PREFACE
A GUIDE TO INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN CYPRUS
Benjamin J Broome
Cyprus Fulbright Scholar
THE GREEN LINE
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS
PREFACE
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE Benjamin J Broome
"Building Bridges Across the Green Line draws from many years of contact and cooperation between
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, who often came together under difficult conditions and
overcame many obstacles to their work. The book summarizes the wisdom of the pioneers in bi-
communal activities, and it will be a valuable guide for those who take the simple human step of
communicating with their neighbors on 'the other side' of the buffer zone. It is gratifying to note that
the author used as part of the title of his book the phrase: "Building Bridges" because back in 1978,
when we started our co-operation, we were on record saying in a UNDP publication, that we are
"building bridges" and that "it may take us half way along the path". We've come to know Benjamin
Broome through a number of ground-breaking workshops he facilitated over the past decade, and
this book reflects both his keen understanding of the two communities in Cyprus and his commitment
to building links between people separated by conflict."
Lellos Demitriades and Mustafa Akinci
Former Mayors of Nicosia
green COVER-ENG 03-04-06 14:50 Page 1
In this guidebook, Benjamin Broome explores the dynamics of intercultural
communication in unofficial contacts across the Green Line in Cyprus. The book
begins with an overview of efforts over the past three decades to promote
cooperation across the buffer zone, with an examination of the obstacles
confronted by those involved in these projects. Drawing from bi-communal
workshops he has facilitated during the past decade, the author describes the
images, both positive and negative, that each side holds of the other, helping the
reader recognize the differences that divide the communities, while appreciating
the commonalities that bind Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together. He
provides a revealing look at issues of identity, showing how they are intricately tied
to the conflict that divides the communities. Practical suggestions are made for
establishing trust, engaging in dialogue, and working together on joint projects.
Finally, he discusses the social and psychological impact of cross-community
contact and its importance in preparing for life after a settlement. Designed for
anyone who wishes to understand the challenges and the promises of
communication across the Green Line, it will be useful for novices and veterans
alike, outside third-parties working in Cyprus, and the serious traveler who seeks to
comprehend the complexity of bi-communal relations on this conflict-divided
eastern Mediterranean island.
Benjamin Broome is a professor of communication at Arizona State University in the
USA. During the last decade he has facilitated workshops, training programs, and
seminars with community groups, NGOs, and project teams in Cyprus, focusing on
intercultural communication, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution.
green COVER-ENG 03-04-06 14:50 Page 2
MAKING CONTACT
A GUIDE TO INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN CYPRUS
Benjamin J Broome
Arizona State University
Fulbright Scholar in Cyprus
THE GREEN LINE
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS
Copyright
©
2005
by the United Nations Development Programme
UNPA, P.O.Box 21642, 1590 Nicosia, Cyprus
Book design and production by Action Global Communications
Cover illustration and design by Action Global Communications,
representing the Venetian Walls of Nicosia,
with the Green line dividing the city.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without prior permission.
Printed in the Republic of Cyprus.
ISBN: 9963-627-01-3
With support from the
Bi-communal Development Programme
funded by USAID and UNDP
and executed by UNOPS
The publication of this guidebook was made possible with a grant
from the Bi-communal Development Programme (BDP), which is
funded by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and is executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services
(UNOPS). I would like to express my appreciation to the former
Programme Manager of the BDP in Cyprus, Mr. Miran Rechter, for
his leadership and endorsement of this project. I am especially
grateful to Mr. Thore Hansen, Former Deputy Programme Manager
and Ms. Ece Akcaoglu, Programme Analyst of the Bi-communal
Development Programme, who guided the proposal process to a
successful result. In addition, I would like to express my thanks to
USAID, especially Ms. Elizabeth Kassinis and Ms. Kim Foukaris,
whose support was critical to the success of this venture. Special credit
is due to Clark Price, whose initial encouragement is responsible for
my pursuit of the project. I am indebted to the former U.S.
Ambassador to Cyprus, Donald Bandler, for his confidence in my
ability to produce a useful product.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
With support from the BDP during the summer of 2001, and
with invaluable assistance from the Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens and Sabanci
University in Istanbul, I had the opportunity to organise and facilitate
a series of seminars that were held in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey,
culminating in a workshop in Bruges, Belgium, that brought together
over thirty Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turks, and Greeks for
discussions about rapprochement activities in the region. Many of the
ideas generated in those meetings are included in this book, and I am
grateful to the participants for their willingness to share their
experiences and insights. The full report of the seminar, with a list of
participants and members of the facilitation team, is available upon
request from the UNDP/UNOPS office in Nicosia, Cyprus.
Most of all, I want to thank my Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-
Cypriot friends and colleagues who participated in the bi-communal
workshops that took place during my stay in Cyprus from 1994-1996
and who have provided leadership for the bi-communal activities
over the last decade. It was from them that I learned the difficulties
and rewards of building bridges across the Green Line. If others find
this guidebook useful, the credit goes to these courageous and
committed individuals, who are the true ‘pioneers' in building the
future of Cyprus.
Benjamin Broome
Tempe, Arizona, USA
The information, content and language in this publication are the authors’ own and
do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the BDP, its funders, or its
executing agency.
ii
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Acknowledgements i
Table of Contents iii
Preface v
1. Introduction 1
2. Entering Unfamiliar Territory 5
3. Making Contact 10
Historical Overview of Bi-communal Contacts 13
Political Contacts 15
Business and Professional Meetings 18
Citizen Gatherings & Exchanges 20
Conflict Resolution Activities 22
Pioneering Bi-communal Groups 28
Special Projects 32
4. Confronting Obstacles 38
Use of Bi-communal Events as a Political Tool 41
Negative Portrayals in the Media 44
Concern about 'Recognition' 45
Personal Criticism 49
Dealing with Frustration 50
CONTENTS
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
iv
5 Encountering Images 51
How do Turkish Cypriots see Greek Cypriots? 53
How do Greek Cypriots see Turkish Cypriots? 56
Appreciating Differences 58
Recognizing Variety 60
Discovering Commonalities 61
6. Examining Identity 63
Connection to Motherland 66
Attachment to Cyprus 70
Burden of the Cyprus Conflict 72
Relation to the Other Community 73
Cultural Characteristics 74
Connection to International Community 76
Identity and Interdependence in the Cyprus Conflict 77
7. Taking Steps toward Success 81
Establishing Trust 82
Constructing a Safe Environment for Dialogue 87
Working Together Productively 92
8. Shaping the Future 96
Social and Psychological Impact 97
Preparing for Life After a Settlement 101
Some Words of Advice from the Veterans 104
Conclusion 106
References 108
Resources on the Web 113
Regional Peace Building 113
Conflict Resolution 114
Intercultural Communication 114
About the Author 116
Index 119
For more than a decade there have been sustained attempts by
Cypriots from both communities to promote contact and cooperation
across the Buffer Zone (referred to as the ‘Green Line') that has
divided Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots from one another for
over three decades. Commonly known as ‘bi-communal activities,’
these efforts have ranged from intensive conflict resolution workshops
to academic seminars, panel discussions, cultural events,
environmental projects, summer camps and other youth gatherings,
and receptions to commemorate special holidays of various
diplomatic entities. The bi-communal activities have been locally
driven, but in many cases they required the logistical assistance of
third-parties, and in some cases they were facilitated by outside
trainers and other technical experts. For the most part, these events
provided the only way for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to
meet one another in Cyprus.
In recent months, however, major developments have taken
place in Cyprus that significantly affect contacts between the
PREFACE
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
vi
communities and the role of bi-communal activities in promoting
these links. The first of these developments occurred in April 2003,
when the restrictions that had long prevented communication and
contact across the Buffer Zone were partially lifted, allowing for the
first time in nearly thirty years ordinary Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots to visit one another in their homes, sit together in coffee
shops and restaurants, shop in one another's stores, and work
together on a limited basis
1
.
A second major development occurred in December 2003,
when elections in the north brought to power a pro-rapprochement
party that views inter-communal contacts favourably. A long-held
stance by Turkish-Cypriot officials against inter-communal contacts
was removed, and for the first time the Turkish-Cypriot authorities
voiced their support for cooperation with the other side. Many of the
individuals who played a leading role in the rise of pro-solution
parties in the north have participated actively in the bi-communal
activities over the years, and several have indicated that the co-
existence stance they advocate was developed as a result of the
opportunities they had to engage in intense discussions and dialogues
with Greek Cypriots about the core issues of the Cyprus problem.
Their ascent to positions of influence has drastically lowered (but
probably not eliminated entirely) the social pressure and media
criticisms that ‘bi-communalists' have long experienced in the north.
The most recent development, and perhaps the one with the
most serious long-term consequences, occurred on 24 April 2004.
United Nations-sponsored negotiations were restarted in January
2004, with agreement from leaders of the two communities that a
version of the ‘Annan Plan,' which had originally been the focus of
negotiations in 2003, would be submitted to separate referenda in
each community. Upon acceptance by voters in both communities,
the plan would take effect on 1 May 2004, the day that Cyprus was
scheduled to become a full member state of the European Union
(EU), allowing Cyprus to enter the EU as a unified state. While the
PREFACE
vii
Turkish Cypriots voted heavily in favour of the Annan Plan, the
Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected the plan, thus preventing it
from taking effect. This negative vote on the part of the Greek
Cypriots not only made it less likely that a political agreement would
be reached in the near future, but it led to a great deal of
discouragement among those involved in the peace process, including
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who had worked so hard
and for so many years in the interests of rapprochement. Hopes for
large-scale cooperation between communities were dashed, and the
individuals and groups working for reconciliation had to re-group
and re-think their strategy.
At the time of this writing, it is difficult to know what will happen
next, either with the prospects for a political agreement or with the
future of bi-communal efforts on the island. However, one thing is
clear – the dynamics of inter-communal relations have been changed
irrevocably by the recent developments. Even without a political
settlement, it is unlikely that the Green Line will ever again function as
an impenetrable wall between the two communities. Thousands of
individuals will continue to cross the line on a daily basis, some to work
or seek services, others to shop, eat, visit friends, or take excursions.
With or without a solution, it is likely that joint projects dealing with
infrastructure, environment, education, and health will go forward,
and joint business ventures will become more common.
Face-to-face communication with members of the other
community is now an unavoidable reality for many in Cyprus, from
the shopkeepers on Ledra Street, to the doctors and nurses at Nicosia
General hospital, the waiters in Kyrenia and Bellapais, the taxi drivers
in both communities, and the Cypriot general public. Individuals who
might never have considered taking part in third-party organized bi-
communal activities are confronted with the need to interact with ‘the
other.' Economic and practical incentives for cooperation drive cross-
community contacts, and many opportunities are developing for joint
projects across a wide spectrum of society.
On the surface, it may appear to outsiders, or even to ordinary
Cypriots, that there is no ‘communication problem' between Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. After all, when people get together,
they get along well, often enjoying each other's company. And since
the checkpoints were opened, there have been no serious incidents of
violence or other problems to indicate that the two communities are
unable to get along. However, for the vast majority of Cypriots
crossing the Green Line or meeting visitors from the other side, the
conversation has never moved beyond a surface level. Cypriots of
both communities tend to exhibit a politeness toward strangers, and
their cordiality can go a long way toward smooth relations – as long as
interaction stays within ‘safe' topics. Yet the burden of the Cyprus
conflict remains over everyone's head, and sitting in a coffee shop on
the other side enjoying a leisurely Sunday afternoon does little to
remove the weight of living in a divided country. And carrying on a
casual conversation is very different from working together on a daily
basis, struggling with disagreements and managing conflicts
productively.
Unfortunately, few people understand well (if at all) the views
of the other community, and many people hold misleading images
about the other side. It is inevitable that people will experience
difficulties, and without adequate knowledge, such incidents can
easily spiral into negative consequences. In order for interaction to be
effective and for joint projects to work smoothly, it is important for
those involved to understand more about the dynamics of
intercultural communication, to learn more about the ‘reality' of the
other community, and to be able to ‘process' their experiences within
a framework that helps them work through the confusion and
uncertainty that inevitably accompanies such contact.
There is no ‘secret formula' that guarantees successful
encounters across the Green Line, but there is much wisdom that can
be gained from the experiences of those who have been involved in
such encounters for the past decade. In addition, there is a large body
of literature about intercultural communication, and although every
viii
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
situation is different, there are some basic guiding principles that govern
fruitful cross-cultural interaction. This guidebook is designed to share
the wisdom of those who have already travelled along the bi-communal
road and to suggest ways to maximize the inter-communal experience.
It should be useful to anyone involved in cross-community contacts,
from experienced bi-communalists to those new to inter-communal
relations. I also hope it will be helpful for the third parties and other
members of the international community working with Cypriots,
outsiders living in Cyprus, and to Greek and Turkish organizations
that have relations with Cypriot NGOs, businesses, and other groups.
A Turkish-Cypriot official recently stated: ‘The days of
intercultural conflict are giving way to an era of intercultural
cooperation.'
2
For much too long Cypriots have been concerned
primarily with the conflict. Now it is time to shift the focus toward
learning more about cooperation and consensus building. Cyprus
and its people cannot afford to remain stuck in a painful and
dysfunctional past. It is time to move toward the future and join the
multicultural world of which all Cypriots are members.
ix
ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
1
The easing of restrictions on crossing the Green Line was noteworthy for several
reasons. First, the decision to allow contact on such a grand scale took nearly everyone by
surprise. The relaxation of restrictions seemed to go against a decades-old policy by the
Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which had restricted most forms of contact between the two
communities, and which for several years had enforced what amounted to a 'ban' on meetings
by bi-communal groups. Neither the diplomatic community nor the Greek-Cypriot authorities
had anticipated a move to ease the restrictions, and the citizen peace groups in both
communities were not optimistic about severe limitations on contact being removed before a
solution. Second, the response of the people in Cyprus to the new 'freedoms' was more
positive than expected. The procedures included a requirement (now lifted) for Greek Cypriots
to show their passport when crossing to the north, and it was assumed by most people that
the majority of Greek Cypriots would refuse to 'recognize' the Turkish-Cypriot regime by
presenting this document at the checkpoint. Yet, the rush to cross the Green Line started
almost the moment the new rules went into effect, and traffic has been steady since, with
more than half the population of the island going to the other side at least once, many on a
regular basis. Third, the long-held fear that inter-communal hostilities would start again once
people could travel freely was dispelled. Fortunately, there have been no extreme acts of
violence, and while relations are far from normalized, the contacts have gone smoothly,
particularly in light of the propaganda within each community over the years that promoted
negative images of the other side.
2
Dr. Hasan Alicik, head of the Turkish-Cypriot Educational Planning and Programme
Development department, as quoted in the Cyprus Mail, Thursday, July 15, 2004.
In May 1994, I travelled to Cyprus for the first time, entering a world
that for me was simultaneously both familiar and strange. Fourteen
years earlier I had spent a year teaching at the American College of
Greece, and in the meantime I had returned to Greece and the
Aegean numerous times. So stepping off the plane and seeing signs
written in the Greek script, catching a glimpse of the shimmering
Mediterranean sea, and feeling the hot sun blazing down from a deep
blue sky made me feel right at home. However, it was soon apparent
that I was no longer in Greece. Just outside the airport stood a
strikingly beautiful mosque, situated on the shores of the Larnaca salt
lake. Driving to Nicosia, we passed a military guard post sitting high
on a hill overlooking a village, and as we neared the city the image of
the Turkish flag jumped out at me from the side of the Pentadactylos
Mountains. And when I opened the curtains to my hotel room, I
looked down on the barbed wire and bullet-pocked buildings of the
Buffer Zone that divides the city and the island. Completing my
initiation, I crossed the next day to the north, passing through the
checkpoints on both sides of the time warp of the Buffer Zone. The
1. INTRODUCTION
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
2
Green Line was no longer just a dotted mark on my map of Cyprus.
None of these signs of division were a surprise to me, as the
Cyprus conflict had been part of my intellectual world since 1980,
when my Greek and Greek-Cypriot students at the American College
in Athens had impressed upon me their version of events. Later, my
Turkish students in the United States helped me see the other side of
the situation, and my own research helped me put it all in a larger
perspective. Nevertheless, the impact of encountering the conditions
in person was overwhelming. Now I was seeing and hearing myself
the signs, symbols, and rhetoric to which I had been exposed
previously only through the eyes and ears of others.
From the beginning of my stay in Cyprus I felt the weight of
the conflict. I was in Cyprus not as a tourist but as a third-party
facilitator, and the enormity of the task before me was evident not just
in the outward signs of separation but particularly in the discussions I
had with people around me. It seemed impossible to have a
conversation with anyone – from the taxi driver to the shop owner to
my neighbours to officials – without the Cyprus conflict entering the
discussion. The intensity with which it was discussed, the polarization
of the issues, the uncompromising attitudes, and the despondency
conveyed by almost everyone combined to leave me less than hopeful
about the possibility of serving in a useful role during my time in
Cyprus.
It was not long, however, before a more positive force entered
the picture, and it provided a much-needed lift in my spirits. I started
meeting the individuals who were involved in the bi-communal
activities. At that time, there were only a few, but their courage and
commitment were impressive to me, and it takes only the dimmest of
lights to help one navigate in a dark cave. Gradually, I overcame my
initial shock and discouragement, and I took on what the diplomats
often state as ‘cautious optimism.'
Over the years, as the bi-communal movement grew, I gained
great respect for these early pioneers in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot rapprochement. I saw them struggle through many difficulties,
most of which would have turned back the average person. I also
witnessed them make mistakes, which temporarily set back their work,
but from which they recovered and continued. Later I saw people drop
out of different bi-communal groups because of various frustrations,
and I watched the people in these new bi-communal groups make the
same mistakes as others before. It was then I began to realize that those
who became involved at later stages of the bi-communal work, bringing
with them a tremendous amount of energy and new ideas, could
benefit greatly from the wisdom of those who had gone before. Thus
grew the idea for this guide.
Since returning to my academic position in the States in 1996,
I have had several opportunities to make public presentations, take
part in academic panels at conferences, and write articles for academic
journals and chapters for edited books. In this guide, I have borrowed
much from these earlier writings. These previous publications (see
references) have been reviewed by colleagues in Cyprus, as well as
subjected to the normal academic review process, so they have been
scrutinized carefully. Nevertheless, some of my remarks are likely to
generate disagreement. If there are mistakes in my observations, I
take full responsibility. At the same time, I realize that it would be
difficult to write anything meaningful that would be completely non-
controversial. I hope that those who disagree with the ideas I present
in this book will share their comments with me. I know that my own
knowledge will continue to grow over time, as ideas are tested in the
complex world of cross-cultural interaction.
Cypriots who enter into working relationships across the Green
Line face a unique set of circumstances and need knowledge of the
specific situation they will face as much as they need general principles
and guidelines. Thus, in this book I have tried to present a balance of
situation-specific information with well-tested principles about
forming intercultural relationships, developing empathy, resolving
interpersonal conflict, and working together productively.
Anytime a third party offers advice and guidance to those with
whom he or she is working, a great deal of care is needed. Although
3
INTRODUCTION
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
4
the people of Cyprus are my family and friends, and the shape of their
future matters a great deal to me, I am constantly aware that I am an
outsider to the Cyprus conflict. I did not live through the experiences
that divided the island, and it is unlikely that I will suffer the direct
consequences of failure to reach a satisfactory settlement. My status as
an ‘insider-outsider' allows me to play a special role in the conflict, but
it does not give me a special lock on the ‘truth.' Rather, it places me in
a position to see the truth in the perspectives of both parties. If it
serves no other purpose, I hope that this book helps its readers reach
a similar place in their journey across the Green Line.
The Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots lived together in peace before the
Turkish invasion in 1974. We were neighbours, and we got along well,
attending each other’s weddings and other celebrations. Unfortunately,
Turkey found an excuse to exercise its intentions about Cyprus, and when they
used force to separate us, they destroyed the peace on our beautiful island.
Greek-Cypriot shop owner
Before the Peace Operation in 1974, the Greek Cypriots always treated us as
second-class citizens. They controlled everything and they made our life
miserable. It was not safe to travel, and we couldn’t go to our fields and other
places of work. We faced massacres and a systematic attempt to force us from
the island. Fortunately, Turkey came to our rescue when things went too far
(with the Greek coup), and now for the first time we have the opportunity to
live in peace.
Turkish-Cypriot business leader
The two primary communities in Cyprus have been physically
divided for forty years, since the outbreak of inter-communal
hostilities in December 1963, which resulted in the creation of the
Green Line running through Nicosia and the formation of Turkish-
Cypriot enclaves throughout Cyprus. The 1974 war, which divided
2. ENTERING
UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
6
the island into two ethnically distinct geographical areas, cut off nearly
all contact and communication between the two communities. Without
the opportunity to work together, socialize, or know each other as
neighbours, a wide chasm was formed between Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots, generating misunderstandings, misconceptions, and
mistrust. As time passed, unfavourable images of the other became
more solidified and more difficult to change. People who once knew
each other as neighbours lost touch with one another, and the new
generation, with no direct experience of the other community, was left
with nothing but the negative views passed on to them by parents,
teachers, and the media. In today’s world, where most societies are
characterized by ethnic and cultural diversity, Cyprus became an
anomaly, seemingly left behind by the winds of global change.
Until recently, the only mechanism for contact between the
two communities was a small but steadily growing set of bi-communal
activities, some organized through local efforts and others by the
international community. Workshops, seminars, training programs,
cultural events, social gatherings, and numerous joint projects
brought people from the two communities together for a variety of
opportunities to learn about each other. These activities have served
as a positive force to help bridge the widening gap between Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. They have helped change some of
the inaccurate images each community holds of the other, and they
have led to many friendships and working relationships. The bi-
communal events have served as a crucial link between the two sides
of the Buffer Zone, holding open a small channel of communication
and keeping alive the possibility of a shared future.
Today the island finds itself in a place that would have been
hard to imagine only a few years ago. For the first time in decades,
travel is permitted back and forth across the Green Line, allowing
ordinary people the opportunity, and for many the necessity, for
contact across community lines
1
.
The potential for mutual learning offered by cross-community
contact is not realized easily, however, and the prospect of
7
disappointment, discouragement, and disillusionment is always
present. For many people who have ‘given a try' to bi-communal
groups, the experience has not been a satisfying one, often leading to
frustration and painful feelings. For some individuals, meeting with
the other side has served only to reinforce their previously held
negative images.
There are numerous obstacles to successful experiences across
the Green Line, and unless one is properly prepared for them, the
possibility of failure is high. Just as importantly, a satisfying
encounter requires appropriate attitudes and actions to be exhibited
by both parties. Awareness of what it takes to promote positive bi-
communal relations can go a long way toward ensuring that the
encounter will be productive and satisfying.
In these few pages, I hope to offer some guidance for those
who interact with individuals across community lines in Cyprus.
First, I will provide a historical perspective on bi-communal contacts
between the two communities, reviewing some of the many types of
groups that have been formed during the past decade. Next, I will
discuss the potential barriers to successful encounters across the
Green Line, presenting some of the headaches and difficulties that
could face those who enter into contacts with members of the other
community. Then, I will examine the differences and commonalities
in perceptions that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots hold of one
another. This will be followed by an examination of identity issues in
Cyprus, particularly as they influence the Cyprus conflict.
Subsequently, I will propose a number of actions that individuals and
groups can take to promote positive, satisfying relationships across
community lines. Finally, I will take a look at the potential contri-
butions that bi-communal contacts can make to the future of Cyprus,
and I will offer a few thoughts about preparing for life after a
settlement. At the end of the book, I will suggest a list of resources
available on the web for those who want to learn more about
rapprochement in the region, and about intercultural communi-
cation and conflict resolution in general.
ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
The ideas presented in this book are based on the experiences
of hundreds of individuals in Cyprus who have taken part in bi-
communal activities during the past decade. I’ve been fortunate to
participate in several of the bi-communal groups that operated
during this period, as well as a number of ‘four-party' seminars held
outside Cyprus. The discussions that we had in these groups and the
difficulties that we worked through provided a wealth of information
that can benefit others. I’ve observed the struggles that most groups
experienced as they sought ways to reconcile differences. I’ve
witnessed the changes many individuals went through as they came
to terms with views that conflicted with what they had been taught
about the other. I’ve talked with people as they tried to process all the
new and often confusing information they gained from discussions
involving the other community. And I’ve had the privilege of
facilitating dialogue in a bi-communal setting on many difficult topics
that form the core of the Cyprus conflict. In these pages, my aim is
to present some of the collective wisdom generated in the meetings,
seminars, workshops, and trainings in which I have participated,
placing it in a form that can be useful to others.
I believe it is important to be realistic in describing the
difficulties and differences one might face. Thus, some of the
discussion might come across as quite direct or my warnings might
seem harsh at times. My intention is not to discourage anyone from
cross-community contact, but I believe it is important to enter such
territory with full awareness of the potential pitfalls as well as
promises. What seem to be smooth surfaces can turn out to be
quicksand that swiftly traps unsuspecting journeyers.
My hope is that the information in this guidebook will enhance
the quality of the experience for those who find themselves in
conversation, group discussions, and working partnerships in a bi-
communal setting in Cyprus or abroad. There is nothing that can
guarantee success or smooth sailing, and sometimes things don’t
work out, no matter how hard one tries or which principles one puts
into practice. At the same time, many people have fully satisfying
8
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
experiences without conscious awareness of the information
discussed in the following sections. However, when we find ourselves
in unfamiliar territory, it is always a good idea to consult a map of the
area and to prepare for what might lie ahead. This can help prevent
many wrong turns and dead ends, and it can help us stay out of
quicksand and other difficult situations.
9
ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
1
It is estimated that over 50% of Cypriots have crossed the Buffer Zone at least once
since the partial lifting of restrictions. According to a report by the Justice Ministry of the
Republic of Cyprus, there were 795,740 Greek-Cypriot visits to the north between June and
August 2003, while the number of Turkish-Cypriot visits to the south was 664,564 (from the
September 17, 2003 edition of the Cyprus Mail, www.cyprus-mail.com). Although traffic is
busy on most days across the checkpoints, it is especially heavy on holidays. For example,
according to a Greek-Cypriot police report (see the December 28, 2003 edition of the Cyprus
Mail, www.cyprus-mail.com) more than 5,000 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots crossed the
Green Line on Christmas Day 2003, with nearly equal numbers from the two communities
(2,667 Turkish Cypriots and 2,683 Greek Cypriots).
I resisted going to Ledra Palace for a long time. My uncle is still missing from
1974, and my entire family was angry with me for meeting with the Turkish
Cypriots. Personally, I thought that as soon as I saw a Turkish Cypriot I
would feel nothing but hatred and resentment, after all that has happened.
But something compelled me to go -- perhaps it was a moment of weakness.
Now I spend more time with Turkish Cypriots than with my own family!
Greek-Cypriot civil servant
At first my friend had to twist my arm very hard to get me to meet with the
Greek Cypriots. I had my doubts about their sincerity, and I couldn’t see how
any good could come of such meetings. Now I know they feel pain just like I
do, and I realize that until we work together to ease it, everybody in Cyprus
will continue suffering.
Turkish-Cypriot mother
When examined from a purely objective point of view, there
should be little enthusiasm within either community to communicate
and develop relationships across the Green Line. The negative
portrayals of each other in the press, the bias in the educational
system, and the rhetoric of politicians, combined with the difficulties
surrounding any form of communication or contact, do little to
3. MAKING CONTACT
promote interest in bi-communal encounters. Fortunately, we have
found that the wall of separation, even though it has existed for more
than a generation, has not destroyed the desire of people to know
their neighbours. Many people are eager to come together, and it is
not only because of curiosity about ‘life on the other side.' Many
people have indicated to me that they feel a part of themselves
missing because they are separated from their neighbours in the
other community. There is a spirit of kinship that exists between the
two communities, and although it is not publicly recognized, most
people probably are eager for the ‘family feud' to end so they can
develop more normal relations with their ‘cousins.'
Fifteen years ago, there were only a handful of people
involved in regular bi-communal contacts. As more activities were
organized, it became clear that there existed a large unspoken desire
to meet people from the other community. This was particularly
evident during 1994-1997, a period when hundreds of individuals
participated in conflict resolution workshops and thousands of others
attended various bi-communal events. The growth in these activities
was slowed, but not stopped, by a decision of the Turkish-Cypriot
authorities in December 1997 to stop granting permissions for
Turkish Cypriots to cross the Buffer Zone to meet with their Greek-
Cypriot counterparts. The number of people involved in bi-
communal groups continued to grow despite many difficulties. This
increase in contacts did not eliminate the overall mistrust that is
present on both sides toward the other community, but it
demonstrated the existence of a willingness to meet together to work
on improving relations and building a basis for a common future.
After returning to my academic position in the USA in 1997, I
was often asked to make presentations about the bi-communal work in
Cyprus. Generally people were surprised to learn of the wide variety
of groups that had been meeting and the large number of people
involved in contacts with the other side. This surprise was shared by
Cypriots, Greeks, Turks, American academics, local community
members, and others who might have been in attendance. For most
12
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
of them, the only news they had received of Cyprus was about the
negative actions that one side had taken toward the other. Even now,
after more than a year of relatively open contact, few people are
aware that there has been such a sustained effort over the years by
citizen groups in Cyprus to build bridges across the Green Line.
In this chapter I will provide a brief historical overview of bi-
communal contacts in Cyprus. Although it is not meant to be
exhaustive, and it primarily covers the period until 2000, it will
illustrate the many ways in which forward-thinking individuals
helped keep alive the possibility of a joint future in Cyprus, and I
hope it will help portray the larger context of which any bi-
communal working relationship is a part. Having the bigger picture
in mind can help us pass through difficult times and deal with the
many frustrations that will inevitably occur (these are discussed in
more detail in another chapter). Anyone who finds themselves on a
bi-communal journey will find that many have gone before, and
there will be a lot of company along the way.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BI-COMMUNAL CONTACTS
1
Although contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
have been limited since the start of inter-communal violence in
1963, and were almost completely shut off between the forced
division in 1974 and the 2003 ‘opening' of the checkpoint, there
has never been a total cessation of contacts. Communities that
identify themselves as Greek-Cypriot remained in the areas under
Turkish-Cypriot administration (Maronite communities in the
Kormokiti area and a shrinking pocket of mostly older Greek
Cypriots in the Karpas), and people with families in these
communities were allowed limited visits across the Buffer Zone.
Approximately 200 Turkish Cypriots live south of the Buffer Zone,
and during certain periods after 1974, a number of Turkish
Cypriots were crossing the checkpoint in Famagusta to work in
Agia Napa, Larnaca, and other towns in the southeast corner of the
island
2
. There has also been significant contact among Cypriots
13
MAKING CONTACT
living outside Cyprus. For example, there are large communities of
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots living in cities such as
London, and individuals socialize and work together. In addition,
students from both communities often study at the same university
in Europe and the United States, sometimes with meaningful contact.
In Cyprus, however, the restrictions placed on freedom of
movement meant that special arrangements were necessary in order
for most citizens to have contact with individuals on the other side of the
Buffer Zone. Until the ‘closing' of the checkpoint in December 1997, it
was primarily through the assistance of international diplomatic mis-
sions that bi-communal meetings were held. Even with such assistance,
it was always difficult and often impossible to arrange bi-communal
activities. There were very few bi-communal meetings during the 1970s
and 1980s, but for a short period of time, between 1994 and the end
of 1997, bi-communal groups met regularly. However, in December
1997 political difficulties meant that Turkish Cypriots could no longer
cross the checkpoint at Ledra Palace to meet with Greek Cypriots
3
.
Until this ‘interruption' of bi-communal activities, there was
a trend of increasing contact and communication, reaching a point
in late 1997 when at least one bi-communal group was meeting
almost every day of the week, bringing together over 2000
individuals across the dividing line. After permissions were
stopped, most regular meetings of bi-communal groups in Cyprus
ceased, but numerous contacts took place at the mixed village of
Pyla, located in the Buffer Zone next to the British sovereign area.
Between 1998 and 2003 it was one of the only places to which both
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had access. Occasionally,
there were large gatherings allowed in the Buffer Zone, usually
sponsored by the United Nations, political parties, or trade unions.
In addition, meetings took place outside Cyprus, and hundreds of
individuals maintained contact through the UN-operated
telephone lines and with electronic mail.
Activities aimed at bringing together Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots have spanned a wide range of issues. Some projects
14
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
have focused on practical matters, such as keeping the sewage system
operating properly in the divided city of Nicosia. Others have
focused on the political level, bringing together party leaders. A
number of bi-communal concerts, art exhibitions, and dance
performances have taken place. Professional gatherings of lawyers,
architects, and trade unionists have been held. Workshops and
seminars dealing with conflict resolution have been offered to various
groups. Several ongoing groups have met together on a regular basis
to discuss the core issues of the Cyprus problem. Special projects
utilizing the Internet have been sponsored, and a number of
electronic discussion groups were operating.
In general, bi-communal activities can be organized under six
broad categories: Political Contacts; Business and Professional
Meetings/Projects; Citizen Gatherings and Exchanges; Conflict
Resolution Activities; Ongoing Bi-communal Groups; and, Special
Projects (see Figure 1). The remainder of this section will describe
each of these categories in more detail.
POLITICAL CONTACTS
The one place where contacts are most essential in any conflict is at
the political level. Without negotiation, discussion, and dialogue
among the political leaders, military confrontation becomes more
likely. Fortunately, Cyprus has avoided the latter since 1974, in part
because the community leaders have maintained an ongoing series of
negotiations, usually with U.N. sponsorship. Even though the
negotiations often broke down without making much headway, and
there were times when one side or the other refused to participate in
talks, at least the dialogue has not broken off altogether.
In addition to the negotiations that have taken place between
the political leaders of the two communities, there were other
meetings involving political contacts. For a number of years, the
Slovak Embassy sponsored regular gatherings of the leaders of the
political parties in both communities. These meetings usually took
place in Ledra Palace and were established as a way of helping the
15
MAKING CONTACT
political leaders stay in touch with one another and exchange views.
At times these meetings were held on a regular basis, and at other
times there were long gaps between contacts, but over the years, the
meetings have continued to take place.
There also have been occasional visits by political party leaders
to the other community, where they have made presentations to a
particular group or taped an interview that was broadcast on
television. Pioneering these efforts, in May 1995, George Vassiliou,
former President of the Republic of Cyprus, gave a presentation on
the European Union to a large gathering sponsored by the Turkish-
Cypriot Young Businessmen’s Association in Nicosia. In October
1997, Mustafa Akinci, leader of the Turkish-Cypriot TKP party,
travelled to the Greek-Cypriot SIGMA TV station to appear on a
televised panel dealing with political issues. Following these
examples, other lectures and interviews took place in later years.
Today, with the easing of restrictions on travel across the Buffer
Zone, meetings between political party members and leaders are
easier to arrange and more frequently held.
16
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Political Contacts
Special Projects
Citizen Gatherings
& Exchanges
Business and
Professional
Meetings/Projects
Ongoing
Bi-communal
Groups
Conflict Resolution
Workshops, Training,
& Seminars
CONTACT &
COMMUNICATION ACROSS
THE GREEN LINE
FIGURE 1: BI-COMMUNAL CONTACTS IN CYPRUS
In addition, there were a number of contacts involving the
youth wings of the political parties. For several years there were
contacts between the youth organisations on the political left,
organised primarily by EDON, the youth wing of AKEL. In 1996,
a series of bi-communal workshops were organised for youth
organisations across the political spectrum, culminating in a
weeklong visit to Brussels sponsored by the European Commission.
This group continued to meet together on a regular basis over the
following year, and most of the youth organisations maintained
contacts across the Buffer Zone that continued even after the 1997
restrictions. In September 2000, the youth organisations helped
their parent parties organise a ‘Festival of Mutual Understanding’,
held at Ledra Palace in the Buffer Zone. This event brought
together over 7,000 Cypriots from both communities. Greek-
Cypriot parties organising the event were DISY, AKEL, KISOS and
the United Democrats; the Turkish Cypriot parties were the
Patriotic Unity Movement, Republican Turkish Party and the
Communal Liberation Party. The event included a bi-communal
cultural programme with music, dance and poetry.
Several workshops have been conducted outside Cyprus for
policy leader groups, including both elected officials and other
community leaders. For example, ten Turkish Cypriots and ten
Greek Cypriots attended a workshop in July 1994 at Coolfont
resort in West Virginia in the United States. This group continued
to meet together after returning to Cyprus. In a similar manner,
many of the elected leaders and appointed political advisors in
Cyprus participated in various workshops and seminars held
outside Cyprus during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although
such encounters were not for the purpose of negotiating specific
points of a settlement, they served to bring influential individuals
from each community into contact with one another, preventing a
total breakdown of communications.
17
MAKING CONTACT
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS
In many ways, the most ‘natural’ place for bi-communal contacts is in
business and professional settings. Some argue that economic and
collegial ties are the key to overcoming differences and building a
stable basis for future cooperation. Unfortunately, it is precisely these
contacts that are most difficult to initiate and sustain, particularly when
both sides refuse to engage in activities they believe might grant
legitimacy to the other’s political institutions. In spite of the barriers,
there were several groups that took initiatives to meet together
during the past decade, well before restrictions were relaxed in 2003.
Starting in 1978, the visionary mayors of the divided city of
Nicosia, Lellos Demitriades and Mustafa Akinci, formed a team of experts
to spur the completion of a joint sewage system for Nicosia, the con-
struction of which was interrupted by the hostilities in 1974. The success
of this effort led them to the creation of a joint force that would develop
a Nicosia Master Plan, a development blueprint dealing with all aspects
of life in a city that both men hoped would soon be reunited under a
single government comprised of separate ethnic zones. Architects, city
planners, sociologists, and economists met regularly during the 1980s
and into the 1990s in order to develop a scheme for developing
business districts, housing areas, parks, and even traffic patterns.
In March 1997, representatives of more than sixteen trade
unions in both communities held two historic meetings, one on each
side of the Buffer Zone. The event, sponsored by the European Union,
was the culmination of months of planning and meetings between
steering committee members. The unionists discussed many issues,
holding an open debate on such topics as the merits of Cyprus’ entry
into the EU. In September of that same year, on the occasion of
International Peace Day, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot trade
unions submitted to the United Nations office in Cyprus a joint
declaration, urging the international community and the island’s
leadership to ‘hear the voice of the majority of the people and work
towards a fair solution which will bring peace to the island.’ Such
meetings have continued through the present.
18
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Two different but complementary efforts were undertaken
to bring business leaders together. Both efforts were sponsored by
the U.S. Mission in Cyprus. A group of senior business leaders was
first brought together at Ledra Palace in 1995 by the U.S.
Ambassador. Eventually, Richard Holbrooke, appointed by
President Clinton as special envoy to Cyprus, brought this group
together with their Greek and Turkish counterparts for a series of
meetings outside Greece. Around the same time, the Cyprus
Fulbright Commission started a group of young business leaders,
and this group continued meeting on a regular basis through 1997.
Both groups explored opportunities for cooperative business
ventures that could be initiated prior to a settlement and under a
future federated Cyprus.
The Cyprus Fulbright Commission sponsored a series of
management training courses for mid-level and senior-level managers,
involving more than 250 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. A
total of seven courses, each lasting for two to three weeks, were
offered between 1994 and 1997, five of them for mid-level managers
and two for senior-level managers. Topics covered in the workshops
included investment appraisal, management methods, and marketing.
All the seminars were conducted by the International Management
Development Institute (IMDI) of the University of Pittsburgh. The
managers who took part in these courses continued their contact
with one another, eventually forming an ongoing bi-communal
group and organising exchange visits to each side of the buffer zone.
Finally, a number of professional groups met in a bi-communal
setting, including lawyers, educators, journalists, accountants,
environmentalists, medical professionals, mental health care
workers, social work professionals and others. In some cases,
professional groups met outside Cyprus for workshops or special
training. For example, a group of educators met in Boston in 1996,
and a group of senior-level newspaper editors attended journalistic
training together in Washington, D.C. in 1996. In most cases,
however, the professional groups focused on special projects in
19
MAKING CONTACT
Cyprus related to their areas of interest. For example, a group of
lawyers from the two communities started meeting in 1995,
continuing their meetings until the end of 1997. Their main task was
to review the changes in law that had taken place in the two commu-
nities since 1974, when the legal system had been a unitary one, so
that integration of the now separated systems could be accomplished
more easily after a political settlement is reached. Another example
is provided by a group of educators who worked over a period of one
year to identify ways in which the other community is portrayed in
history books and literature taught to children in the school systems,
proposing ways to eliminate the ‘enemy image’ from such materials.
It is difficult to judge the overall impact these projects have had on
the larger society, but the outcomes have been very important in
changing perceptions among those involved.
CITIZEN GATHERINGS & EXCHANGES
Without contact between citizens from all sectors of society, it is
unlikely that any agreement signed by political leaders will succeed.
Yet, in Cyprus it is the ordinary citizens who were prevented from
any kind of normal contact for twenty-nine years. Thus, it became
even more important to find ways to organize citizen gatherings and
exchanges. Although there were many barriers to such contact, there
were numerous attempts to bring together people from all walks of
life across the dividing line.
Perhaps the largest bi-communal gatherings were special
receptions sponsored by various diplomatic missions. The United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), for example,
holds an annual open house on 24 October (U.N. Day), at which
special activities are planned by the U.N. staff. These events have
often attracted large numbers of individuals from both communities,
sometimes totalling more than two thousand. There were also several
receptions and programmes sponsored by individual embassies,
often on the occasion of a particular country’s important holiday, or
in honour of a special guest to the island.
20
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
In addition to receptions and informal gatherings, the United
Nations, often working with other diplomatic missions, organised
several music concerts in recent years. A U.N.-sponsored pop concert
featuring mainland Greek and Turkish singers was the first of its
kind in Cyprus and brought together thousands of young Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots in June 1997. The event was marred
by protests in each community, but participants joined hands, gave
each other flowers, and sang together ‘Give Peace a Chance.’ Several
concerts at Ledra Palace over the years have featured local groups,
and in every case the individuals in attendance mixed easily, dancing
and singing together. In addition to these one-time musical events, a
bi-communal choir was established and has been meeting together
for several years to learn and practice songs that derive from each
community’s tradition
4
.
Special exhibitions were also held featuring art, photography,
and other works by individuals in both communities. For example, in
1996 there was an exhibition sponsored by the European Union of
political cartoons by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The
American Center sponsored an exhibition of photographs taken on
both sides of the Buffer Zone. The Peace Centre in the Greek-Cypriot
community organised a recitation of Turkish-Cypriot poetry. These
exhibitions did not bring together large numbers of people, but they
served as important symbols of peaceful co-existence.
Finally, several pilgrimages were organised in which Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were able to visit holy sites on the
‘other side’ of the Buffer Zone. Greek Cypriots were allowed on
several occasions to visit one of the most important Orthodox sites on
the island, Apostolos Andreas monastery in the Karpas. As many as
1,300 pilgrims travelled in buses from Nicosia to the remote church,
usually on the saint's feast day. In a corresponding gesture of good
will, programs were organized to bring Turkish-Cypriot pilgrims to
Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca, one of Islam’s most venerable shrines.
In none of these visits was there much, if any, contact of the pilgrims
with the local population. Nevertheless, the pilgrimages served to
21
MAKING CONTACT
reconnect those who made the visits with the important places on the
island, helping to ease the pain brought about by lack of access.
The various gatherings and exchanges involving citizens
groups in Cyprus cannot, by themselves, bring about significant
social change. Receptions, concerts, exhibitions, and visits to religious
sites do not offer opportunities for more than casual exchanges, and
in many cases people may meet only a single time without seeing
each other again. Symbolically, however, they were very important in
promoting a better future for Cyprus. They allowed people to meet
face-to-face, and they helped to dispel some of the myths that are
perpetuated about the other community through the education and
media systems. It is more difficult, following a pleasant conversation
with a fellow Cypriot, to continue spreading hatred. However, for
genuine change to occur, the opportunity for deeper and more
sustained dialogue must be possible. This was the role of the various
bi-communal activities described in the next section
5
.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTIVITIES
6
The most sustained and intense efforts to promote bi-communal
contacts during the past decade came in the form of workshops,
training programs, and seminars dealing with the growing field of
conflict resolution. These took the form of problem-solving
workshops, introductory and advanced conflict-resolution skills-
training, interactive design processes, mediation training, and special
seminars and study groups dealing with issues such as identity,
property concerns, federation, and European Union issues. In a
society where conflict permeates the system, these activities played a
crucial role in providing a way to deal more effectively with
differences. They helped many individuals in each community gain
a better understanding of the issues as perceived by the other side,
and they introduced new skills into the repertoire of each
community. Significantly, they provided a ‘safe space’ in which
healing and reconciliation could take place, thus relieving some of
the immense psychological burden that plagues the whole of Cyprus.
22
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Finally, they resulted in many bi-communal friendships and working
relationships that could not have existed otherwise.
The problem-solving workshops in Cyprus had their
beginnings in 1966, when John Burton and his colleagues in London
offered a five-day workshop in ‘controlled communication’ that
brought together high-level representatives from the two
communities
7
. Some years later, in 1973, an informal seminar
involving political leaders of the two communities was held in Rome
8
.
Attempting to build on the success of this event, Lawrence Doob
made plans to offer a workshop in Cyprus in July 1974, but the
events of that period precluded such an activity
9
. A locally organised
workshop involving intellectuals, called ‘Operation Locksmith,’ was
held with Doob’s participation in 1985. In 1979 and again in 1984
problem-solving workshops were conducted for community leaders
by Herbert Kelman and his colleagues at Harvard University
10
. Ron
Fisher held a series of four workshops over a five-year period, with
the two primary workshops focusing on the educational system in the
two communities
11
. A local initiative of inter-communal contacts that
grew out of this work started in September 1989, leading to a joint
social action group under the name ‘The Greek-Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Federation
in Cyprus
12
.’
Taken together, the problem-solving workshops started a new
type of dialogue in Cyprus, one that was based on attempts to
understand and build trust rather than on accusatory rhetoric and
condemnation of the other. These workshops served an important
purpose by exposing a core group of Cypriots to the growing
academic field of conflict resolution. This allowed a local initiative to
develop with a goal of unofficial diplomacy at the citizens’ level. Calls
arose for more assistance from third-party facilitators and trainers,
which set the stage for a sustained effort to offer conflict resolution
skills training on a broad basis across society.
The conflict resolution skills training began in July 1991, when
Louise Diamond, a conflict resolution specialist from the Institute for
23
MAKING CONTACT
Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in the United States, visited Cyprus
at the invitation of members of the newly formed Peace Centre in the
Greek-Cypriot community and began offering mini-workshops on
conflict resolution. In October 1992, she conducted a one-day
workshop in each community, sponsored by the Peace Centre in
Nicosia
13
, and a joint steering committee was formed for purposes of
promoting conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus
14
. This led to a
workshop that took place in July 1993, when a group of ten Greek
Cypriots and ten Turkish Cypriots went to Oxford, England, for a
ten-day period
15
. Partly as a result of the success of this program, a
number of conflict resolution workshops were held in the summer of
1994 organised by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC) and
conducted by the Cyprus Consortium, a group that consists of IMTD,
the Conflict Management Group (CMG) of Harvard University, and
National Training Laboratory (NTL) based in Virginia. The team
leaders for this effort were Louise Diamond and her colleague Diana
Chigas (from CMG). Funded by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and administered by CFC, several weeklong workshops
were offered, including two that covered basic conflict resolution
principles and skills and one that offered training for those interested
in conducting local conflict resolution workshops. During the period
1995-1997, more workshops conducted by the Cyprus Consortium
were held in both Cyprus and in the United States, including an
advanced ‘training of trainers' workshop, which allowed local Cypriots
to offer introductory conflict resolution skills workshops to their fellow
citizens, both in bi-communal and mono-communal settings.
