SELECTED WORKS OF
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN
ELEVENTH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SELECTED WORKS OF
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN
ELEVENTH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1 OCTOBER 1985–30 SEPTEMBER 1989
Joint History Ofce
Ofce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC ♦ 2013
v
FORWARD
This volume is published under the auspices of the Joint History Ofce, Ofce of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It presents material drawn from the public record
of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., US Navy, while serving as the Eleventh Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1 October 1985 through 30 September 1989.
The text arrays in chronological order selections of his congressional testimony, pub-
lished articles, public and ofcial correspondence, public appearances, and interviews
to illuminate a decisive period in the Nation’s history which saw the continuing buildup
of US Armed Forces and those of our alliances; tumult in the Philippines and Central
America; confrontation in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf; and the denoue-
ment with the Soviet Union in the Glasnost period.
These pages portray Admiral Crowe’s unceasing efforts to rebuild America’s Armed
Forces and his devotion to the men and women of her military. Of particular note are his
success in reorganizing the Joint Chiefs in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act;
his work to establish Unied and Specied Commands in support of the Unied Com-
mand Plan, to include Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Central Command
(CENTCOM); and his acumen as principal military adviser to the National Command
Authorities under two Presidents and three Secretaries of Defense in operations in the
Pacic, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf. Arguably one of his greatest successes, and
one for which he was most proud, was opening relationships with the military leaders
of the Soviet Union.
Selection of the volume’s content was the responsibility of Major General Julian (JB)
Burns, USA (Ret.), who served for a time on the Admiral’s personal staff. Brigadier Gen-
eral John L. Shortal, USA (Ret.), the Director for Joint History, reviewed the manuscript
and Ms. Penny Norman prepared it for publication.
This volume is an ofcial publication of the Ofce of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, but inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs, its contents
do not represent the ofcial position of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Julian (JB) Burns John F. Shortal
Major General, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)
Director for Joint History
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Crowe, William J., 1925-2007, author.
[Works. Selections]
Selected works of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN : eleventh chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 1985-30 September 1989 / compiled and edited by MG Julian
(JB) Burns, USA (Ret.).
pages cm
1. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff--Archives. 2. United States--Armed Forces--Histo-
ry--20th century--Sources. 3. United States--History, Military--20th century--Sources.
4. United States--Military policy--Sources. I. Burns, Julian, 1947- editor of compilation.
II. United States. Ofce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint History Ofce,
issuing body. III. Title.
UA23.7.C76 2013
355.00973’09048--dc23
2013023633
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Compiled and edited by
MG Julian (JB) Burns, USA, Retired
With much valuable assistance from
Admiral Carlisle Trost, CNO, Retired
The Honorable Jim Locher, Former OSD SOLIC
The Honorable Frank Miller
RADM Joe Strasser, USN, Retired
RADM John Bitoff, USN, Retired
Susan Lemke, Special Collections Librarian, NDU
Mark Patrick, Administration, OCJCS
MG Robert Williams, USA, Retired, Commandant US Army War College
Michael Waesche, Program Manager, National Archives, Suitland, MD
BG John Shortal, USA, Retired, Director of Joint History, OCJCS
Penny Norman, Editor, Joint History Ofce, OCJCS
With particular thanks to
Mr. Bob Murphy and Mr. Frank Pope, BAE Systems, INC
Linda Ramsey, Security Manager, BAE Systems, INC
Mr. Greg Sharp, The Spectrum Group
Lucy Haynes, TRURO Angelican Parish
With Special thanks to
Brigadier General Blake Crowe, USMC; Bambi Crowe Coval; and the entire Crowe
Family
and
Ruth Ann Schumacher Burns, for use of the Dining Room Table
ix
BIOGRAPHY
Admiral William James Crowe, Jr., was appointed the eleventh Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, by President Ronald Reagan on 1 October 1985.
He was reappointed to a second two-year term in 1987. In this capacity, he served as the
principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National
Security Command. Admiral Crowe served as Commander in Chief, US Pacic Com-
mand, prior to appointment as Chairman.
Born on 2 January 1925, in La Grange, Kentucky, Admiral Crowe moved to Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, at the age of ve and grew up there. He attended Classen High School
and then the University of Oklahoma for one year. He completed a war-accelerated course
of study and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1946 with the Class
of 1947. His further academic achievements include a Master of Arts in education from
Stanford University and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton.
His initial sea tour was aboard the USS Carmick (DMS-33), followed in June 1948
by studies at the Naval Submarine School, New London, Connecticut. He qualied in
submarines on 31 March 1950 in the submarine USS Flying Fish (SS-29), then served
as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander, Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet.
He was assigned to the submarine USS Clamagore (SS-343) from 1952 to 1954 and as
Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President of the United States from 1954 to 1955. He
served as Executive Ofcer of the submarine USS Wahoo (SS-565) in Honolulu, Hawaii,
and as Commanding Ofcer of the submarine USS Trout (SS-566) in Charleston, South
Carolina, prior to assignment as Commander, Submarine Division THIRTY-ONE in San
Diego, California.
Signicant shore assignments prior to attaining Flag rank include: Aide to the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy); Director of East Asia and Pacic Branch,
Politico-Military Division, Ofce of the Chief of Naval Operations; Senior US Advisor to
the Vietnamese Riverine Force, Republic of Vietnam; and Director of the Ofce for Micro-
nesian Status Negotiations, Department of the Interior.
After promotion to Rear Admiral in June 1974, he reported as Deputy Director, Stra-
tegic Plans, Policy, Nuclear Systems and National Security Affairs Division, Ofce of
the Chief of Naval Operations. From January 1975 to June 1976, he served as Director,
East Asia and Pacic Region, Ofce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs). On 30 June 1976, he assumed duties as Commander, Middle East
Force, a command based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, which he held until July 1977.
In August 1977 as a vice admiral, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans, Policy and Operations), as well as Senior US Military Representative to the United
Nations. His promotion to admiral was approved by the Senate on 28 March 1980. He
x
xi
became the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, on 30 May 1980. He
assumed the additional responsibility as Commander in Chief of US Naval Forces Europe
on 1 January 1983. Admiral Crowe became Commander in Chief, US Pacic Command,
on 1 July 1983.
Admiral Crowe was married to the former Shirley Grennell of Okeene, Oklahoma.
They have three children: Blake Crowe, Brent Crowe and Bambi Crowe Coval.
SERVICE RECORD
Promotions Dates
Temporary Permanent
ENS 05 Jun 46
LTJG 05 Jun 49
LT 01 Jun 52
LCDR 01 Jan 58
CDR 01 Jul 62
CAPT 01 Jul 67
RADM 25 Jul 73 01 Jun 74
VADM 23 Aug 77
ADM 30 May 80
Assignments Dates
From To
USS Carmick 1946 1946
Naval Mine Warfare School, Yorktown, VA 1946 1946
USS Carmick 1947 1948
Naval Submarine School, Submarine Base,
New London, CT 1948 1948
USS Flying Fish 1948 1951
Staff, Commander Submarine Force,
US Atlantic Fleet 1951 1952
USS Clamagore 1952 1954
Naval Administrative Unit, Potomac River
Naval Command 1954 1955
Student, Stanford University 1955 1956
Executive Ofcer, USS Wahoo 1956 1958
Head, New Development/Special Weapons Branch,
Personnel Research Division, Bureau of Naval
Personnel, Washington, DC 1958 1959
xii
xiii
Aide to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans and Policy), Washington, DC 1959 1960
Commanding Ofcer, USS Trout 1960 1962
Student, Princeton University 1962 1965
Staff, Commander Submarine Squadron THREE 1965 1966
Commander, Submarine Division 31 1966 1967
Head, East Asia and Pacic Branch,
Politico-Military Policy Division, Ofce of
Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC 1967 1970
Assignments Dates
From To
Senior Adviser, Amphibious Task Force 211 and
Commander, Task Force 210; Senior Adviser,
Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao,
Binh Thuy, from 6 Apr 1971 to 20 Aug 1971,
US Naval Forces, Vietnam, and Naval Advisory
Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 1970 1971
Director, Ofce of Micronesian Status
Negotiations and Deputy to President’s Personal
Representative for Micronesian Status
Negotiations, Department of the Interior,
Washington, DC 1971 1973
Deputy Director, Strategic Plans, Policy and
Nuclear Systems Division, Ofce of Chief of
Naval Operations, Washington, DC 1973 1974
Director, East Asia and Pacic Region, Ofce of
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),
Washington, DC 1974 1976
Commander, Middle East Force 1976 1977
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy
and Operations, and Senior Navy Member,
US Delegation, United Nations Military
Staff Committee, Washington, DC 1977 1980
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe 1980 1983
Commander in Chief, Pacic Command
(redesignated US Pacic Command on
11 October 1983) 1983 1985
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 1985 1989
Principal US Military Decorations and Qualications
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star (with “V” device)
Air Medal
Submarine Ofcer and Submarine Commanding Ofcer
xv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1985 Selected Works 1
October 1 Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony as the Eleventh Chairman
October 28 Remarks to European Command Ofcers and Wives at the Ofcers’
Club
November 8 Remarks on the 210th Birthday of the United States Marine Corps
November 27 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Central
Command
November 27 Remarks at the Change of Command and Retirement Ceremony
USLANTCOM and SACLANT
December 12 Statement on Defense Organization before the Senate Armed
Services Committee
1986 Selected Works 21
February 6 Statement on FY 1987 DOD Budget before the Senate Budget
Committee
February 7 Excerpts of Remarks at the Dining-In for the Joint Staff
March 2 Excerpts from an Interview on “Meet the Press” with Mr. Kalb, Ann
Garrels, and Albert Hunt
March 4 Letter on Soviet Arms Control Cheating to Representative Jim Courter
March 5 & 6 Remarks at the Armed Forces Staff College on March 5 and the Air
War College on March 6
March 27 Chairman’s Memorandum for Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of
Defense, on Oversight of Intelligence Activities
27 March Excerpts from Remarks at the Navy League Joint Services Luncheon
April 14 Remarks at the 28th Senior Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, US
Department of State
April 16 Interview Comments with Time, Newsweek, and US News & World
Report on the Attack on Libya
April Interview excerpts on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Soviet threat,
and US naval military readiness with Sea Power magazine Editor-in-
Chief James D. Hessman and Contributing Editor Vincent C. Thomas
xvi
xvii
May 8 Statement on Nuclear Testing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
May 15 Excerpts from Remarks at a Joint Chamber of Commerce/Kiwanis/
Lions/Rotary Luncheon for “Bill Crowe Day”
May 21 Remarks on Career Reections: Thoughts for 1986 USNA Graduates
at the Graduation Ceremonies, US Naval Academy
June 23 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, Strategic Air Com-
mand, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
July 16 Statement on the Reorganization of Special Operations Forces before
the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness
July 19 Remarks at the Banquet held by the National League of Families of
American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia
August 5 Letter on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to the Honorable
Jim Wright, House Majority Leader, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC
August 13 Letter on JCS Reorganization to Chairman Barry Goldwater, Senate
Armed Services Committee
October 11 Excerpts from an Interview with David Hartman on “Good Morning
America,” ABC network television
November 11 Remarks at the World Peace Luncheon for Veterans on Armistice Day
November 19 Remarks at the 1986 National Convention of the Retired Ofcers’
Association
November 25 Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense
Policy Panel on Arms Reduction Proposals at Reykjavik
December 10 Remarks before Senator Barry Goldwater on his Retirement
1987 Selected Works 107
January 13 Statement before the Senate Budget Committee on FY 1988–1989
DOD Authorization
February 6 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonies at NORAD and
US Space Command
April 27 Excerpts from Remarks at the Princeton University Interfaith Coun-
cil Breakfast
April 28 Public Lecture—“America and Her Military” at the Woodrow Wilson
School, Princeton University
May 1 Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Investiga-
tions Subcommittee on Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
May 11 Excerpts from Remarks to the Armed Services YMCA Luncheon
Honoring the Senior Enlisted Advisors from Each Service
June 1 Remarks at the Activation of US Special Operations Command
June 5 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
Persian Gulf
June 6 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonies, US SOUTHCOM
June 23 Remarks at the Navy Memorial Foundation Dinner
June 24 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony at Headquarters,
US European Command
June 29 Remarks at the Activation of US Forces Command
September 29 Statement on his Nomination for an additional two-year term before
the Senate Armed Services Committee
October 13 Remarks at the Dedication of the US Navy Memorial
October 27 Remarks to the Royal College of Defence Studies
November 10 Remarks at the Dedication of the Crowe Global Hat Display
November 16 Remarks at a Dinner Honoring Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
1988 Selected Works 165
January 25 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the INF
Treaty
February 4 Remarks at the Opening of the National Prayer Breakfast
March Excerpts of an Interview with Mike Wallace on “60 Minutes,” CBS
network television
April 24 Comments with Lesley Stahl on “Face the Nation,” CBS network
television
July 3 News Brieng at the Pentagon on the Iranian Airbus Tragedy
July 11 Excerpts from News Conference Welcoming Marshal Sergei F.
Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR
July 11 Joint Statement with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev
July 11 News Conference with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the
General Staff of the USSR
August 19 Press Conference Statement on the Vincennes and Iranian Flight 655
September 23 Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Special
Subcommittee on War Powers on the War Powers Resolution
September 28 Excerpts from Remarks at a Reception held for the World Board of
Governors of the USO [United Services Organization]
xviii
xix
November 14 Remarks on Receiving the Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service
Award of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
November 21 Letter to the Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
December 7 Remarks at the Dedication of the USS Oklahoma Exhibit
December 14 Remarks at the National Defense University
1989 Selected Works 213
January 4 News Brieng with Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci on the
Downing of Libyan Planes in the Gulf of Sidre
January 17 Remarks in Farewell for President Reagan
January 19 Remarks at a Luncheon for Medal of Honor Recipients
February Guest Appearance on “Cheers,” NBC network television
March 14 Statement before the Senate Budget Committee on US Military
Posture
March 30 Remarks at the Naval War College
May 8 Remarks to Welcome Mr. Dick Cheney to Duties as Secretary of Defense
June 6 Remarks at a DOD News Brieng for the Admiral’s Upcoming Trip
to the Soviet Union
June 12 Remarks on the Signing of the Dangerous Military Activities Agree-
ment
June 13 Remarks on “The US-Soviet Military-to-Military Relationship” at
the Voroshilov General Staff Academy
June 21 Joint News Conference with General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the
Soviet General Staff, as translated from Russian
August 21 Speech at a Dinner Hosted by the Veterans of Foreign Wars
&
September 7 And also at the American Legion National Convention
September 22 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Transportation
Command
September 27 Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Forces Com-
mand
September 29 Remarks upon his Retirement and Departure as Chairman
Photo Captions 103
1. Ensign William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, upon graduation at the US Naval Academy. (June
1946)
2. Lieutenant(jg) Crowe serving as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander of the
US Atlantic Fleet’s Submarine Force. (1952)
3. Admiral Crowe’s swearing in ceremony as the 11th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger attended by President Ronald Reagan
and Mrs. Shirley Crowe. (October 1985)
4. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, with the Joint Chiefs: General John A. Wick-
ham, Jr., CSA; General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF; Admiral James D. Watkins, CNO; and
General Paul X. Kelley, CMC. (1985)
5. Farewell ceremony for Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger hosted by President
Ronald Reagan and Admiral Crowe. (November 1987)
6. Welcome ceremony in honor of Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, USSR, hosted by
Admiral Crowe at the Pentagon. (July 1988)
7. Admiral Crowe on the set of “Cheers” with Ted Danson (Sam Malone). (February 1989)
8. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, with the Joint Chiefs: General Alfred M. Gray,
Jr., CMC; Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, CNO; General Larry D. Welch, CSAF; General
Carl E. Vuono, CSA; and General Robert T. Herres, USAF, the rst VCJCS. (1989)
1
1985
SELECTED WORKS
Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony as the Eleventh Chairman
The Pentagon | October 1
Secretary [Caspar] Weinberger, distinguished guests:
I’m very grateful for those kind remarks, Mr. Secretary. I think they were a little over-gen-
erous, and I usually have a witty saying, but the newspapers publish all of my comments.
So, I do appreciate that you did not mention my jokes, my hat collection, or my rumpled
dress in the newspapers.
