two phases of a TNC
rideshare.
104
Phase I begins as soon as the TNC driver logs into the digital
network and is waiting for a passenger to request a ride.
105
Phase II begins
when the driver accepts a ride request and is driving to pick up the
passenger, continuing while the passenger is in the driver’s vehicle.
106
Phase II ends when the ride is complete.
107
During Phase I of a trip, Pennsylvania law requires TNCs to provide
certain amounts of primary automobile insurance coverage.
108
Specifically, the TNC must provide coverage of at least $50,000 per
person for death or bodily injury, at least $100,000 per accident for death
or bodily injury, and at least $25,000 per accident for property damage.
109
The statute also requires TNCs to secure first-party medical benefits of at
least $25,000 for pedestrians and at least $5000 for drivers.
110
Both Uber
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK DRIVERS, at 1 (2015), https://bit.ly/2t9jgjD. As of June 21,
2018, every state except Oregon has enacted legislation regulating TNCs. See P
ROP. CAS.
INSURERS ASSOC. OF AM., TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY STATES WITH ENACTED
LEGISLATION (2018), https://bit.ly/1pB4nOl. Oregon’s proposed bill failed to pass through
the legislature in 2017. See id. Oregon legislatures introduced another bill to regulate
TNCs, however, in the 2019 regular session. See H.B. 3023, 80th Or. Legis., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2019). H.B. 3023 was in the House Committee on Revenue upon adjournment of the
2019 Regular Session. See 2019 Regular Session HB 3023 B, O
R. ST. LEGISLATURE,
https://bit.ly/2nVwNMv (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
100. See Daniel E. Cummins & Stephen T. Kopko, New Law: Mandated Coverages
for Uber and Lyft Vehicles, T
ORT TALK (Nov. 6, 2017), https://bit.ly/2PLvFGY; see also
53 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A07 (West 2019).
101. See § 57A07.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
107. See id.
108. See § 57A07(b)(1)-(2).
109. See § 57A07(b)(1).
110. See § 57A07(b)(2).
598 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
and Lyft adhere to these requirements.
111
Although TNC insurance is the
primary insurance during this Phase I of the trip, the driver’s personal
insurance can still cover the driver if the insurance company chooses to do
so.
112
During Phase II of a trip, Pennsylvania law requires TNCs to secure
primary automobile insurance of at least $500,000 for death, bodily injury,
and property damage.
113
Like Phase I, the TNC must also secure at least
$25,000 for pedestrians and at least $5000 for drivers in first-party medical
benefits.
114
Both Uber and Lyft implement these requirements.
115
Although both Uber and Lyft comply with the Pennsylvania laws
regarding TNC insurance coverage, the question still remains: At what
point does a TNC driver’s personal vehicle become a commercial
vehicle?
116
The answer to this question carries significant weight in
determining whether a driver qualifies as a limited tort or full tort insured,
and thus, must be thoroughly examined.
117
Under current Pennsylvania law, however, an insured electing
limited tort coverage on a personal insurance policy cannot later allege that
the vehicle is not a “private passenger vehicle” for the purpose of claiming
coverage under the commercial vehicle exception.
118
In Bennett v.
Mucci,
119
the plaintiff sustained injuries in a car accident involving a
vehicle he drove “solely for the operation of his business.”
120
Although the
plaintiff used the car solely for business purposes, he maintained personal
insurance, as opposed to commercial insurance, for the vehicle.
121
The
plaintiff elected the limited tort alternative when purchasing his personal
insurance.
122
At trial, the jury found that the plaintiff’s injuries were not
“serious,” as required under Title 75, Section 1705.
123
Thus, the jury
111. See Uber Insurance Policy, supra note 7; see also Lyft Insurance Policy, supra
note 7.
112. See § 57A07(l)(2).
113. See § 57A07(c)(1).
114. See § 57A07(c)(2).
115. See Uber Insurance Policy, supra note 7; see also Lyft Insurance Policy, supra
note 7.