An ongoing series of workshops were held for student
recipients of a grant from the Cyprus American Scholarship Program
(CASP) to study in the United States. CASP workshops have been
held in the United States nearly every year since 1993. These
workshops each last approximately one week, with anywhere from
twenty-five to fifty students taking part. These are geared toward
undergraduate seniors and graduate students who are finishing their
studies in the United States and returning to Cyprus. Other conflict
24
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
resolution skills training has been targeted toward the younger
generation, ages sixteen to eighteen. This training took the form of
youth camps held in the United States, with several at the School for
International Training in Vermont and several in Maine, conducted
by Seeds of Peace. In all cases, after returning to Cyprus, these young
people continued their contacts and in many ways assumed the
leadership role in promoting bi-communal activities.
The conflict resolution skills training played a crucial role in
the overall development of bi-communal activities in Cyprus. Not
only did it introduce a new set of skills into Cypriot society, but it
provided an almost ‘therapeutic’ setting in which individuals could
come to terms with some of the pain and suffering brought about by
the communal separation. Such training also fostered new
relationships and more accurate perceptions of the other. Perhaps
most importantly, the conflict resolution activities brought together
the primary players who would soon form a stronger citizens-based
peace movement, which began to take shape with the start of the
interactive design workshops that focused on developing a strategy
for peace-building in Cyprus
16
.
This series of interactive design workshops started in the fall of
1994, with the initial group involving participants from the summer
1994 conflict resolution workshops. During the nine months from
October 1994 through to June 1995, a process referred to as
Interactive Management (IM) was used to help a bi-communal group
of fifteen Greek Cypriots and fifteen Turkish Cypriots develop a
strategy for their peace-building efforts in Cyprus
17
. During these
sessions, the group progressed through three stages of planning and
design: (1) analysis of the current situation; (2) goal setting for the
future; and (3) development of a collaborative action agenda. The
group met in the evenings on a weekly basis, and occasionally on
weekends. In the beginning months, the Greek-Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot groups worked separately, because the political
situation did not permit bi-communal meetings. These became
possible in February 1995, after which the participants met together
25
MAKING CONTACT
in the Buffer Zone. This group produced a systems analysis of the
obstacles to peace-building efforts in Cyprus, created a ‘collective
vision statement’ for the future of peace-building activities in
Cyprus, and developed a plan of activities that would guide their
work over the following two to three years. The latter consisted of
fifteen projects, including workshops, presentations, training
programs, and other events. After the staging of an ‘agora/bazar,’ to
which individuals were invited to sign up for these projects,
approximately 300 individuals became involved in twelve bi-
communal projects
18
.
As part of the set of fifteen projects, additional design and
problem-solving workshops were conducted during 1995 and 1996
with groups of young business leaders, youth leaders, and women’s
groups. These groups initially met in separate communal workshops
for the analysis phase, and then they came together for purposes of
identifying and structuring goals for the future of their work. All
three of these groups met together for approximately one year, and
each of the groups was able to spend a full week together in Brussels,
at a seminar sponsored by the European Commission. During 1997,
IM workshops also were conducted with student groups and citizen
groups. Unfortunately, these workshops were interrupted by the ban
on bi-communal activities at the end of 1997 and were not able to
progress through all the phases of the design process. A training
program was conducted in December 1997, in which eighteen Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots received instruction in Interactive
Management, preparing them to offer IM workshops to other
groups in Cyprus. In addition, a new effort was carried out in August
1997, bringing together Cypriot peace-builders with their
counterparts in Greece and Turkey for a weeklong IM workshop in
Les Diablerets, Switzerland.
In general, the IM workshops helped carry the bi-communal
movement into an ‘action stage,’ in which participants in previous
problem-solving and conflict resolution workshops began to take
leadership roles in designing and implementing projects that
26
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
involved members of both communities. This was a crucial stage for
the bi-communal work, because it marked the transition from a
primarily training activity to greater activism and local initiative. The
third-party role shifted from instructor, trainer, or facilitator to that
of consultant, advisor, and equal partner in strategy development.
The former roles have continued to be important, but the primary
responsibility for much of the training and development of new
initiatives began to fall on the shoulders of those who had participated
in earlier workshops, trainings, and problem-solving sessions.
Complementing the previous skills training in conflict
resolution, a series of mediation training programs was offered by
Fulbright Scholar Marco Turk, starting in the fall of 1997 and
continuing through the spring of 1999. Turk was assisted in some of
this training during the 1997-1998 academic year by Fulbright
Scholar John Ungerleider. These workshops were offered to both bi-
communal and mono-communal groups and consisted of programs
ranging from fifteen to forty hours of instruction, exercises, role-
playing, and discussion about applications in participants’ work,
home, or community settings. Some groups received advanced
training totalling over one hundred hours of instruction, qualifying
them to offer training to others in Cyprus. In total, approximately
500 participants received over 600 hours of training in conflict
management and mediation. Workshops were offered to bi-
communal citizens groups, teachers, psychiatric nurses, a Turkish-
Cypriot women’s group, mental health care professionals, the
Domestic Violence Crisis Centre, the Cyprus Police Academy, both
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot citizens groups, youth groups,
American International School teachers, United Nations
Humanitarian troops, and others. After bi-communal activities were
interrupted in December 1997, Turk took several bi-communal
groups outside Cyprus for training in mediation and negotiation.
Later, a mediation centre was established in each community which
has been organizing and administering training programs as well as
the mediation of actual disputes. Taken together, these workshops
27
MAKING CONTACT
introduced new sets of skills to Cypriots in both communities, and
they provided many opportunities for bi-communal contact
19
.
The workshops, training, design sessions, and other activities
often brought up subjects that are at the core of the Cyprus problem.
In order to discuss some of these topics in more depth, special study
groups and seminars were organized on topics such as identity issues,
property concerns, the meaning of ‘federalism,’ and the nature of the
European Union. For example, in 1996, a six-week seminar
examined the topic of ‘identity.’ Participants discussed what it means
to be a ‘Greek Cypriot’ or ‘Turkish Cypriot,’ dealing with themes
such as degree of inheritance from the ‘Motherlands’ of Greece and
Turkey, ways in which both identities have been shaped by the
Cyprus problem, and commonalities and uniqueness in song, dance,
and other aspects of Cypriot culture. It was an enlightening
experience for all participants, helping them understand better their
own and the others’ perceptions. In addition to the seminars, other
special study groups were formed. For example, the Cyprus
Consortium set up an ‘intractability study,’ examining the factors that
have led to the current situation in Cyprus. The World Peace
Foundation sponsored a one-time seminar, held in Boston, bringing
together Cypriot academics with international experts to find ways to
move the peace process forward in Cyprus. Fulbright Scholar Philip
Snyder created a group to study environmental issues. Other special
groups of this type have been formed, all of them oriented primarily
toward understanding specific issues in greater depth.
PIONEERING BI-COMMUNAL GROUPS
20
The problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution skills training,
interactive design workshops, and the mediation training led to the
formation of numerous bi-communal groups that met regularly,
many of them on a weekly basis. Most of these groups adopted a
special focus, oriented toward a professional area (e.g. education), a
particular sector of society (e.g. women), or a special task (e.g.
developing links among peace-builders in the eastern
28
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Mediterranean). Some of the groups have been mentioned above;
for example, the group of young political leaders and the group of
young business leaders were formed in conjunction with the
interactive design workshops and later each developed into an
ongoing bi-communal group. The number of groups established in
this manner is too numerous to list in this paper, but a short
description of some of these groups will illustrate their activities
21
.
The bi-communal ‘Trainers’ group was formed following the
conflict resolution skills workshops held during the summer of 1994.
After their experience in these workshops, several participants
expressed a desire to work together in training others in conflict reso-
lution skills, and they were joined by individuals who wanted to promote
other types of peace-building activities. This group initially worked
together over a nine-month period in a series of interactive design
sessions (see previous section), creating a collective vision statement
and a collaborative action agenda for peace-building activities. The
‘agora/bazar’ described earlier led to the formation of several ongoing
groups and several special projects. They continued working together
after their initial project was finished, forming a ‘coordinating group’
for the various bi-communal activities in which they were involved,
and meeting together for support and further training. After 1995,
they expanded their group to include others trained in problem
solving approaches, conflict resolution skills, interactive design
methodologies, and mediation skills. This ongoing bi-communal
group forms the core around which the majority of bi-communal
activities in Cyprus took place during the period 1994-1997, and it is
their ‘offspring’ who continued to organize many of the bi-communal
activities that developed after 1997. They endured many difficulties
together and formed a very strong group identity. They have also
been a primary resource for nearly all third-party facilitators and
trainers who have worked in Cyprus, and they are regularly called
upon to give advice to various international diplomatic personnel.
The bi-communal educators group was formed during a
three-day conflict resolution workshop in October 1995, which was
29
MAKING CONTACT
followed by a second workshop for educators in May 1996. Many of
the members of this group were originally involved in a series of
problem-solving workshops held in the early 1990s. After a seven-
day workshop for higher-level educators that took place in Boston in
August 1996, many of the participants from the various workshops
came together to form a core group of individuals concerned
primarily with issues inherent to those who teach in public and
private schools and universities in Cyprus. This group took on a
number of projects, including an in-depth study of the educational
systems as they operate in Cyprus and their impact on people’s
perceptions of the conflict. They were also responsible for starting
the Youth Encounters for Peace (YEP) described below. Overall, this
group of educators is dealing with one of the most important topics
that must be addressed before sustained peace is possible in Cyprus.
As long as the school systems continue to present a one-sided view of
the conflict and negative perceptions about the other community, the
conflict will carry itself over into future generations indefinitely.
The bi-communal women’s group started with an interactive
design workshop in May 1996, focused on factors that create pain
and suffering in Cyprus, as seen through the eyes of women. This
workshop, which continued over the course of several months, led to
other groups dealing with women’s issues. Efforts were made to write
a ‘women’s history’ of Cyprus, to examine why there are so few women
in decision-making bodies in Cyprus, and to create a ‘Cyprus Link’
based on the successful ‘Jerusalem Link’ that has been in existence
for many years. A group of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot women
travelled together and participated in the Beijing U.N. Women’s
Conference in 1995, and with the initiative of the European Union,
a group of women visited Brussels in 1997. Although various projects
have involved a wide range of women, the core group that began
meeting in 1996 has continued to convene and lead the way in many
of these endeavours. Their work offers a perspective on the Cyprus
conflict that can be provided only by such a group, and they are
addressing issues that have long been ignored in Cyprus. Perhaps
30
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
most importantly, this group is giving voice to a segment of the
population that is usually the victim of the military confrontations
and other violence created by men.
The bi-communal student group, consisting of students
studying at public and private universities, started in October 1996.
Most of these students had never met anyone from the other
community, and in spite of some anxiety, they established excellent
rapport in their first meeting. After several meetings, in which they
explored many common interests, they met with each of the two
community leaders, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash. Later they went
together for a one-week seminar in Budapest, and upon returning
they began to enlarge their group. Eventually, another group of
university students was formed, and the members of the first group
organised a conflict resolution workshop for this new group. Just
before the interruption of bi-communal activities in December 1997,
the students were meeting as a single group and planning many
projects. During 1998 the students continued meeting in separate
community groups, waiting eagerly for the time when they could
continue their work together. The success of the student group was
surprising, given the high level of extremist rhetoric that is generally
found among students. However, the ability of these students to
work together across community lines is a testament to the possibility
for rapprochement among those who are too young to have directly
experienced the events of 1974
22
.
In August 1997 a regional peace-building group met together
for the first time in the Swiss village of Les Diablerets. The six-day
workshop, sponsored by Fondation Suisse de Bons Offices (FOSBO),
brought together leading members of the peace-building community
from Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey to explore ways of developing links
between individuals and groups that are involved in rapprochement
activities in the eastern Mediterranean. After a very successful meeting,
in which several ‘four-way’ projects were developed involving individuals
from Turkey, Greece, and the two communities of Cyprus, the group
maintained communication during the remainder of 1997, meeting
31
MAKING CONTACT
in December at Ledra Palace in Nicosia (Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots) and in January 1998 in Istanbul (Turks and Greeks). Plans
were made for the development of an institute under the umbrella of
which funding could be sought for various events. The interruption
of bi-communal activities just after their meetings in December made
it difficult to continue the group's work as planned, but communications
continued among the group members, and several of them participated
in four-way seminars held later, including a seminar held in Sigtuna,
Sweden, in 1999. Organized by the Department of Peace and Conflict
Research at Uppsala University, this meeting provided an opportunity
for some members of the Les Diablerets group to meet again face-to-
face and to begin making plans for future efforts. The same group
met again on the Greek island of Chios in 2000 (again organized by
Uppsala University), and in 2001 a four-way meeting (involving
participants from Greece and Turkey as well as the two communities
of Cyprus) was held in Bruges, Belgium (this time supported with a
grant from the Bi-communal Development Programme (BDP),
which is funded by USAID and UNDP and is executed by UNOPS).
Although the Bruges group met for the first time not long before the
restrictions were put in place at the end of 1997, it helped take the
peace-building work in Cyprus to a new level, by connecting
participants directly with their counterparts in Greece and Turkey
23
.
SPECIAL PROJECTS
The conflict resolution workshops and the ‘agora/bazar’ that resulted
from the initial interactive design workshops in 1995 led to a number
of special projects. These became the forerunners of dozens of
initiatives that exist today, many supported by the BDP
24
. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to describe all of the projects currently going
on, but several of the early initiatives can be offered as examples.
One of the more inspiring projects is an initiative called Youth
Encounters for Peace (YEP), which has brought together numerous
groups of young people, ages sixteen to nineteen. Until this program
started, most of the youth in Cyprus had never met anyone from the
32
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
other community. This project provides the younger generation with
an opportunity to get to know the people with whom they will share
the island of Cyprus in the future. The encounters organised by YEP
started in July 1997 with a two-day gathering that brought together
thirty Greek Cypriots and thirty Turkish Cypriots. A second group
was formed in October 1997, and a third group in December of the
same year. Between 1998 and 2002, more than eight additional
groups were formed. They sponsored several events, including
musical concerts, festivals, dances, tree-plantings, and workshops.
One of the most innovative and inspiring events was the co-villagers'
meetings, which brought together Cypriots who had lived in the
same village before 1974. The first such event, held in July 1999,
focused on the town of Paphos, while later events were organised for
other villagers. At these events, individuals who had not seen each
other for twenty-five to thirty-five years were re-united at emotional
gatherings that included the exchange of food, drink, photos and
in some cases treasured personal items that had been left behind in
1974 and saved by neighbours.
The YEP project helped inspire another youth-oriented
program called Youth Promoting Peace (Y2P), which was established
in 2000. The members of this project sought to promote close
cooperation between the young people in the two communities,
creating bridges of communication between the Greek-Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot youth. They organized a number of conferences
dealing with topics such as education in Cyprus and the potential
socio-economic impact of the European Union, and they conducted
several workshops on topics such as negotiation skills, prospects and
expectation of the Annan Plan, and conflict resolution. Additionally,
they organized music festivals and other activities, such as ‘Fly a Kite
for Peace' day in 2003 and a tree planting in Pyla in 2000. These
youth groups helped initiate and organize in 2000 the ‘Cyprus Day
of Peace,’ now celebrated on 30 September each year
25
.
An innovative BDP-sponsored project called Technology for
Peace (TFP) utilized the Internet to bring people together across the
33
MAKING CONTACT
Buffer Zone. In addition to introducing those involved in the bi-
communal work to the use of the Internet, it sought to build an
infrastructure for all bi-communal groups to better coordinate their
activities, by posting announcements and information about
meetings, storing records of products produced during meetings,
and providing space for electronic discussion groups. It also aimed
to document the history of various groups’ activities and to help
people locate funding possibilities, obtain information on the issues
they were discussing, and develop links with other groups around
the world. The project idea was initially developed as part of the
interactive design group’s 1995 ‘agora/bazar,’ and its first Internet
workshop was held in 1996. Three workshops were held in August
1997, facilitated by a U.S. team of experts from the Institute of World
Affairs in Washington D.C. Two of the workshops were mono-
communal training in each community, and the third was a ‘virtual’
workshop held using special software that allowed participants to
take part in a cross-communal negotiation simulation. This led to
other training workshops in the summer of 1998, and continued use
of the TFP infrastructure by various groups to exchange messages
and information. A website was developed that provided space to bi-
communal groups to post information about their activities and to
use it as a means of communication among members and with
outside groups. With the ban on bi-communal contacts, the project
become even more important, because it promoted more organised
and continuous communication, and it opened a new dimension in
bi-communal rapprochement by allowing means of collaboration
that did not necessarily require face-to-face contact
26
.
Another special project, again emanating from the interactive
design group’s ‘agora/bazar’ in 1995, resulted in several issues of
Hade bi-communal magazine. The initial issues of this publication
were produced by a dedicated group of writers working under very
difficult circumstances. Its title, Hade, is a word that means basically
‘Let’s go’ to both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and it features
articles written by members of both communities. In the first issue,
34
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
which used English for most of the articles, authors discussed many
topics related to peace-building efforts in Cyprus. There are stories
about bi-communal groups, about specific bi-communal events, and
about the experiences of individuals who visited places on ‘the other
side’ for the first time. The edition also included poetry and book
reviews. It was a success in both communities, and a second edition
was published, this one with articles in Greek and Turkish.
Unfortunately, internal conflict and difficulties related to working
across the Green Line led to a halt to publication, and so far, there
have been no new editions.
As the bi-communal groups attracted more funding,
particularly from the BDP, some of them became more
institutionalized. The mediation groups that had been meeting
under the guidance of Fulbright Scholar Marco Turk created a
Mediation Centre in both communities. A Management Centre was
set up in the north, with a full-time staff, offering specialized training
to individuals and groups in the Turkish Cypriot community. An
NGO Resource Centre was established in the south, providing a
meeting space and resource library for a wide range of organizations
in the Greek Cypriot community. The establishment of these
institutions gave the bi-communal groups more legitimacy within the
larger society, and they make it possible to serve a larger number of
people in Cyprus, offering services that help strengthen civil society.
1
Portions of this chapter are based on material I prepared for a manuscript to be
published in a new book by Anastasios Tamis and Michalis Michael (Eds.), Cyprus in the
Modern World.
2
In most cases, the individuals who live “on the other side” face discrimination,
prejudice, lack of language services, and other difficulties.
3
In December 1997, after the decision of the European Union to delay a decision
granting Turkey candidate status, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities stopped giving permissions
for Turkish Cypriots to cross into the Buffer Zone for meetings with Greek Cypriots. Later, the
Turkish-Cypriot authorities instituted rules that allowed ‘officially recognized’ organizations
to meet together in the Buffer Zone. However, the only organizations meeting this
designation were certain trade unions and political parties.
4
The bi-communal choir faced difficulties from the beginning in obtaining
permission to meet together. After the interruption of bi-communal activities in 1997, they
continued to meet on a regular basis in mono-communal groups, separately rehearsing
35
MAKING CONTACT
traditional Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot songs as well as songs of the Turkish composer
Livanelli and the Greek composer Theodorakis. They have performed together outside Cyprus,
including a historic concert in Istanbul, as well as at the few bi-communal events that have
been held since 1997 in the Buffer Zone.
5
In February 2002, a new project was started under the name ‘Citizens’ Movement
for Reunification and Coexistence.’ The overall aim was to create a visible citizens' peace-
building movement operating within the Greek-Cypriot community.
6
See Broome (1998) for a description of conflict resolution activities in Cyprus.
Diamond and Fisher (1995) examines the important work of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy.
Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis (1993) provides an inside look at track two diplomacy in Cyprus.
7
See Burton, 1969; Mitchell, 1981.
8
See Talbot, 1977.
9
See Doob, 1987.
10
See Stoddard, 1986.
11
See Fisher 1992 & 1997.
12
See Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993.
13
Although this centre operated primarily in the Greek-Cypriot community, its stated
purpose was bi-communal in nature, with the intention of involving both Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots in the operation and activities of the centre. Due to the political constraints,
it was unable to operate as a true bi-communal organization, but it helped organize a number
of conflict resolution workshops and public presentations in the Greek-Cypriot community
with a focus on bi-communal issues.
14
This group later became known as the ‘Bi-communal Steering Committee.’ It served
in the capacity of advisor for development of further conflict resolution activities, and it
eventually obtained a room in Ledra Palace for its office and meetings. It has been recognized
in at least one U.N. report for the valuable role it plays in promoting better relations between
the two communities.
15
See Diamond & Fisher, 1995.
16
The Senior Fulbright Scholars in Cyprus have played important roles in the conflict
resolution skills training, among other activities. Individuals who contributed in significant
ways to the conflict resolution efforts include John Ungerleider, School for International
Training in Vermont, Senior Fulbright Scholar during the 1997-1998 academic year; Eric
Neisser, Rutgers University Law School, Senior Fulbright Scholar during the 1995-1996
academic year; Marco Turk, University of California at Irvine, Senior Fulbright Scholar from
the fall of 1997 through to the spring of 1999 (see section on mediation training); and Philip
Snyder, Cornell University, Senior Fulbright Scholar from January 1997 through to June 1998.
In addition to his involvement in the conflict resolution skills training, Snyder played a
particularly important role in facilitating the rapid expansion of bi-communal activities that
took place during 1997. Other Fulbright Scholars in recent years include: Emil and Marion
Angelica, St. Louis University (1998-1999 academic year); David Johnson, University of
Tennessee (1998-1999 academic year), John Tirman (Aug-Dec, 1999), David Churchman,
California State University (Jan-June, 2000), and Hermann Peine, University of Utah (2000-
2001 academic year). Tirman developed a website, located at http://www.cyprus-conflict.net,
that provides information related to the bi-communal activities in Cyprus.
17
Interactive Management is an approach to group design developed specifically to
deal with complex problem situations (see Broome & Keever, 1989; Warfield, 1994).
18
A full report of these workshop activities is available from the author. See also
36
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Broome, 1997 and Broome, 1998 for a more complete description of the IM workshops with
the core group.
19
In addition to the numerous workshops offered by Turk, Pete Swanson, a trainer
with the Federal Mediation Service in Washington, offered a weeklong training program for a
bi-communal group in the fall of 1997.
20
Many of the groups described in this section are no longer meeting regularly. The
withdrawal of permissions for bi-communal meetings in December 1997 made it practically
impossible for these groups to continue meeting on a consistent basis. However, during the
time period when they were able to meet, they established friendships and working
partnerships that continued throughout the ban, and they found other ways to maintain
contact and work together.
21
During most of 1996 and 1997, there existed anywhere from ten to fifteen
ongoing bi-communal groups. In addition to the groups described in this section, the young
business leaders, youth leaders, citizen’s group, lawyers, journalists, policy leaders, and a
number of others were meeting every month, and sometimes more often. Of these, the group
that called itself the "Citizens Group" is of particular importance. It kept its meetings open to
anyone who wanted to attend, and for some time it remained more active than the others
after the interruption of bi-communal activities in 1997. In addition, many of the project
groups (see following section) were also meeting regularly.
22
See Broome (1999) for a description of the university student group.