To say that I have a full heart today is an understatement, and you can no doubt
deduce this is an exciting and moving occasion for the Crowe family. I must confess also
to a certain amount of apprehension as I assume the duties of the Chairmanship—duties
that were so ably performed by General Jack Vessey. He leaves us a legacy of profession-
alism, commitment, and integrity. Above all, he has set an example of leadership, a high
example of leadership that will challenge and ennoble all those who follow.
Shirley and I have lived almost half our married life in Washington, DC, and in turn
have developed a deep affection for this city. Many of my most satisfying years—and also
many of my toughest years—were spent right here and in that building right over there.
In a very real sense we are coming home. I would like to acknowledge at the same time
the many personal friends that are here today—many of them who have come a great
distance. Shirley and I are attered by your presence.
I think a particular mention should be made of the Oklahoma delegation. As those
of you who know me well can testify, I have a deep loyalty to my home state. The warm
support that I have continually received from “Sooner” friends and boosters has always
been an inspiration to me.
I came into the Navy as a young man persuaded that a career devoted to the defense
of our country, its institutions, its ideals, its way of life would be both worthwhile and
fullling. Some forty-three years later, I hold that conviction more strongly than I ever
have before. In today’s turbulent and uncertain climate, American ideals, know-how, and
leadership are crucial to the peace and survival of the entire free world. And over the
years, the US military has come to play an integral role in this drama. I have always felt
blessed to have the opportunity to serve in such a full and exciting period of our history.
Although I must admit that the Chairmanship, I believe, is going to involve some fullness
and excitement more than I had bargained for, in any event.
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Crowe Selected Works
1985
As I assume this ofce, I am heartened by the fact that I will be serving alongside of
four exceptional and highly regarded Chiefs of Service. I have worked with all of them
previously, and they are friends of long-standing. I look forward with great anticipation
to renewing my association. Mr. Secretary, I can assure you that I will make every effort
to nurture the maturity and the thoughtfulness that has characterized the deliberations
of the Joint Chiefs under my predecessor.
I would like to direct a brief word to the men and women of the Joint Staff. I have been
genuinely impressed with the quality of the work which you render to the Chairman, and
I look forward to serving with you—to sharing your frustrations and your successes. The
Joint Staff is a military organization, and as such, I expect your loyalty; but I am fully
aware that your respect must be earned. I pledge to you that I will bend every effort to
do exactly that—to earn your respect as we work together enhancing the security of this
great republic.
I am well aware of the difculty of shedding your individual Service orientations
and addressing the broader concerns of the joint arena. The fact is, however, that the
need for “joint” operations, “joint” thinking, and “joint” leadership has never been
greater as we meet the global challenges and in order to get the most out of our nite
resources.
I understand there is one group on the Joint Staff which is quite concerned about my
arrival. I wish to put any misgivings to rest. I am a tennis player, but I assure you that
there will be no discrimination against golfers while I am the Chairman. Although I do
harbor some bias against golf stories—it just seems to me there are never any new ones.
Secretary Weinberger, the greatest reward of a military career is the opportunity to
associate with young American men and women in uniform, day in and day out. I have
seen those people react to stress and boredom, war and peace, good times and bad times.
They consistently give 110 percent and meet every test, often without the amenities and
the advantages which are enjoyed by their civilian counterparts. I am very grateful for
the opportunity that you have given me to continue to work with those magnicent
soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who give so much of themselves on behalf of this
great nation.
Mr. Secretary, let me close by assuring you that I will devote my total energies and abil-
ities to supporting you as we labor together to keep our country strong, safe, and peaceful.
Oath of Office
I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the ofce upon which
I am about to enter.
So help me, God.
Remarks to European Command Officers and Wives at the Officers’ Club
Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany | October 28
It’s no coincidence that I’m visiting you on my rst stop on my initial visit as Chairman to
Europe. It was by plan, because I appreciate and recognize the great importance of this
Command and the work that you do. I think the last time I was in Stuttgart was probably
three years ago when I spoke at the Navy Ball here. I’ve always enjoyed my visits to Ger-
many. At the time, I was on duty in Naples as the Commander in Chief of the Southern
Command. We always enjoyed coming up here because everything was so rational and
orderly compared to Naples, and also clean. I must confess to you, though, that after we
had been here three or four days, we began to yearn for Naples. We started driving on the
correct side of the road and not parking on the sidewalks, and even stopping at the red
lights. It’s always refreshing to get back to the disorganization of Naples. It does have a
certain amount of charm. It begins to grow on you if you live there very long. Of course,
the autumn in Germany is always lovely, too. The turning leaves, for instance, and we
look forward to Oktoberfest and Fasching. All of which mark autumn in Europe as well
as the constant stream of visitors from Washington. Is it to buy crystal for Christmas?
I’m pleased to see so many of your spouses present today. I’ve always been told that
behind every great man stands a surprised mother-in-law. You’re really a responsive
audience. It’s amazing how many people laugh at your jokes when you’re the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I do want to say, though, in a very, very serious vein, how important it is that families
are here and that what they do for the military is deeply appreciated by your spouses
and also by your leadership. I’ve discovered over the years that no organization can
perform effectively without strong support from the distaff side. You are as much a part
of the military as those people in uniform. Not only do you help your country and the
Service by your presence but you’re also a part of a much larger entity—you represent
the United States. Each of you plays an international as well as a national role. I can’t
stress how much each of you play the role in maintaining the peace—which, after all,
is our fundamental mission.
I’m brand new as the Chairman, and it’s premature and way too early for me to be
making any great pronouncements. I’ve found already that this job keeps you quite busy
and very beleaguered. I thought that in just the few minutes that I have today that I’d
like to say something about the general view of the US military role in supporting our
government’s policy as I see it from the perspective of the Chairmanship, and talk about
what I see and what I will be dealing with primarily in the next few years. I warn you at
the outset that I am fundamentally an optimist. It should come to you as no surprise.
Despite the depressing headlines and the pressure of everyday business and prob-
lems, it is my belief—and it is a strong belief—that if you step back from the everyday
press and look back over the long term of the last 35 years, you will see that the United
States has enjoyed considerable success in its military policy. Where you are living—
Western Europe—is blessed with the longest period of uninterrupted peace that it has
4
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Crowe Selected Works
1985
enjoyed in this century. It has fully recovered from the devastation of World War II. It is
manifested with a rm belief in the rights of the Free World. And NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] has played an integral part in this process—politically, socially, as
well as militarily. The area where I just came from, the Pacic and the Far East, for the
most part is prosperous and secure across the board. They are enjoying unprecedented
afuence and steady political progress and are becoming more self-reliant militarily and
involving themselves in the international community. These are all marks that Asia has
proven itself to be an area that has to be reckoned with.
The point I want to make is that the United States has been a strong contributor to
these two vital areas—Western Europe, and East Asia and the Pacic. We have produced
policies of broad stability—socially, politically, economically, culturally. This stability has
paid off. We encourage democratic initiative, with economic free enterprise, and we have
attempted to promote stability and peace. If there is one thing we have learned, it is that
any place we have afuence and stability, we will have peace and the democratic way.
The other side is trying to promote dissidence, instability, and that’s what we’re ghting.
That is what you are all about.
The United States is trying to promote these foreign goals to go hand-in-hand with
our own national policy. Throughout this 40-year process, American strength and Amer-
ican power have been a vital part in the element of our overall policy posture. We must
continue to maintain our strength if we are to continue to deter Soviet intimidation,
adventurism, and interference. The NATO Alliance has formed a response to the Soviet
threat. The United States has contributed and participated heavily. In the Far East, we
literally threw a military shield over Europe, and with this umbrella, we have permitted
our allies and this country and our Third World friends to concentrate on internal devel-
opment to realize their own potential, in their own fashion and at their own pace. To put
it simply, the American people can take great pride in the role their military forces play
in fostering and securing progress in Europe and Asia.
Therefore, on balance, I nd the political picture encouraging. Of course, there are
day-to-day problems, and you and I deal with them every day. Some of these are of gen-
uine concern. We must worry about them. We must manage them and deal with them.
Paul Harvey once said, “In times like these, it’s helpful to remember that there have
always been times like these.” I think that is absolutely true. I am convinced that we
can manage our problems if we continue to be determined, thoughtful, and energetic.
Looking into the future it is in our nation’s fundamental interest to continue to promote
stability, to encourage a healthy economic environment, and to support our friends and
allies. It will require a mix of far-seeing policies, tailored to foreign sensitivities. It will not
always be easy, but, if successful, great rewards will be ours. And from our perspective,
even more important is to recognize that American strength is an integral part of this
process. If the Soviet Union were one day to achieve a decided military superiority, it would
erode, if not destroy, the very foundation of our foreign policy, not to mention the dangers
in the event of hostilities. It is imperative to recognize that our military forces underwrite
US diplomatic and economic policy; they fulll our commitment to regional security and
assist our friends and allies to promote the peace that we cherish and seek to preserve.
American strength is the indispensable pillar not only in our individual world but also
those of the entire free world.
What this means to you and me is that what you are doing has not only been import-
ant in the past but that it will also continue to be important for the foreseeable future. The
vigor and health of the NATO partnership is a cornerstone of world peace and stability.
Looking briey to what I see as the Chairman’s perspective is those kinds of things
I know we are going to be preoccupied with in the coming months—time prohibits me
from running out a comprehensive list or going into any detail. If you desire, I can stand
to elaborate during the question period.
First, clearly from a military perspective, the persistent Soviet military buildup will
continue to absorb our energies. In many respects this is a manifestation of our success.
The Soviet ideology and economy are essentially bankrupt. Moscow sees the strong roots
of freedom spreading to, in some cases, communist countries—witness the PRC [People’s
Republic of China]—resorting to an incentive philosophy to nurture or restore their econ-
omies. There is one thing that is important to control unilaterally—armed conict. You
are as aware as I am of the character of the Soviet military machine, so I won’t dwell on
it, but it will undoubtedly cast a shadow over the Free World in the foreseeable future.
It will shape our own military program in the coming years. Part of our job as military
professionals is to make the world aware of the Soviet capabilities and their relentless
drive to become the predominant power.
A throw-off of this phenomenon is the current arms control effort. The Free World is
rightfully apprehensive about the balance of nuclear terror. Certainly in Washington,
the Pentagon is a heavy contributor in this dialogue—I mean positively, not negatively.
Of course, we have the arms control negotiations that we are engaged in. The problem
that faces military leadership, as I see it, is to look for ways to nudge the process forward
where it is in the interest of all the free world and in the interest of our international
commitments—if we can get a viable lasting arms control agreement. We are looking for
ways to nudge the process forward without jeopardizing the nation’s security.
This is a tough problem. In the public affairs world, as Jay Coupe would say, “It is a
problem of perceptions,” particularly when you’re working in a bureaucratic maze like
Washington. There are a lot of vested interests and a lot of points of views in arms limita-
tion. The fact remains that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working very hard to do exactly
what I just said: manage ways to achieve meaningful arms control without in any way
threatening the security of the Free World.
Another sign of Soviet frustration has been its encouragement and involvement in
fostering terrorism and Third World instability. It has been unsuccessful in achieving its
major goals, so it has turned to peripheral activities, supporting the insurgent and dis-
ruptive causes around the world. In practical terms, it has challenged the United States
in a very direct way by involving itself with Central American politics. It has done so in
a very heavy fashion, as a direct counter to the free world deterrent strategy. Combined
with such activities is the current wave of terrorism that is sweeping a large part of the
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globe. Our own military is being forced to congure itself for limited conicts and to nd
ways to counter terrorism. We have no choice. Frankly, we are meeting the challenge
very well. We have created and structured capabilities for a counterterrorist system.
And I think we are making progress—slow and gradual but, nevertheless, persistent,
progress—in Central America.
The Middle East problems, I’m afraid, are still unresolved. Although it’s painful for
us to make in the military the kind of adjustments that we are being forced into—that
is, a change in priorities on top of our already heavy commitments—it is, nevertheless,
imperative that we do so. We are doing it in a thoughtful, consistent, and I believe what
will ultimately be, a successful way.
European Command’s participation the other night in the Achille Lauro affair is symp-
tomatic of the kind of responses we will be asked to provide. I can’t tell you how proud
of your performances we were in the Pentagon, and what a shot in the arm it was to the
people in our country—I’m talking about the whole country. I received an avalanche of
comments, letters, and phone calls about your success and what you have done. I hope
you understand how much your country appreciated and how proud they are of you and
what you have done.
Underlying all this is the constant campaign for resources. This effort is exacerbated
in the current climate by a number of factors. Being at peace and involved in various
arms negotiations, it’s difcult for many Americans to appreciate the need for military
modernization, for vigorous training, for correcting the deciencies of the Vietnam War,
and the necessity for us to remain constantly ready. The drumbeat on disclosures on
waste and abuse have certainly not helped our case, although, they have very little to do
with the special needs of a strong national defense. Above all, the national decit imperils
the President’s security program. In essence, the prospects of the next few years are just
simply not good. We are in for a long siege. Zero growth or even less is a strong possibility
and probably a more realistic possibility. And even that may be overly optimistic. I guess
I don’t look forward to this struggle.
In a lighter vein, but, nonetheless, troublesome, there is still the pressure of Congress
on Defense reorganization. I had no more than arrived in Washington than they started
talking about eliminating my job. If they are going to do that, I wish they would hurry
before I go to all this trouble. Frankly, my own thinking on this subject is still in ux. I
am not a good judge of how serious the pressure is or what the outcome might be. It will,
however, be a growing debate. We’re going to hear a lot of arguments mixed up in the
next few months, particularly in the Senate Armed Services Committee on the hearings
Senator [Barry] Goldwater and Senator [Sam] Nunn will be holding. There is also a bill
reported out in the Subcommittee in the House as well as a whole host of proposals from
private citizens on the subject. Everyone will have their say before it’s over. It will furnish
a certain amount of “gossipy type” material that the public so much enjoys. It will be
unfortunate, but I will say we just have to live with it. C’est la vie.
I want you to understand that I’m very serious about this. The contest over reorgani-
zation is not a criticism of our military people, or the job they are doing, or your skills,
or your dedication. Everyone I speak to who is involved in this process stresses this. I
speak nationwide when I say I have never seen so much pro-military sentiment. I have
been inundated with complimentary letters since the hijacking, which I mentioned a
moment ago. It is just one of the anomalies of life in a democracy that translating such
sentiment into tangible scal support is not always easy—particularly when there is not
a direct threat outside your window. I can tell you that I have been assured by Sena-
tors Nunn and Goldwater and others that everybody in the military should understand
their proposal is a nonpartisan effort—an effort based on 40 years of history, not on one
administration—and has never been directed toward the people in the military. Their
effort is directed towards helping, not deriding, the military. We must be careful where
we wear our feelings as we approach this debate.
Security is the business of the military in this country, and our mission is peace. But
we can see that keeping up our strength seems to be more difcult. That is just one of
the occupational hazards of our trade.
Remarks on the 210th Birthday of the United States Marine Corps
Chairman’s Dining Room, the Pentagon | November 8
This is a great day for the Marine Corps. You are celebrating 210 years of service to the
country—a phenomenal success in war and readiness in peace. Based on these achieve-
ments which you all are very familiar with, I think you have every right once a year to
“let it all hang out.”
I have been to a number of these occasions, and I couldn’t help thinking about them—
at shore, at sea, and in foreign countries. They are always festive occasions. I think it’s
appropriate that the rst Marine recruiting station was formed in a bar in Philadelphia.
It did make a great deal of sense to me.
I couldn’t help thinking, as I always do, when I hear General LeJeune’s words about
what drives the Corps and what the motivation is that seems to distinguish them—it’s
the pride. It’s not a false pride. It’s the pride that’s based on tremendous achievement.
It’s also based on an awful lot of hard work, not only coaching new Marines but also
preserving that tradition.
I watched my own son let the Marine Corps tear him apart and rebuild him from a
child to a man. The main characteristic that it gave him is pride—pride in his country,
pride in the Corps, pride in his self. And this is characteristic of all Marines.
One of the characteristics that I have always admired is that Marines, no matter
what their expertise or specialty, are always Marines. I’ve heard it said, “If you scratch
a Marine aviator, you will nd an infantryman. If you scratch a naval aviator, you’ll nd
him in sick bay.”