116. See Cummins, supra note 27 (“The quandary in this regard is whether the Uber
or Lyft driver’s use of his own personal vehicle for business purposes triggers an exception
to the limited tort option.”).
117. See id.
118. See Bennett v. Mucci, 901 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“One who
elects limited tort coverage for a vehicle under a private passenger motor vehicle liability
insurance policy can not later claim that the same vehicle is not a private passenger motor
vehicle for purposes of § 1705.”).
119. 901 A.2d 1038 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1039.
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 599
awarded the plaintiff only economic damages.
124
The plaintiff appealed
the jury’s verdict.
125
On appeal, the appellant-plaintiff argued that, because he used the
vehicle for business purposes, his limited tort election should not be
binding based on the plain language of Section 1705(d).
126
The
Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed and held that a person electing
limited tort status on a personal vehicle cannot later allege that the vehicle
is not a “private passenger vehicle” for the purposes of claiming the
commercial vehicle exception.
127
The court noted that accepting the
appellant’s argument “would undercut the General Assembly’s goals of
promoting financial responsibility.”
128
Although the Pennsylvania General
Assembly
129
has an interest in promoting financial responsibility, it has
also exhibited a preference for the full tort option, rather than the limited
tort option, when the driver’s tort status is in dispute.
130
In Bennett, the
Superior Court distinguished this general preference for full tort rights by
stating:
The result we reach in the instant matter is not in tension with our
General Assembly’s preference for full tort rights. Where, as here, the
insured is the victim of an accident in the vehicle for which he procured
limited tort coverage, the outcome under [Section] 1705 is not in
doubt.
131
The court in Bennett addressed Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle
exception with regard to personal insurance policies only.
132
The court did
not address the exception when both personal and commercial policies
cover individuals,
133
as is the case when TNC drivers are driving while
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1041.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1042.
129. The Pennsylvania General Assembly is Pennsylvania’s legislature. See General
Assembly Homepage, P
A. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.legis.state.pa.us/ (last visited Feb.
4, 2020).
130. See L.S. v. Eschbach, 874 A.2d 1150, 1156–57 (Pa. 2005); see also Ickes v.
Burkes, 713 A.2d 653, 656–57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“[T]he intent of the [Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law is] to provid[e] the full tort coverage whenever there is a
question as to which coverage is applicable.”); Berger v. Rinaldi, 651 A.2d 553, 557 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994) (“[I]n virtually every circumstance where there is a question about [which]
coverage will apply, there is a conscious attempt to rule in favor of the full tort alternative.”)
(quoting Consideration of H.B. 121 Continued, 1990 Assemb., 174th Sess. 214 (Pa.
1990) (statement of Rep. Richard Hayden, Representative, Pa. House of Rep.), available
at https://bit.ly/35oHk3F) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Richard Hayden].
131. Bennett, 901 A.2d at 1041.
132. See id. at 1041–42.
133. See id.
600 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
logged into the TNC’s digital network.
134
Thus, the question remains
whether a TNC driver’s tort election under the driver’s personal insurance
applies during Phase I of the trip.
135
The remainder of this Comment
explains why the commercial vehicle exception should apply to TNC
drivers whenever the driver is logged into the digital network, thereby
upgrading TNC drivers to full tort status.
136
III. A
NALYSIS
The rise of Uber and other TNCs presented novel issues for
Pennsylvania legislators, leading to new legislation regarding insurance
requirements in 2016.
137
Despite this recent wave of legislation, a complex
question still remains: At what point in time does a TNC driver’s personal
vehicle become a commercial vehicle?
138
This question is of the utmost
importance when automobile accident liability is disputed, specifically
regarding the insured’s tort election options in Pennsylvania and how these
elections affect insurance payouts.
139
Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle
exception should apply whenever a TNC driver is logged into the digital
network, thereby upgrading limited tort TNC drivers to full tort status.
140
Further, choice no-fault jurisdictions should amend their laws to clearly
and unambiguously apply the exception to TNC drivers logged into their
digital networks.