23
The seminars held abroad led to the creation of several island-based think-tank
and action groups. The most recent is called the Cyprus Forum, set up in July 2002. Its
founding members include influential public figures, academics, and business persons who are
dedicated to developing creative ways to address the Cyprus conflict.
24
The Bi-communal Development Programme (BDP), which is funded by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and is executed by the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS),
funds bi-communal projects. The BDP aims at promoting the peace-building process in Cyprus
by encouraging the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to work together in the
preparation and implementation of projects in areas of common interest. Proposals (projects)
for funding under the Programme can be submitted either by public agencies or independent
entities such as professional groups and NGOs. The Programme gives priority to activities in
environment, public infrastructure, public and animal health, governance and civil society,
education and culture, and information and communication technology.. A description of BDP
activities can be found at the website: http://www.unopspmu.org
25
Many of the youth activities grew out of the very successful summer camps held
in the United States. Cypriot youth attended for several years both the well-known Seeds of
Peace camp in Maine (see http://www.seedsofpeace.org/) and summer camps organized by
John Ungerleider at the School for International Training in Vermont (see http://www.sit.edu/).
Between 1997 and 2003, over 1000 young people attended these camps. For the students who
attended, it was the first time they had met anyone from the other community, and most of
them went back to Cyprus with a strong desire to continue seeing each other and a
determination to work for peace.
26
Another website was established in June 2000 with aims to increase awareness
about ongoing peace-building efforts, increase participation in them, and provide a forum
and tools for the organization of new peace-building projects. Located at http://www.peace-
cyprus.org/, this internet site includes announcements of special events, reports of activities
that take place, news about developments, petition campaigns, editorials, papers, and
presentations about Cyprus. It also hosts artistic projects suitable for the web, including
poetry, short stories, photography, painting, architecture, film and video, music or multimedia
projects related with Cyprus and peace.
37
ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
Sometimes it’s very discouraging. We face a lot of difficulties in going to
Ledra Palace every week. We believe we are doing a great service for Turkish
Cypriots – it’s the only way to help the other side understand our point of view
– yet it seems that within our own society the forces against us are growing
everyday. I often wonder if it’s worth all the sacrifices.
Turkish-Cypriot social worker
I feel as if all the hard work we’ve done has gone down the drain. After the
Buffer Zone events last week [August 1996], the only voice left is that of the
hard liners. We thought we had taken a few small steps forward, but now we
have taken a giant leap backwards. I don’t know if there is any reason to
continue.
Greek-Cypriot schoolteacher
A decade ago individuals involved in contacts across the Buffer
Zone were routinely criticized in both communities for their
meetings with the other side. At best they were viewed as idealistic,
naïve, and dreamers. Worse, they were accused as traitors to the
national cause, as friends of the enemy, as paid agents of the
international community. The media either ignored them or were
vicious in their attacks, claiming they were ‘betraying their country'
4. CONFRONTING
OBSTACLES
or ‘selling out' to the other side. The authorities at times quietly
tolerated bi-communal activities and at times were openly critical of
them. It was not easy for these early pioneers to go against the
prevailing mood in their own societies and exercise their basic
human right to meet and discuss issues with fellow human beings.
In some ways, things have not changed a great deal from these
early days of bi-communal meetings. Many people (perhaps the
majority) are still sceptical about the benefits of promoting cross-
community contact, and most people are hesitant to participate in bi-
communal activities and events. The type of resistance varies over
time, with different age groups, and between communities, but even
with the increase in numbers of people involved, and even after the
April 2003 lifting of checkpoint restrictions there is still not
widespread support for activities that promote cross-community
contact. In some cases, even today, those who are involved in such
activities are criticized and occasionally harassed.
Although each person’s experience will differ, and conditions
will change over time, there are a number of obstacles that those
engaged in joint efforts across the Green Line will likely face. Many
of these difficulties emanate from the social and political reality of
Cyprus. In a society where there are many interest groups with a
stake in maintaining the status quo of the conflict, resistance to
reconciliation efforts is unavoidable. And in a social system where the
existence of the conflict has become part of everyday existence, the
meeting of individuals across the dividing line can be perceived as a
serious threat to the comfortable (if undesirable) status quo. Finally,
for those who suffered from the loss of loved ones, property, and a
way of life, any attempt to understand the point of view of the other
may be considered inappropriate and even insensitive.
No longer ‘banned' from meeting or needing ‘permissions' to
meet at Ledra Palace, it has been possible since April 2003 for
individuals and groups to meet nearly anywhere in Cyprus. Even
though many of the old restrictions are gone, cross-community contacts
continue to be plagued by various political events. And even though
40
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
the authorities on each side no longer condemn the work of peace
builders, there are still many in each community who oppose any
activities that bring people together across the Green Line. In this
chapter, I will discuss some of the obstacles that have made bi-communal
contact difficult in the past, and which are still present in the new
situation, perhaps at a more subtle level. For some people, the
frustrations associated with these difficulties are overbearing, while
others accept them as unavoidable burdens that one has to bear. In any
case, it is best to have them in mind during one’s bi-communal journey
1
.
USE OF BI-COMMUNAL EVENTS AS A POLITICAL TOOL
In December 1997, when authorities in the north stopped granting
permissions for Turkish Cypriots to cross the checkpoint to attend
meetings in the Buffer Zone, the event made few newspaper headlines.
However, the change in policy marked a crucial turning point in the
growth of bi-communal activities, and perhaps in the Cyprus conflict
itself. In many ways this ‘ban’ on bi-communal activities was as
disappointing as the breakdown in political negotiations that had
taken place earlier that same year. It meant that dozens of groups,
involving perhaps as many as 2,000 individuals, could no longer
continue their regular meetings, and the projects in which they were
engaged became much more difficulty to realize.
The Turkish-Cypriot authorities withdrew permissions for
bi-communal meetings just after the European Union decisions to
(a) exclude Turkey in the group of countries for which it would
consider membership, while (b) simultaneously agreeing to start direct
accession negotiations with the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of
Cyprus. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership decided that all contact
with Greek Cypriots, at the official and unofficial levels, would stop
until they were accepted as an equal and recognized partner in these
negotiations and until Turkey was placed on the list of candidates for
European Union membership. The bi-communal activities became a
victim of political events, and for the first time they were used as a
political tool in the complex world of international politics.
41
CONFRONTING OBSTACLES
This use of the bi-communal activities as a political tool was
partly a result of their success during the 1990s. By December 1997 they
had grown to the point where they could no longer be dismissed as
simply an irritant to authorities. Indeed, with so many people taking
part in regular events that brought people together across the dividing
line, and with several high-profile professional groups involved,
these activities were starting to have a subtle influence on the political
process itself. In addition, most of the international diplomatic
community was solidly behind the bi-communal activities, and more
and more diplomatic missions were becoming involved in supporting
them. Thus, bi-communal activities were seen by the Turkish-
Cypriot authorities as the ideal political tool to gain leverage with the
international community, while simultaneously shutting down some
of the growing pressure from the opposition groups that supported
these activities. Ironically, the growing strength of the bi-communal
activities created a situation that made their continuation very difficult.
While this ban brought a temporary halt to the momentum
that had built up among those involved in bi-communal activities, it
was not the first time such a limitation had been placed on contacts.
Throughout the 1990s permissions were often difficult to obtain, and
sometimes even when they were given, it was only at the last minute that
participants were notified that their application had been approved.
Often, just before a meeting was to take place, permissions that had
been granted previously were withdrawn. Frequently some names
that had been submitted were left off the list provided to the guards
at the checkpoint, meaning these individuals could not pass into the
Buffer Zone and join their colleagues in the meeting
2
. There were long
periods during which no bi-communal activities could take place
because permissions were routinely denied for the Turkish Cypriot
participants to pass the checkpoint. The primary difference with the
situation from December 1997 to April 2003 was the semi-permanent
nature of the permission ban during that period. At the time, there
seemed to be no end to it in sight, and even the full weight of the
diplomatic community had not been able to reverse the closure.
42
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Although the Turkish-Cypriot authorities received most of the
criticism for preventing their own people from meeting with
individuals in the other community, the Greek Cypriots also placed
many obstacles in the way of bi-communal contacts. In part, the
willingness of the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to defy the
international community’s call for resumption of bi-communal
activities was due to the Greek Cypriots’ use of the events for their
own political purposes. It has long been a theme of the Greek
Cypriots to state that ‘the two communities have always lived
together in peace until the Turkish invasion,’ and they have
consistently put forth the view that ‘if the Turkish army left Cyprus,
the two communities would manage their own affairs without
problems.’ For the Greek Cypriots, the existence of productive bi-
communal contacts seemed to prove their point that Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots have no trouble getting along. The Turkish
Cypriots, on the other hand, advocated exactly the opposite point of
view, pushing the theme that ‘Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
have never lived together peacefully and never will.’ The rapid
growth of the bi-communal activities crept into the Greek-Cypriot
political rhetoric and in the media, and even the extreme nationalists
were beginning to state, often with a disdainful tone, that ‘the ease
with which the two communities mix at bi-communal events prove
that the Cyprus problem is not an inter-communal affair; rather, it is
only the Turkish invasion that keeps us apart.’ Needless to say, this
rhetoric on the part of Greek Cypriots did not sit well with the
Turkish Cypriots, and the EU decision on Turkey’s future
membership possibilities provided a convenient way to remove the
source of this ‘thorn’ in their side.
NEGATIVE PORTRAYALS IN THE MEDIA
Especially during the early days of bi-communal efforts, the various
media in Cyprus tended to portray the activities and those who
participated in them in a negative manner. Newspapers, magazines,
and radio and TV commentators attacked the individuals involved in
43
CONFRONTING OBSTACLES
such endeavours, often misrepresenting their intentions and
defaming their character. When the citizens’ initiative was launched
in 1989, there were severe attacks from newspaper journalists in both
communities against those who participated. The participants who
returned from the ten-day conflict resolution workshop in Oxford,
England, in 1993 suffered a similar fate, especially in the Greek-
Cypriot press. The Turkish-Cypriot media strongly condemned
participants in the 1994 conflict resolution seminars. During the
1996 period of sustained growth in bi-communal activities, several
prominent Greek-Cypriot magazines published articles ridiculing
many of those taking part in cross-community workshops, distorting
the nature of the activities and painting an inaccurate and sinister
picture of those involved.
As portrayed in the Greek-Cypriot media at the time, contacts
with the other side served mainly to give credence to those who
wanted to classify the situation as an ‘inter-communal conflict,’ taking
the emphasis away from the international dimension of the situation
(i.e., it should be viewed strictly as a problem of ‘invasion, occupation,
and violation of human rights’). Articles in the Turkish-Cypriot press
claimed that meetings between citizens from the two communities
sent the wrong message about the need for the two communities to
live apart, and they pointed to the ‘danger’ that the Turkish-Cypriot
participants would be ‘charmed’ by the Greek Cypriots and would
forget the crimes committed against them in the past. The people
who participated were often called ‘traitors,’ accused of being
‘unpatriotic’ to the national cause, or ridiculed as ‘friends of the
enemy.’ The press in the two communities took turns at accusing
participants of being ‘pawns in the American game,’ or ‘trained by
the CIA’ to distort the minds of unsuspecting people. At one point,
the Turkish-Cypriot press accused participants of being part of a
group that had organised a series of ‘communist cells’ to overthrow the
government. Greek Cypriots often claimed that the Turkish-Cypriot
participants in these activities were sent by their authorities to present
the official view, and Turkish Cypriots claimed that the Greek Cypriots
44
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
were using the meetings to make a political statement about inter-
communal harmony. At best, participants were portrayed as naïve and
unrealistic, unable to see the dangers of cavorting with those whose
true intentions are to dominate them or drive them from the island.
Fortunately, even though there are still negative press reports
that distort the overall picture of rapprochement efforts, media
coverage of cross-community activities has improved recently,
particularly since the openings in April 2003. However, the media in
general has not lived up to its potential as a strong tool for peace.
Hopefully, things will continue to improve, but those involved in
inter-communal activities are not likely to find much encouragement
for their efforts from the newspapers they read, the radio programs
to which they listen, or the TV programs which they watch. This will
not only make it difficult for the general population to voluntarily
participate in bi-communal activities, but it will encourage the
continuation of an overall critical stance toward such efforts and
toward those involved in them.
CONCERN ABOUT ‘RECOGNITION'
The bi-communal activities in Cyprus have been able to progress
further than anyone a decade ago imagined possible, especially in
light of the extremely difficult political situation on the island.
Nevertheless, the projects that were successfully implemented by bi-
communal teams were limited in scope and focused primarily on
cultural and educational activities. They were prevented from
reaching a level where sustained working partnerships between
businesses and institutions, which are the essence of a future unitary
state in Cyprus, could be formed. A major barrier that prevented bi-
communal activities from entering this important stage of
development was the concern, especially by Greek Cypriots, about
‘recognition’ of the other community. The Greek Cypriots did not
want to allow any activities, such as business partnerships, that might
have a chance of being interpreted as legitimising what they termed
‘the invasion and illegal occupation’ of Cyprus.
45
CONFRONTING OBSTACLES
On one level, this concern is easy to understand, especially
from a strategic point of view. Both Greek-Cypriot officials and
international analysts are quick to point out that the international
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and the corresponding lack of
recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,’ or
‘TRNC,’ is the primary advantage enjoyed by the Greek Cypriots in
their attempt to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek-
Cypriot National Guard forces are no match for the Turkish troops
deployed across the Buffer Zone, and any military confrontation
would quickly end in disaster for the Greek Cypriots. Their success
in obtaining resolutions from the United Nations condemning the
Turkish intervention in 1974 and calling for withdrawal of foreign
troops from Cypriot soil has counted as perhaps the only ‘victory’ for
the Greek Cypriots in thirty years of stalled negotiations. They have
gradually accepted the inevitability of a federal bi-zonal solution, but
demands for recognition of the ‘TRNC’ prior to further negotiations
is probably more than the Greek-Cypriot population will ever accept.
The ‘recognition card’ is one they intend to hold onto until the end,
probably for good reason, according to political analysts.
Unfortunately, Greek Cypriots’ concerns about recognition tend
to go far beyond the level of recognising a Turkish-Cypriot state. They
extend into every level of society, including business exchanges and
institutional relations. The Greek Cypriots are afraid of a ‘domino’
effect that might result from giving even a hint of recognition to any
level of Turkish-Cypriot society. For example, when the Turkish-
Cypriot branch of the Rotary Club applied for membership with the
international office of that organisation, the Greek Cypriots blocked
such an association. Even in cases where a similar organisation did
not exist in the Greek-Cypriot community, they used their status as
the internationally recognised political entity to block the Turkish
Cypriots from joining their branch of the organisation with the
international office. In one case, after learning of a Turkish-Cypriot
request to become part of the international association of a world-
wide business-oriented group, the Greek Cypriots formed their own
46
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
branch of that organisation and applied for membership in the name
of Cyprus, fearful that the Turkish-Cypriot branch might be given
membership because it was the only one on the island.
This concern about recognition extends to sports teams,
community organisations, business ventures, and even to academic
institutions. Several academic seminars dealing with regional issues
were held in the late 1990s at a leading private college in Nicosia,
involving Greek-Cypriot and Greek academicians, speakers from
abroad (including Turkey), and even Turkish Cypriots teaching in
London or the United States. Turkish-Cypriot academics teaching at
institutions of higher learning in the north of Cyprus, however, were
not invited, even during periods when permissions for cross-visits
were allowed
3
.
A similar obstacle blocked progress in several bi-communal
groups dealing with business concerns. The group of young business
leaders described earlier eventually stopped meeting regularly, even
during the period when bi-communal contacts were growing
elsewhere, because their attempts to establish joint business projects
could not go forward. They had met for nearly two years, engaging
in numerous productive discussions about core issues, but without an
opportunity to work together doing what they did best, which is
practicing business, they did not have sufficient motivation to carry
on. A similar difficulty prevented a group of senior business leaders
from engaging in joint projects.
The concern about recognition affected even the details of bi-
communal meetings, especially those held outside Cyprus, to which
professionals from each community were often invited. In this case,
it became difficult to use many professional and institutional titles,
which as a normal practice at such professional gatherings are usually
placed on address lists, invitations, nametags, etc. The concern of the
Greek Cypriots was that using a person’s title, such as ‘mayor,’
might imply recognition, or listing someone’s institution, such as
‘Eastern Mediterranean University,’ might help legitimise an
institution that received funding from ‘illegal sources.’ Since most
47
CONFRONTING OBSTACLES
funding organisations are not familiar with such sensitivities, the
titles and institutional affiliations were often included in lists of
participants, on nameplates at the conference table, or as part of
introductions, and this often resulted in protests from Greek
Cypriots. In some cases, the entire Greek-Cypriot delegation
walked away from such meetings, to the great embarrassment of
their hosts. This did not help create a good impression abroad
about the maturity of Cypriots.
Although this discussion of recognition has focused on the
Greek Cypriots’ concern about granting legitimacy to the division, the
Turkish Cypriots also stopped many potential activities out of fear
about actions that might indicate their recognition of the Republic of
Cyprus as their representative to the international community. One
such case concerned the European Union funds made available for bi-
communal activities under the ‘Fourth Protocol.’ For a number of
years, the European Commission attempted to find a way to
implement procedures for distributing these funds, but to be utilised
the project needed to be bi-communal in nature and approved by the
planning bureau of the Republic of Cyprus. Because of the latter
requirement, Turkish Cypriots would not accept any of the funds.
Many of the bi-communal groups developed projects that could have
utilised money from the Fourth Protocol, but their concern about
participating in a project that must be officially sanctioned by the
Greek-Cypriot government prevented them from taking part. And,
without Turkish-Cypriot participation in a project, it was very difficult
to claim it as a bi-communal effort. This difficulty prevented many
viable projects dealing with environmental, educational, health, and
cultural issues from going forward
4
.
Taken together, the political uses of bi-communal contacts, the
negative images promoted by the media, and the fear of recognition
severely affected bi-communal activities in Cyprus. Often
participants became too frustrated to continue. Some international
sponsors decided that funding bi-communal activities in Cyprus was
48
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
not worth such an effort. Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot
attitudes hardened when confronted with these obstacles. Greek
Cypriots interpreted the ‘ban’ on bi-communal activities as evidence
of intransigence by the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots saw
the Greek Cypriots’ refusal to allow their sports teams, business
organisations, educational groups, and NGOs access to full
participation in international affairs as a true sign of their disinterest
in a genuine partnership.
Unfortunately, many of these obstacles have not disappeared,
even with the partial opening of the checkpoints to travel across the
Buffer Zone. Hopefully, they will be less of a barrier once a political
settlement is reached, but the concerns that lie behind these obstacles
could affect the successful implementation of that settlement.
PERSONAL CRITICISM
In addition to the societal factors that have always stood in the way of
bi-communal activities, participants have also faced barriers on a
more personal level. This was particularly evident in the earlier days
of bi-communal gatherings, when after returning to their homes
after meeting in Ledra Palace, they often heard people state things
about the other side that went against what they were learning from
their own experience with the other. When they would try to help
their friends understand that what they were saying might not be
true, inevitably they would have to deal repeatedly with people
making statements like: ‘you’re just being naïve,' or ‘most of them are
not like the ones you met,' or ‘you were in an artificial setting.' Even
worse, their friends might make fun of them or accuse them of
collaborating with the enemy.
It has never been easy for those involved in bi-communal
activities to explain their thoughts to those who have not had the
experience of meeting with the other side. However, the alternative,
to keep silent, is usually not an option in a society where talk is so
highly valued, and where there is little anonymity.
49
CONFRONTING OBSTACLES
DEALING WITH FRUSTRATION
Taken together, the political uses of bi-communal contacts, the
concern about recognition, the negative images promoted by the
media, and criticism from family and friends, severely affected bi-
communal activities in Cyprus. Often participants became too
frustrated to continue. Some international sponsors decided it was
not worth the effort. Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot
attitudes hardened when confronted with these obstacles but Greek
Cypriots interpreted the ‘ban' on bi-communal activities as evidence
of intransigence by the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots saw
the Greek Cypriots refusal to allow their sports teams, business
organizations, educational groups, and NGOs access to full
participation in international affairs as a sign of their disinterest in a
genuine partnership.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these obstacles will disappear
any time soon. By reaching across the Green Line for contact with
the other community, it is inevitable that you will face these and
similar difficulties. It will be easy to become discouraged, and at times
you will be tempted to ‘give up.' It is best to keep in mind that
hundreds of other people continued their involvement over the
years in spite of the frustrations and dangers. Perhaps it is helpful to
remember that all the broad, level roads along which we travel today
were once footpaths, full of stumbling blocks. Over time, as more
people take the bi-communal path, it will become wider, smoother,
and less cluttered with obstacles.
50
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
1
Portions of this chapter are based on material I prepared for a manuscript to be
published in a new book by Anastasios Tamis and Michalis Michael (Eds.), Cyprus in the
Modern World.
2
See Broome (1999b) for a description of difficulties obtaining permissions for bi-
communal events.
3
On one occasion, when I was speaking at such a seminar, a group of Turkish Cypriots
traveling together in the south on a bi-communal excursion came to hear my talk, providing
an ironic contrast to the recognition concerns displayed even by academic institutions!
4
In 2003 a program was finally put in place to utilize these funds. For information
see: http://www.delcyp.cec.eu.int/en/index.html
I’ve never met anyone from the other side, but my parents and my teachers
have told me all my life about how the Greek Cypriots used to treat us as
second-class citizens, causing us to fear for our safety, and driving us into
enclaves. I would like to meet and talk with Greek Cypriots, to learn for myself
what they are like.
Turkish-Cypriot student
Meet with Turkish Cypriots? I wouldn’t mind, really, but with all the
propaganda they’ve been given about Greek Cypriots, they probably think we
have little horns growing on our heads and EOKA tattoos painted on our
arms. I hope I can show them that we’re not so bad!
Greek-Cypriot student
Our lives revolve around images. Since we are limited in how
much we can experience ourselves, most of what we know is
dependent on information we receive from teachers, textbooks,
parents, relatives, friends, the media, etc. While some sources are less
distorted than others, all information is biased in one way or another.
And we have no choice but to use this data, however inaccurate or
5. ENCOUNTERING
IMAGES
limited it may be, in forming impressions, making decisions, and
taking action. Images serve as our guide to reality.
Until recently, very few people in Cyprus had direct
experience with individuals in the other community. Members of the
older generation could remember what the other was like 30 or 40
years ago, but memory is very selective and changes over the years
made these memories unreliable as a guide to today’s situation.
Faced with this situation, young and old alike had to rely on
information that was distorted, often deliberately. The education
system, the media, the politicians, and even family members painted
incomplete and misleading pictures of people and life on the other
side of the Green Line. For most Cypriots, there was no alternative
but to accept these depictions as authentic, since as long as contact
was limited there was little chance for it to be disputed.
The situation is different today, with contact across the Green
Line possible for anyone and likely for many. However, this increase
in contact means that the images of the past are even more likely to
be encountered, and sometimes they will not be flattering. Greek
Cypriots will find that Turkish Cypriots believe certain things about
them that seem incredulous. Turkish Cypriots will find Greek
Cypriots unbelievably naïve about certain aspects of life in the north.
Some of these images can be humorous, while others can be
insulting. Misunderstandings and hurt feelings are likely.
Although it will not take care of the problem by itself, it is
important to be prepared for how each side sees the other. This
section will describe some of the images that exist on each side about
the other, in the hope that this information might help the reader
interpret better what is heard in discussions. It also might help one
question some of the views he/she holds of the other side.
The observations in the following sections are based on results
from a series of mono-communal seminars that were focused on
images of self and other in Cyprus. In these separately held
meetings, participants generated ideas in response to several
questions, including the following: ‘What perceptions exist within
52
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
our society (Turkish-Cypriot or Greek-Cypriot) about the other
community (Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots) – in the media,
education system, government statements and documents,
diplomatic circles, family gatherings, coffeehouses, and other places?'