The important point, of course, is that the Marine Corps and Marines have a special
place in the hearts of all Americans and in our history. Every schoolboy learns early in
his life that the Marines are noted for steadfastness and devotion to duty—for patriotism,
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for their ability to tell exaggerated sea stories, for their reputation as a lover, and above
all, of course, for their courage with a capital “C.” We’ve heard that referred to all the
way from Mexico to Korea, from Tripoli to Vietnam. Marines exhibit their courage time
and time again.
So, on behalf of the nation and on behalf of your fellow Services, I would like to extend
to you every good wish and my deep admiration and affection. Happy Birthday. Thank
you very much.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Central Command
MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida | November 27
General [Paul Xavier] Kelley, distinguished visitors and guests, and soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and airmen of the United States Central Command:
It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here this morning. Tampa Bay was the historic
point for Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders’ departure. Contrary to popular rumor,
I was not present on that occasion. Nevertheless, Tampa Bay has since that day turned
into a wonderful harbor and haven among two beautiful and progressive cities on this
planet. Contrasting today’s weather with Washington’s drizzle and cold, I can assure
you that it is really enjoyable to be here basking in the warmth of Florida hospitality
and sunshine. I can understand why Bob Kingston was so reluctant to come to the DRB
[Defense Resources Board]. I’m sure that is partially the reason, if not the whole reason.
It is also a privilege for me to be a part of this ceremony today. We are passing to
General George Crist the stewardship of the United States Central Command, one of
America’s seven unied commands, and we are simultaneously marking the retirement
of a most distinguished combat leader and veteran, General Bob Kingston.
Changes of command are a time-honored custom among military organizations,
wherein total responsibility is transferred from one individual to another. A responsibility
that is so necessary for effective military organization is retained even though the colors
pass from hand to hand. Today, as we watch these symbols of authority pass, I think
that it is appropriate that we pay particular honor to the incumbent, Bob Kingston, who
has led this force from its inception and in the intervening three years established it as
a full-edged unied command respected and supported by our Middle Eastern friends
and allies throughout his AOR [area of responsibility]!
I will not dwell on the sentiment felt by us all at the departure of Bob Kingston—he,
of course, was a soldier, diplomat, ghter, and promoter of US interests worldwide. It goes
without saying that he will be sorely missed. Rather, I want for a moment to celebrate
and to honor an exceptional career marked by unusual accomplishment, which comes
to a close today. It started in Brookline, Massachusetts, 36 years ago.
It has been an extraordinary 36 years of understated heroism and service for Bob and
his lovely wife, Jo, who has gone from post to post fashioning his career. It has also been
a highly varied career—from the re-swept hills of Korea to the jungles of Vietnam…, and
nally on to a certain hangout here in Tampa for revenue-runners called “Crawdaddy’s.”
I’d like to visit Crawdaddy’s, but unfortunately I’m not going to have the time today. But
I’m told that I can go there any time for alligator steak, and all I have to do is take Bob
Kingston and I will be well-received and welcomed.
Bob and I are of the same generation. In the several decades that we have been in the
Armed Forces of the United States, the world and our country have undergone a host of
changes. Technological advances have transformed our physical world and permitted
our country to reach unparalleled levels of prosperity. On the other hand, these same
changes have shrunk the globe incredibly and thrust our nation four-square into the
international community—with all the benets and all the problems that entails.
In the process, our Armed Forces have become an indispensable pillar of the tran-
quility and well-being that we enjoy as Americans. We have not always been at peace,
and oft-times our personnel in uniform have had to ght and sacrice to protect our
way of life and our global interests. Throughout his impressive career, Bob Kingston
has been in the forefront of such men and women—in the very heart of battle. He rose
through the ranks, having spent a year as an enlisted man. He drew two combat tours
in Korea—participating with distinction in the Inchon landing, and later undertaking
the hazardous duties of clandestine amphibious operations behind enemy lines. This, of
course, was not the only unique and remarkable part of his career.
In the 1960s, he served as an exchange ofcer to the United Kingdom with the 16th
Independent Parachute Group, where he commanded a British company in the parachute
regiment. During the Vietnam War, he served as adviser to the Vietnamese Rangers
and later as Commanding Ofcer of the First of the 35th Infantry. During that tour, he
received the Distinguished Service Cross, our nation’s second highest decoration for
valor. It is particularly noteworthy that after two tours of combat in Korea and another
in Vietnam, he returned to Indochina a second and a third time.
For a career soldier like Bob Kingston, the war in Vietnam could not come to an end
until his fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were accounted for. He became the
Commander of the Joint Casualty Center in Thailand. Many of you are familiar with the
important work he did there—recovering and accounting for our missing comrades in arms.
As Admiral [Noel] Gayler, one of my predecessors as Commander in Chief, Pacic Command,
said, “Bob Kingston consistently demonstrated high standards in judgment, leadership,
and common sense. He can handle big jobs.” And the big jobs did come. You heard them
recounted today in his biography: training billets where he shared his tremendous knowl-
edge and experience to others; a major post in Korea, as well as a major command; and
then, of course, the biggest of all, CINCCENT [Commander in Chief, Central Command],
where his performance certainly fullled the assessment that Admiral Gayler made.
I know I speak for every member of this command when I say that we will feel a par-
ticular sense of loss at your departure, Bob. Throughout over four years of service here,
you brought your unique perspectives to your task. You have dedicated yourself totally
to enhancing the effectiveness of this command. I can assert from my experience as a
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former fellow-CINC that Bob Kingston vigorously insisted on realism in exercises, encour-
aged broader participation by US forces and friendly nations in the region, dramatically
improved command and control and intelligence capabilities, and promoted ingenious
means to test and train US forces.
You will forgive me if I cut off the list right there, because it goes on and on. Sufce
it to say that he leaves the Command a fully ready force, equal to the tasks rst set out
for it in 1979 when the Rapid Deployment Force was rst conceived. This is no mean
achievement. We are deeply indebted as a nation to Bob Kingston. Bob and Jo, on behalf
of your many friends in Tampa and our citizens throughout the country and overseas, I
wish you well and every good fortune in your coming endeavors. As we say in the Navy,
“May you always have fair winds and following seas.”
It is well that General Kingston has succeeded so thoroughly in his work. CENTCOM’s
area of responsibility is large and diverse, extending from Egypt east to Pakistan; from
Jordan south to Kenya—vast land areas bridging two continents and a region as far from
our shores as any strategic area. It encompasses important trade routes. It is the seat of
the world’s three leading religions. It contains vast mineral wealth and encompasses 19
sovereign nations with a variety of political leanings. Today the region unfortunately is
plagued with a bitter war and considerable turmoil. Most important, it comprises diverse,
proud peoples who share a common hope for security and stability—many of whom look
to the United States for assistance and for leadership as they search for peace.
That is why my predecessor, Jack Vessey, on 1 January 1983, activated USCENTCOM
as a full-edged unied command. Its purpose: not to wage war but to prevent it—to
deter hostilities by the demonstration of our willingness and capability, manifested in
this command, to support our interests and our friends throughout the region. Today, the
task of carrying on that challenge passes to General George Crist. George and Barbara,
I bid you welcome to CENTCOM and Tampa. I speak for the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in saying that we are pleased to have you here.
George, your selection for this important position underscores the faith the President
has in your skill, leadership, and devotion to duty. When you settle in and survey your
command, I am condent you will be impressed by its capabilities and above all by its
dedicated people. I think that I can say happily that this is a banner year for the Villanova
Wildcats, George Crist’s alma mater. Not only did the Wildcats win the national basketball
title but they also see one of their own as the rst marine ever to lead a unied command.
To the men and women of the Command, let me say how much I have admired your
accomplishments and evident operational talents. Your achievements in support of our
national strategy are legion. I have known General Crist well for several years. He is a proven
combat veteran, a man of unagging energy and devotion, and an ofcer of broad strategic
vision, more than equal to the tasks before him. I am condent he will lead the CENTCOM
team to new levels of achievement. I charge you to give him your full measure of loyalty.
Finally, to all present today, I am mindful we meet here on the eve of our great national
holiday. I wish you all—and especially to Bob and Jo Kingston as they depart—a blessed,
safe, and happy Thanksgiving.
Remarks at the Change of Command and Retirement Ceremony
USLANTCOM and SACLANT
Norfolk, Virginia | November 27
[Lieutenant] General [Maurice J. L.]Gysemberg [of Belgium], distinguished guests:
It is always a great pleasure to return to Norfolk, historic haven for American ght-
ing ships and within cannon shot of the rst battle between ironclads. It is difcult to
imagine that these lands were purchased over three centuries ago from an Old Dominion
carpenter for only ve tons of tobacco—a realization made all the more difcult in view of
the current prosperity of the Tidewater area. Of interest today, this community embodies
and fosters a close civil-military partnership. As the home of the Atlantic Fleet, Hampton
Roads has welcomed thousands of sailors, and its citizens have always been staunch
supporters of a strong defense posture. The city of Norfolk is particularly apropos as a
site for this occasion, because it annually honors our nation’s commitment to NATO with
its renowned Azalea Festival.
It is hard to realize that the next Azalea Festival will be the 33rd, which reminds us
that NATO itself is now past its middle age. While this great alliance has suffered the
normal pangs and trials that attend all multinational undertakings, it is the largest and
most successful peace movement the world has ever witnessed—offering the people of
Europe and North America the longest sustained period of tranquility in this century.
For four decades, through the wisdom of our statesmen and the readiness of our arms,
Western Europe has avoided external aggression. This is no mean achievement.
In turn, the US Atlantic Command has been a crucial player in this drama. Cer-
tainly, all of us here today appreciate the great collective stake we have in liberty and our
institutions and our way of life, but also in the ocean highways that connect and bind
together our coalition. Ever mindful of our past, our nation and our allies are committed
to the freedom of the seas as the sine qua non of the effective defense of NATO-Europe
itself. Recent Soviet activity and deployments in the region have underscored Moscow’s
recognition of how important international seaways are to the security of the West.
Put simply, the Atlantic can either be a bridge or a barrier. Given the character and
great resources of our great alliance, to win the land battle we must win at sea. Hence,
Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force elements in this great command guard and promote
our interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean regions.
The Atlantic Command graphically testies to the multipurpose nature of American
power. Our strength buttresses NATO’s political designs; it signals US determination to
resist aggression; it serves as an inspiration to those of us who labor in the alliance vine-
yards; it is an integral part of the Coalition’s deterrent posture; it contributes heavily to
Washington’s ability to respond to regional crises; and, in the event of major hostilities,
it would play a crucial role in the defense of the entire Free World. These truths have not
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been lost on the Kremlin. Every day we see increasing evidence of Soviet respect for this
command and the power it represents.
It follows that excellence in LANTCOM’s combat readiness, training, and leadership
is not merely desirable; the command’s ability to ght and to ght well is an indispens-
able pillar of our national policy. We can all be grateful, extremely grateful, that under
Admiral Wes McDonald’s guiding hand extremely high standards have been set and
surpassed—that his forces have met every test with superb performance.
It is a high privilege for me to participate in this ceremony today as we acknowledge
our deep debt to Wes McDonald for three years of peerless leadership and welcome Admi-
ral Lee Baggett as he assumes the LANTCOM mantle.
This festivity has special poignancy because not only does it symbolize the continuity
of responsibility in the passing of the symbol but it also marks the close of a distinguished
military career. I will not dwell on Admiral McDonald’s superb performance: his decisive
responses to the Soviet threat as SACLANT; his promotion of new doctrine and tactics
among the Fleet and among our allies to integrate new equipment more thoroughly; and,
as CINCLANT, his incisive direction of the Grenada rescue operation. Certainly, these
and other achievements are legion and well-known to you all. I want to focus instead on
an unusual and exceptional lifetime of service. Let it be clear—I do not consider this a
sad occasion, but one of celebration and recognition. I don’t consider military retirement
an ending, but the beginning of another adventure, particularly for someone of Wes
McDonald’s personality and considerable talents. The Navy’s loss is the civilian world’s
gain, particularly when a man of Wes’ stature joins its ranks.
The US Navy has a World War I recruiting poster that says, “Don’t read history, make
it.” A review of Wes McDonald’s career vivies this poster for me—he is a rare combination
of history books and a world atlas. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946, but
he is a member of the Class of 1947—don’t ask me to explain that, just take my word for
it. I have spent a great deal of time explaining it, because Wes and I are classmates. We
are the only two still on active duty. The rest have gone on to be Presidents like Jimmy
Carter, CIA directors like Stanseld Turner, chief executive ofcers like Tom Pownall, and
Medal of Honor winners like Jim Stockdale. It was pointed out to me one sour note about
the whole business today, and I hesitate to repeat it, but there’s a distinct possibility that
after this ceremony, I may be the oldest man in the Navy. I am neither going to conrm
or disafrm that statement. I am going to ignore it.
The world has changed dramatically since Wes McDonald left Annapolis. He rst
ew in the “SNJ” and in the cloth-covered, tail-dragging “SNB”—otherwise known as
the “Secret Navy Bomber.” Today, F-14 jets can go faster straight up than the SNB could
straight down. His rst ship was CV-47, the Philippine Sea—remarkably simpler than this
magnicent vessel, USS America. When he was a midshipman, nuclear power, satellites,
missiles, and lasers were more comic strip material than reality and the volunteer Navy
was over two decades in the future.
In the 39 years since he graduated, he has served with distinction in peace and war:
ranging from a tour as an Air Force exchange pilot—the greatest sacrice of his career,
a trip to the South Pole accompanying Admiral Byrd in 1946, and leading the initial
air strike on North Vietnam in 1964. In time, he commanded a carrier, oversaw a naval
district, led a ghting eet, became a personnel management expert, and as OP 05 was
a prime mover in shaping today’s naval aviation.
Above all, Wes has managed to move with the times and to adjust as the world has
undergone economic, technological, and political change. He is one of the new breed of
leaders who is attuned not only to technological advance but also to the social pressures
of the modern world. He is a humanist with great empathy for those he leads and who
commands, not by at but by example. He is at home on the bridge of a ship, before Con-
gress, talking to civic clubs, managing funds, negotiating with foreign military leaders,
as well as telling exaggerated sea stories about the “good old days.” If I were to charac-
terize his most singular attribute, it would be as he was portrayed in the Lucky Bag [the
US Naval Academy yearbook] by his classmates at Annapolis 39 years ago: “Never too
busy to extend a cheery hello…, his genuine interest in others has made him one of the
best-liked fellows in the class.” That is still true today. Incidentally, he is the president
of our class today.
When we graduated thirty-nine years ago, the commencement speaker was James
Forrestal. I’ll be candid. I don’t remember a great deal that he said, but he gave us one
piece of advice that has stuck in my memory vividly over the years. He said, “Always
conduct yourself so that you are welcomed when you return to your hometown.” Wes
McDonald will always be welcome to return to his hometown.
In an age when many young men and women are searching for someone to emulate,
I would advise them to focus on Wes McDonald’s record of exceptional achievement and
of dedicated service to our great nation. His major accomplishment, of course, was mar-
rying Norma, a warm and very impressive lady. I’m sure that there is no one here that
would disagree. For some forty years, Wes and Norma have followed the colors, savoring
their life together. The Navy Times tells me on a full-page advertisement that the tough-
est job in the Navy is being a Navy wife. I frankly agree full-heartedly. Despite Wes’ long
hours, his numerous jet-setting trips across the Atlantic, and the demanding operational
requirements, Norma has always kept a steady hand on the helm as the First Lady of
the Atlantic—a superb representative of the command, the military services, and the
nation. Her leading role in the publication Wife Line in raising support for Navy relief and
in supporting the American Cancer Society has made her a most valued member of the
Navy community. We will all miss her patriotism, optimism, calmness, and graciousness.
Norma, I’m told that at retirement you have twice as much husband and half as much
pay, and I hope you can handle that.
The bottom line is that in richness of life and in the fullness of accomplishment, Wes
and Norma have outdone that recruiting poster by making history, not reading it. They
are graphic examples of how wonderful military life can be and how husband and wife
can work as a team. They are the best recruiting poster we could devise for young men
and women entering the Services today. This nation is blessed to have people like the
McDonalds who give so much of themselves in the behalf of others.
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Wes and Norma, speaking for your many friends in Hampton Roads, throughout the
Atlantic Command, our country, and in NATO, I wish you the best of everything in the
coming years.