141
A. When is a TNC Vehicle a Commercial Vehicle?
Because Pennsylvania mandates that TNC insurance be primary for
a TNC driver while the driver is logged into the TNC’s digital network,
142
whether a TNC vehicle is commercial during Phase II of a trip is largely
undisputed.
143
The question remains, however, whether the driver’s tort
134. See generally 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A07 (West 2019)
(governing the minimum coverage TNCs must maintain for their drivers in Pennsylvania).
135. See Cummins, supra note 27.
136. See infra Section III.A.
137. See § 57A07; see also Cummins, supra note 27 (“As the use of Uber and Lyft
rideshares become more prevalent in Pennsylvania, it is more likely that motor vehicle
accidents involving such drivers will increase and thereby give rise to novel issues of
law.”).
138. See Cummins, supra note 27 (“One such issue is whether an Uber or Lyft driver
who has elected the limited tort option under his own personal automobile insurance policy
will be deemed to be a full tort plaintiff if he is involved in an accident while driving as an
Uber or Lyft driver.”).
139. See id. (“The quandary in this regard is whether the Uber or Lyft driver’s use of
his own personal vehicle for business purposes triggers an exception to the limited tort
option.”).
140. See infra Section III.A.
141. See infra Section III.B.
142. See § 57A07(f).
143. See Cummins & Kopko, supra note 100 (“[T]he statutory framework confirms
that a Lyft or Uber driver’s separate personal automobile insurance coverage typically will
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 601
election under the driver’s personal insurance applies during Phase I of the
trip.
144
1. Furthering the Business of the TNC
During Phase I, a driver is neither driving a passenger to a final
destination nor on the way to retrieve a passenger; the driver is simply
waiting for a ride request.
145
One issue that arises in determining whether
the TNC driver is driving a commercial vehicle during Phase I is whether
the driver is furthering the business of the TNC when the driver is waiting
for a ride request.
146
Title 53, Section 57A07 explicitly states that a TNC must provide
primary insurance during all phases of a trip.
147
Section 57A07’s statutory
language requiring the TNC to provide primary insurance includes Phase
I of the trip–when the driver is not currently engaged in a pre-arranged
ride.
148
Additionally, the Section 57A07 explicitly allows the personal
insurance provider to opt-out of coverage when the driver is using the
vehicle “while the driver is logged onto a digital network or while a driver
provides a prearranged ride.”
149
The TNC driver’s personal insurance need
not apply to potential accidents during Phase I because the driver is
“logged onto a digital network.”
150
Under this scenario, the TNC driver is
furthering the business of the TNC in Phase I because the driver is waiting
for a ride request, which will initiate a new ride and lead to more company
revenue.
151
Unlike a TNC driver who is driving without the application
not come into play if the driver is involved in an accident resulting in personal injuries or
property damages.”).
144. See Cummins, supra note 27.
145. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
146. See Johnson v. Glenn Sand & Gravel, 453 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(citing Pillo v. Mohan, 189 A.2d 850, 851 (Pa. 1963)) (“[T]he test for whether an agency
issue should reach the jury turns upon whether any reasonable inference from the facts
supports the finding that the employee was acting in furtherance of his employer’s
business.”). Note, however, that this case points back to an employee-employer
relationship. See id. TNC drivers, on the other hand, are independent contractors. See
Wiessner, supra note 28.
147. See § 57A07(a).
148. See § 57A07 (b)(1)–(2).
149. See § 57A07(l)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall require that a personal
automobile insurance policy provide coverage while the driver is logged into a digital
network, while the driver is engaged in a prearranged ride or while the driver otherwise
uses a vehicle to transport passengers for compensation; see also § 57A07(l)(1) (“Insurers
that write automobile in this Commonwealth may exclude any and all coverage afforded
under the policy issued to an owner or operator of a personal vehicle for any loss or injury
that occurs while a driver is logged into a digital network or while a driver provides a
prearranged ride.”).