After generating responses to these questions, discussion centred on
which of these were most widely held among the general population.
The following sections focus on the images likely to be
encountered in meeting with people from the other side. Some of the
images are probably well known, while others might come as a
surprise. In either case, it is important to bear in mind that although
these images might be widespread within the overall population, a
particular individual could hold very different views. We are all
exposed to different information, and we all process it in a multitude
of ways because of our previous experiences and belief systems. Even
so, it is a good idea to be aware of the existence of these images and
to realize that they are ‘out there' waiting to enter any discussion
1
.
HOW DO TURKISH CYPRIOTS SEE GREEK CYPRIOTS?
Many of the images in Turkish-Cypriot society about the other side
were formed during the period from 1963-1974, when they
experienced discrimination, harassment, and persecution as a
minority in Cyprus. Greek Cypriots had fought during the British
period for ‘enosis', or union with Greece, and many saw as a
disappointment the independence that resulted from their struggle.
The constitution was viewed as unworkable and included too many
privileges for the Turkish Cypriots. There was resentment by the
Greek Cypriots about what was perceived as unfair advantages, as
well as frustration from the inability to pass legislation. When the
Turkish Cypriots withdrew into enclaves scattered throughout the
island, they became invisible to most Greek Cypriots, and extremist
groups were able to act with impunity. The suffering of the Turkish
Cypriots during this period, which went unnoticed by the majority of
the Greek-Cypriot population, is firmly embedded in the minds and
hearts of Turkish Cypriots. Fortunately, Turkish Cypriots hold a few
53
ENCOUNTERING IMAGES
positive images of Greek Cypriots, but it is the negative characteristics
that receive constant reinforcement from the authorities, the
educational system, and the media.
In general, some of the more commonly held beliefs about the
Greek Cypriots include the following:
‘Greek Cypriots think Cyprus belongs to them. They believe that
Cyprus is a Greek island, that they are the rightful owners. They
have not been able to abandon the Megali Idea that points toward
enosis with Greece. Greek Cypriots don’t believe we have a right to
be in Cyprus. They don’t respect us or even recognize our communal
identity. They think we are under full control of Turkey, without a
will of our own.'
‘Greek Cypriots ignore their responsibilities for past mistakes. They
think the conflict started in 1974. They always concentrate on the
Turkish military actions, but they fail to see what happened before
that, how they created the conditions for the Turkish intervention.
Greek Cypriots distort the facts about the period 1963-1974, the
missing persons, the stolen icons, and other issues, making it seem as
if everything was fine until Turkey intervened.'
‘Greek Cypriots fail to understand the reality in the north. They don’t
see the growing disparity between the two sides, and they
misunderstand our wish to have our autonomy and equality. They
don’t see how the embargos they implement hurt them in the long
run, giving us Turkey as our only window to the rest of the world.
They have a naïve view of the situation with Anatolian Turks coming
to Cyprus, and they don’t see that it is their own actions that are
bringing more of them. The conditions are driving us away from
Cyprus, and soon they will find themselves sharing the island with
Turkish peasants rather than with Turkish Cypriots.'
‘Greek Cypriots think of us as inferior. They don’t understand that
we have our own political institutions, that we have a democratically
elected government, that we have rules and regulations under which
we administrate our society. They don’t realize the creativity and
ingenuity it takes just to keep things working, and how our business
54
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
skills have enabled us to survive in the face of many difficulties. They
still think of us as ‘good enough for making shamishi. If there is ever
the possibility for them to do so, they will try to make us their
workers again.'
‘Greek Cypriots are preoccupied with their own victimization. They
fail to see that they have victimized others. We know they have some
genuine and serious concerns about their security, but they are not
at all concerned about our security. Greek Cypriots have a
superiority complex, not only toward us but towards others as well.
They want everything for themselves. They take all the advantages
and benefits of being recognized, and they do not share it with us.'
‘Greek Cypriots are not serious about resolving the conflict. They
would like to see things return to the pre-1974 status, when they
were in control of the whole island, but they don’t want a solution
based on true partnership. In fact, they fail to understand what
partnership means; they don’t see the importance of equal political
status. They lack understanding of the issue of parity, both politically
and economically. Greek Cypriots do not have strong enough pain to
need change from the present status, and they have no incentive for
compromise. Their desire to join the European Union was driven by
political motives, and they don’t see how the final result will be the
permanent division of Cyprus. Perhaps this is what they want, so they
don’t have to deal with us any more.'
‘Greek Cypriots are not realistic about the future. They think that if
the Turkish army leaves, everything will be okay. They don’t
understand that unrestricted freedom of movement will allow the
extremists on both sides to create trouble. They forget to mention
that since 1974 there have been very few civilian deaths in Cyprus at
the hands of the other community. No one would want to see EOKA
and TMT operating again. Greek Cypriots also have false hopes of
returning to their former homes. They seem to be living in a dream
world, thinking they can just turn back the hands of time and make
things like they used to be. Finally, Greek Cypriots forget that
entering the European Union will mean that Europeans will be able
55
ENCOUNTERING IMAGES
to settle more easily in Cyprus. They don’t understand the changes
that will take place when they have to follow European rules.'
‘Individually, the Greek Cypriots are good people. They are very
serious, and they have been very successful in building a strong
economy and persuasive in influencing international opinion. They
are diplomatic, polite, and can be quite charming. In social
situations, they are fun to be with – good singers and dancers, and
plenty of really funny jokes! Unfortunately, they are more religious
than us, and they are controlled too much by the church. We are also
worried that Russian interest groups and the Russian mafia are
gaining too much influence over some politicians.'
HOW DO GREEK CYPRIOTS SEE TURKISH CYPRIOTS?
Unlike the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek-Cypriot community does not
have a history of oppression by the other side. They don’t talk about
a time when life was bad with the Turkish Cypriots, and they don’t
feel relieved that the past is behind them. Most of the images that
Greek Cypriots hold of the other side are based on the 1974 events.
And even then the negative feelings are directed primarily toward
Turkey rather than toward the Turkish Cypriots. For the most part,
the Greek Cypriots remember the time before 1974 as a period of
peaceful harmony, with the two communities living together in
mixed villages, attending each other’s weddings, and working
together in the fields. Of course, the reality was different, and as
described earlier, the Turkish-Cypriot memory of this period is poles
apart from the Greek-Cypriot version. Nevertheless, there are a
variety of images prevalent within Greek-Cypriot society about the
Turkish Cypriots.
Some of the more commonly held beliefs about the Turkish
Cypriots include the following:
‘Turkish Cypriots are pawns of Turkey. They have no say about
Cyprus - they are powerless about developments on the island. They
are used by Turkey, which does not really care about them except for
its own strategic interests. Even though they are ‘protected’ by the
56
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Turkish army, they are also oppressed by them, having no voice of
their own. They are passive, afraid to speak up, even though we
know the Turks do not care about them.'
‘The agenda of the Turkish Cypriots is to divide the island. They do
not really want a solution. They already have what they were seeking,
and in the negotiations they simply stall for time, always finding a
way to block progress. Their intransigence makes it impossible for us
to hope for a settlement.'
‘Turkish Cypriots’ demands are disproportionate to their size. At less
than 20% of the population (and decreasing every day as they leave
and are replaced by Turkish settlers), they want 50% of the power.
And they are interested in sharing power only in the south – in the
north they want to be masters. They have nearly 40% of our land,
and they don’t want to give any of it back. They have our houses, our
hotels, our beaches, our farmland, our orchards, and they don’t
know how to manage or take care of any of it. And to make matters
worse they have the most beautiful part of Cyprus, including our
jewel, Kyrenia, our lovely mountains, the Pentedactylos, and the
wonderful beaches of Famagusta. Panayia mou!'
Turkish Cypriots do not respect international law. No nation has the
right to invade and occupy another sovereign country. The United
Nations, the United States, and the European Union, along with the
entire world community has condemned the Turkish invasion and
called for the removal of Turkish troops. Resolution after resolution
in the U.N. has been ignored by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.
They complain that we imposed an embargo on them, but it is the
international community that refuses to trade with them. The only
reason they can get by with their blatant disregard for the law is the
military strength of Turkey standing behind them.'
‘Turkish Cypriots are favoured by the international community.
Despite their intransigence, their illegal status, their violation of
international law, their refusal to negotiate seriously, the Turkish
Cypriots have not been pressured by the international community to
make concessions. We are asked to give and give, and we never see
57
ENCOUNTERING IMAGES
anything in return. It is because the West supports Turkey. They
think they need her as an ally, but they don’t realize how
untrustworthy she is.'
‘Turkish Cypriots are not economically and culturally advanced.
Their economy is so depressed that they have to rely completely on
Turkey for their survival. In the case of a solution, they will pose an
economic burden for Greek Cypriots. And they have not contributed
much to our civilization – no beautiful art, great literature,
architectural masterpieces, or democratic ideals. In Cyprus we have
a rich legacy of over 8000 years, and the Turkish Cypriots have been
here only a short while. All they’ve been able to do is take our
churches and add minarets.'
‘Turkish Cypriots have a place in Cyprus. We never had any
trouble getting along with the Turkish Cypriots, before the Turks set
their sights on Cyprus. We have a lot in common with them, certainly
more than with the Turks anyway, and we have many shared
interests related to the European Union. They will be our enemies as
long as they occupy our properties, but we used to be neighbours.
We are not sure we can live together again, after all that has
happened. We’re sure that if Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots
were left alone they would find their way forward.'
APPRECIATING DIFFERENCES
One of the potential benefits of bi-communal contact is
change in the negative and distorted images that each side holds of
the other, hopefully replacing them with a more sophisticated view.
In order for Cyprus to experience genuine peace at some point, the
parties have to work through differences in perceptions and
develop an understanding and appreciation of each other's point of
view. Furthermore, they must work to form a shared vision of the
island's future, so that in spite of the differences in their
interpretations of the past, they can move beyond these opposing
views to create a place where both communities can live in peace
and work toward common goals.
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
In my discussions with those who have taken part in
workshops and seminars, nearly everyone talks about how much
their picture of the other side has been altered. They also give
emphasis to the importance of being able to present to the other side
a different perspective about life in their own community. It is clear
that the exchange is both ways, and it is a learning experience for
everyone.
The end result, however, is never present at the beginning of
one’s journey, and along the way, the going can be rough at times.
When we hear someone make statements about our community that
we believe are clearly mistaken, our natural reaction is to
immediately ‘correct' that person. Usually, we try to do this even
before they finish their statement! No one wants to hear negative
information, especially if we know it is not true. And most of the time
we take it personally. When Greek Cypriots hear about how they
used to carry out massacres in Turkish-Cypriot villages, they feel as
if they are being accused of having carried out these deeds
themselves, which they clearly have not done. When Turkish
Cypriots hear that they have stolen Greek-Cypriot property, they feel
accused of being a criminal, and the hurt feelings associated with this
indictment are not easy to keep inside.
Unfortunately, our attempts to correct or refute others’
statements, as well as our vigorous defense against perceived
accusations, simply make matters worse. Most of the time they
reinforce in the other’s mind (and in our own) the accuracy of the
image. Such argumentative debate is almost always a waste of time,
and even worse, it contributes to the perpetuation of the conflict. In
some ways, it might be better never to have met, because now the two
sides can say with confidence that they have ‘seen for themselves' the
other side, and sadly it seems that what they heard is true after all.
It is important to keep in mind that the individuals making the
negative statements did not create them, and probably they never
decided consciously to use them. Like all of us, they simply are
relying on the information that is available to them, and they are
59
ENCOUNTERING IMAGES
repeating things they have heard all their life. As with all stereotypes,
there is probably some truth in what they are saying. At a minimum,
the statements are based on events that once happened in some
form, even if they no longer take place or if they were exaggerated.
It is best to frame the situation as a two-way educational opportunity.
We might say to ourselves: ‘Here in front of me, is someone from
whom I can learn something new. He/she has a perspective on my
community that I will never have the opportunity to hear at home.
And if they get to know me, some of their perceptions might change
-- perhaps I can contribute also to their learning.'
Unfortunately, changes in perceptions are not likely to occur
after a single encounter. When I meet with the other person, I might
be able to show him/her something different from what he/she was
told all his/her life, but I am just one person, and there are always
exceptions to the rule. In any case, after the other’s encounter with
me, he/she will go back (as I will) to the same environment that
created and nurtured these perceptions in the first place, and it will
not be easy for him/her to hold tightly to what he/she saw and heard
during their discussions with me. In order for real change to occur,
and in order for each party to develop genuine empathy for the
other’s point of view, there will need to be numerous conversations,
over time, in different environments, and with a variety of people.
And the exchange will have to be more than social ‘chit-chat.' Serious
discussions about central issues form the basis for real change in
perceptions.
RECOGNIZING VARIETY
There is a tendency to view the other community as homogeneous
and to portray them in strictly negative terms. Yet the other is never
an undifferentiated entity, and neither is everyone on one’s own side
all of the same opinion. It is important to recognize the variety that
exists among the ‘enemy' or within one’s own community. Most of
the bi-communal groups that have formed are composed of
individuals from various political persuasions, with quite different
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
views about what must be done to improve the situation in Cyprus.
It is misleading to state that this is the ‘Greek-Cypriot position' or
the ‘Turkish-Cypriot position.' Indeed, we have found that there is
sometimes more similarity across community lines than there is
within each community. It is often the case that Greek Cypriots will
form closer ties with other Turkish Cypriots than they will with
many of their compatriots. Of course, there is an ‘official' position
on each side and in the beginning stages of group work it is these
views that often dominate. However, as the group develops a more
open climate of sharing, individual differences are brought out into
the open and form the basis for discussion. From the more than
200 bi-communal meetings and workshops in which I have
participated, I have rarely seen discussion about issues which fall
along strictly community lines. This richness of intra-communal
differences may make it more difficult for the extremists in either
side to promote separation of the two communities, and it is a
factor that promises greater possibility for inter-communal
cooperation in the future.
DISCOVERING COMMONALITIES
While it is crucial to recognize, confront, and appreciate differences,
it is important to realize that Cypriots also share common interests,
common aspirations, and even a common culture. After all, Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have lived on the island together for
400 years! For most of their shared history they have confronted
similar problems and lived under similar conditions. As a friend
reminded me once while we were watching the sunset in Paphos, the
same sun rises and sets on both the north and south of the island.
And despite differences in language, religion, and ethnic origin,
Cypriots are fellow human beings, struggling to survive and prosper,
providing a better life for their families and trying to ensure a proper
future for their children. Commonalities are not always as easy to
spot as differences, especially in conflict situations, but they form the
basis for any meaningful relationship.
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ENCOUNTERING IMAGES
Unfortunately, the subject of commonalities among Cypriots
has been politicized (like most issues in Cyprus!). In their attempts to
stress the need for communal separation, Turkish-Cypriot rhetoric
tends to overemphasize the differences between the communities,
while in their attempt to stress the need for a unified island, Greek-
Cypriot rhetoric tends to overestimate the similarities. This is a case
in which the views of both sides are essentially correct on one level
and dangerously wrong on another level. By giving primary
emphasis to the commonalities between the two communities, the
Greek Cypriots are failing to take into account fundamental areas of
disagreement that prevent the two sides from coming together. By
focusing on the differences, the Turkish Cypriots are helping to
create a situation where people may not be able to live together again
when a solution becomes a reality.
I have seen almost every group with which I have worked in
Cyprus go through a stage in which the Greek Cypriots are shocked
by the disparity between their views and those of their colleagues in
the other community, and I’ve seen Turkish Cypriots constantly
struggle with (and sometimes resist) the realization that there is much
more commonality between the two sides than they expected.
Individuals and groups need to develop a more balanced picture
that is closer to the reality of Cyprus, putting them in a better
position for working together in a true partnership characterized by
trust, empathy, and respect.
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
1
It is important to keep in mind that the contacts that have taken place since April
2003 have affected these images in ways that are not yet known. It would be useful to
conduct again a series of workshops in which questions about images of the other could be
explored. A recent Master's thesis by Zenon Severis, The Effects Of The Opening Of The Green
Line On Young Greek Cypriots And Their Perception Of Identity is one of the first research
projects to address this question. Perhaps as you read this section, you can think about ways
in which the images reported here, which were characteristic of the larger population before
the recent 'openings,' have changed or are changing, hopefully in ways that lessen their
negative impact.
I don’t feel complete with my country divided. Part of me is missing. I yearn
for Kyrenia, for Karpas, and most of all for my mother’s village, Lapithos.
But I also ache because the Turkish Cypriots are no longer in my life.
Greek-Cypriot journalist
I’m grateful for our freedom, that we can live without fear of the Greeks. But
my soul is troubled. I carry a heavy burden with me always. It’s called the
Cyprus problem, and it’s a part of who I am.
Turkish-Cypriot peace activist
Conflicts often arise and sustain themselves because of political
aspirations, thirst for military dominance, struggle for economic
advantage, quest for control of resources, and geopolitical
manoeuvring by the big powers. But is there also something deeper,
more human, lurking behind the scenes?
Although we must recognize the immediate and direct impacts
of the more ‘visible' factors such as those listed above, I believe that
the hidden element in many conflicts, especially those involving
different ethnic groups, is perceptions of self and other. How do the
different groups see themselves? What images do they hold of the
6. EXAMINING IDENTITY
1
other? How do these differences in self-perceptions and views of the
other clash? How do they help create different views about the
future? How is each group’s view of themselves threatened by the
other? Can the conflict itself become essential to how groups see
themselves? I believe these and other identity-related questions are
critical in promoting more effective ties across the Green Line in
Cyprus.
Identity issues impact conflict situations in several ways. The
conflict itself is likely to revolve around differences in how each party
perceives itself, especially vis-à-vis the other. These differences in
perceptions may have led to the conflict in the first place, and they
usually exacerbate the separation and make reconciliation nearly
impossible. Trust is shattered, accusations fly, wounds fester, hope is
lost. If they have lived in close proximity in the past, each party’s
definition of itself includes the relationship they had together.
Separation tears apart this collective identity and requires a re-
definition of one’s self. In order for suitable agreements to be
reached between the conflicting parties, these identity issues must be
addressed
2
.
In some ways, identity issues in Cyprus appear to be relatively
straightforward. There are two well-defined geographical zones,
each populated and administered primarily by a single ethnic group.
Each community uses a consistent label for itself – Turkish Cypriots
in the north and Greek Cypriots in the south. Turkish Cypriots are
Turkish-speaking, think of themselves as secular Muslims, take pride
in their Ottoman heritage, and consider themselves European in
outlook and orientation. Greek Cypriots are Greek-speaking, belong
to the Orthodox Christian church, take pride in being part of the
Hellenic world, and orient themselves toward Europe and the West.
To an outsider, it may be easy to see the Turkish Cypriots simply as
part of Turkey and the Greek Cypriots as an extension of Greece –
merely two ‘outposts' of their respective motherlands.
The reality in Cyprus, however, is much more complicated.
The multi-faceted nature of Cypriot identities and their influence on
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
the conflict emerged during the workshops that I facilitated with
citizen peace groups during the past decade. In most of these
workshops, discussion was guided by two questions, one posed for
the purpose of generating and clarifying ideas and the other for
exploring the relationship among the ideas. In each group we were
trying to create an influence structure that represented the system of
issues surrounding the topic of our discussion. In the core group
with which I first worked, we initially explored the obstacles to peace-
building efforts in Cyprus, followed by goals for the group’s peace-
building activities. In other groups we examined issues facing the
youth of Cyprus, barriers to increased cooperation among young
business leaders, factors that lead to pain and suffering in Cyprus,
obstacles to cooperation among citizen peace groups in the region,
and other topics. In none of these workshops was identity the
primary topic, but in every case there were identity issues that
became a major part of our discussions.
In addition to these workshops, I also facilitated several
seminars that posed specific questions about identity. For example,
we often addressed questions related to perceptions of the ‘other,'
perceptions of self, and perceptions of how the other sees you. In one
of these workshops, we spent nearly six weeks exploring how
participants see themselves, within their own society, and vis-à-vis
one another. The main purpose of this seminar was to explore how
identity issues affect the Cyprus conflict. In the initial stages of their
discussion, the participants in this group generated responses to the
question: ‘What feelings and beliefs are associated with my identity as
a Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot?' As part of our discussion, we
explored the major themes that ran through these statements,
categorizing the responses under six headings (see Table 1).
In the following section I will explore each of these themes in
greater detail, basing most of my observations on information taken
from the identity seminars. It is augmented by discussions from the
other workshops, as well as from the series of seminars held during
July 2001 that were concerned with rapprochement in the region
3
.
65
EXAMINING IDENTITY
Before continuing, it is imperative to point out that there is a
great deal of variety within each community, and although these
intra-group differences are often overshadowed by their allegiance to
the ‘national cause,' it is important to recognize that neither group
can be treated as a monolithic whole. This diversity was also evident
in our workshops. Sometimes the most contentious discussions took
place between members of the same community rather than across
ethnic lines. Thus, the descriptions I present below must be
understood as general patterns that emerged from the discussions
during our seminars. It is inappropriate and misleading to see
individual Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots as embodying all or
even most of the characteristics presented in the following sections.
Nevertheless, within each group there was a consensus that the
beliefs and feelings we discussed are representative of the general
population and are reliable guides to how people see themselves.
It is helpful to keep in mind when reading the following
sections that they report perceptions that emerged from workshops
and seminars held in a bi-communal setting. The results are not a
product of social-scientific research about identity issues in Cyprus.
Thus, one could argue that the ideas outlined below reflect primarily
the views of those individuals drawn to bi-communal groups, rather
than of the population as a whole. Nevertheless, the individuals in
the bi-communal groups represented a broad cross-section of
Cypriots, and they were asked to present what they believed to be
opinions commonly found in the larger society (and not just their
own personal views). Therefore, it is likely that the discussion
presented below can be understood as broadly representative of the
society in general. In any case, the ideas should provide a stimulus
for discussion and debate, both in mono-communal and bi-
communal settings.
CONNECTION TO MOTHERLAND
The category that emerged in the workshops as the dominant theme
for both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was the connection
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
67
ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
Turkish Cypriots Greek Cypriots
Carrier of Hellenic civilization,
member of Greek community, part
of Orthodox religion, pride in con-
tributions to Western civilization
Confusion about relation between
Greek and Cypriot heritage, distrust
of Greek intentions toward Cyprus
Pride associated with Ottoman
heritage, Turkish language,
Muslim religion
Increasing uneasiness about the
degree of influence exerted by
Turkey over internal affairs
Connection with whole of island,
attachment to place of birth, pride
in Cypriot history, Cypriot dialect
Distinction from people of Greece
Suffering through many troubles,
difficult to survive as a Turkish
Cypriot, suppressed economic
potential
Sandwiched between Turkey and
Greek Cypriots, helpless, victims
of situation
Sense of incompleteness, lack of
freedom to move in my island,
bitter about past
Always compromising, victims of
international forces, weak position,
strength to survive
Treated as minority, separated
by language & religion, sense of
insecurity
Desire for dialogue, willingness
to make peace
Fractured by separation
Search for similarities, desire for
unification
Close family ties, strong sense
of neighbourhood, emphasis
on social events
Passivity in dealing with difficult
situations, tolerant of others
Close family ties, strong sense of
neighbourhood, emphasis on
social events
Peace-loving, compassionate,
sentimental, hard working
Identification with Europe,
cosmopolitan, insufficiently aware
of international issues
Misunderstood by international
community
Identification with Europe,
emphasis on international law and
rights, self-assured on world stage
Suspicious of other cultures,
blame international community
for problems
TABLE 1: COMPARING IDENTITY ISSUES IN CYPRUS
CONNECTION TO MOTHERLAND
ATTACHMENT TO CYPRUS
BURDEN OF CYPRUS CONFLICT
RELATION TO OTHER COMMUNITY
CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
CONNECTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Connection to the soil, pride
in richness of culture, Cypriot
dialect
Distinction from people of Turkey
they felt to what they describe as their motherlands, Turkey and
Greece. For the Turkish Cypriots, this connection was relatively
straightforward. They saw themselves as part of a larger Turkish
population that lived not only in Turkey but also in many other
countries of the region. The Turkish language was an important part
of their self-definition, and they found great meaning in the poetry
and literature that the Turkish language made possible. They took
pride in being descendents from the Ottomans, an empire they
perceived as the most tolerant and multicultural in the world’s
history, providing some of the progressive ideas that are found in
many modern nations, especially those that incorporate many
cultures within their borders. Turkish Cypriots considered
themselves secular Muslims, celebrating the Islamic holy days and
attending to the primary rituals, such as marriage and death
ceremonies, but not participating actively in worship services or
following the more conservative practices related to clothing, daily
prayer, attending the services of the mosque, etc. For the most part,
they felt strongly aligned with the institutions and cultural life of
Turkey, and they took comfort from being so close to the people
from whom they descended and the land from which their
forefathers immigrated nearly 400 years earlier. As will be made
clearer in later sections, Turkish Cypriots also differentiated
themselves from the mainlanders, especially from the religiously
conservative Anatolian settlers who have come to Cyprus more
recently, but their own strong connection to Turkey was undisputed.