As military people, change is a constant for us. With the departure of a comrade
comes the arrival of new friends. This continual process refreshes, stimulates, and
ensures quality armed forces. It is one of the great attractions of military life.
Today, we greet Lee Baggett and his lovely wife, Doris, from Pascagoula, Mississippi.
Lee is a distinguished ofcer with an enviable reputation. He fought in Korea and Viet-
nam. His credentials in NATO are also well-established: he has just completed a tour as
Commander of Allied Forces in Southern Europe and CINCUSNAVEUR. Like Wes, he
is totally familiar with the political-military world. But, unlike Wes, Lee and Doris are
avid golfers—fortunately, I believe they have the talent to overcome that handicap. Your
selection for this important position, Lee, underscores the faith the President and the
Secretary of Defense have in your skill, leadership, and devotion to duty. When you settle
in and survey your command, I believe that you will be impressed by its capabilities and,
above all, by its dedicated people. Lee and Doris, welcome aboard!
I am condent you will nd many rewarding challenges here. At the same time, I
urge you to enjoy the hospitality of Hampton Roads and all the richness of life it has to
offer. Finally, to all present today, I am mindful that we meet here on the eve of our great
national holiday. I wish you all—and especially to Wes and Norma as they depart Service
life—a blessed, safe, and happy Thanksgiving.
Statement on Defense Organization before the Senate Armed
Services Committee
December 12
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I welcome this opportunity to share with you my views on the organization and deci-
sionmaking procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unied commands. I believe your
current review of these matters to be timely, appropriate, and important to the Nation.
As you are aware, I have been in my post only ten weeks. It is probably a little pre-
mature for me to be making grand pronouncements about the duties of the Chairman
since I am still looking for some of the light switches in my ofce. However, I am not a
newcomer to the general subject, having served the last ve years in command of joint
and unied forces and three years before that on the JCS as the operations deputy to
the Chief of Naval Operations. In any event, despite my recent arrival, I intend today to
call the shots as I see them at this juncture.
Senate Staff Report and House Bill
As you know, we are engaged in a three-track process of review and possible reform
of the national security machinery. On November 20th, the House of Representatives
passed by a wide margin HR 3622, modifying the organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Concurrently, this committee is considering the House bill and the Senate Armed
Services Committee staff report with a view toward legislation not yet dened. Finally, a
Presidential Commission, headed by the Honorable David Packard, is examining oper-
ational and organizational arrangements in the Department of Defense, including, but
not limited to, the JCS.
I have not as yet seen any of the work or products of the Packard Commission, so I
cannot comment on its ndings. However, I have read the report prepared by your staff on
“Defense Organization: The Need for Change.” Similarly, I have studied the House Armed
Services Committee report on HR 3622, entitled “Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act
of 1985,” as well as the bulk of the testimony taken by this committee.
The SASC staff report includes some excellent historical material, treats thoughtfully
selected subjects (e.g., civilian control, German General Staff, etc.), and illuminates a
number of problem areas that deserve examination. Nevertheless, I would argue that
where the JCS is concerned, it is awed in three respects.
First, it builds an imbalanced case while quoting extensively from critics of the sys-
tem; it does not address the extensive role of the JCS in everyday operations and manage-
ment of our global forces. Overall, the one-sided approach of the report conveys a picture
of confusion and breakdown, which I believe is misleading. Moreover, the report leaves
the impression that the Chiefs of Service are unduly parochial, extremely self-serving,
and that log-rolling dominates the JCS. Even in the short time I have been aboard, it is
manifest to me that such a description does the JCS a disservice. I have never served
with a more thoughtful and broad-minded group of senior ofcers. They are human, of
course, and on occasion make mistakes, but all the organizations I have ever been asso-
ciated with suffer from those imperfections. I would not quarrel with the conclusion that
improvements can and should be made in the JCS organization. On the other hand, it
is not necessary to distort the picture in order to make that case.
Second, this same study has given short shrift to the changes made in the last
three years by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to improve internal management,
to encourage cross-Service cooperation, and to promote joint solutions to problems.
The testimony of the four Chiefs of Service this week treated these steps in some detail,
so I will not dwell on them. Sufce it to say, these recent improvements are especially
pertinent for your deliberations, and I would have preferred that the SASC report had
emphasized them in its analysis.
Last and most disturbing, the principal recommendation of the report—to replace
the JCS with a body of advisers divorced from both the operational and administrative
worlds of the Services—would add another layer to an already overloaded bureaucracy,
and its adoption would be, in my view, a serious mistake. I will have more to say on this
question later.
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The House Armed Services Committee report differs from the Senate staff effort in
two important ways. First, it does not attempt to judge JCS performance over the last
40 years—a matter on which honest people can genuinely disagree. Rather, it focuses
attention on the needs of today and suggests that the JCS and the Joint Staff should be
more detached from Service interests, deal more objectively with some tough resource-re-
lated issues, and move further to integrate US Armed Forces along lines envisioned in
the National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Act of 1958. Second, it does not
propose to completely reorganize the Department of Defense as it now exists.
Rather, the House report seeks further improvements in the JCS organization and
recommends some shift in lines of authority within the JCS structure.
Own Assessment
At this point I believe a few words about my own view of the JCS system are in order.
You are generally familiar with functions assigned to the JCS and the Joint Staff by
public law and DOD directive—i.e., to serve as principal military advisers; prepare strategic,
military, and logistics plans; and so on. But these crisp statements of function do not begin
to describe real-world demands placed upon the JCS system. To a great extent, these tasks
cut across the entire spectrum of Defense management, military preparedness, peacetime
operations, and war planning, with or without participation of our allies. They involve
strategic concepts, threat assessments, force development, current military planning on a
global scale, peacetime assignment of forces to the unied commands, joint reconnaissance
activities, worldwide exercise schedules, security assistance requirements and priorities,
overseas base negotiations, host nation support agreements, forces and options in support
of diplomatic objectives, crisis management, counterterrorism, and a host of complex issues
surrounding arms control initiatives and ventures. Given such a range of demands and
achievements, I would argue that the JCS has served the Nation rather well.
At the same time, I would readily admit that we should be seeking organizational
improvements. Unquestionably, the global strategic and military environments are in
ux. The worldwide sweep of our commitments, the burgeoning Soviet challenge, and
the complexity of our alliance network are taxing our ability to develop a resource-ef-
cient and coherent strategy, which will carry us into the future. Similarly, increasingly
constrained resources dictate that we get the maximum return on our investment.
In military terms, that means we must more and more operate jointly and make the
plans and programs of the Services more complementary. Complicating the picture is
terrorism and low-level conict in the Third World. Keeping pace with these develop-
ments is straining our capabilities. In response, Secretary Weinberger, working with
my predecessor, [US Army] General [John] Vessey and the Service Chiefs, has for some
time been seeking ways within the bounds of current legislation to improve Defense
organization and introduce more efcient procedures. The JCS views this challenge
as a continuing one, and you have had a succession of government witnesses testify
that there is indeed room for further modest organizational changes. I readily concur
with this assessment.
Philosophy
With this background and in the light of my own experience, I would like to share some
personal observations that condition or guide my approach to reorganization. These
thoughts are not new, but they seem to have a tendency to get lost as the debate intensies.
The principle of civilian control is deeply rooted in our Services from top to bottom. This
is not just a product of carefully crafted rules, but of our society’s mores, our educational
institutions, our recruitment and training system, and our way of life. In the spate of recent
reorganization studies, I have seen no serious recommendations that would threaten
civilian control. Clearly, national security is a complex and challenging business. The
predominant reason (but by no means the only one) that Defense organization does not
always perform as desired is that issues and choices facing the decisionmakers are both
diverse and thorny. This fact of life will not change no matter what organization we adopt.
When one addresses reorganization, he is essentially talking about redistributing
power, and this fact introduces a great deal of passion into the dialogue. One of the most
difcult tasks your committee faces will be to separate emotional from intellectual argu-
ments. Where so many vested interests and threads come together, evolutionary steps
are preferable to sharp and dramatic reform. If change is to be successfully implemented
in a large and complex organization such as the Defense Department, it must be done
in modest steps with at least a modicum of agreement among the competing elements.
Unintended and unpredictable consequences will inevitably attend every change. Mov-
ing in a deliberate rather than a precipitate fashion will allow managers to uncover and
better deal with such consequences as they emerge. The Joint Staff is directly dependent
on contributions from all the Service staffs and/or from the Service Chiefs themselves.
Every joint operation depends in part on specialized knowledge or expertise resident in
the Services, not to mention the necessary equipment and forces.
Organizational changes must honor this fundamental reality. Similarly, no matter how
much authority the Chairman has, he cannot know everything, and he will, of necessity,
be relying on others for assistance. No Chairman who takes his responsibilities seriously
would function in any other way. Thus, no matter what changes are made, it is imperative
that the Chairman’s ties and two-way channels of communication with the Chiefs of Ser-
vices be kept open. The balance of authority can be shifted somewhat, but the Chairman’s
effectiveness will always rest in large part on his ability to do business with the individual
Chiefs and Services. No matter what changes are made, it is vital to preserve the JCS chan-
nel for getting unvarnished military advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA).
Detailed Proposals
Let me now move from the general to the specic. I intend to speak to those recommen-
dations which impress me as the most important and to state my views briey. If you
desire, I will be happy to expand on my reasoning or to comment on other issues during
the questioning period.
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The JCS System Overall
I believe that the JCS system is the best mechanism this nation has for coordinating
the preparations for and the conduct of modern warfare. It brings together, as no other
system would, the views of Service Chiefs responsible for building forces (organizing,
equipping, training, and providing for the US Armed Forces) and the advice of the unied
commanders responsible for carrying out operational missions. It is also exible enough
to furnish a mechanism for the President to direct discrete military operations, as in
counterterrorism or other limited operations with a high political content from Wash-
ington with direct advice and support from the JCS. Such exibility is very important
in today’s dynamic climate. If you have concluded from the thrust of these remarks that
I would oppose replacing the JCS with a new body of advisers, such as the “Joint Mili-
tary Advisory Council” recommended in the SASC staff report, you would be correct. I
strongly believe that such a group would not be as effective as the current JCS in ren-
dering National Command Authorities practical military advice, in inuencing service
programs to support the needs of the operational forces, or in assisting the Chairman to
carry out his duties. I am aware, of course, that the “dual” responsibilities of the chiefs
are on occasion difcult to fulll, but I believe the strengths that derive from this arrange-
ment on balance outweigh the demerits. As mentioned earlier, my own experience argues
strongly for keeping the Chiefs of Services tied into the central mechanism.
Military Advice to National Command Authorities
Under the existing rules and practices, I do not feel particularly hampered in furnishing
my personal advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. I believe there is merit,
however, in designating the Chairman as the principal adviser, so that there is no ques-
tion about the Chairman’s right to express his own views on military issues. At the same
time, as emphasized earlier, it is important that the JCS’ right to render their collective
advice on their own initiative, as opposed to “on request,” should be protected. In this
regard, I support requiring the Chairman to set forth the dissenting views of other Chiefs
if they do, in fact, disagree with the Chairman. Some of the Chiefs testied last week that
they would like the Chairman to act as principal adviser “on behalf of” the JCS. I have
no problem with this proposal.
Management of the Joint Staff
I join a commonly held view that the management of the Joint Staff needs more attention.
With respect to the Joint Staff, I already have considerable authority. As Chairman, I set
the agenda for the JCS, can force items forward whether there is agreement or not, and
can task the Joint Staff to meet my own requirements. The one area that concerns me now
is the control of the Staff’s workload. As others have noted, the Joint Staff handles thou-
sands of issues annually, representing requests from many directions, including the service
chiefs, commanders of the unied commands, the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense,
OSD, and the Congress. I know of no other civilian or military staff that receives taskings
from so many sources. The Chairman sees a few hundred of these papers as they move
to the top of an agenda, which he controls. But I am equally concerned about those other
actions that may be diverting the Joint Staff from more important and relevant business.
Thus, I strongly believe that the Chairman, assisted by the Director, should be authorized
to review and screen all taskings to the Joint Staff with discretionary authority to return
low-priority or ill-dened items to the originator. The Chiefs and I have discussed this prob-
lem and I believe we can resolve it without legislative action. No matter what management
system we adopt, it is vital that any chief be permitted to table questions that he feels are
important to our security and have them aired in the JCS. Thus, whatever authority you
give me, I would move to see that such access for the Chiefs is protected.
Military Chain of Command
I tend to agree with those concerned about having the JCS as a corporate body in the mil-
itary chain of command. DOD Directive 5100.30 partially solves the committee problem
by specifying that “the channel of communication for execution of the Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP) and other time-sensitive operations shall be from the NCA through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
executing commanders.” Additionally, I favor the chain of command running through the
Chairman, as a standard practice, if the Secretary of Defense or President deem it desirable.
Deputy or Vice Chairman
One proposal for strengthening the Chairman’s position is a four-star deputy or vice
chairman. Several variants have been discussed during the course of these hearings.
I personally concur with promoting the Director to four-stars and designating him as
a “vice chairman.” To me this is a logical step toward sharing the Chairman’s duties,
thereby permitting him to manage his time better and strengthening management of
the Joint Staff. I do, however, subscribe to the present arrangement where the Chiefs of
Service act in the Chairman’s stead during his absence from Washington and assume
this responsibility for a set period. My short time in ofce has convinced me that both
the Services and the JCS benet from the Chiefs’ experience as Acting Chairman.
Role and Authority of the CINCs
Having just completed serving as a unied commander for two years in the Pacic, I am
concerned with one other issue—the role and authority of the CINCs. I expressed myself in
writing on this subject last year in response to queries from this committee. In essence, it
is my strong belief that the directives governing the CINC’s place in the chain of command
should be reassessed and their role somewhat strengthened. The JCS have discussed
this issue and have already initiated a review of the governing document, “Unied Action
Armed Forces”, colloquially known as JCS PUB 2. At this reading, it appears we can
achieve what needs to be done without legislation. In any event, I would urge you not to
act on this particular question until we have completed our assessment and reported the
resulting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. We anticipate that this action will
be completed in six months. In this regard, the House bill recommends that the Chairman
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be given responsibility to “supervise” the CINCs in addition to his current responsibilities.
In a limited sense, I do that now as the agent of the Secretary of Defense. But I do see some
merit in codifying this relationship, since it would dispel any confusion.
Mr. Chairman, these remarks cover my principal concerns and suggestions. Overall,
I am deeply impressed by this committee’s effort to come to grips with Defense organi-
zational issues which, to quote your staff report, have confounded some of the “most
thoughtful, decisive, and experienced” minds we have. Your decision to broaden these
hearings, with reference to work already accomplished by the House, has made it easier
for me to survey the landscape of possibilities and to express my preference for the general
direction of change. I can assure you that I and the Chiefs collectively and individually
are taking very seriously your efforts to improve the Defense machinery.
We have a vested interest in improving our ability to carry out our responsibilities
and are determined to work with you in this endeavor.
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SELECTED WORKS
Statement on FY 1987 DOD Budget before the Senate Budget Committee
February 6
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee today and provide my assess-
ment of the nation’s Defense establishment. While I am convinced that the current pos-
ture of the Armed Forces is sound, I likewise believe there is a great deal yet to be done to
insure the nation’s future security—particularly in the face of a steadily increasing Soviet
threat and Moscow’s broadening use of surrogates. I am, of course, aware that there is
some pressure to cut back Defense appropriations in an effort to assist in reducing the
current national decit.
Therefore, I believe it important, in my rst opportunity as Chairman to testify on the
budget, that I comment not only on the status of our Armed Forces but as well on the
role military strength plays in US policymaking and in the American relationship with
the international community. I would strongly argue that deliberations on the military
budget should commence with a clear understanding of what our Defense establishment
does for us.
The Role of US Military Strength
The Secretary of Defense has provided the Congress with a comprehensive statement of
US defense policy. That statement notes, among other things, that the fundamental goals
of our National Security Policy have remained essentially unchanged since the 1940s to:
• Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United
States;
• Preserve US and allied vital interests abroad; and
• Shape an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions
can survive and prosper.
These are not just empty words—they genuinely describe what our strength can and
does do for us. It has provided us a great deal more than simply a shield against direct
attack. That same power underwrites our dealings with the international community—for
example, to use the sea lanes, to communicate with friends overseas, to approach arms
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control negotiations with condence, and to cement alliances which, in turn, enhance
our own security. In fact, our strength has been an indispensable pillar not only of our
own freedom but also the freedom of our friends and allies around the world.