150. See § 57A07(l).
151. See How Uber Makes–And Loses–Money, supra note 90 (“For Uber, growth
means faster pickup times, more drivers on the road, and potentially lower prices for riders.
It also means more revenue for Uber.”).
602 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
open, a TNC driver waiting for a ride request is open for business.
152
A
TNC driver waiting for a ride request can be equated to a convenience
store clerk waiting for customers; even if customers do not engage in
commerce, the worker is nonetheless furthering the business of the
company by working. In this situation, a fact finder could make a
reasonable inference that the TNC driver was “acting in furtherance of his
employer’s business.”
153
Therefore, Section 57A07 is not negated simply
because a TNC driver is waiting for a ride request.
154
Conversely, a TNC driver could turn on the digital network with no
intention of furthering the business of the TNC. For example, a driver
could log on to the digital network and drive across town without picking
up, or attempting to pick up, a single passenger. This loophole could
potentially lead drivers to pay only the minimum amount for their personal
insurance, while unfairly reaping the benefit of full tort status.
155
By
applying Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle exception to the TNC
driver’s tort election under the driver’s personal insurance, the driver could
use the TNC’s digital network while driving for non-business purposes–
the driver would be covered by the TNC’s commercial insurance policy
and would, therefore, be covered as a full tort driver.
156
Thus, allowing
Pennsylvania’s commercial vehicle exception to override a TNC driver’s
personal vehicle tort election could create substantial public policy issues,
including increased insurance fraud and insurance premiums.
157
Some may argue that the TNC driver is not furthering the business of
the TNC during Phase I; however this argument is fundamentally unfair.
Such an approach would unjustly disadvantage the TNC drivers who are
legitimately furthering the business of the TNC while they wait for a ride
152. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
153. See Johnson v. Glenn Sand & Gravel, 453 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982).
154. See generally § 57A07 (requiring TNCs to provide minimum primary insurance
for TNC drivers).
155. Automobile insurance is required in Pennsylvania pursuant to the Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law. See 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701–1799.7
(West 2019). Insureds must select whether they want to be insured as a limited tort or full
tort driver. See id. § 1705. Full tort drivers typically receive better insurance coverage in
exchange for higher premiums. See No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 1.
156. See § 1705(d)(3) (upgrading limited tort individuals to full tort status if they
were injured while a passenger in a vehicle “other than a private passenger motor vehicle”);
see also § 57A07(a) (West 2019) (mandating that the TNC insurance is primary and must
cover the TNC driver even if the driver’s personal insurance does not cover the claim).
157. See generally Insurance Fraud, N
ATL ASSN INS. COMMRS,
https://bit.ly/2Gu2h3w (last updated May 14, 2019) (“Insurance fraud occurs when an
insurance company, agent, adjuster or consumer commits a deliberate deception in order
to obtain an illegitimate gain.”); see also Insurance Fraud is Driving Up Premiums, B
US.
INS. QUOTES, https://bit.ly/2GxykiL (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (“[A] significant percentage
of a premium increase is to help cover losses due to insurance fraud.”).
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 603
request.
158
Should the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopt the position
that the commercial vehicle exception does not apply to Phase I of a trip,
TNC drivers who are not abusing the system would be unfairly forced to
apply their tort election under their personal insurance policy.
159
This
inequitable framework could, therefore, result in less coverage for the
TNC drivers who are legitimately abiding by the system.
160
Potential abuse of the system, although important to recognize,
should not influence the legislature to unfairly strip rights away from those
who are adhering to the Commonwealth’s laws. Rather, the onus should
fall on the TNC itself to monitor its drivers’ locations and actions. The
TNC should monitor and track statistics including, but not limited to the
number of rides accepted and completed compared to the number of rides
requested, and how many rides were accepted and completed in a
timeframe. Therefore, the TNC should bear the responsibility of tracking
these statistics and any fraud that may arise from the application of the
commercial vehicle exception to Phase I of a TNC trip. TNCs should
report any abuse of the system by TNC drivers to the appropriate
authorities,
161
and the TNC should also internally handle such abuse.