For the Greek Cypriots, the connection they felt to their
motherland was more complicated. Clearly, they saw themselves as
part of Greek culture, as belonging to the larger Greek community,
and as part of Greek history. They felt power in the expressiveness
of the Greek language, the richness of its vocabulary, and the many
poets and writers who used the language with skill and beauty to
create works recognized by the world community. They took great
pride in the accomplishments and contributions of the Hellenes, who
are considered as providing the basis of western democracy,
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
philosophy, science, medicine, psychology, literature, and arts. The
Orthodox Christian religion was an important aspect of their
identity, providing celebrations, feast days, rituals of birth, marriage,
and death, but no one described themselves as religious and few
believed the Church held much influence over their daily lives.
Unlike the Turkish Cypriots, however, they did not feel close to the
daily life and institutions of their Greek kin, and to some extent they
even felt a dislike of the Greeks, discussing how they often felt treated
by them as second-class citizens. Even though they took some
comfort from the promises of the Greek government to provide
protection from outside threats, they did not believe the Greeks
could (or would) deliver when the need arose. On the one hand, they
felt a need for support and security arrangements with Greece. At
the same time they were suspicious about the intentions and goodwill
of Greece toward Cyprus, viewing them as directly responsible for
much of the pain and frustration of the island. Finally, they
expressed uncertainty about how much of their heritage was Greek
and how much was due to the numerous influences from other
rulers of Cyprus. Overall, despite several misgivings and confusions,
the Greek Cypriots recognized their ties to the mainland and felt
pride in their Greek heritage.
The difference in the Greek-Cypriot feelings toward Greece,
compared to the Turkish-Cypriot feelings toward Turkey, can be
explained partially by the different historical circumstances each face.
The Greek influence in Cyprus goes back over 3000 years, to the
time of the first Greek settlers who came to Cyprus after the Trojan
wars described by Homer, while the Turkish presence in Cyprus
started over 400 years ago with the Ottoman conquest of the island.
While the period of Turkish influence has been relatively
uninterrupted, except for the British colonial period, the Greek
impact on Cyprus lies within several other layers of conquest,
including Phoenician, Assyrian, Egyptian, Roman, Byzantine,
Lusignian, Venetian, Ottoman, and British. Although the language
and mythology remained predominately Greek, these periods have
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ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
left their mark as well. Many Greek Cypriots will point to the
‘unbroken chain of Greek heritage,' but it is not always a very
convincing argument, even to the Greek Cypriots themselves. In
addition, the distance to the motherland is greater for the Greek
Cypriots than for the Turkish Cypriots (it is 500 miles to Athens,
while it is only 40 miles to the Turkish coast), and besides the
practical difficulties of maintaining a close relationship with a far
away neighbour, such physical distance also creates psychological
distance. Another factor is the ratio of Turkish Cypriots (less than
120,000 total population) to mainland Turks (65 million inhabitants)
compared to the Greek Cypriots’ (650,000) relation to the inhabitants
of Greece (10 million). The Greek Cypriots do not feel overwhelmed
by the size of the Greek population, so it is not difficult for them to
feel and act independently of Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots
may feel more constrained in the face of the large population of
Turkey. Finally, the Greek role in the 1974 coup that led to the
Turkish intervention is openly acknowledged, and Greek Cypriots
quickly condemn both this intervention in their internal affairs and
the lack of Greek help in their attempt to defend themselves against
the Turkish forces. By contrast, the Turkish Cypriots express
gratitude to Turkey for their intervention in 1974, viewing this an act
of ‘salvation' for their community.
ATTACHMENT TO CYPRUS
In addition to the strong ties both communities feel toward their
mother countries, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots also
expressed deep attachment to the island of Cyprus. The Turkish
Cypriots emphasized their love for the island, their roots in the soil,
their emotional attachment to the landscape and its smells, colours,
sounds, and cooling winds of summer evenings. They discussed the
uniqueness of their Cypriot dialect, cuisine, and many cultural
traditions. They also took pride in having a separate identity from
their Turkish kin, speaking about their secularism and dislike for
anything too religious.
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
Similarly, the Greek Cypriots discussed at length their feelings
of belonging to the land of the island, the human and natural aspects
of the Cypriot landscape, and the emotional ties they feel to the
mountains and the sea, the smell and colours of the sun and the air.
They also emphasized the Cypriot dialect, in their case tracing it back
to the times of Homeric Greek, emphasizing, as did the Turkish
Cypriots, ways in which their culture is unique from that of the
mainland Greeks. Unlike the Turkish Cypriots, they pointed to the
8000-year history of human settlement on Cyprus, recognizing that
monuments were built by their ancestors prior to Greek influence.
They also emphasized the international recognition given to their
government and the fact that Cyprus was an independent state,
allowing Cyprus to play a role on the world stage. Also, unlike the
Turkish Cypriots, they talked about their unwillingness to leave the
island, even when conditions are bad and the future grim. Finally,
the Greek Cypriots stressed their connection with the whole of the
island, and they gave special importance to the place (village and
setting) of their birth.
Beyond these differences, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots expressed very similar feelings of affection for their
homeland. For both, it reflects the meaning they give to the Cypriot
part of their hyphenated name. However, the differences that
emerged between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot views are
not insignificant. The latter’s attention to the 8000-year history of the
island is no accident – they have been taught in their history that they
are the original inhabitants of the island and that the Turkish Cypriots
are relative newcomers. The attention to international recognition is
another part of the political nature of Greek-Cypriot identity – they
derive part of their legitimacy from this legal status as the official
representatives of Cyprus, and an important part of the way they see
themselves has to do with this status. Finally, the emphasis Greek
Cypriots gave to their connection with the whole of the island is quite
different from the Turkish-Cypriot views. The Greek-Cypriot official
position is that every Cypriot must have free access to the whole of
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ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
the island, and this political message has been hammered into the
consciousness of every Greek Cypriot from birth. For many of them,
the village of their birth (or the village of their parents) lies in
Turkish-Cypriot controlled territory, and giving attention to a
specific location is a way to keeping alive the political hope that one
day they will have access to these places. For the Turkish Cypriots,
although they may miss the place of their birth (if their home was
formerly in the south), and nearly all of them want to visit places in
the south that used to be important to them, few Turkish Cypriots
expressed a desire to live again in those places. These differences
between the two communities are major driving forces in the conflict,
and they represent issues that are very difficult to resolve.
BURDEN OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT
Very few Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots have known a period
without the Cyprus conflict. It has been at the forefront of their lives
since the 1950s, and today it is a pervasive force that overlays much
of their existence. Both groups have suffered physically and both
now suffer psychologically. Although the Cyprus conflict impacts
strongly on the identity of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, it does so in different ways. For the Turkish Cypriots, an
important part of their identity is the struggle to survive as a
community. They see themselves as having endured a great deal of
suffering over the years at the hands the Greek Cypriots, and they
are constantly reminded of the events that caused this suffering.
They hold within themselves a feeling that they are victims of grave
injustice, that they have been persecuted by many forces. For the
Turkish Cypriots, they believe strongly that their community
deserves better, both in term of recognition as a community and in
economic opportunities.
For the Greek Cypriots, identity is also tied to struggle, but
their fight is for justice that will address the wrongs committed
against them in the past. They see themselves as suffering, but the
cause of their troubles is primarily Turkey and the international
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BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
community, not the Turkish Cypriots. They feel divided, incomplete,
and without freedom (to move freely and settle within Cyprus). There
is a lot of bitterness about the past and uncertainty about the future.
They see themselves as constantly compromising in the interest of
peace, putting themselves in a weak position at the bargaining table.
Despite the similarities at one level, the differences in Greek-
Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot views of themselves vis-à-vis the Cyprus
conflict is one of the primary forces that keeps the conflict alive. The
Turkish Cypriots’ struggle to survive as a community is pitted against
the Greek Cypriots’ struggle to exercise their individual rights. The
Turkish Cypriots’ feelings toward the Greek Cypriots for the
suffering they caused is ignored by the Greek Cypriots in their
emphasis on outside forces (primarily Turkey) as the cause of
suffering in Cyprus. The constraints that the Turkish Cypriots feel
because of their international isolation are incompatible with the
Greek-Cypriot belief that they (the Greek Cypriots) have to be
constantly alert to the danger of the world community accepting the
status quo as the starting point for a solution, leaving them in an even
weaker position. In the meantime, there is a general ‘heaviness,'
caused by the existence of the unresolved conflict, which pervades
the psychological and social well-being of all Cypriots and their views
of themselves.
RELATION TO THE OTHER COMMUNITY
The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have lived together on
the same small island for over 400 years, and the ties they have with
one another form a crucial backbone of their identity. For the
Turkish Cypriots, there is a clear awareness of the ways in which
language and religion separate them from the Greek Cypriots.
There was some discussion about the existence of an inferiority
complex, brought about by so many years of being dominated
economically, politically, and culturally. Turkish Cypriots
expressed a feeling of insecurity toward Greek Cypriots, feeling
threatened by this larger community, and they saw a need to
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ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
protect themselves from the prejudice and abuse that used to
happen regularly. There was a strong dislike for being treated
today as a minority by the Greek Cypriots. At the same time, there
was a strong desire to have more dialogue, to directly communicate
and engage in trade, and to find ways to live peacefully side by side.
The Greek Cypriots emphasized their similarities with
Turkish Cypriots, along with an explicit recognition that they
seldom thought about differences. They expressed a desire to co-
exist with the Turkish Cypriots, to live together with their
neighbours in peace. There was a strong dislike for any form of
artificial separation between the two communities, and they saw
themselves as constantly fighting for individual rights, both their
own and their neighbours’.
It was clear that neither of the communities feels ‘complete'
without the other, but this seemed truer for the Greek Cypriots
than for the Turkish Cypriots. Because of their minority status
(numerically, economically, and politically), the Turkish Cypriots
had always been aware of their differences from the Greek
Cypriots, and they had long taken these dissimilarities as a matter
of fact. For the Greek Cypriots, however, who were the ruling
majority for much of the twentieth century, the differences between
themselves and the Turkish Cypriots have been more or less
overlooked and/or ignored. In many ways, the basic difference in
how each group sees themselves vis-à-vis the other fuels the
conflict, leading to incompatible positions about how the two
communities should relate to one another. The Greek Cypriots’
insistence on ‘living together' on the island is in direct opposition to
the Turkish Cypriot assertion that the only future for Cyprus is an
arrangement with appropriate safeguards that allows the two
neighbours to live securely and peacefully ‘side by side.'
CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
In spite of speaking a different language, following a different
religion, and holding such different views of history and the current
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situation, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots share many common
cultural characteristics. In each community, individuals define
themselves within the context of family ties, and personal identity is
closely linked to parents, siblings, and relatives. Neighbourhood is
also important, and the character and history of the place where
individuals reside helps determine how they see themselves.
Emphasis is given in both communities to helping neighbours and
others in need. At the same time, people are curious about the affairs
of their neighbours, and both sides said there is a tendency to talk
about others ‘behind their back.' For both groups, much of life
revolves around social activities, and food is a central feature of social
gatherings. Although there are a few differences in the cuisine of
each community, for the most part the diet is the same, and everyone
will point quickly to their favorite Cypriot foods such as halloumi and
‘souvla'. In each community, people see themselves as friendly to
others, hospitable to guests, and eager to learn about others.
Music, dance, and art are integral parts of social life among
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and they tend to have the
same or similar dance costumes, instruments, melodies, and forms of
artistic expression. Each group pointed to their love of ‘tsifteteli,' a
popular dance and music that has origins in the Middle East. Both
groups discussed their tendency to treat time in a somewhat casual
manner, especially their habits of being late for events and doing
things ‘at the last minute.' There are many common nonverbal
expressions, quite a few shared words and phrases, and numerous
communication habits that are identical – both groups pointed out
that several people are usually talking together at the same time in
social conversations (and other settings) and that most social visits
end with a long conversation at the gate, even if it is already very late
at night (something I experienced myself many times!). Finally,
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots both value humour, placing
emphasis on telling jokes, and they consider themselves to have a
good sense of humour toward events and toward other people.
The primary cultural characteristics that separate the two
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ENTERING UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY
communities relate to activity orientation and emotional expression.
The Turkish Cypriots saw themselves as somewhat passive in
responding to external events, and they considered themselves as
having a relaxed approach to life. They talked about their ability to
‘forgive and forget' wrongdoings against them. While they
considered themselves emotional, they are careful about publicly
displaying their emotions too strongly. The Greek Cypriots, on the
other hand, saw themselves as taking a more proactive approach to
situations, as impatient, and as future-oriented. They see themselves
as sentimental, quick-tempered, and emotionally expressive. They
have trouble letting go of past wrongs that others have done against
them, and they feel bitter about the way they have been treated by
the outside world. These differences in approach to action and in
expression of emotion have created many misunderstandings when
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots attempt to work together.
CONNECTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Although neither Turkish Cypriots nor Greek Cypriots generated
many individual items about how they see themselves in relation to
the rest of the world, the similarities and differences in their views are
central aspects of the Cyprus conflict. One consistent component of
both groups’ view of self is their European orientation. Despite the
location of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean, in close proximity
to countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and other Middle
Eastern countries, the Cypriots clearly position themselves as part of
the Western world. There is actually a physical connection to the
West – two large British sovereign military bases are located in
Greek-Cypriot controlled territory. In addition, Greek Cypriots
receive over two million tourists every year, most of them British and
northern Europeans. Even the Turkish Cypriots, who are Muslim by
religion, turn away from the Arab world and towards Europe. While
there is some acknowledgement of Middle Eastern influences on
their culture, Cypriots are vigorous in defending their Western
lifestyle and ways of thinking, as well as their political connections to
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Europe, Britain, and the United States. This probably comes from
several factors -- the many years they were a British colony, the large
number of Cypriots currently living in Europe (especially London)
and the United States, the fact that many students have studied
abroad, and their recent entry into the European Union.
Beyond the similarities, however, the type of connection each
community holds to the Western world is quite different. The
Turkish Cypriots feel frustrated by their inability to make the rest of
the world understand their situation. They don’t easily trust the West
to deal with them fairly, since it has a history of prejudice toward
Islam. They can’t understand why the international community
refuses to recognize their political legitimacy and fails to
acknowledge the reality of the division of Cyprus. The Greek
Cypriots, although their standard of living is not very different from
those found in most European and U.S. cities, have tended to
maintain a non-aligned position toward the West. While they rely on
the U.S. and Europe for political support and economic trade, they
are suspicious of the intentions of the West, particularly those of the
United States, which they perceive as favouring Turkey.
IDENTITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT
While one must be careful in drawing analogies between vastly
different situations, the Cyprus conflict has many characteristics of a
married couple seeking legal divorce. When such separation occurs
between married couples in contemporary Western societies, it is
usually difficult and almost always painful, but it can allow each
person to go her or his own way, finding new opportunities and
building a new life. It is not so easy, however, to just walk away from
a marriage and begin anew, because the divorce situation is
complicated by the interdependence that exists between the
marriage partners. Frequently, children are involved and both
parents want custody, or the couple lives in a small town and neither
can move away easily, or both work for the same organization and
cannot change jobs effortlessly. Additionally, they may own joint
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property, such as the house they built together, or they may have
established an estate that cannot be easily broken into separate pieces
and divided between the two sides. Quite often, one of the parties is
in a stronger position economically (e.g., one spouse may have a full-
time salary while the other has never had a full-time job outside the
home, leaving this person with few opportunities for gainful
employment). It is not unusual for the separation to be initiated by
one of the parties against the wishes of the other, with the aggrieved
party denying the difficulties that led to the break-up and at the same
time harbouring illusions of bringing the marriage back together
‘like it was before.' The situation is sometimes exacerbated by the
parents of the couple, especially if these different sets of parents don’t
get along with each other. In most situations, friends or colleagues of
the couple are drawn into the conflict, and although these friends
previously may have had a good relationship with the couple as a
unit, they are now pressured to ‘choose sides' and lend their support
to one or the other. The list of complicating factors could continue,
but it is easy to see that such situations can involve a host of variables
that are not easy to sort out or resolve.
In the case of Cyprus, the situation is complicated by many
factors similar to the ones listed above. After a short partnership in
governing the island, disagreements and difficulties led to fighting,
and an initial cease-fire has turned into a de facto separation. Inter-
communal violence has ceased, but no agreement has been reached
on matters that divide the parties – who will control which territory
on the island, how the parties will share power and responsibility in
matters that concern everyone, what guarantees will be put in place
for security, how the weaker party will be protected from economic
and cultural domination by the stronger side. The Greek Cypriots
want to turn back the clock to recreate the situation before the war,
when they were the dominant group, while the Turkish Cypriots
insist that the separation is final – at last they can build their own
institutions without the interference of the Greek Cypriots. The
motherlands of the two communities are traditional enemies, and
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although they promise to ‘protect' the respective communities from
aggression by the other, Cyprus suffers continuously from their
interference in its internal affairs. External parties, such as the
United States, Britain, and the European Union, are trying to help
broker an agreement, but each side feels that the other is favoured
by the outside party.
Like the married couple seeking a legal divorce, the two
communities of Cyprus find themselves in a position of
interdependence. Identity issues divide them but also tie them to
each other. The conflict has become an integral part of both
individual and community identity. Because war and forced division,
rather than a natural process of relocation over time, created the
geographical zones in which the two communities of Cyprus live, the
conflict is an unsettled presence that permeates society. It is nearly
impossible to carry on a conversation for any length of time (on
almost any topic) with either a Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot
without the conflict entering the discussion.
The dominance of the conflict in the individual and collective
psyche affects the society in an interesting manner – it serves to
heighten or even strengthen individuals’ sense of self-importance.
The international community has devoted much attention to Cyprus,
and it is doubtful that this small island would have received such
interest from the world community if the conflict did not exist. It is
not uncommon to hear Cypriots (of both communities) say (only half-
jokingly) that Cyprus is the center of the world, but this perception
would be more difficult to maintain without the existence of a conflict
that receives constant notice from Europe and the United States. The
news media in Cyprus give daily headline coverage to even the most
insignificant statements by special envoys, ambassadors, politicians,
and almost any other outsider who mentions Cyprus in the text of
their remarks. It is ironic that outside Cyprus few people know
anything about the conflict (or even where Cyprus is located), while
in Cyprus one easily gets the impression that the world’s attention is
focused on the most recent developments about the Cyprus conflict.
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At the same time, the crucial role played by the Cyprus conflict
creates many problems in the everyday life of Cypriots in both
communities. The psychological burden is enormous, and most
people suffer emotionally from the unresolved feelings associated
with the 1974 events and from the fear that war will come again.
Uncertainty, anxiety, insecurity, and pessimism abound in Cyprus,
and these negative feelings affect family life, worker productivity,
and political decisions about economic, environmental, educational,
and almost all other issues. The attention given to the conflict also
allows Cypriots to avoid or ignore many of the social problems that
face their society. Domestic violence, mental depression, treatment of
foreign guest workers, environmental problems, and other concerns
can be easily shoved aside by politicians who use the ‘national cause'
as an excuse to focus on other issues.
Finally, identity concerns help keep the conflict alive in
Cyprus. Differences in how the two communities define themselves
make it very difficult for the conflict to be resolved. Like marital
separations, which seldom end harmoniously, each side in Cyprus
blames the other for the break-up, trust has disappeared from the
relationship, tension is high, and communication with one another
has broken off. Although many attempts have been made to re-
establish the relationship, there seems to be little hope for the
‘marriage' resuming, certainly not in its previous form. However,
there is hope that the two sides can work out an amicable agreement
that allows them to share the island without constant tension, fear,
and the psychological burden of a failed partnership.
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1
This chapter is based on a paper (Broome, 2004) that is part of a recent book on
identity (see references for full citation).
2
In the social sciences, identity has been an important construct since George
Herbert Mead’s Mind, Self, and Society (1934). In recent years, the study of identity has
assumed greater importance in intercultural communication. For a discussion of identity in
various cultural contexts, see Tanno and Gonzalez (1998). Collier (1998) provides a good
overview of various approaches to studying identity issues.
3
I am referring to the series of four-party seminars supported by the Bi-communal
Development Programme during summer 2001 (see acknowledgements for more detailed
description of these seminars).
It’s never easy to make things work smoothly in the bi-communal setting. We
all have good intentions, but in groups it doesn’t always work out the way you
think it should. However, I’ve learned that there are many things I can do to
make the process better. For me, learning to listen was the biggest task – we’re
not used to doing much of that in Cyprus!
Greek-Cypriot psychologist
I’ve been through dozens of training programs in conflict resolution,
mediation, consensus building, and inter-group communication, all of which
were extremely useful. Even so, I often manage to say things that create
difficulties in the group – old habits die hard! I’ve found there’s no guarantee
of success. But we have to learn from our mistakes.
Turkish-Cypriot teacher
Conflict can be managed productively only if both parties take
specific steps toward resolving the issues that separate them from one
another. The distortion of the past, the negative images of the other
community, the placement of blame on the other, the lack of trust
between the two sides, and the unwillingness to make concessions all
hamper efforts to work together productively. I believe the past must
7. TAKING STEPS
TOWARD SUCCESS
be confronted honestly, but the focus must turn to creating a viable
working relationship for the future. Many issues can make this shift
difficult, if not impossible. If people feel that their identity is under
siege, if they feel insecure, if they don’t feel acknowledged and
respected, if they feel wronged – they will become defensive,
accusatory, and provocative, preventing the very actions that are
necessary to look ahead. On the other hand, if threat can be
removed, if respect can be demonstrated, and if confidence can be
built, the relationship can be redefined and the two sides can learn to
work together cooperatively.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to lay out a series of simple
procedures that will ensure success in intercultural relationships.
There are too many forces beyond our control, and every encounter
is a unique combination of people and circumstances. And
occasionally there are people in a group whose main purpose is to
disrupt the communication or block progress in a project.
Nevertheless, based on experiences of those who have been involved
in joint projects during the past decade, as well as academic literature
on intercultural communication and conflict resolution, it is clear that
there are certain principles that underlie successful cross-community
relationships, and individuals can take steps that will increase the
likelihood of positive outcomes. With this in mind, the following
sections will offer a number of suggestions to facilitate communication
in the bi-communal setting. These will be organized around the
primary tasks facing all groups: establishing trust, creating a safe
environment for dialogue, and working together productively.