For ve years before returning to Washington, I served in command billets that
brought me in touch with most of our major allies and a good share of the Third World.
In NATO, I observed rsthand that our military contribution to that coalition anchors its
unity and political structure. When I served as USCINCPAC, a succession of Asian lead-
ers emphasized to me the importance of a strong America with forces forward-deployed
in the Western Pacic. In their view, our strength has deterred Soviet interference and
intimidation. Behind that bulwark they have been able to seek economic prosperity and
political maturity in their own fashion and at their own pace. I was continually warned
that a decided Soviet military superiority in the Pacic would be disastrous.
In the last month, I have visited both Central America and the Middle East. Clearly,
the leaders in both areas want a strong America as a backdrop for their efforts to build
free and functioning societies. To allow our strength to deteriorate would seriously under-
mine their efforts as well as sacrice our own goals.
In essence, our military capability provides us a host of benets in terms of both
national security and foreign policy. Every day we are realizing a return on our invest-
ment as the Armed Forces provide an umbrella under which all our other cards are
played.
These considerations have, over the years, shaped our general military strategy. Its
key components are:
• Collective security coupled with a vigorous overseas defense of the United States;
• A strong and credible strategic deterrent to either nuclear or conventional military
attack on the United States and its allies;
• Capable forward-deployed conventional forces to assist allies and to deal quickly
with emerging crises;
• A central reserve to augment forward-deployed units or deal with the unforeseen
circumstances over a wide spectrum of violence (to include low-intensity conict
and counterterrorism) and in a variety of climes;
• The sea and airlift capability to project and support US forces on a global basis;
• The ability to ensure America’s free and uninterrupted use of the seas for trade
and security purposes;
• A vigorous security assistance program to aid allies and friends in improving their
ability to defend themselves; and
• A willingness to engage in meaningful arms limitation negotiations.
These principles, of course, combine to make up our military policy. Granted, it is
a demanding strategy, but one that bets our goals and our position as a leader of the
Free World. Even though this strategy does not call for the United States to match its
adversaries weapon for weapon, I often hear the argument that we should cut back our
commitments to better t our resources. But the proponents of such a philosophy don’t
seem to be able to reach agreement on what commitments to cut back, what regions to
neglect, or what allies to cut adrift. Without such a consensus, the argument has little
force, particularly, in today’s interdependent and uncertain world.
The Threat
By denition, our strategy is determined not only by our own interests but also by the
actions of our opponents. As Secretary Weinberger emphasizes in his statement, “in this
respect the Soviet Union remains the dominant consideration,” Moscow still harbors
dreams of unlimited expansion and of the ultimate defeat of the free world. Yet commu-
nism’s ideological appeal has steadily lost ground, and the Kremlin has been plagued
with a host of intractable economic and political problems. As a result, Soviet leaders
are turning more and more to raw power to achieve their objectives, either directly or
indirectly—witness Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. The thrust of their
military buildup is ambitious, hostile to free governments, and persistent.
Over the last 30 years, every one of my predecessors has expressed concern about the
Soviet worldwide threat and the evolving military balance. Today, the sheer size of current
Soviet forces and the scale and momentum of the Kremlin’s modernization efforts are of
signicant concern. Tremendous advances have been made in hardware over the last two
decades, upsetting many of the advantages we held in the immediate post-war period.
For example, the strategic nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The Soviets now
enjoy superiority in ICBMs, medium-range nuclear forces, and in mobile ballistic mis-
siles. They are a burgeoning nuclear power intent on achieving dominance over the US
strategic deterrent. As to conventional arms, they lead the world. The Soviet inventory
includes about a 4-to-1 advantage over the United States in tanks, 2-to-1 in aircraft,
and 5-to-1 in artillery. These gaps will likely continue to grow, since the Soviets have
historically produced more weapons than the combined efforts of the United States and
NATO. The personnel picture is no different. Active Soviet military forces outnumber US
active forces by about 2-to-1. Similarly, their progress in space commands deep respect:
e.g., satellites, ABMs, and ASATs. Perhaps most impressive is the rise of the Soviet navy
in the last 30 years from a short-legged regional force to a blue water eet with a global
reach. I won’t dwell on statistics because Russian accomplishments are well-documented
in our Posture Statement and Defense literature. In sum, this buildup is unprecedented
in world history and on sheer momentum will carry well into the 1990s, if not longer. In
this regard, it is important to note:
Soviet military doctrine consistently stresses the offense and a “war winning” philosophy.
• Their forces vastly exceed those necessary to defend their own shores.
• They are today capable of waging war on two fronts, both in the east and in the
west.
• Given their modern navy and political connections with satellite countries, they
now have a global military reach.
• The Soviets possess an overwhelming superiority in the area of offensive chemical
weapons.
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Most disturbing, the qualitative edge the West has long enjoyed is being eroded. This
has been achieved through large R&D investments, emphasis on technological education
(4 times as many engineers as the United States in the last 10 years), piracy of Western
technology, and a willingness to accept inefciencies in the process.
Special mention must be made of the increasing Soviet tendency to act through sur-
rogates. The USSR is the world’s largest arms salesman, delivering some $95 billion in
weapons over the last decade. Approximately $80 billion worth of equipment, some new
and some outdated by Soviet standards, has been funneled into the Third World during
the same period. In turn, Soviet customers are emerging as the military powerhouses of
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Moreover,
Moscow continues to be successful in having its clients act against Western governments
and peoples. The result is a burgeoning terrorist threat, more small but erce regional
conicts, and an increasing willingness of small anti-American regimes to challenge
Washington. Perhaps this trend is the result of our success in preserving a rough bal-
ance of power which deters direct Soviet action against the West, but the fact remains it
presents a serious and growing challenge to the US military.
Concurrently, we see new leadership in the Kremlin, which appears to be reinvigorat-
ing the [Communist] Party apparatus. We also know that with all of its military muscle,
the Kremlin faces some very thorny political, economic, and social problems. How all of
this will affect Soviet behavior over the next few years remains to be seen. I am convinced,
however, that the United States will be in a far better position to inuence the Gorbachev
regime if we continue discussions and negotiations from a position of increasing rather
than sagging military strength.
Whatever you decide, let it be based on a full and unemotional appreciation of the
peril we face. These threats cannot be assumed away, nor is it necessary to overstate
them. They are impressive and ominous in their own right.
Current Status and the FY 1987 Budget
Let me now move to the state of our Armed Forces. Last year, General Vessey testied
before this committee that “by every common sense measure, our forces are more ready
than at any time in the recent past.” That statement remains valid today and is made pos-
sible by the support of our citizenry and the Congress. On behalf of the men and women
in the Armed Forces, I thank you. Each of the service chiefs will testify in some detail
as to the major concerns and the requirements of his service. I will speak to our overall
war-ghting capability from my perspective as Chairman. To do this, I have selected ve
broad areas of interest—manpower, modernization, training, sustainability, and Special
Operations Forces. Before proceeding, however, a few words are in order concerning the
FY 1986 scal climate.
As a result of a decision to level Defense spending this year and subsequent across-
the-board cuts, mandated by Public Law 99-177, we already have seen a number of
funding dislocations which will impact our military posture. This includes a 5 percent
reduction in operations and maintenance funding, which is forcing some belt-tighten-
ing in such areas as base management, operations tempo, and essential maintenance.
Further, we see some freezes in civilian hiring as well as realignments in military
personnel rotation and travel accounts. While we are striving to work around these
problems, I cannot emphasize too strongly the adverse impact of such cuts on the
readiness of our forces and the stability of military life. They threaten to undo much
of what has been accomplished in the last few years as we have fought back from the
neglect following Vietnam.
Manpower
In particular, I would not want to see reversed the remarkable improvements in our
manpower situation, which is the heart of our force structure. Overall, personnel read-
iness is at its highest level of any peacetime period in our history. About 50 percent of
the forces are careerists, and as a result, we have a solid cadre of mid-grade ofcer and
enlisted personnel. The Nation can be extremely proud of the high caliber of its Service
men and women.
FY 1985 was another successful year for all the Services. The quality of our recruits
exceeded that of FY 1984. Among our non-prior service enlistees, 93 percent were high
school diploma graduates and 93 percent scored average or above on the enlistment test.
However, as you are aware, the youth population from which the Services can recruit contin-
ues to shrink, and recruiting can be expected to become a growing challenge in the future.
Retention continued at very high levels for FY 1985 as well, but not without potential
warning signs. Overall, enlisted retention declined from FY 1984 levels for all Services in
all categories except for rst termers in the Army. This has aggravated shortages in some
of our enlisted skills. In addition, the Navy still is having difculty retaining sufcient
nuclear ofcers and, along with the Air Force, continues to lose experienced pilots. In
and of itself, none of this is cause for great alarm at this time. But it does serve to remind
us that personnel readiness, recognized as the cornerstone of our national defense, is
very fragile indeed.
The bottom line is that our most precious asset is quality personnel; consequently,
as we approach the FY 1987 budget, a healthy personnel structure is the rst priority
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is imperative that we have programs which will attract
and retain adequate numbers of dedicated, intelligent, and disciplined soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines. Under no circumstances can we afford to return to the unstable
manpower picture of the 1970s.
Modernization—Strategic Nuclear Forces
Turning to force modernization, the United States has no choice but to maintain a credi-
ble nuclear deterrent for itself and for those non-nuclear allies who depend upon it. Stated
in different terms, we should be able to tell the Soviet Union: “You cannot coerce us with
your nuclear arsenals, because if you launch those weapons you will suffer as much if
not more damage than the United States.”
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Unfortunately, US strategic force modernization lagged far behind Soviet efforts
during the 1970s. As a result, we have been forced to refurbish all three legs of the triad
at the same time—notably with the Peacekeeper missile, the B-1 bomber, and the Trident
submarine. Current plans call for placing 50 Peacekeepers into modied Minuteman
silos. In addition, we urgently need to continue research into more survivable modes
for basing the second 50 missiles and development of a smaller ICBM/mobile launcher.
By the end of this year, the rst 20 of 100 B-1 bombers will have been delivered to
the Strategic Air Command. Over the next several years, this program will partially
and temporarily modernize the manned bomber element of our triad. Concurrently, we
must move ahead with the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), so that it can be ready
for deployment in the 1990s.
Thereafter, we will have a prudent mix of B-1B and ATB types. Additionally, we now
have ve deployable Trident submarines, with two more on sea trials. Each carries 24
improved C-4 missiles. In various phases, contracting and construction work continues
on an additional six submarines funded by Congress through FY 1986.
This budget would fund the 14th Trident plus the D-5 missile. Because of its hard-tar-
get kill capability, the D-5 goes a long way toward increasing the potency and credibility
of our strategic nuclear posture. In order to guard against tactical and technical sur-
prise, it is essential to have an updated and healthy triad which will see us into the next
century. The President’s modernization program will give us that capability if it is fully
carried out. We cannot afford to do otherwise.
Looking to the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wholeheartedly support the President’s
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which will muster the Nation’s technological talent to
determine whether an alternative to sole reliance on mutual assured destruction is fea-
sible. It is both prudent and moral for the United States to explore means for ending the
dominance of offensive ballistic missile weaponry.
Modernization—Chemical Warfare
Additionally, the JCS fervently support efforts initiated in the FY 1986 budget to develop
an updated deterrent chemical capability. This program is necessary to offset a serious
disadvantage on the battleeld and to counter offensive and defensive asymmetries
strongly favoring the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the American ghting man
in the eld, it is difcult to overemphasize this request.
Modernization—General Purpose Forces
I have just returned from Europe and was able to witness rsthand some of the modern
weapons and equipment which have come into the inventory as a result of investments
made over the last six years. Similarly, during my tour in the Pacic, we received a
stream of modern weapon systems. It is most impressive and is benetting Active,
Reserve, and National Guard forces alike. My FY 1987 Posture Statement documents
these advances in some detail. It’s not just quantity we are adding, but quality as well.
Test scores in gunnery and bombing are steadily climbing, in great measure because
of improved munitions and re control systems for use with tanks, artillery, ghter and
attack aircraft, and ships. Higher speeds in the M-1 tank and Bradley ghting vehicle
have permitted a quantum jump in the pace of our land warfare capabilities. Improved
reliability and less time spent in maintenance are characteristics of these new weapon
systems, which equate to increased capability.
Similarly, recent investments in airlift and sealift have materially enhanced the abil-
ity to project power in every theater. I personally watched the fast sealift ship (ALGOL)
unload in Antwerp port a few days ago during exercise REFORGER. In six days it moved
from Norfolk to Western Europe 33,000 metric tons, including 1,150 pieces of major
equipment. Everything was unloaded in 21 hours. The integrated Aegis system is at sea
and exceeding expectations in missile kill capability.
While we have made great progress over the last six years, it is also important to
stress that we are only midstream in the conventional force modernization process. To
cite some FY 1985 gures from the Active Army, about:
• One-third of our tank battalions have the new M-1;
• One-fourth of our mechanized battalions have the Bradley ghting vehicle;
• Two-thirds of aviation companies have the improved Blackhawk helicopter; and
• One-fth of the air defense SAM missile batteries are equipped with the new
PATRIOT.
In general, these modernized units give our people a fair chance to deter and defend
in areas where they may be “rst to ght,” as in the Central Region of NATO. But those
units not modernized—a majority of Active Army battalions and many in Reserve com-
ponents—remain behind the power curve in equipment quality, particularly as rein-
forcements for NATO.
With respect to US tactical air forces, I nd similar trends. Over the last ten years,
roughly two-thirds of the Air Force’s tactical ghter squadrons have been modernized with
the F-15, F-16, and A-10. During the same period, the Navy modernized over half of its tacti-
cal air squadrons with such types as the F-14 or F-18. For both Services, this modernization
process has not trickled down as much or as fast to the Reserves as we would like to see.
Our “blue water” Navy also is only partially into the modernization process, particu-
larly with the new Aegis-equipped ships, which will add protection to our carrier battle
groups in tomorrow’s sophisticated electronic environment and help compensate for the
Soviet numerical superiority. Only four battle groups are now so equipped. In addition,
we remain midstream in efforts to modernize our nuclear attack submarine force, with
only 33 of the 688-Class in a force of 96. If we are to face the future with the condence
that we can reinforce our allies, as on the anks of NATO, or keep Soviet pressure off the
sea lines of communication, then we must persevere with these modernization efforts.
In summary, we have made great progress over the last six years updating our con-
ventional forces so that they can survive on the modern battleeld and compete with the
Soviet threat of today and over the horizon. More progress will be seen over the next two
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years as equipment currently in the pipeline reaches our combat forces. But it should
be clearly understood that we are still midstream in the modernization effort. To falter
now would not only stretch out the entire process but would also erode many of the
gains already made and, frankly, prove more expensive in the end. The FY 1987 budget
recognizes this reality and continues the momentum.
Training and Exercises
New acquisitions have been complemented by a rigorous training program designed to
capitalize on their enhanced capabilities: our exercises are bringing together all the Ser-
vices and increasingly include National Guard and Reserve units. Over the last year, the
JCS scheduled some 95 exercises designed to evaluate doctrine, tactics, procedures, and
command and control arrangements involving multiservice and multinational compo-
nents. Concurrently, overseas deployment training by Army Reserve component soldiers
is up by nearly 50 percent compared with ve years ago.
Likewise, we are stressing more and more the logistics side of war ghting. A few
examples are illustrative. The REFORGER exercise in Western Europe recently tested
every aspect of reception and onward movement of reinforcements from the continental
United States using host-nation support from our European allies. TEAM SPIRIT per-
forms a similar function for the reinforcement of Korea. Central Command’s BRIGHT
STAR exercise is growing in realism every year and enhancing our ability to project power
into the Middle East. These are just the tip of an exercise iceberg. In sum, our training
is steadily becoming more joint, realistic, and innovative.
Sustainability
Other improvements can be seen in the sustainability or combat “staying power” of our
forces. As a system, sustainability includes war reserve stockpiles (munitions and spares),
transportation capabilities, and industrial surge capacities. We worry about potential
“war stoppers” or their impact on the theater nuclear threshold. Thus, our goal in sus-
tainability is “logistic support to our conventional forces from initiation to successful
termination of any conicts.”