Creating a duty on the part of TNCs to monitor their drivers’ statistics
would minimize abuse of the system.
162
2. Bennett v. Mucci
The case of Bennett v. Mucci
163
contributes to the conversation about
whether a TNC driver’s personal insurance tort election should apply
during Phase I of a TNC ride.
164
In Bennett, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that an insured electing limited tort coverage on a personal
158. Those who are not legitimately furthering the business of the TNC are
committing insurance fraud and raising premiums for all consumers, not just the TNC
drivers. See generally Insurance Fraud is Driving Up Premiums, supra note 157
(describing insurance fraud and fraud reporting services).
159. See generally § 1705 (outlining Pennsylvania’s election of tort options).
160. If the driver elected limited tort on the driver’s personal insurance policy, the
driver may only sue for economic damages unless the driver proves he or she sustained a
“serious injury,” pursuant to Section 1705. See id.
161. Many states have instituted fraud bureaus that investigate insurance fraud. See
Insurance Fraud, F
ED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://bit.ly/1LNH0xR (last visited
Feb. 4, 2020). Additionally, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has
created a uniform fraud reporting system, which allows consumers and insurers to
electronically report suspected insurance fraud. See N
ATL ASSN INS. COMMRS, supra
note 157.
162. See generally Stopping Insurance Fraud, BUS. SEC., https://bit.ly/36xJGOl (last
visited Feb. 4, 2020) (discussing the implication of insurance fraud on businesses and how
businesses can protect their bottom lines).
163. 901 A.2d 1038 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
164. See id. (holding that an insured electing limited tort coverage on a personal
insurance policy cannot later allege that the vehicle is not a “private passenger vehicle” for
the purpose of claiming coverage under the commercial vehicle exception).
604 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
insurance policy cannot later allege that the vehicle is not a “private
passenger vehicle” for the purpose of claiming coverage under the
commercial vehicle exception.
165
This broad holding is inapplicable to
TNC drivers because TNC drivers carry two automobile insurance
policies—a personal policy and a commercial policy—whereas the
plaintiff in Bennett only carried a personal policy.
166
Because Bennett addressed tort elections regarding personal
insurance policies,
167
the question persists: Should Bennett govern TNC
drivers who hold both a personal and commercial insurance policy on their
vehicle? To date, Pennsylvania courts have not directly addressed this
issue. If this issue arises in Pennsylvania litigation, however, courts should
distinguish the facts in Bennett from applying the commercial vehicle
exception to a TNC driver.
Although the plaintiff in Bennett used his vehicle solely for
business purposes, he did not maintain a commercial insurance policy on
the vehicle.
168
Rather, he maintained only a single, personal insurance
policy for the vehicle.
169
Because two policies were not in dispute, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the plaintiff’s tort election status on
his personal, and only, insurance policy was controlling.
170
A TNC driver operating during Phase I of a TNC ride does not fall
under the broad holding of Bennett.
171
Unlike the plaintiff in Bennett, a
TNC driver maintains both personal automobile insurance and the TNC’s
commercial insurance.
172
Because two competing policies exist, a conflict
arises regarding which coverage will apply.
173
When a coverage dispute
exists regarding whether the limited tort or full tort option should apply,
the General Assembly’s intent is to defer to the full tort option.
174
Given
165. See id. at 1041.
166. See id.
167. See generally id. (discussing the implications of electing limited tort coverage
on a personal insurance policy).
168. See id. at 1041.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1042.
171. See id. at 1041 (holding that a driver who elects limited tort coverage under a
personal insurance policy cannot later claim the vehicle is not a private passenger vehicle
for the purposes of Title 75, Section 1705 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes).
172. See generally 53 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A07 (West 2019)
(enumerating the required automobile insurance coverage TNCs must provide for their
drivers).