ESTABLISHING TRUST
No relationship can last long without the existence of mutual trust.
Lack of confidence in the intentions of the other leads to continuous
questioning of each other’s motives. Suspicions, misgivings, and
scepticism make it impossible to work together or live together
peacefully. Mistrust causes us to live behind protective shields, hiding
our true feelings, making it difficult for others to get to know us.
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Trust, on the other hand, makes it possible to develop a
climate of openness and security, in which true sharing can take
place. It allows us to differentiate between the individual human
beings that make up the other community, separating them from the
official stances stated by authorities for public consumption. Of
course, increased trust in a few individuals does not eliminate the
overall distrust of the other’s authorities and their intentions vis-à-vis
one’s own community, but in the long run, it gives us a more
sophisticated understanding of the other community and makes it
easier for us to support ideas that move the peace process forward.
Although it may never be easy to reach a state of complete
confidence in the other, it is essential to recognize, acknowledge, and
respect each other’s view of self. If parties are able to deal with
identity matters in a positive way, they can start to tear down some of
the fences that have kept them apart. The following are actions that
can help build trust:
Promote a more balanced view of the past.
It would be misleading to suggest that anyone can be completely
objective about the past, but the deliberate distortion of history to
serve primarily political purposes creates unnecessary division and
presents a serious obstacle to reconciliation. Generally, both Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are very selective in their memory of
past events, and their description of these events is far from objective.
The past has been distorted beyond recognition by the educational
systems and political propaganda of both sides. Such one-sided
interpretations of historical events push the two communities further
apart and allow little room for healing processes.
Inter-communal contacts offer opportunities to hear other
sides to the story, to listen to a different interpretation of the past. We
can help each other understand the distortions and to correct the
misperceptions that are widespread in each community. We can
learn that the view of events we have come to accept as the ‘truth' is
biased and one-sided. By listening to another viewpoint, we can
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begin to understand our own history better, and we might develop a
desire for correcting our own community’s interpretation and
presentation of the ‘facts.'
Acknowledge that both communities share mutual
responsibility for the Cyprus conflict.
If there has been one consistent characteristic of the Cyprus conflict
during the past forty years, it is the attempt of each side to place
blame on the other for ‘starting' the conflict, for instigating various
provocative events, for the breakdown of negotiations, etc. Each side
consistently and predictably accuses the other of acting in bad faith,
being untrustworthy, taking actions to harm the other, putting up
roadblocks in the way of progress, and spreading lies and
misinformation about the ‘true' situation. This kind of blaming
places each of the parties in a defensive position, causing each to
focus on attacking the other rather than acknowledging its own
responsibility for creating and maintaining the situation. Such
blaming actions quickly spiral into a mutually destructive exchange
of accusations, making it impossible for the two sides to consider con-
cessions to the other. It is interesting to note that in the political
negotiations, nearly every time that one side accepts something, the
other rejects it, even in cases where they might have already accepted
the same ideas in the past. And then each blames the other for the
breakdown!
It is rare that full responsibility for a problem can be attributed
solely to one party. In Cyprus the case can be made easily that both
parties share the blame equally (along with outside powers). In order
to make progress, this cycle of mutual blame and accusations must be
broken. At least one of the parties must be willing to make
unqualified offers to the other side, and the other side must receive
this offer as genuine. Until each party acknowledges the pain they
have brought to the other and the role they have played in escalating
the tension, it will be impossible to reach a satisfactory agreement to
resolve the conflict.
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If parties are able to publicly recognize their ‘mistakes' and
take responsibility for past actions, threat will be reduced to each
side’s identity, making it much easier to approach the conflict in a
positive manner. Such acknowledgement can help create an
atmosphere where all views can be heard and respected, making it
much easier for parties to work together in resolving issues. In an
atmosphere of trust, participants are able to understand the
complexity of the conflict, and they learn that simplistic ‘finger
pointing' is of no value in promoting realistic solutions to the conflict.
Help each other deal with the pain and suffering of the past.
The psychological burden carried by people in both communities is
one of the major barriers to reconciliation. War injures people, and
it leaves scars. Sometimes the wounds caused by conflicts never heal,
particularly when people are pulled apart against their will. The
injuries, the scars, and the open wounds become part of the identity
of the victims, and they result in bitterness toward the other that
cannot go away on its own. Often, only reconciliation can remove the
pain of the past.
The Turkish Cypriots do not easily forget their past treatment
as second-class citizens, particularly during the period 1963-1974,
when they were confined to small enclaves and feared for their safety
anytime they travelled outside these protected areas. Many have lost
relatives, including immediate family members, friends, and
neighbours, who ‘disappeared' or who were victims of raids on
villages. No one in the Turkish-Cypriot community wants to live
through such a time again. Many of the Turkish Cypriots who lived
prior to 1974 in the south of Cyprus did not want to leave their
homes, but they felt they had no choice. Since 1974, Turkish
Cypriots have faced other difficulties, resulting from non-recognition
and an economic embargo, that they continue to blame on the Greek
Cypriots. They live constantly in a state of uncertainty about what will
happen in the future and whether or not they will be forced once
again to move and start over. The pain that has resulted from these
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bad memories and anxieties about the future weigh heavily in their
willingness to cooperate with Greek Cypriots.
Similarly, Greek Cypriots suffered a traumatic shock in 1974,
being pushed out of their homes and away from their land and
businesses, and witnessing the killings, rapes, and destruction that
accompanied the advance of the Turkish army. The agony from
having family members and relatives still unaccounted for, and the
deep desire to return to their homes and communities, haunts the
entire Greek-Cypriot community. The sense of injustice and the
feelings of helplessness follow them on a daily basis and bring anger,
resentment, and feelings of revenge. It is often expressed as
ultranationalist rhetoric that simply deepens the pain. For many, the
simple act of meeting with Turkish Cypriots is seen as a betrayal to
those who have suffered. For some, bi-communal meetings signify
‘giving in' to injustice and wrongdoing.
This pain, suffered by both communities and attributed to
each by the other, cannot be overcome by simply blaming it on the
other community, ‘punishing' the other community, or calling for a
return to previous conditions. Neither can the wrongs of the past be
‘righted' by simply changing or legitimizing the current situation.
The emotional trauma must be addressed by giving individuals the
opportunity to meet with members of the other community and
discuss their feelings together. These discussions cannot undo the
past wrongs, but they can help lift the burden that prevents creativity
and forward movement. Even those who remember the past
situation more favourably are weighted down by feelings of
inconsistency. They wonder how it was possible to destroy what they
believed was the previous harmony, and even though they blame
external forces, there is a nagging guilt associated with the possibility
that they contributed to this situation by their own well-intentioned
but thoughtless actions. As long as each community is mired in the
past, it will be impossible to make progress.
In order to construct a shared future, individuals in both
communities must be willing to share their own pain in a productive
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manner, and they must be willing to listen to the feelings of the other.
There must be acknowledgment of responsibility for what happened
in the past, and the public discourse in both communities must
change so that the needs and concerns of both communities are
taken into account. Provocative actions that heighten tensions only
reinforce the pain for both sides, and all attempts to bring harm on
the other only speed up the spiral of self-inflicted suffering. If the
animosity toward the other can be purged from one’s identity, it is
likely that the damage from conflict can be repaired, providing an
opportunity to frame the other as a fellow human being who has also
suffered long enough.
CONSTRUCTING A SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR DIALOGUE
When speaking about bi-communal activities with my Greek-Cypriot
friends who have not been involved in any of these events, one of the
most common statements that I have heard goes something like this:
‘If the Turkish troops left Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and the
Greek Cypriots would have no trouble getting along with one
another.' Although this statement greatly masks the complexity of
the situation, our own experience in bi-communal activities has
shown that members of the two communities can speak easily with
one another and can readily form friendly relations in social
situations. Rarely do major disputes arise during either social
gatherings or in workshop settings. However, there is equal truth in
the contentions of some Turkish-Cypriot academics and politicians
that the real problem between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
lies not at the individual level, where friendly relations are not
difficult, but at the community level, where the Turkish Cypriots have
been badly mistreated by the Greek Cypriots.
My own conclusion is somewhat different from either of these
positions. On the one hand, I have learned that polite conversation
and friendly relations are not the same as mutual understanding,
respect, and ability to work together. I’ve come to believe that the
initial friendliness of most bi-communal gatherings exists at only a
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surface level and is made possible by the natural politeness of
Cypriots and the resistance, especially by Turkish Cypriots, to
confrontation in social gatherings. At the same time, I have learned
that productive dialogue is possible, both at the individual and the
community level, when the appropriate conditions exist. In order for
productive dialogue to take place, it is important to provide a ‘safe
space' in which people can share their views in an open yet
structured manner without fear of attack and free from the worry
about politicization of every issue. Mechanisms must be provided
that allow systematic movement from initial statements of concern
towards deeper exploration of difficult issues. Much work needs to be
done to help build trust and to create a sense of interpersonal ‘safety.'
I have seen time and again the relational damage that can be
done when people are simply placed in the same room and expected
to find ways to overcome decades of misinformation and lack of trust.
They often have no choice but to utilize the rhetoric of their own
side’s propaganda, without realizing the effects it has on the other
person and on relations between the communities. Of course,
progress is seldom possible without difficulties, and even with the
most carefully designed plan of activities, there are many delicate
moments when the whole process is on the verge of falling apart.
However, the more the groups have worked together to build
trusting relationships, the more difficult it is for a single incident to
unravel the group. In a situation such as that in Cyprus, where there
has been such a long period of separation, these trusting
relationships are not likely to happen without some assistance.
Members of both communities must work extremely hard to deal
with the burden of past traumas.
Groups often have difficulty engaging in productive
discussions because the atmosphere is full of anxiety and
apprehension. People feel insecure and the group climate becomes
tense. This is often caused by fear, which is one of the primary
driving forces behind defensiveness. If a group feels threatened, it
will retreat from the other and build protective walls. Whether the
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threat comes from physical violence, political control, economic
domination, or loss of cultural traditions, the reaction is the same. In
order for a relationship to work productively, the fear of such
possibilities must be removed. The following steps can help create a
safe climate in which meaningful dialogue can take place.
Listen to learn.
Most of us are used to hearing people tell us: ‘You have to learn to
listen.' While all of us recognize that this admonition has some merit,
most of us don’t know how to accomplish the task. The study of
listening is widespread in the social sciences – there is even an
academic quarterly called The International Journal of Listening. As you
can imagine, the literature is full of suggestions for how to develop
better listening skills, and there are numerous training programs to
help people become better listeners. There is no assurance, however,
that even if one were to go through extensive training, she or he
would see the results desired, disappointing those who originally told
us to learn to listen!
Fortunately, there is a way to ‘learn to listen,' and unlike most
of the guidelines I have offered in this book, I believe this one is
relatively simple. The ‘secret' is to turn the phrase around and ‘listen
to learn,' especially when we disagree with someone or find ourselves
in conflict with another person. Most of the time, in such situations
we listen so that we can refute, correct, or challenge what someone
has said. Or we listen in order to better prove our point. In this case,
the goal of listening becomes one of changing the other’s opinion. In
these situations, it is likely that we will learn very little, and neither
will the other person. No one has gained much, except perhaps we
have the satisfaction of hearing ourselves talk!
If we listen to learn, on the other hand, we create the
possibility of transforming the situation so that everyone gains. We
will hear very different things from the other when we are in a
learning mode, both because our receptivity increases and because
the other’s willingness to share increases. When the other person is
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not listening, we tend to get stuck in our opinions, stating them over
and over (and sometimes louder and louder!), hoping that they will
eventually get through. However, when we see an indication that the
other is learning, then we are willing to go further, explaining more
about our opinion. As the listener, we develop a more sophisticated
understanding of the other’s views, placing us in a better position to
create our own thoughts, and more importantly, building a climate
where more productive dialogue can take place.
Convey more positive images of the other community.
It is difficult to share a small geographical area with someone you
don’t like, respect, or consider as your equal, and it is especially
difficult if the other is considered your enemy. Both Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots tend to paint a negative image of each other.
The general Turkish-Cypriot description of Greek Cypriots is
especially harsh, often portraying the Greek Cypriots as suppressors
and murderers. Although there is acknowledgment of the ‘good
Greek Cypriots,' the all-too-common image is one of extremists
intent on exterminating the Turkish Cypriots.
At first glance it might seem that the Greek Cypriots are less
negative in their portrayals of the Turkish Cypriots, especially given
the often-heard references to the kindness of Turkish-Cypriot
neighbours and their affection for certain individuals. However, it
becomes clear upon closer examination that the Turkish Cypriots are
not viewed with respect or equality. Such images of the other do not
make it easy to enter into productive negotiations about issues that
divide communities.
Through participation in structured bi-communal discussion
groups, it is possible to encounter members of the other community
as fellow human beings rather than as objects of hatred or contempt.
Turkish Cypriots might learn that their neighbours on the other side
of the Buffer Zone are usually well-intentioned, even though they
make mistakes. Greek Cypriots might come to accept Turkish
Cypriots as equals – intellectually, socially, and culturally. Both sides
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can do away with the extreme images that have been promoted in
their media and educational system, adopting a more realistic picture
of the other community. Hopefully, they will realize that a wide
variety of views and intentions exist in both communities, and that
the stereotypes and prejudices that have dominated thinking about
the other are both counterproductive and dangerous.
Create Shared Empathy.
Empathy, we are told, is something that helps us understand others.
We have been taught to ‘empathize with' the situation of friends
going through difficult times or who face a tough road ahead. We
learn that we should ‘put ourselves in his/her place' in order to
understand how the other feels. Certainly these are laudable actions,
and they can promote positive human relationships. However, in a
conflict such as the one in Cyprus, these acts rarely happen. One
might argue that empathy is impossible in this case. How do you
‘empathize' with people who have caused you so much pain and
suffering? How is it possible to ‘put yourself in the other’s place' if
you have no contact with them? Clearly, a situation such as Cyprus
demands more than our simplistic notions of empathy can provide.
But is it an irrelevant concept?
Fortunately, there is another way to view empathy
1
. Instead of
treating it as something one has for another or does to another, it can
be considered something that individuals create together. In this way,
the focus shifts from the individual to the relationship. The question
is no longer one of seeing the world through another’s eyes. Rather,
the task is one of creating mutual understanding, which is usually
something different than either party holds alone. In this way, my
own truth is not threatened, and although I might change the way I
see things, we make efforts to construct a truth that we both can
share. Such an outcome forms the basis for a solid working
relationship. There is no magic way to create shared empathy, but
steps like those outlined in the following sections can go a long way
toward this goal.
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WORKING TOGETHER PRODUCTIVELY
The natural tendency in protracted conflict situations is to protect
one’s hard-earned rights, to keep the other away, to prevent encroach-
ment on one’s territory, or to push for access to what is ‘rightfully'
yours. Demands and denials rule the day, and tension remains high.
Although the two parties in a conflict may have ended their former
partnership, such behaviours are counterproductive, and they need
to find a way to deal with matters that concern the two of them. This
means establishing a new partnership, based on new principles.
Moving from prolonged conflict toward a workable
relationship is not easy, and it requires both sides to work together
on many tasks. It is necessary for everyone to start thinking
seriously about how they will coexist, how they will share what
cannot be divided, and how they will work together to take care of
tasks that must be co-administered. Many attempts will fail, but
there must be a continual effort to move forward. The following
suggestions won’t guarantee success, but they will facilitate the
process of working together:
Recognize the complexity of the situation.
Conflicts are never simple, yet they almost always get framed in
‘either-or,' ‘us-them,' or ‘right-wrong' terms. ‘Our side' is justified in
its actions and the other side is obstructing progress. The impulse is
to rally around a single cause and to portray the other as a uniform
evil. Under such conditions, common interests cannot be discovered,
and joint actions will never be taken. On the other hand, if each side
can begin to see the other in differentiated terms, and if both of them
can identify the multiplicity of factors that complicate the situation,
they will be able to confront the conflict in much more realistic and
practical terms.
Focus on the future.
In protracted conflicts, there is a tendency to become locked in the
past, blocking the ability of groups to envision a future they could
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share. Entombed in a poisoned past, parties are unable to get beyond
a period that no longer exists. Although the past can never be
ignored, and even though it may be painful to discuss and difficult to
acknowledge, it is counterproductive to dwell exclusively on the past.
Life takes place in the future, and until the parties are willing to
discuss what lies ahead, they will never be able to go there creatively.
Once they direct their thinking toward how their relationship will
look when they are no longer in conflict, former opponents will be
able to redefine themselves and the way in which they will work
together under new arrangements.
In the bi-communal groups, individuals from both communities
have met together consistently over a period of several years, engaged
in productive dialogue on difficult issues, and produced analyses,
projects, and plans that have the backing of the full group. These
groups have experienced difficulties, at times falling into the trap of
mistrust that characterizes the larger society, but they’ve managed to
work through their differences and tear down some of the walls that
separated them across community lines. Their work clearly
demonstrates that, if the proper setting is created and if individuals
adopt a constructive attitude, it is possible to replace the cycle of blame
and accusation with one of mutual trust and understanding. Nothing
could be more critical for the future of Cyprus.
Show a willingness to make positive moves.
Often progress in conflicts is stalled not so much because of what one
party or the other says or does as it is by what they fail to say or do.
Although both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots sometimes use
the rhetoric of cooperation, neither has a habit of offering
suggestions that might help defuse the tension. Each side has been
afraid of taking the first step toward building confidence. However,
no deadlock can be broken until one side or the other makes the first
conciliatory gesture. Parties in conflict often remain in a stalemate
because each is waiting for the other to make the first positive move.
Sometimes both sides are afraid that if they take the first step, the
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other will take advantage of them. If each side maintains a hard-line
stance, it offers no way for the other to take positive steps that might
relax the situation and lead to a positive climate for negotiation.
The future can never be certain, and the consequences of
one’s actions are never predetermined, but unless one or both parties
are able to take steps that offer something useful to the other, both
will remain mired in a quicksand that continues to pull them
downward. Taking risks can lead to unintended consequences, and
sometimes can even be dangerous, but if either or both sides are
willing to ‘step out on a limb,' they break the deadlock and encourage
other beneficial moves.
Once participants have lost some of their fear of the other, it
becomes much easier for them to promote actions that send positive
messages to the other community. Members of bi-communal groups
are in an excellent position to see the effects of their side’s hard-line
policies on the other community and how these play into the hands
of the extremists. It becomes clear how certain policies and actions
can be damaging for accomplishing the very goals they are intended
to advance. It is important to realize that strength comes from a
willingness to reach out towards the other as much as it does from
attempts to push the other away. When someone offers a move
toward peace, it opens a small window to the future, through which
the other might follow.
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1
See Broome (1993) for a description of what I refer to as “relational empathy,” a
concept that was developed for application in intercultural contexts and conflict situations.
This concept under girds most of the work in which I am engaged as third-party facilitator.
I’m afraid that all these groups that meet with Turkish Cypriots simply divert
attention from the real problem for our future, which is the Turkish
occupation of our country. What difference can bi-communal activities make
in the face of 40,000 Turkish troops?
Greek-Cypriot official
The only future for Cyprus is a divided one, and nothing positive can result
from these meetings with the Greeks. If we are not careful, we will lose all the
gains we have made in the past 25 years, and the sacrifices we have made
will be for nothing.
Turkish-Cypriot official
It is not likely that even the most dedicated and committed of
the original core group of bi-communal participants could have
articulated fully the potential benefits of their work. They simply
knew it was the ‘right thing to do,' or they felt strongly compelled to
do something in the face of continued stagnation at the political level.
By looking back, however, it is possible to see numerous ways in
which their actions have contributed positively to the situation in
Cyprus. Whether you are participating actively in organized bi-
8. SHAPING THE FUTURE
communal meetings, working on a technical committee that involved
members of both communities, or simply coming into casual contact
with the other side, it can help to have these contributions in mind.
Such awareness will allow you to go forward with the knowledge that
in addition to the personal learning that comes from working together
with the other side, you are helping to build the future of Cyprus.
The tangible results from bi-communal activities are difficult to
measure. Because of the constraints imposed by the political situation,
bi-communal activities have not led to large-scale joint business
ventures, integrated schools, island-wide projects, exchange programs
for professionals, or joint media stations, all of which are projects that
could help build a stronger future for a bi-communal partnership at
the state level. Nevertheless, there are three specific ways in which the
bi-communal activities have had a direct and visible impact.
First, until April 2003, they provided the only real corridor
through the physical barrier of the Buffer Zone. Without the bi-
communal activities, practically no contact would have occurred
across community lines over a thirty-year period. Second, the
existence of so many bi-communal groups and their unceasing
demand for more contact, along with international support for their
efforts, had an influence on the decision taken by the Turkish-
Cypriot authorities to partially lift restrictions to travel across the
Buffer Zone in 2003. Although there were many political factors that
led to this new policy, the growing presence of a strong opposition
(many of whom had been actively involved in bi-communal activities)
that favoured an increase in contacts undoubtedly played a role in
the thinking of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Third, a close
examination of the U.N.'s Annan Plan for negotiating a political
settlement shows that it includes several ideas initially developed in
the bi-communal seminars and workshops. Several of the U.N.
personnel who played a role in writing the Annan Plan had attended
one or more of these workshops, and they had read reports from
other bi-communal groups, so it is only natural that these ideas
would find their way into the Plan.
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Beyond their more visible impacts on the resolution of the
conflict, the bi-communal activities and cross-community contacts
have contributed, or have the potential to contribute, in ways that are
not so easily quantified. Some of these ‘hidden' impacts are personal
and psychological, others are social and cultural, and a few may not
be realized until well into the future. The remainder of this section
will list and describe these less tangible impacts of reaching across the
Green Line in Cyprus.
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT
Understanding the fears, hopes, and concerns of the other community.
By preventing contact between ordinary Cypriots, the physical
barrier of the Buffer Zone created an even more damaging
psychological barrier between the two sides. Relations between the
two communities have deteriorated since 1955, with the start of the
EOKA campaign for ‘enosis’ and the corresponding establishment of
TMT. There is no guarantee that relations would have improved
had the society remained integrated, but it is very clear that the two
communities have grown further apart since the dividing lines were
established in 1963 and 1974. Even during the worst of times prior
to 1974, there were a few people who maintained strong ties between
the two communities. As long as these examples of partnership
existed, there was hope that better overall relations could develop.
However, without any contact the fears, hopes, and concerns of each
community would have been completely lost to the other side. The
bi-communal activities provided a means to keep alive some under-
standing of the other community, opening for a small group of
people a window into the world of the other. Without this insight, it
is not possible to make informed choices about the future, even if that
future is living on a divided island.
Reducing the psychological burden from past events. Memories of
episodes that took place between 1955-1974 dominate the minds of
many people in Cyprus. Those who lost family members, had to
leave their homes and means of livelihood, witnessed massacres,
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bombings, rapes, and other acts of violence, or lived as refugees
cannot easily lay aside mental images of these horrors. Even the
younger generation, who did not directly experience such incidents,
are confronted with them on a daily basis through stories from their
parents, lessons in school, and constant renditions in the newspapers,
radio programs and television specials. The psychological burden
imposed by images of the past weighs heavily on the minds of all
Cypriots, creating a pathology that permeates society. The weight
does not lessen with time, although it may take a different form. The
separation in Cyprus magnifies the effects of this burden, and the bi-
communal activities provide one of the few means to find relief. The
pain cannot be erased, but it can be dealt with in a healthier manner
by meeting individuals from the other community as fellow human
beings and residents of the same island, by exchanging stories of the
past and hopes for the future, and by working together in building
that future.