In line with this goal, we have seen substantial growth in US expenditures for sus-
tainability over the last six years. In the past four years, the funding for ammunition has
grown by over 25 percent; spare parts funding has doubled; and ammunition inventories
of all services have improved substantially. In Europe, for instance, ground ammunition
tonnage is up 18 percent, and it has almost doubled in the Pacic. Munitions deciencies
which plagued us for years are improving steadily, but at the current rate of expenditures,
it will be several years before we can near our goals and breathe easier.
The FY 1987 budget still puts considerable emphasis on sustainability—and rightfully
so. But years of neglect cannot be remedied easily or quickly. We simply must stay the
course if we want a genuinely sustainable force as well as a modern and well-trained
one. Otherwise, we will be spending a great deal for modern equipment with one hand
and then reducing its effectiveness with the other.
Special Operations Forces
A particular word about Special Operations Forces [SOF] is in order. While small in total
strength, our Special Operations Forces have enormous utility and value in peace, crisis,
or war. Some are specically tailored, dedicated, and readily available to protect American
lives and property overseas against international terrorists or other nongovernmental
groups hostile to the United States.
SOF units are comprised of the US Army Special Forces and Ranger battalions, US
Air Force Special Operations Forces, and the US Navy SEAL teams. Major equipment
initiatives include more helicopters with specialized mission equipment, improved AC-130
gunships, air transports, long-range communications, dry-deck shelters on submarines,
and SEAL delivery vehicles, along with related support facilities. Overall, the program
remains on track in FY 1986 with:
• An increase in Army contingents including CH-47D helicopters and related sup-
port;
• Expansion of the Navy’s Special Warfare Training School and number of SEAL
platoons; and
• New equipment acquisitions by the Air Force to upgrade the SOF aviation sup-
port eet.
Simultaneously, considerable thought has been put into the command and control
problem. I am persuaded that we now have a system which gives us considerable exi-
bility and permits us to exercise whatever degree of operational supervision is indicated
by the circumstances.
Essentially, we have made remarkable improvements in SOF capabilities and read-
iness since the early 1980s. I also support the incremental approach toward improve-
ment embodied in the general SOF revitalization program and in particular the FY 1987
submission. Many specialized and unique capabilities simply cannot be achieved on a
“crash” basis. The program will require careful monitoring and management over the next
few years to ensure that various components of the revitalization effort remain on track.
Overall Capability
Overall, the war-ghting capability of the US Armed Forces, Active and Reserve, remains
at a high state. Keeping it there requires us to focus on two facts of life.
One, readiness is a composite of several factors: combat equipment, personnel, main-
tenance, exercises, and supply levels. As General George Brown observed exactly ten
years ago, neglect in any one of these areas can stress separate parts of the system with
an impact on overall posture. The process of deterioration may seem gradual, but the
breakdown in credible military capability, should it occur, would be instant.
Readiness does not determine by itself how well a force will acquit itself in combat. A
force less than fully ready may do very well. Conversely, a 100 percent ready force still
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may not have adequate military capability because of quantitative or qualitative decien-
cies in force structure. The obvious conclusion is that force structure and readiness are
not an either/or proposition. We need to be strong in both areas. The President’s budget
for FY 1987 strikes such a balance.
Summary and Conclusions
Mr. Chairman, our military posture today is driven by a number of real-world demands,
many of which have evolved over the last 30 years. If anything, we have become more
rather than less dependent upon global peace and security than we were two or three
decades ago. Layered on top of these demands is a Soviet threat which has steadily
increased over time in all dimensions of modern warfare and in all of the regions which
concern us most. In this environment, I see no substitute for peace through strength.
Further, I believe that the prospects of inuencing the Soviet Union toward a constructive
posture in world affairs will depend inevitably upon our capability to negotiate from a
position of strength, both today and over the long haul.
Beyond these strategic imperatives, the President’s budget for FY 1987 has several
other military qualities, which I support. It:
• Strongly emphasizes those capabilities essential to US security while covering
others which only we can provide as a superpower and as a partner in global
security arrangements;
• Continues to esh out essential improvements in our strategic nuclear and conven-
tional force structure, along with new initiatives in the high frontiers of technology
and improvements in military compensation;
• Maintains a carefully crafted balance between equipment modernization, person-
nel readiness, training and exercises, maintenance and supply, and sustainability;
• Provides that growth necessary not only to continue improvements in our military
posture but also to lead our allies toward a similar commitment of resources; and
• Most important, it sends a strong message of deterrence to our enemies.
This is not to say that this budget eliminates risk. Our challenges are many and
our adversaries are large, powerful, and dedicated. On a typical day, we have roughly
475,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines serving on or around the Eurasian con-
tinent—essentially where our forward defense commitments abut or overlap the forward
posture of Soviet Armed Forces. We count on these Americans and our allies to deter
in a very high threat environment. We also recognize that they must be backed up by
capable and ready forces in the United States for both deterrence and defense purposes.
Yet, over $35 billion has been removed from the FY 1986 budget from what we counted
on just a year ago. This is negative real growth of about 6 percent. Decrements of this
nature require signicant changes and rebalancing. The price in defense is in stretching
out and increasing the cost in modernization and in reaching sustainment goals. We will
also give up more desirable levels of ying hours, combat vehicle mileage, and steaming
days. We are hitching up our britches and taking a greater risk. But this is as far as I
advise we go. We need a balanced program that allows for some real growth in FY 1987.
The President’s budget does that.
Excerpts of Remarks at the Dining-In for the Joint Staff
Fort Myer, Virginia | February 7
General McKnight, on behalf of all of us, I’d like to extend a hearty thank you to you
and the Marine Corps for tonight. We’ve enjoyed it so much. I don’t know when I’ve seen
so much health concentrated in one group. I certainly haven’t seen it in the Joint Staff.
It’s my intention not to be too serious for a few minutes, but before that, there is one seri-
ous note I would like to strike. I’ve had a tough week, and I found out why General Vessey
left when he did—I’m surprised General Olson didn’t go with him. It was a tough week, and
it raised the question: If pro is the opposite of con, is progress the opposite of Congress?
I came here tonight expecting to have a good time, but I was really surprised. I was
shocked and moved to nd out how the knowledge of tonight’s event was so widespread.
Before I get too deeply into my remarks, I’d like to read to you a message I was handed
just prior to tonight’s festivities. It says, “Dear Bill, Nancy and I want to wish you and the
ofcers of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a festive and fun evening as you
partake in one of the military’s oldest traditions—the dining-in. We want you to know that
we appreciate all of the important contributions you have made and are making to our
nation’s defense. The hard work and dedication shown by you and the staff of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is one of the many reasons we remain at peace. Enjoy your evening and our
best wishes.” The message is signed, “Ron and Nancy Lieberman of Falls Church, Virginia.”
I am always a little intimidated by invitations to address a dining-in. They have the
reputation of beginning at 1830 sharp and sometimes ending at 2300 dull! I was more
intimidated tonight when I looked at the uniform being worn by Mr. Vice, Dale Jones.
A few years ago, I was asked to be the guest speaker at an Air Force dining-in. After
delivering what I believed to be a respectable effort—although I must admit there were
some needles aimed at the Air Force in my remarks—the President of the Mess asked
Mr. Vice to toast the guest speaker. A repulsively self-condent young second lieutenant
stood up and proposed the following: “We thank the Air Force for our bread and gravy;
for our indigestion we thank the Navy.” I just hope that tonight’s Mr. Vice has a little more
respect for his elders—although obviously Table One does not. Speaking to this group
is like being the point man for “Rotor-Rooter”—you never quite know what you may get
into, but you’re pretty sure you’re not going to like it.
I talked over my invitation tonight with our Mess President, General McKnight. He
wasn’t exactly the picture of condence. I don’t know what he expected when I asked
how many people would be there or how big the dining room was. He said, “Well, it sleeps
about 300.” As many of you know, Mac came to us after serving as the Commanding
General of the United States Army Information Systems Command. Pretty impressive
title, isn’t it? General McKnight is a man of many parts, few of which work. Someone on
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his staff at ISC said that when he left the Information Systems Command and came to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff it raised the intelligence level of both staffs. I don’t know what
you’re laughing at. I don’t think you understand the joke. (That would be funny if they
were kidding.) General Vessey told me before he left that Mac has come a long way since
getting his third star—so much so that he now has delusions of adequacy. Please bear
in mind I owed Mac a few digs. On the way over, when I expressed some apprehension
about my own remarks, he told me, “Don’t worry, they don’t expect much.”
Of course, I would be remiss if I didn’t pay my respects to another valued member of
the Staff—Dale Vesser. Some of you may not know Dale; he’s seldom around. He’s usually
at the Pentagon Athletic Center beating up on some second lieutenant on the squash
courts. He’s the only member of the [Joint] Staff whose phone rings at the POAC. Around
the building, it’s said that Dale Vesser is the only one that can make me look good in a
uniform. When I became Chairman, there were a lot of remarks made that I dressed like
an unmade bed. A reporter covering the swearing-in ceremony described my uniform
as “slightly rumpled.” With Dale, you can take out the word “slightly.” Dale, of course,
is doing a superb job as our J-5, but I must admit I was a little concerned when we had
our rst meeting and he told me that he didn’t think “international relations” were any
worse than any other kind of in-laws.
It’s good to see the Assistant to the Chairman here tonight. You wouldn’t think you
could make fun of John Moellering. Just wait. He is lling one of the most important jobs
in our organization—one in which you have to know a lot about politics. I knew I had to
hire John while I was interviewing him, because of his attitude toward politics. He told
me that “Politics was a lot like sex—you don’t have to be good at it to enjoy it.” (I saw that
proved graphically in the Congress this week!) You may not know this but in his spare
time John has done some creative writing—and the IRS wants to talk to him about it.
John is a West Pointer and I am a Naval Academy graduate. We were reminiscing one
day, and I asked John why West Point had a jackass for a mascot. (I hope you guys take
this joke all right!) He told me that it was because the Army had rst choice—Navy got
the Marine Corps! Is there nothing sacred? Not this evening, there isn’t.
As I look around the room tonight, the only one I see taking notes is Al Hansen, our
J-4. I understand that he is an absolute information fanatic and has to know everything
that is going on. I have to really question a man like Al when he says that he is really
looking forward to testifying before the Congress about logistics. That’s a lot like asking
for a ride on the Titanic. Any Air Force pilot who can graduate from the Air Force Aircraft
Maintenance Ofcer’s Course with honors—he never talks about that in front of other
Air Force ofcers. He’s got a number of weird organizations down there, but I discovered
one this week that’s really quite interesting to me. It’s a medical ofce. He’s got a couple
of medical ofcers, including Commander Haurahan. I didn’t quite know what they did
down there, but I know they were connected with medicine in some fashion. I discovered
last week that they’ve been suggesting that Bo Derek dedicate her body to medical sci-
ence—every Thursday afternoon here in their ofce. Has a certain ring about it, doesn’t it?
I’m especially pleased to see the newest general ofcer on the staff here tonight—Dick
Burpee. It’s good to have you here, Dick. Dick ew F-4s in Southeast Asia back in the late
sixties and still thinks he is a ghter pilot. He’s the only ghter pilot I’ve ever met who
wasn’t named Ace, Buzz, Zippy, or Moose. Aviators are a constant source of amazement
to me. They are so shy and retiring. Actually, if over-condence were an event in the
Olympics, I’m sure we’d send a ghter pilot.
The next man I want to welcome to the festivities tonight is Lenny Peroots, the man
with the Intelligence, or something like that. Lenny told me recently that the best three
years of his life were spent in the fourth grade. He told me right after he became the head
of DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] that before he got the job, he led a lonely, shallow, and
meaningless life. Now he is no longer lonely. We are currently reviewing his job description.
I understand that the idea for tonight’s dining-in came from Brad Hosmer. Brad,
on behalf of all of us, thanks a lot! Brad joins John Moellering as being the only two
people around that are old but still look like their graduation photos in their academy
yearbooks. At Christmas, I thought about giving John Moellering a razor as a present.
His wife said, “Fine, but he doesn’t use blades yet.” Sort of sickening, isn’t it? Both still
get asked for proof of age. It serves you right, Brad, to have to work for Powell Carter.
Powell’s the only man that Dale Carnegie ever punched in the mouth! (I’m sorry Powell’s
not here tonight.) Brad’s so smart that he was once turned down by the television show
“Real People” because he didn’t qualify.
I think it’s appropriate that I say something about the people in my immediate ofce.
John Bitoff and I have been together for a long, long time, off and on. He believes a reli-
gious experience is a bottle of Blue Nun.
Howie Chandler is an F-16 pilot who works for me as an aide. He is single—at least
for the moment. Very ne young man. He is an incurable romantic. That’s the reason he
needs 30,000 units of penicillin every day. He’s the man who told me that the difference
between a dog and a fox is ve martinis.
Eva Pedene is a very ne young lady. When she rst came in, I told her that I would never
ask men and women who work for me to do anything that I wouldn’t ask my aide to do.
Joe Donnell and I have been together for a long time. You do notice Joe occasionally.
Joe is a light drinker. Whenever it’s light, he drinks.
I have had quite a bit of association with Dean Sackett, who is now advising us on one
of the most difcult problems the country is facing—of course, arms limitations. I’m not
so sure we’re getting the best advice. Dean was driving out to Dulles Airport and came
to a sign that says, “Dulles, Left.” So he thought about it a minute, turned around, and
came back. Reminds me of E. F. Hutton—when Dean talks, nobody listens.
Of course, I’m close-aided, assisted, and plagued by the Chairman’s Staff Group.
Waldo Freeman and I have become cohorts, compadres in crime, regarding NATO.
Waldo is a pretty forbidding person, and I didn’t realize how much until we were walking
through an airport and a Mooney came up and told him to have a bad day.
Before I wear out my welcome here tonight, I want all of you to know that my address
is given in the spirit of friendly rivalry. I say that so I can get out to my car after this
dining-in is over.
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As you no doubt have deduced, I enjoy a good joke, and I attach great importance
to an individual’s ability to see the humor that surrounds us all. A third grader, when
asked what would happen if there were no stories in the world, replied that we would all
die of seriousness. There’s a lot of truth in that.
I have attended many dining-ins in my life, and it has always seemed to me that a good
offense is the best defense. Since you are going to offend someone before the evening is
over, I have always adopted a policy of offending as many people as possible. Neither time
nor my knowledge permit me to offend everybody here this evening. However, I apologize to
those I missed. I am sure that there are many in the audience who deserve some attention.
Despite these foregoing irreverences, I consider this occasion primarily an opportu-
nity to pay tribute to you—the men and women of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff—and tell you how much I appreciate the blood, sweat, and tears you have shed
on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, on behalf of your Services and your country.
I must admit that as I look across the audience this evening, I am lled with an
immense feeling of pride; a pride that comes from close association with all of our Ser-
vices. Since our country’s founding, we have enjoyed a rich heritage of freedom and secu-
rity. This has been due, in large part, to the unswerving dedication and determination
of Service people such as yourselves.
In my travels around the country and the world, I am continually impressed with the
quality of young people serving in our Armed Forces today. They are the best I have ever
seen in 40 years of service. I’m not worried about the future of our country, because I
have seen evidence that it is in good hands. I see it in the faces of our young people. All
the Chiefs are unied to keep it that way. The challenges we face together as a nation
have never been greater. Yet, as I see the people assembled here and think about your
fellow service men and women deployed throughout the world, I am condent that we
will continue to meet and overcome our problems.
The current commitment to defense demonstrated by America’s leaders and the
public at large, when combined with the professionalism and patriotism of our nation’s
Armed Forces, provides the greatest guarantee that our peace and freedom and that of
our allies will be preserved.
Our military continues to maintain a signicant qualitative edge over all our potential
adversaries. This is due not only to our modern, highly-sophisticated weapons systems
but, more important, to the men and women that keep them operating. While our ene-
mies will continue to strive for scientic breakthroughs to close the gap, our personnel
edge will remain secure—I’m condent of that because the character, spirit, imagination,
exibility, courage, and commitment of our individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines remain unequalled. This is our nation’s greatest strength and most effective
bulwark against aggression.
I must admit to a certain amount of optimism about the future. It really can’t afford
to be otherwise. American people, and in turn their military forces, are a direct reection
of our security and can take a great deal of pride in the crucial role that we here tonight
have played in enhancing the prospects for a safe future.