173. The issue of competing insurance policies was addressed by Representative
Richard Hayden during the Pennsylvania House of Representatives hearings on House Bill
121. See Statement of Rep. Richard Hayden, supra note 130.
174. See L.S. v. Eschbach, 874 A.2d 1150, 1156–57 (Pa. 2005); see also Ickes v.
Burkes, 713 A.2d 653, 656–57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“[T]he intent of the [Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law is] to provid[e] the full tort coverage whenever there is a
question as to which coverage is applicable.”); Berger v. Rinaldi, 651 A.2d 553, 557 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994) (“[I]n virtually every circumstance where there is a question about [which]
coverage will apply, there is a conscious attempt to rule in favor of the full tort alternative.”)
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 605
this preference, courts should rule that a TNC’s commercial policy trumps
a TNC driver’s personal insurance when an accident occurs.
175
Thus, the
commercial vehicle exception should apply to a TNC driver who elected
limited tort on the driver’s personal insurance policy, thereby upgrading
the driver to full tort status if the driver is involved in an accident while
logged onto the TNC’s digital network.
B. Choice No-Fault Jurisdictions Should Create a Unified
Definition of a Commercial Vehicle Regarding TNCs
Currently, Pennsylvania law is silent as to whether the commercial
vehicle exception, codified under Section 1705(d)(3), applies while the
TNC driver is logged onto the TNC’s digital network.
176
By comparison,
New Jersey (another choice no-fault jurisdiction) explicitly states that the
limitation on lawsuit option
177
is not available for actions arising from a
“prearranged ride.”
178
Under New Jersey law, a “prearranged ride” is
defined as:
[T]he provision of transportation by a [TNC] driver to a [TNC] rider,
beginning when a driver accepts a ride requested by a rider through a
digital network controlled by a transportation network company,
continuing while the driver transports a requesting rider, and ending
when the last requesting rider departs from the personal vehicle.
179
Although New Jersey law is certainly more explicit than
Pennsylvania law
180
in denying the limitation on lawsuit option during a
prearranged TNC ride, Title 39, Section 39:5H-2 of the New Jersey
Statutes contains one major flaw. The statute fails to address whether the
limitation on lawsuit option applies during Phase I of the TNC trip when
(quoting Consideration of H.B. 121 Continued, 1990 Assemb., 174th Sess. 214 (Pa.
1990) (statement of Rep. Richard Hayden, Representative, Pa. House of Rep.), available
at https://bit.ly/35oHk3F).
175. See L.S., 874 A.2d at 1156-57; see also Ickes, 713 A.2d at 656-57; Berger, 651
A.2d at 557.
176. See 75 P
A. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d) (West 2019).
177. The limitation on lawsuit option is New Jersey’s version of the limited tort
option in Pennsylvania. Compare 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705(d) (West
2019)(regulating limited tort coverage in Pennsylvania), with
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(a)
(West 2019) (regulating coverage limitation on lawsuit coverage in New Jersey).
178. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5H-10(j) (West 2019) (“The limitation on lawsuit
option . . . shall not be assertable by a transportation network company or a transportation
network company driver in any action for damages arising from a prearranged ride, or be
asserted against any party not receiving personal injury protection benefits in any action
for damages arising from a prearranged ride.”).
179. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:5H-2 (West 2019).
180. Title 53, Section 57A07 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes fails to
address whether the limited tort option under Title 75, Section 1705 of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes can apply at any time during a prearranged ride. See 53 P
A. STAT.
AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 57A07 (West 2019).
606 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2
the driver is not engaged in a prearranged ride.
181
Therefore, neither New
Jersey nor Pennsylvania law explicitly addresses whether the limitation on
a lawsuit or limited tort option, respectively, applies to Phase I of a TNC
ride.
182
Although case law regarding this issue is underdeveloped, this
question is one of significant importance and one in which legislatures
must resolve. Failure to adopt the commercial vehicle exception when a
TNC driver is logged onto the digital network could lead to an unjust
award of damages that are limited to the TNC driver’s personal tort
election.
183
Additionally, unclear statutory language could lead to
increased litigation regarding the scope and meaning of the statute.
184
For example, the at-fault driver’s insurance company would likely
claim that the TNC driver is bound by the driver’s personal tort election.