Creating a forum in which difficult issues can be discussed
productively. There is no shortage of discussions about political topics
in Cyprus, but most of them tend to polarise the issues rather than
help to resolve them. When politicians, educators, journalists, church
leaders, and taxi-drivers present their views on the core issues, their
rhetoric is often positional posturing that elicits even stronger
statements from the other side. Issues such as identity concerns,
property matters, security, territory adjustment, and the like cannot
be discussed in a realistic manner outside a bi-communal setting.
Chances are small that any progress can be made in the general
public’s understanding of these issues unless people have the chance
to hear individuals from both sides, talking with each other, rather
than at each other. The bi-communal seminars that addressed these
issues have shown that productive dialogue can occur on these topics,
and these need to be conducted in even greater quantity now that
contacts are easier. Through these forums, it is possible that progress
can occur in identifying a set of options for dealing with most
concerns that drive the Cyprus problem.
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Providing a moderating voice in response to provocative events. When
the Buffer Zone events at Dherynia took place in August 1996, in
which Greek-Cypriot motorcyclists entered the Buffer Zone
threatening to ‘ride to Kyrenia,’ and resulting in the death of two
Greek-Cypriot protestors, the outcry in both communities was intense.
Turkish Cypriots were incensed that Greek Cypriots had tried to cross
over into the area they control, and they used this incident to back up
their argument that unless the Turkish troops had stopped them, the
Greek Cypriots would have once again massacred Turkish Cypriots.
The Greek Cypriots were shocked at the beating of a Greek-Cypriot
protestor caught in the barbed wire and the killing of another who
tried to take down the Turkish flag, and they used these events to
reinforce their argument about the ‘barbaric’ nature of the Turks. The
rhetoric on both sides was extreme and uncompromising. No one
stopped to analyse what had led to these events, and neither side
shouldered any of the responsibility they held for bringing them
about. Perhaps the only setting where reasoned discussion occurred
about these provocative events was among those who had been
involved in the bi-communal activities. Within this community, there
were attempts to understand why the events had spiralled out of
control, how they might be perceived by the other community, how
the one-sided rhetoric was hurting the cause of each side as well as the
image of Cyprus to the outside world, and what might be done to
prevent such events in the future. These discussions could not take
place in a bi-communal setting at that time, but the individuals and
groups with bi-communal experience met together, and they provided
a moderating voice in response to an otherwise extreme and narrow
discussion of blame and accusations. Their voice was not one that
received major coverage in the press, but it helped in a small way to
pull Cyprus back from a deadly course toward possible war. It is likely
that other provocative episodes will occur in Cyprus, and the need for
people with bi-communal experience who can think and speak more
moderately in response to these events will be critical in order to
prevent a negative spiral of violence from developing.
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Presenting the general population with an alternative to fear of
another war. Confrontations in Cyprus such as those at Dherynia in
August 1996, and conflict between Greece and Turkey such as those
over the island of Imia earlier that same year, could have easily
escalated into full-scale military clashes that would have brought
disaster to the people of Cyprus. The possibility of another war is a
common topic of conversation for the people of Cyprus, and the
anxiety associated with such scenarios permeates everyday life.
People on both sides are concerned about how such a war will affect
their children and the future of Cyprus. At times, this concern
becomes pathological, disrupting many people’s lives and standing in
the way of progress. There may be no way to completely calm these
fears, especially in the absence of an implemented political solution,
but those involved in the bi-communal activities were able to obtain
a certain amount of relief from the overbearing anxiety through the
human connections they made with the ‘enemy.’ Although their fear
of war was not necessarily lessened, a certain balance was achieved
for many of the participants by seeing the very real possibility for
peaceful co-existence. In addition, the larger population of Cyprus
was presented with an alternative future to consider. The fact that
large numbers of people were meeting and working together across
community lines provided some hope that the coming years might
bring something other than another war.
Providing signs of hope to the international community. The lack of
progress in negotiations in Cyprus over the years left many members
of the international community disheartened and discouraged. As
dozens of special delegations, special envoys, fact-finding trips, ‘final
push’ efforts, shuttle talks, proximity talks, secluded negotiations,
and other attempts to bring the leaders of the two communities
toward a settlement proved fruitless, most third-party negotiators
and diplomatic personnel developed a sense of hopelessness about
the possibility of reaching a viable agreement. The bi-communal
activities provided for them a breath of fresh air amidst the
unchanging rhetoric of the officials and the lack of movement with
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the negotiations. The events that took place at Ledra Palace
presented a different side of Cypriots, painting a picture of people
who can engage in reasoned dialogue about both the past and the
future and who can work together productively. A glimmer of hope
emerged that provided a reason for the diplomatic community to
continue their efforts. After all, diplomats are human beings as well,
and there are few people who can remain optimistic in the face of
continued deadlock. The participants in the bi-communal activities
have demonstrated over and over that in a properly designed setting,
the two communities can learn to trust one another and work
together for a common future.
Breaking the cycle of mutual blame and accusations. In order to
make progress, the cycle of mutual blame and accusations (see earlier
discussion) must be broken. Perhaps the only place where this cycle
has been broken is in the ongoing bi-communal groups. In this
setting, individuals from both communities have met together
consistently over a period of several years, engaged in productive
dialogue on difficult issues, and produced analyses, projects, and
plans that have the backing of the full group. These groups have
experienced difficulties, at times falling into the trap of mistrust that
characterises the larger society, but they’ve managed to work
through their differences to tear down some of the walls that
separated them across community lines. Their work demonstrates
that, if the proper setting is created and if individuals adopt a
constructive attitude, it is possible to replace the cycle of blame and
accusation with one of mutual trust and understanding. Nothing
could be more critical for the future of Cyprus.
PREPARING FOR LIFE AFTER A SETTLEMENT
Despite the way it often looks, to both Cypriots and outsiders, the day
will come when the two sides will reach a settlement of the conflict.
After so many years – literally generations – it will be not only a cause
to celebrate but also a reason for peace-builders to work harder. In
fact, the role of the bi-communal activities will be even more critical,
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because contact will be easier, joint projects will be common, and
cooperation will be required. In many ways, the inter-communal
contacts have not focused so much on bringing about a settlement as
they have been on preparing people for life after the settlement.
When and if a ‘solution' to the Cyprus problem arrives, those
with experience in cross-community contact will play a crucial role in
the following:
‘Selling' a political agreement. Given the disparity in the positions
of each party in the Cyprus conflict, it is obvious that many
compromises will have to be made in order to reach a settlement.
Some of these compromises will have to come in areas that the
leadership has long promised are ‘non-negotiable.' The biggest fear
of many Cypriot and international strategists is that when the leaders
manage to work out an agreement, they will have great difficulty
‘selling' it to the people in their respective communities. The extreme
nationalists on both sides will call the deal a ‘sellout' to the other side
and accuse their leaders of ‘giving in' on fundamental issues. When
this time comes, there will need to be voices that can help assure
people of the need for compromise. The individuals in the bi-
communal activities are among the few people in Cyprus who have
experience in building consensus with the other side, and they may
be the only ones to understand the need for compromise and
accommodation. If the voice of the extremists is the only one heard
in response to a negotiated agreement, then the chances are slim that
it can receive the support of the people.
Forming partnerships. When an agreement between the two
communities is eventually signed and accepted by the people of
Cyprus, opportunities will exist finally for business and institutional
partnerships to be formed. The success of these partnerships will be
critical for the full implementation of the agreement. Some cooper-
ation in the business sector will be driven by perceived potential for
profit. However, most of the efforts to develop relationships across
community lines will require determined initiative by individuals
who understand their importance, who are aware of the potential
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difficulties, and who are committed to their success. These initiatives
will be difficult for ordinary citizens to carry out. Some might want to
start a project with the other community but never carry through
with their ideas, because of doubts about the possibility for results,
fear of negative response from their colleagues, or uncertainty about
how to proceed. Some who start such cooperative ventures will give
up after encountering initial difficulties. A few will encounter
conflicts they will not know how to manage, and these conflicts could
escalate. The participants in the bi-communal activities, especially
those who are part of the ‘core' group with significant experience
over the years, are ideally situated to promote true partnerships on
the island. They have the necessary contacts with the other
community; they know the topics that need to be addressed through
such cooperative ventures; they already have in mind hundreds of
potential projects; they are motivated to start such projects; they are
sensitive to the concerns of the other community; they are aware of
what might cause conflict; they possess skills for dealing with conflict
and disagreement; they have the tools for problem-solving and
design; they see the potential for impact on the larger society; and,
perhaps most importantly, they are committed to making such
ventures work.
Promoting the identity of peace-builder. The people of Cyprus,
after decades of separation, are at a crossroads. The generation that
planted the seeds of discord has never managed to take the steps that
can lead toward positive redefinition of the relationship. As a result,
progress is frozen, and the future is on hold. During the past few
years, the citizen-level peace-building groups that have been formed
hold promise for the future. The large number of people in both
communities who have started reaching out to the other side in an
effort to develop trust can lead to true partnerships. In their
meetings, they have taken many of the steps outlined above, and for
these individuals and groups, a new identity of ‘peace-builder' is
emerging. This identity, which is more positive, more realistic about
the past, more forward-looking, and more aware of the
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interdependence between communities, is helping to build trust and
heal wounds. Still, the challenges are many, and time is running out.
Hopefully, it will be possible soon to describe the identity of ‘peace-
builder' in more specific terms, and if sufficient numbers in each
community can reconcile their differences and redefine their
collective relationship, the people of Cyprus will be on their way to
negotiating an agreement that will allow them to lead productive
lives, both separately and in cooperation with one another in those
areas where their interdependence binds them together.
SOME WORDS OF ADVICE FROM THE VETERANS
It is always helpful to learn from those who have gone before.
Sometimes, advice from ‘veterans' of bi-communal activities can
help us avoid mistakes that were made in the past, and words of
encouragement from those who have faced difficulties can help
maintain our own desire to continue our involvement, even when
times are rough. During the four-party seminar held in July 2001
in Bruges, Belgium, participants, representing some of the
‘pioneers' of rapprochement work in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus,
were asked to give their advice to those currently involved in bi-
communal and bi-national activities. The following list summarizes,
in brief form, the recommendations offered by members of the
Bruges group:
Understand that there are fundamental changes taking place
in the region. Greece and Turkey can no longer afford to maintain
an antagonistic relationship. The accession of Cyprus to the
European Union, and the candidacy of Turkey for membership in
the EU, have established a trajectory toward peace within the
‘conflictual triangle.'
It is important to recognize that rapprochement is irreversible.
The leaders of Greece and Turkey are committed to better relations,
and even if the governments change, there is little chance that the
process will reverse.
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Do everything you can to bring to the respective authorities
what we have been doing in our work. Remember that those in
elected offices work off the information that is available to them,
and currently they have many misunderstandings about the value
of bi-communal work in Cyprus. They need to be properly educated.
Intensify the coordination of civil initiatives with official
initiatives and help officials learn from our experience. Although the
‘real work' of peace must take place at the citizen level, it is the
authorities who will set the terms for peace and who will sign
agreements that we will all have to live by. Make contact with those
in power and nurture the relationship between citizen groups and
government officials.
Never forget that rapprochement is for civil society to sustain
(not for persons of power). Don’t personalize it by linking it with a
single personality in office. These individuals, no matter how
visionary they may be, cannot carry forward initiatives, and no
matter who holds positions of power, the push for better relations
must be centred on the citizens and citizen groups that are involved
in cross-community activities.
Try to get away from fixed ideas and make an effort to see the
other’s point of view. We are all steeped in our biased histories, but
until we listen to the other and find a way to really get behind their
thinking, we can’t make much progress.
Refrain from responding to points made that do not need or
deserve an answer. In our culture, we tend to speak against
everything we hear, and we feel a need to ‘correct' everyone who says
something we disagree with. This allows others to set the agenda. By
ignoring the person who says stupid things, we can move the
discussion toward more positive dialogue.
Find the wording that satisfies the need. Sometimes we limit
ourselves by using terms that cause a negative reaction with others. If
the term you want to use causes difficulties, then change it. Let your
efforts be defined by what you do rather than what you call things.
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Report facts and not doctrines. Too often we present the
propaganda we have heard as truths, when they are usually
distortions of what actually happened, designed to support a certain
point of view.
Remember that by engaging in activities related to
rapprochement you are performing the most patriotic moves that
you can make. Nothing takes more courage and bravery, and
nothing contributes more to the future of our country, than steps
toward building sustainable peace.
Remember that obtaining funding takes time and effort. No
one is going to seek you out and ask what you want. There are many
sources of funding for worthy efforts, and part of your time must be
devoted to making contacts with these individuals and organizations.
It is very useful to remember that life works in cycles:
rapprochement will go through its ups and downs. There will be
difficult times when it seems no progress is being made. There will
be setbacks. However, we must keep working even during difficult
times, and we must never lose our hope.
CONCLUSION
Until humans started building bridges to cross rivers, canyons, and
other obstacles provided by Mother Nature, travel was more
restricted and groups tended to keep within the territory that
defined their ‘homeland.' There was not as much exchange of goods
and services, in large part because it involved too much effort and
took too much time to make such ventures worthwhile. Bridges
literally changed the course of human history, because they opened
up channels of communication, allowing the free flow, not only of
material commodities and wares, but also of ideas and culture. They
also promoted the formation of alliances, so that small communities
could pool resources to enrich their lives and could band together to
protect themselves against invading armies.
Bridges are given great emphasis in times of war, when much
effort is devoted to destroying bridges used by the enemy, to stop the
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advance of their armies. Consequently, after the war, bridges have to
be rebuilt in order for life to continue productively. Sometimes these
bridges are rebuilt hastily in order to start traffic moving as soon as
possible, but when the resources are available, there is no doubt that
it is better to replace the destroyed bridge with one that will stand
strong over time and that will serve its purposes well.
The events of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s destroyed the
bridges in Cyprus between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
These events also changed the social landscape. The Green Line
became the deep canyon without a way across. It is time to build new
bridges, and by becoming involved in constructive cross-community
contact, you become the architects, engineers, and labourers
engaged in this task. The design is not a simple one, and the
challenges confronting the builders are numerous. It will require a
lot of time and effort. But the result will establish new connections
between two communities that are interdependent and that need to
find ways to build empathy and work together productively.
107
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Anastasiou, H. (2000). Negotiating the solution to the Cyprus
problem: From impasse to post-Helsinki hope, The Cyprus Review,
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politics. Edinburgh, UK: Q Press.
Bolukbasi, Suha. (1998). The Cyprus dispute and the United
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Broome, B. J. (2004a). Reaching across the dividing line:
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Broome, B. J. and Murray, J. S. (2002). Improving third-party
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Broome, B. J. (2001). Participatory planning and design in a
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Broome, B. J. (1999a). Greek and Turkish Cypriot university
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Broome, B. J. (1998). Overview of conflict resolution activities
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Broome, B. J. (1997). Designing a collective approach to
peace: Interactive design and problem-solving workshops with
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Cyprus.
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Broome, B. J. (1993). Managing differences in conflict
resolution. In D. J. Sandole and H. van der Merwe (Eds.), Conflict
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, pp. 95-111.
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Broome, B. J., & Chen, M. (1992). Guidelines for computer-
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112
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
REGIONAL PEACE BUILDING
Cyprus Fulbright Commission
http://www.fulbright.org.cy/
European Commission
http://www.ec-eu-delegation.com.cy/
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
http://www.eliamep.gr
Peace-Cyprus Web Site
http://www.peace-cyprus.org/
Technology for Peace (TFP)
http://www.tech4peace.org/
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TSEV)
http://www.tesev.org.tr
The Bi-communal Development Programme:
http://www.unopspmu.org/
U.S. Embassy
http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/bsp.htm
RESOURCES
ON THE WEB
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING
Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives
http://www.c-r.org/accord/index.shtml
Beyond Intractability: Online Knowledge Base
http://www.beyondintractability.org/iweb/index.htm
Carter Center
http://www.cartercenter.org
Conflict Management Group (CMG)
http://www.cmgroup.org/
Conflict Research Consortium
http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/
Conflict Resolution Catalysts Home Page
http://www.crcvt.org/
George Mason University Degree Program in Conflict Resolution
http://web.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR/
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD)
http://www.imtd.org/
International Association for Conflict Management
http://www.iacm-conflict.org/
United States Institute of Peace
http://www.usip.org
Seeds of Peace
http://www.seedsofpeace.org
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
Intercultural Relations
http://www.interculturalrelations.com
This is a free online interdisciplinary resource designed for people
around the world who study, teach, train, or research in intercultural
communication, cross-cultural psychology, cultural anthropology,
multicultural education, race/ethnic relations (sociology), multicultural
114
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
literature, sociolinguistics, TESOL, international business and other
related disciplines.
Intercultural Communication Institute
http://www.intercultural.org
ICI offers resources, including a Master’s degree program, for cross-
cultural, multicultural, international, and diversity training and
education.
Intercultural Press Home Page
http://interculturalpress.com/shop/index.html
This is a source for books, videos, simulations and other publications
that are used in intercultural communication training.
Intercultural Communication Loop
http://www.webring.org/cgi-bin/webring?ring=intercultural;list
This web ring is a linked list of sites related to the study of
intercultural communication, aimed at educating about diverse
cultures and promoting peace and tolerance of differences based on
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, beliefs, or
abilities.
Teaching Tolerance
http://www.tolerance.org
Part of the Southern Poverty Law Center, this site includes ‘10 ways
to fight hate,' ‘explore your hidden biases,' ‘deconstruct biased
language,' and ‘explore hidden history' (including ‘quizzes' to
measure your awareness and unconscious biases).
115
REFERENCES
Benjamin J. Broome is professor at Arizona State University. He
teaches courses in intercultural communication, group
facilitation, and conflict resolution. He regularly gives
presentations at international conferences, and his publications
have appeared in leading academic journals. In his research and
application projects he has worked with groups in Mexico,
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, several countries in Europe, and with a
number of Native American Tribes in the United States. From
1994-1996 he held a position as Senior Fulbright Scholar in
Cyprus, offering seminars, workshops, and training in commu-
nication, inter-group relations, and conflict resolution. Since
returning to his faculty position in the United States, he has
travelled to the eastern Mediterranean numerous times to
organize and facilitate workshops and seminars dealing with
Cyprus and Greek-Turkish rapprochement.
Professor Broome has devoted his academic career to the
development and application of culturally appropriate processes
for building consensus in complex problem situations. His goal is
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
REFERENCES
to assist groups in understanding and resolving difficult issues
that confront them. He believes that in diversity there is strength,
in conflict there is opportunity, and in constructive dialogue there
is hope for building a viable future for all human beings.
118
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
A
anxiety............................................................................31, 80, 88, 100
attitudes .................................................................2, 7, 49, 50, 93, 101
B
barriers ................................................7, 18, 20, 45, 49, 65, 85, 96, 97
Bi-communal Development Programme......................i, ii, 32, 35, 37
bi-communal
activities ...............ii, v, vi, vii, 2, 6, 8, 14, 15, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32,
35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 87, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 102, 103, 104
contacts .....................................7, 12, 13, 18, 22, 34, 41, 43, 47, 48, 50
events .......................................................................6, 12, 36, 41, 43, 50
groups ............ix, 3, 7, 8, 12, 14, 19, 27, 28, 34, 35, 37, 47, 48, 60, 66,
93, 94, 96, 101
meetings .....................................................14, 25, 37, 40, 41, 47, 61, 86
organizations...................................................................................35, 36
buffer zone..........................................................................................19
INDEX
C
climate..................................................................61, 83, 88, 89, 90, 94
communication ..................vi, vii, viii, 6, 7, 11, 14, 17, 23, 32, 33, 34,
37, 75, 80, 81, 82
complexity ..............................................................................85, 87, 92
conflict resolution ....................v, 7, 12, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 44, 81, 82
contact ...................v, vi, vii, viii, ix, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 52, 58, 62, 83,
91, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107
cooperation............................v, vi, vii, ix, 18, 33, 61, 65, 93, 102, 104
culture/cultural........... v, 6, 17, 28, 37, 45, 48, 61, 67, 68, 70, 71, 75,
76, 78, 80, 89, 97, 105
Cyprus conflict................viii, 2, 4, 7, 8, 30, 37, 41, 65, 72, 73, 76, 77,
79, 80, 84, 102
D
dialogue............8, 15, 22, 23, 67, 74, 82, 88, 89, 90, 93, 98, 101, 105
diversity ..........................................................................................6, 66
division................v, viii, 2, 4, 5, 13, 15, 18, 48, 55, 63, 73, 77, 78, 79,
83, 95, 97
E
empathy .......................................................................3, 60, 62, 91, 94
European Union ............vi, 16, 18, 21, 22, 28, 30, 33, 35, 41, 43, 48,
55, 57, 58, 77, 79, 104
F
frustration..........................................................3, 7, 13, 41, 50, 53, 69
Fulbright Commission.....................................................19, 24, 27, 36
Fulbright Scholar ..................................................ii, 27, 28, 35, 36, 37
G
Green Line...............ii, v, vii, viii, ix, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 35,
40, 41, 50, 52, 62, 64, 97
120
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
I
identity ..........7, 22, 28, 29, 54, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 79,
80, 82, 83, 85, 87, 98, 103, 104
interdependence..................................................................77, 79, 104
L
Ledra Palace.................11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 32, 36, 39, 40, 49, 101
listen/listening..............................................45, 81, 83, 87, 89, 90, 105
M
media.............vi, 22, 39, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 79, 91, 96
misunderstanding..................................................................6, 76, 105
O
obstacles.........................................7, 26, 40, 41, 43, 47, 49, 50, 65, 83
P
pain...........................11, 22, 25, 30, 55, 65, 69, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 98
partnership .......................................49, 50, 55, 62, 78, 80, 92, 96, 97
peace...............vii, ix, 5, 18, 25, 28, 30, 37, 41, 43, 45, 58, 63, 65, 67,
73, 74, 83, 94, 104, 105
peacebuilding .....................................................................................41
perceptions.................7, 20, 25, 28, 30, 52, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 79
R
rapprochement .............................ii, vii, 2, 7, 31, 34, 45, 65, 104, 105
responsibility .............................................3, 27, 54, 78, 84, 85, 87, 99
S
suffering ......................................11, 25, 30, 53, 65, 72, 73, 85, 87, 91
T
threat....................................................................40, 69, 82, 85, 89, 99
training................6, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37,
81, 89
121
INDEX
trust.....................23, 62, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 88, 93, 101, 103, 104
mistrust...............................................................................6, 12, 93, 101
U
UNFICYP...........................................................................................20
United Nations ..................i, vi, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 27, 30, 36, 37, 46,
57, 96
UNOPS..................................................................................i, ii, 32, 37
V
variety.....................................................................6, 12, 56, 60, 66, 91
vision.......................................................................................26, 29, 58
Y
youth..............................................v, 17, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 37, 65
122
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE
PREFACE
A GUIDE TO INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN CYPRUS
Benjamin J Broome
Cyprus Fulbright Scholar
THE GREEN LINE
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS
PREFACE
BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE GREEN LINE Benjamin J Broome
"Building Bridges Across the Green Line draws from many years of contact and cooperation between
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, who often came together under difficult conditions and
overcame many obstacles to their work. The book summarizes the wisdom of the pioneers in bi-
communal activities, and it will be a valuable guide for those who take the simple human step of
communicating with their neighbors on 'the other side' of the buffer zone. It is gratifying to note that
the author used as part of the title of his book the phrase: "Building Bridges" because back in 1978,
when we started our co-operation, we were on record saying in a UNDP publication, that we are
"building bridges" and that "it may take us half way along the path". We've come to know Benjamin
Broome through a number of ground-breaking workshops he facilitated over the past decade, and
this book reflects both his keen understanding of the two communities in Cyprus and his commitment
to building links between people separated by conflict."
Lellos Demitriades and Mustafa Akinci
Former Mayors of Nicosia
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