I believe today the trends and the mood, both in America and among our friends
and allies around the world, are very encouraging. We are moving in the right direction,
House Budget Committee notwithstanding. What is necessary now is to maintain the
momentum. Mark Twain said it best: “Even if you’re on the right track, you’ll get run over
if you just sit there.” The bottom line is that freedom is not free. It requires the kinds of
sacrice that our republic is noted for, and our military strength is an essential pillar
of our freedom.
As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I salute you for your seless devotion to duty
and for your special contribution to the greatest nation in the world—whose principles
you both exemplify and preserve. You truly labor in behalf of a noble cause.
Mr. President and Mr. Vice, I would like to propose a toast. To the men and women of
the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who work hard, play hard, and if necessary
ght hard—there are no ner military men and women in the world.
Excerpts from an Interview on Meet the Press with Mr. Kalb, Ann Garrels, and
Albert Hunt
March 2
Good day from Washington. I am Marvin Kalb. The US military is under unusually sharp
criticism and scrutiny. Is it spending too much? Does it have a strategy? Can it ght?
Answers now from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, in
his rst major television interview.
Kalb: Admiral, let’s get down to business. The ofcial US position has always been on the
Philippines that we were neutral as between the two sides struggling for power. Now it
turns out that the United States was actually providing some kind of military assistance
to the rebels. Could you tell us what kind of assistance?
Crowe: I think our position throughout was that we were in contact with both sides,
both the Marcos forces as well as the opposition forces. Our general posture and our goal
throughout were to avoid bloodshed, to work out a negotiated settlement, a successful
peaceful transition, one way or another. I think we were very successful at that, and I’m
not sure I follow your question about helping.
Kalb: Well, for example, did the United States, one of its radio technicians, for example,
not at a certain point, a critical point, help the rebels get a certain message to the Marcos
forces that they should not be attacking?
Crowe: I think we were facilitating messages back and forth between both groups to make
sure they understood each other. And I think that was a proper and appropriate mission.
Kalb: Was the United States using any of its military power there?
Crowe: No.
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Hunt: Admiral, you were said to have worried in the inner circles that a continuation of
President Marcos might benet the communists. Conversely, I’d like to ask you what leads
you to believe that Mrs. Aquino is better equipped to combat the communist insurgency
in the Philippines?
Crowe: I’m not so sure that I have ever said that she’s better equipped. I think that we
now support that government, and we’re looking forward to the Aquino government
straightening out and sorting out many of the problems which the country faces.
Hunt: You don’t think she’s better equipped, sir?
Crowe: I think she’s the President of the Philippines right now, and she’s got to face up
to that.
Hunt: But the question is whether you think she’s better equipped to combat the com-
munist insurgents than was President Marcos?
Crowe: I think we’re going to nd that out in the coming days. I will say that the steps
that General Ramos has taken, for example, in the military, which I’m more familiar
with, the initial steps—his leadership appointments, his attempt to reform, I think, are
very encouraging. And if he continues in this vein, I would say the military’s going to
sort itself out and, yes, be in a better posture.
Garrels: Intelligence reports have said that the rebels could prevail in three to ve years.
Today, do you feel any more optimistic with Mrs. Aquino there?
Crowe: It’s more intuitive than anything else. But, yes, I do feel more optimistic because
I know General Ramos very well. I know what his views are. He wants to defeat the
insurgency. He has long been a reformer in the military. There are many things that he
wanted to do. He has not had the authority or the latitude, and I believe he’s going to
have that under President Aquino.
Garrels: What about Minister Enrile, though? He was there before, and he didn’t do
such a great job.
Crowe: He didn’t have a lot of authority under Mr. Marcos, and that’s a fact.
Kalb: Admiral, there has just been given to the President a commission report, produced
by David Packard, who used to have a lot to do with the Defense Department when Pres-
ident Nixon was here. There is a basic recommendation, and that is that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff ought to be revamped and your job, Chairman, ought to be made much more
powerful. Do you buy that? Do you have sympathy for the idea?
Crowe: I think—some of the language that I heard in your pre-program or at the beginning
of the program characterizing the Packard report, and your term “revamped”—I think
this is a little bit overstated. The Packard report was just released yesterday. I have gone
through it, although I’m not extremely familiar with it. We are studying it, and it makes
some suggestions on improvements. It suggests that we do some things we’ve already done,
and I hope that these will enhance the way we do business. We’re going to try to work with
it. But to say it revamps the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I think that’s a little strong.
Kalb: All right. Let me try to be a bit more specic. Senators [Barry] Goldwater and [Sam]
Nunn have talked of a revamping of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. They don’t think it
works well. They think there are four and ve voices when there ought to be one clear
military voice giving a military recommendation to the President. That is also something
that the House of Representatives has said, and now, that is also something that the
Presidential Commission has said. So, what I’m asking you is: do you agree that that
should be the case?
Crowe: In very specic terms, what you’re saying is that these call for me to be the prin-
cipal adviser to both the Secretary of Defense and to the President. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff believe that would be helpful, and we are on board on that, so to speak.
Kalb: You’re on board on that? I don’t think we can be that vague about it though, Admi-
ral. Do you believe that you should have primary responsibility for passing on a unied
military recommendation to the President? That is not the way it works now.
Crowe: I do that all the time. I’m not quite sure I follow you in this. I also, when I am
asked, can express my personal opinion now to my superiors and seniors, which I do. In
many respects, the legislation you’re talking about codies what we do in practice. But
I am charged by law to pass on the corporate view of the Joint Chiefs, which I do. Now,
they’re talking about changing that in some respects.
Kalb: That’s right, and I’m trying to get from you whether you agree with those changed
recommendations.
Crowe: I basically agree with the thrust of the House legislation.
Hunt: Admiral, another thing that Mr. Packard said in his report, or said after his report
was issued, is that it’s quite clear that we are not getting our money’s worth as far as defense
spending is concerned. I’d like to nd out if you agree with that, and if so, why aren’t we?
Crowe: I would never pretend that we don’t have some problems in various areas and
things that we can improve, and so forth. But I would be very careful of the fundamen-
tal statement that we’re not getting our money’s worth. Acquisition and procurement, of
course, are not directly under the JCS, but I do not have—in my observation and in my
business, I do not see the evidence for that.
Hunt: Well, sir, you have a degree in politics, and you know that what the public thinks
is terribly important. Perception sometimes may be more important than realities. The
public clearly thinks we’re not getting our money’s worth.
Crowe: Of course, I think it’s important to understand the very budget itself, the amount
of money that we’re dealing with every year. The Department of Defense gets some 15
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million contracts per year. Do you know how many that is a day? That’s in the thousands
per day. Three hundred thousand contractors are involved in this. So, to say that we
have found some evidence of mismanagement or something where we’re spending too
much, that’s really not too alarming in that regard. But the Defense Department has
made great efforts to do something about that.
Hunt: Let me just try one more thing here, though. And that is that four or ve years
ago there was a clear public consensus for higher Defense spending. Now that consensus
clearly has evaporated. Why has it evaporated?
Crowe: I’m not so sure it has completely evaporated. But one of the reasons it’s eroded
is that we have been rather successful in building up our strength over the last ve or
six years. And I’m afraid that in many people’s minds, they feel that they have achieved
what they set out to do. I would argue with that, but I think in many respects we have
to overcome our success, so to speak.
Garrels: You say you’ve succeeded. On the other hand, the President this week said that
the United States is still behind in every offensive category.
Crowe: He said we still have a ways to go, and I think that’s true. I would agree with
that. But we have succeeded in building up our strength a great deal over what it was in
the late ’70s. As a matter of fact—of course, I’ve been in the military for 40 years, and I
watched us in the nadir of the ’70s, when military advisers were telling what great risks
this country was running in its military strength. We have turned around many aspects
of that, and we are overseeing a much more capable, a much more efcient, and a much
stronger military today than we were in the late ‘70s.
Kalb: Admiral, let me quote Senator Goldwater at you. “There will be those who say the
system ain’t broke, so don’t x it. However, it is broke, and we need to x it.” Do you agree
with the Senator that there are areas of this system that are broke and need xing?
Crowe: There are areas that need improving. I don’t like the word “broke,” and I have
told Senator Goldwater that I do not agree with that statement.
Kalb: All right. What are the areas that need improvement?
Crowe: I think that some of the areas which the legislation addresses will be very helpful.
You’ve probably heard the argument about the study. You’ve heard the argument about the
JCS, with the Chairman having more control over the Joint Staff and the ability to control it.
Procurement is dealt with in the Senate bill. The Congress is now holding hearings
on procurement. And the Packard Commission addresses procurement more than the
other two bills.
Garrels: Do you want to be involved in procurement? That would be your job.
Crowe: It increases my responsibilities in that regard, and we will be studying that very
closely. I have some concerns about the JCS getting more into the procurement. It isn’t
really in procurement as much as it is in the recommendations on the budget—not the
procurement side, but on what will be spent and in what fashion.
I’m trying to say that there’s politics in all of this, and the professional military man
wants to make sure that whatever we do on the budget for the Defense Department,
it’s done on the debate about defense, a full and unemotional appreciation of the threat
we face, the state of our Armed Forces, and the linkages of those armed forces with the
benets it gives us. Mr. Packard is putting his emphasis on acquisition and procurement,
and I think that’s going to require some looking at. We may very well do exactly what it
says. The President has said he’s going to try and implement the Packard Commission
report. I’m much more interested and knowledgeable, of course, on my own business and
in the JCS, rather than procurement and acquisition.
Kalb: Admiral, President Carter let loose with a strong criticism today of President Rea-
gan, saying that President Reagan is misstating the facts on the recent history of Defense
procurement, and so on. President Carter is saying that in his administration and that of
President Ford there was the origin and development of Stealth, of the MX, of the Trident
sub. Is President Reagan misstating the facts, as President Carter put it?
Crowe: I’d prefer not to get in the middle, no matter what. But I can say, for a man that
lived through that era in the career military, I think there were some programs that we are
today proting from that were started in the late 1970s, around the ’78-’79 period. But I
lived through that period and it was a very, very depressing one for the professional military.
The state of our strength and our readiness was very, very alarming. That has been turned
around markedly in every respect in the last ve years, primarily in personnel. We’ve had
some very serious deciencies, which have now been corrected. I think I can speak for every
major military commander in this country, and he will tell you the same thing.
Hunt: Admiral, in that same interview, President Carter also said that support for the
Contras in Nicaragua, who we are, of course, supporting, is—I believe he used the term
“withering away.” I would like to ask you, from a military vantage point, if you still think
a military victory by the Contras is within the realm of possibility in the next couple of
years?
Crowe: I would take vigorous issue with that. The number of Contras, of course, in the
last year has doubled. And I think in Nicaragua the Contra movement has displayed a
remarkable robustness, irrespective of that lack of support.
Kalb: Admiral, do you believe that it is a good idea for the United States government
to stop all nuclear testing by March 31, which is the time the Soviet Union has its ban
extended to?
Crowe: I wouldn’t think so, no. Given the fact that we do have to rely in our security and
our strategy on some nuclear weapons, to stop all nuclear testing doesn’t make good
sense to me. We need the reliability and stability and the safety of our weapons to be
proved and demonstrated all the time.
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Kalb: But would it not make sense, sir, since testing is the basis for any new weapons
system, that if you intended, as the President and [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev
said at the summit they intended to do, to get major agreements this year and next
year in arms control, that an end to nuclear testing would be an excellent rst way,
rst step?
Crowe: It would be an excellent rst step if you don’t object to living with nuclear weapons
you’re not quite sure will work or not quite sure are safe. That doesn’t make any sense
to me at all.
Kalb: Wouldn’t it make more sense if there were just one unit in charge of all of these
space ights, the military or NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration],
one or the other?
Crowe: Perhaps from a management or an efciency standpoint, but that overlooks
the warghting, depending on what systems you’re talking about and so forth. This is
a constant dilemma when you’re talking about efciency. Can we take a function from
all the Services and put it in one place? We have in a number of agencies. And from a
management standpoint, it saves money, and so on, and so on. But does that help when
those systems have to be supported in war? Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t.
It’ll have to be looked at very closely.
Hunt: Admiral, throughout this program you seem to be saying, on the one hand,
that we really need the big Defense budgets that have been requested by President
Reagan, that are causing such controversy on Capitol Hill. On the other hand, you
seem to be saying we’re doing an awfully lot better and we’ve made enormous strides
in the last four or ve years. There’s no doubt that we have and that we’re in an era
of terric scal restraints. If that’s the case, why do we need those sorts of big budget
increases? Why can’t we instead basically keep spending at current levels and try to
increase efciency?
Crowe: I hear a very great deal about scal reality and political reality, and I think my
job and my function and my responsibility are to talk about military reality. As I said
earlier, I hope that the decisions, whatever they are, are made on a full and unemotional
appreciation of the state of the Armed Forces, of the threat that we face, and the benets
that strength gives us. If that’s done, that’s probably all the military can ask for. And
in that regard, I think that we have increased our readiness and our strength. On the
other hand, we’re midstream. Only one-third of our forces have the new tank, only one-
fourth have the Bradley ghting vehicle, only one-third of our carrier groups have the
new weapons systems, only one-third of our submarine force is new. We are midstream
and have a long ways to go. That’s the point.
Letter on Soviet Arms Control Cheating to Representative Jim Courter
March 4
Dear Mr. Courter:
Thank you for your letter of concern regarding the New York Times article “Joint Chiefs
Find No Soviet Cheating.” The story cites an alleged discrepancy between Soviet Strategic
Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) numbers contained in the December 1985 Compliance
Report and those in the FY 1987 Military Posture Statement. Actually, both numbers
are correct because they portray different information.
The author incorrectly interprets the numbers from the unclassied FY 1987 Military
Posture Statement as numbers of SALT-accountable SNDVs. The charts in the Military
Balance chapter of the Military Posture Statement depict comparable Soviet and US
strategic offensive forces. The Military Posture Statement gures are representative
order of battle gures but do not include all SALT-accountable US or Soviet systems. The
Compliance Report contains all SALT-accountable systems whether they are still battle
worthy or not. For example, under the SALT accounting procedures, the United States
must include all B-52s, even those in non-operational storage at Davis Monthan Air Force
Base, Arizona. Similarly, the Soviets have additional non-operational SALT-accountable
aircraft which are included in the Compliance Report but not shown in the Military Bal-
ance chart. In short, the author attempted to draw conclusions from incompatible data.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support the nding on Soviet SNDVs contained in the
23 December President’s Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance. In that report,
the US government found the Soviets to be in violation of their political commitment to
abide by SALT II at a level of SNDVs which was in existence at the time of the signing
of that agreement. The US government determined that the Soviet Union has deployed
SNDVs above the 2,504 cap.
I understand your concern with the article’s allegation and trust my explanation
eliminates the perceived discrepancy. If I can be of further assistance, please do not
hesitate to call on me.
Remarks at the Armed Forces Staff College on March 5 and the Air War College
on March 6
Thank you for that ne introduction.
I am very pleased to be able to speak to you today. I envy your stay here and urge you to
make the most of it. I labor under the belief that not only you personally but the services
and nation genuinely prot from this year of study and reection. My special interest is
that this experience will lead you to think more deeply about jointness and the impor-
tance of cooperation between services.
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My intent today is to attempt to contribute some real-world avor to the national
and joint concerns you’ve been studying here in an academic atmosphere. I’ve been in
my current post about ve months now, and I am facing the facts of life—which are not
always pleasant.
I have been surprised how little control I have over my own agenda. The press of events
in the world is unceasing, and sometimes it seems I’m right at the eye of the storm. I often
use the word “beleaguered” to describe my predicament. “Badgered” is another good one.
Maybe even “bewildered,” too. These are the real “killer bees.”
One compensation—it’s not boring. I deal with a spectrum of interesting subjects
and some of the country’s most capable people. But I’m afraid the result is that I know
something about everything but am not permitted the time to do anything really well.
So, if I sound disjointed today there is an explanation.
Putting aside my personal burdens, let me say a word about my general view from the
Pentagon. It is inevitably shaped by my last ve years in command billets where I had the
opportunity to observe and work closely with our forces in a variety of circumstances.
First and foremost, it is clear that the current posture of our Armed Forces is sound—
by any common sense measure. We have acquired new weapons systems, made great
strides in training, and our logistics support is growing steadily.