185
The insurer would pose this argument because it wants to pay as little
money to the opposing party as possible to protect its bottom line.
186
By
arguing the TNC driver is bound by the driver’s limited tort election, the
insurance company would need to pay only economic damages, unless the
driver proves the injuries were “serious.”
187
Conversely, the TNC driver would likely argue that Pennsylvania’s
commercial vehicle exception applies, thereby upgrading the driver to full
tort status, because the driver was operating under a commercial insurance
policy at the time of the accident.
188
TNC drivers would also likely argue
that they were furthering the business of the TNC when the accident
occurred and that current controlling case law in Pennsylvania, namely
Bennett v. Mucci, is inapplicable in such a situation.
189
Presently, the TNC laws in choice no-fault jurisdictions may lead to
unfair and unjust awards to plaintiffs, as well as increased litigation, both
181. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5H-10 (West 2019).
182. See id.; see also § 57A07.
183. For a discussion of insurance fraud and increased premiums, see supra Section
III.A.
184. See A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 905-06 (Pa. 2016) (“A statute is
ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.”). “Two
reasonable interpretations” therefore potentially lead to litigation over those
interpretations. See, e.g., id. (determining whether a statute was ambiguous).
185. See generally 10 Tactics Insurance Companies Use to Deny and Devalue
Claims, D
ICKERSON OXTON, https://bit.ly/2WQaC76 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019)(discussing
the ways in which insurance companies handle claims).
186. See id. (“The insurance company’s ultimate goal is to pay out nothing or as little
as possible on every claim.”).
187. See 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1705 (West 2019).
188. See id.
189. See supra Section III.A (discussing the significance of the TNC driver furthering
the business of the TNC and why Bennett v. Mucci should not apply when there exists a
personal insurance policy and a commercial insurance policy).
2020 UBER TECHS., UBER TORT? 607
of which directly contradict the purpose of no-fault insurance.
190
No-fault
systems were created in an attempt to decrease the burdensome and drawn-
out personal injury litigation in tort systems and to adequately compensate
the injured party.
191
Therefore, to protect the purpose of no-fault insurance,
legislatures in choice no-fault states should clarify that the commercial
vehicle exception applies to TNC drivers when the driver is logged into
the TNC digital network. Thus, choice no-fault jurisdictions should amend
their statutes to explicitly apply the commercial vehicle exception to TNC
drivers when the driver is logged into the digital network, thereby creating
a uniform definition of “commercial vehicle” as applied to TNC vehicles.
IV. C
ONCLUSION
The rise of Uber and other TNCs created complex questions for
legislatures throughout the United States.
192
This Comment addressed two
questions in particular: (1) at what point in time does a TNC driver’s
personal vehicle become a commercial vehicle;
193
and (2) whether this
distinction affects a TNC driver’s personal tort election option in the case
of an accident when the driver is logged into the TNC network.
194
The
TNC driver’s personal vehicle should be considered commercial any time
the driver is logged into the TNC’s digital network.
195
Therefore, the
commercial vehicle exception should apply to TNC drivers and TNC
drivers should thus be considered full tort insureds when they are logged
into the TNC’s digital network.
196
Pennsylvania and other choice no-fault jurisdictions should amend
their laws to reflect clear and unambiguous language adopting a uniform
definition of “commercial vehicle” as applied to TNCs.
197
Failure to adopt
clear and unambiguous statutory language could lead to unjust
compensation and an increase in litigation, which directly negates the
purpose of no-fault automobile insurance.
198
190. See Automobile Insurance, supra note 21; see also O’CONNELL & MCCOY, supra
note 18, at [1].
191. See Automobile Insurance, supra note 21; see also O’C
ONNELL & MCCOY, supra
note 18, at [1].
192. See supra Section II.C.
193. See supra Section III.A.
194. See supra Section III.A.
195. See supra Section III.A.
196. See supra Section III.A.
197. See supra Section III.B.
198. See supra Section III.B.