Most encouraging, we have made remarkable improvements in our manpower situation
in the last few years—personnel readiness is at the highest level I’ve seen in peacetime.
From my perspective, and I believe the Chiefs all share this view, people are our
number one priority. No matter what other advantages or resources you have, if you don’t
have good people, you’re going to be in trouble.
So, it is with a great deal of pride that I say to all audiences—including Congress—
that the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines we now have in the Armed Forces are
the brightest, most educated, best trained I’ve seen in over four decades of military
service. I’ve observed them in stress and in boredom, in good times and in bad; they
meet every test, often far from home and without the amenities enjoyed by their civil-
ian counterparts.
That pool of energy, dedication, and skill is the bedrock of all our endeavors. We can be
proud of it, and must work hard to preserve it. Facts such as those are all too easy for our
general citizenry to overlook—or never even to hear about in the press of everyday events.
Stepping back and taking a more detached view, I think we can say with conviction
that our overall foreign and security policies have been quite successful over the last 35
years, Vietnam notwithstanding. For example:
• Western Europe has been blessed with the longest period of uninterrupted peace
it has enjoyed in this century. It has fully recovered from the devastation of World
War II and is rmly entrenched in the ranks of the free world.
• In the Far East and Pacic, the free nations of that region are enjoying unprece-
dented afuence and steady progress toward political maturity. They are becoming
more self-reliant militarily and involving themselves in the international community.
Asia is a region that is literally coming of age.
• The United States has been a key participant in all of this progress. Our broad
policies of support—social, political, economic, and cultural—have paid off hand-
somely in terms of peace and stability and attracting friends and allies.
If there is one thing we have learned over the years, it is that where there is afuence
and political stability, there will be peace, and most likely freedom and pluralism in some
fashion will eventually take root.
The Kremlin, meanwhile, promotes dissidence, turbulence, and instability, because
those are the conditions in which their values and objectives are served and their pros-
pects are best.
Throughout this period, this forty-year process of development, American military
strength has played a vital role.
NATO’s power has frustrated Soviet machinations by providing the secure founda-
tion for political and economic growth and interaction in Europe; this is not to mention
deterrence of major hostilities for forty years.
In the Far East, our military shield has prevented Soviet intimidation and permit-
ted allies and friends to concentrate on internal development and to realize their own
potential, in their own fashion and at their own pace. A succession of Asian leaders
continuously stressed the importance of the US umbrella, and forward deployed forces,
in promoting their progress.
To put it simply, the American people—and we, ourselves—can take great pride in
the role US Armed Forces and American military policy have played in fostering and
securing progress in Europe and Asia, attracting friends to Washington, promoting our
international trade, and underwriting arms control efforts. In essence, our strength has
been an indispensable pillar of our freedom and the freedom of our friends and allies.
As I have watched these events play out, I have become more and more persuaded
that time is on our side vis-à-vis the Soviets. As every year of peace goes by, we advance
in this “peacetime” struggle that has been forced upon us by the Kremlin.
A few years ago, it was fashionable to say that America and the forces of democracy
always seemed to be on the wrong side of history. I think the long view of this century
tells us that the wave of the future will be freedom, not despotic alternatives—just this
week witness what happened in the Philippines.
Therefore, on balance, I nd our political-military situation encouraging. Though I
am optimistic about the long-term trend of things—the patterns of development we have
helped to set in motion and to foster—this doesn’t mean that we don’t have problems or
that we can sit back and passively rest on our laurels. As Mark Twain once said, “Even
if you’re on the right track, you’ll get run over if you just sit there.”
Certainly from a military perspective, there are day-to-day problems that we must
confront and overcome. That’s the stuff of our business. So let me outline the more sig-
nicant ones I see the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with in the coming months. These are
what I will be dealing with every day—when I am not attending ceremonies.
Let me begin with one of my most pressing current afictions: the debate about the
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Defense budget and the effort to get these discussions focused on the central realities.
As you know, I have been testifying before several committees on our defense posture.
It’s the rst time that I’ve been exposed to this trauma from the Chairman’s standpoint.
It makes one happy to leave Washington to address friendly audiences, I assure you. It
raises the question: if pro is the opposite of con, is progress the opposite of Congress?
It’s clear to me that we’re in some trouble with the Congress, and indeed with the public
at large. Gramm-Rudman is just the most prominent manifestation of that. We in the
so-called defense sector are clearly competing with non-defense programs in the minds
of many legislators, and the outlook for our critical defense needs is not bright.
The consensus for our defense programs that brought us the impressive gains of the
last few years is dissolving. A number of factors have brought this about. The waste-fraud-
abuse headlines simply do not go away and still hang in the background of the public
discussion. There’s also a lot of specious and confusing rhetoric being thrown around
that holds defense programs responsible for the budget decit. I know you’ve heard it all.
It is, of course, patently wrong. But it convinces a lot of people, at the emotional level, that
defense programs have to be cut because of, as they say, “scal realities.”
Another difculty is that many voters do not understand the everyday contributions
of American strength in the Nation’s life. In part this stems from a habit of thought that
distinguishes sharply between peace and war. In times that look “peaceful” to many
Americans, it’s hard for them to feel any immediate threat justifying military strength.
They don’t realize that all the Nation’s dealings with the world are underwritten by that
strength—that they get returns every day on their investment in the armed forces. But
perhaps the central difculty for those of us who have been making the case for preserv-
ing strength is that we confront a bona-de dilemma. On the one hand, we acknowledge
what is true, that we have made great progress in the last few years. On the other hand,
we must ask for still more effort, indeed more sacrice. The public and the Congress hear
the rst part, the progress we have made, and note that we are “at peace.” It’s very hard
for them to hear the second part, too, that we need more, in a time when resources are
becoming more and more scarce.
This is a thorny problem that will not go away and that we all need to address in every
way we can. The President is leading the way very visibly in his public statements. We
have to get the message across that US military strength does more than shield us from
attack. It underwrites everything we do in the world—use of the sea lanes, commercial
activities, pursuit of arms control with condence. We get dividends from that investment
every day. We have to communicate, too, that we are midstream in the modernization of
our capabilities and that to slacken the effort now will yield dangerous gains to the Soviets.
And we have to keep the eyes of all participants in this debate on the ball: the military
realities we confront. If we delink defense programs from the military threat, from our
alliances, from arms control negotiations, we run the risk of re-inventing the unhappy
days you and I lived through in the 1970s, when forced austerities dangerously reduced
our military strength. We don’t argue that we have to match the Soviets weapon for
weapon, man for man, bullet for bullet. In fact, we have known that if we go into a major
conict with the Soviet Union, we will be outmanned, outgunned, and outnumbered.
American leaders understand that and attempt to compensate for lack of numbers with
excellent people, quality equipment, realistic training, broad and responsive logistic sup-
port, and the help of friends and allies around the globe. But those realities are not well
understood. We must communicate our military perspective. Nobody is better prepared
to do that than each of you.
Let me turn now to another prominent JCS concern: arms control. We have been
negotiating with the Soviets on a wide array of arms control and security issues in the
last few years. Overall, the American approach has had four basic elements:
• The rst is reected in the President’s statement: “A nuclear war cannot be won
and must never be fought.” We seek to ensure that defense of our vital interests
never requires the United States to ght a nuclear war, and we try to reduce the
risk of nuclear war to the lowest possible level.
• Second, arms reduction is not an isolated objective or independent instrument—it
is one of the ways we pursue national security objectives.
• A third principle is that arms agreements must reduce arms, not legitimize
increases. They must also establish comprehensive verication regimes that facil-
itate US monitoring and deter cheating.
• Finally, we are pursuing a number of initiatives that seek to reduce the risk that
conict could occur through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications.
I have been pleased at the constructive role the JCS has played in this process. Inter-
estingly, our voice is heard, especially on the question of military sufciency. It is a good
example of military input to national security decision making. Frankly, I have been
pleasantly impressed with our role in this dialogue. We have had a urry of activity in
connection with the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
last Fall. The two sides are still far apart in some basic principles—such as approaches
to regional conicts—and this complicates the process. Also Gorbachev is no doubt still
“shaking down” his new team. There will likely be more developments, but through it all
we must keep this in mind: strength has brought Moscow back to the bargaining table.
There is a direct linkage between our security investments and the Kremlin’s exibility.
The issue of Defense reorganization, and particularly JCS reorganization, has been
much in the news, too, and on my mind. This subject has created a large cottage industry
lately. My own feeling is that most of the studies and critiques have tended to stress the
negative side of the equation and to ignore what the DOD and the JCS have accomplished
on their own initiative to make things better.
The JCS deals successfully with hundreds of tough issues annually and has an exten-
sive role in everyday operations and management of our global forces. But the one-sided
approach of much of the debate conveys a misleading picture of confusion and breakdown.
Moreover, I’ve found particularly wrongheaded and harmful the criticism that the Service
Chiefs are unduly parochial and that log-rolling completely dominates JCS business. I
readily admit that we should be seeking organizational improvements. The global strategic
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and military environments are in ux. The Soviet challenge is growing. Technology moves
on apace. Constrictions in resources loom ahead and dictate that we get maximum benet
from our investments. No doubt we need some change in the JCS system to match altering
circumstances. But to say we should seek improvements is not to say the system is broken.
There are a plethora of reform proposals. Some are silly and over-reactive. Others
tend to codify what has already been done. Some go a little beyond where we are today
and are overdue. From my perspective, I have two bottom lines.
• I favor evolutionary, not revolutionary change.
• I tend to support proposals that would modestly strengthen the role of the Chair-
man as an adviser and give him better control of the Joint Staff. Likewise, I would
increase the authority of the unied commanders.
Congress seems to be moving in those general directions. On balance, I believe we
will get a bill and that it will be reasonably restrained.
Still speaking about programs and tools, there is another important strategic resource
that I have been trying to raise the visibility of: security assistance.
The President noted that “dollar for dollar, security assistance contributes as much
to global security as our own defense budget,” and Secretary Weinberger’s recent
report to the Congress highlights it as a central element of American coalition strategy.
Unfortunately, the prospect of zero-growth or even declining budgets is likely to put
this very valuable program into a severe squeeze, just at the time when it would be of
great value to us.
From the military perspective, the program has important ramications in our total
force planning process—something that often gets lost in the political arena. Everything
we do—or do not do—under this program ultimately has an impact on our collective
ability to deter acts of aggression. Of all our programs, we could get more return on our
investment from this one. For my part, I will continue to pursue all efforts to vitalize and
raise the prole of this neglected dimension of strategy and to increase the military’s role
in those determinations. It will not, however, be easy.
Let me turn, lastly, to several regional concerns that I am sure will occupy much of
my time in the months ahead, as they have already.
First the Philippines
We all saluted, of course, the achievement of the Filipino people and welcomed the out-
pouring of democratic energies in that peaceful revolution. Those of us in the military
can be particularly proud of the role of some of AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines]
military leaders in that episode, vindicating the overarching interests of popular sover-
eignty and the rule of law.
The odds are now greatly increased that the Philippines will be able to cope effectively
with its severe domestic problems and the insurgency movement. It is imperative to rebuild
healthy relationships between our own forces and the Philippine professionals who serve
President Aquino and to do all we can to help them secure the recent democratic gains.
Historically, our attention has focused on the future of the bases, and they are still
critical interests for us. But, we now have ve years to work with President Aquino on
the bases. The insurgent problem is now, and we have a crucial role to play in preparing
the AFP for this challenge. That’s another reason why I’m so concerned about cutbacks
in our security assistance programs.
The problem of how to deal with the regime in Nicaragua will remain high on the
President’s agenda, as witnessed by his statements this week. Our interests in promot-
ing democracy there, and securing the efforts of friends in our own backyard to develop
economically, socially, and politically according to their own lights, are clear.
I think generally we have turned the corner in Central America, but we’re not yet out
of the woods. The democratic process in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador is still
fragile. There are many endemic economic and social problems to be solved before we
can rest easy. Most disturbing is that Cuba and Nicaragua continue to make trouble.
Some of the basic building blocks for success are in place: the Caribbean initiative,
especially as it applies to trade, development and aid, and measured doses of security
assistance. What is most desperately needed is enhanced aid for the Contras and the
time to let our initiative work.
I have no crystal ball on what will happen to the package the President has requested
from the Congress. But it is clear to me that troubling sentiments have emerged in the
debate. Some simply seem not to understand the nature and implications of Soviet,
Cuban, and Nicaraguan activities in the region. They tend not to see the “hidden hands”
of strong, external, and militarized powers in the actions of Managua. They tend, there-
fore, to believe the US response should be a relaxed one, to let nature take its course.
It is not, however, nature at work in Central America. The US security response must,
generally, emphasize increased material assistance, intelligence sharing, and close mil-
itary ties—including exercises that will help create the conditions under which nations
of the region can work for stability.
We have come a long way from the 1970s, when we rolled with the punches; and we
are avoiding the tendency to lean on our own armed forces to resolve regional conicts.
Above all, we need the national will to persevere.
Finally, the Middle East
This troubled region has occupied much of my time. I see no prospect of that changing.
The area is important to the economic health of the free world and thus to US security.
Access to oil and limitation of Soviet inuence are signicant US objectives.
Jordan and Egypt are the immediate keys to peace, but each is confronted with
serious challenges. Jordan is caught up in animosities between Syria and Israel. It has
bona de national security problems that would concern any defense planner. But it is
caught in a political bind: from the United States, the Kingdom hears that they must have
“peace before arms”; from other quarters, King Hussein hears that Jordan pursues peace
with Israel only at its own peril. The King has shown much courage in supporting the
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peace process while he was threading the shoals of Middle Eastern politics. But nothing
can relieve him of the responsibility for keeping his defenses strong or being responsive
to his own subjects. We ignore those realities at the peril of the peace process. Egypt,
meanwhile, struggles to maintain domestic harmony while staying the course with the
Camp David Accords and fending off constant political pressures from more radical forces
within the Arab Bloc. The Egyptian leadership deserves both our praise and support.
Unfortunately, there is no light at the end of this tunnel. For the foreseeable future
we will be temporizing—i.e., concentrating on crisis management, contingency plans,
and preparedness to protect US lives and property. I wish I could offer more comfort on
this subject.
That concludes an all-too-brief tour of my in-box and my upcoming agenda, as I see
it. It’s been a genuine pleasure to get outside the beltway and visit your ne institution.
I urge you all to contribute to the defense dialogue whenever you have occasion to do so.
I sincerely hope my very brief tour of the defense horizon has not been too depressing.
It might be helpful to recall the advice of that famous philosopher, Paul Harvey, who said:
“In times like these it is helpful to remember that there have always been times like these.”
I genuinely believe with determination we can and will continue to manage our prob-
lems and, in turn, to keep our nation—the greatest nation in the world—safe.
Chairman’s Memorandum for Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, on
Oversight of Intelligence Activities
March 27
1. I appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the memorandum to you
from ATSD (IO) [Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight] concern-
ing compliance by OJCS, unied and specied commands and joint task forces with
DOD Directives (DODD) 5240.1 and 5240.1-R.
2. Executive Order (EO) 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” requires the
Secretary of Defense to issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are neces-
sary to implement the order. DODD 5240.1, 3 December 1982, “Activities of DOD Intel-
ligence Components that Affect United States Persons,” and DODD 5240.1-R, December
1982, “Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect
United States Persons,” implement EO 12333. These directives apply only to intelligence
activities of DOD intelligence components, which, as specically set forth in the directives,
do not include OJCS, unied and specied commands, and joint task forces. Additionally,
these directives contain a general provision whereby they apply to other organizations,
staffs, and ofces when used for collection of information concerning the capabilities,
intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents.
The purpose of the Executive Order is to enhance human and technical collection tech-
niques while achieving the proper balance between acquisition of essential information
and protection of individual interests.
3. As Mr. [Werner E.] Michel’s memorandum correctly points out, OJCS and the
intelligence staffs of the unied and specied commands act as taskers, analysts, and
consumers of intelligence from all sources and play an important role in the overall DOD
intelligence community. However, these staffs are intelligence consumers, not intelli-
gence collectors, and under DODDs 5240.1 and 5240.1-R are subject to these governing
procedures only in the event they are used as intelligence collectors. These directives
correctly do not treat these intelligence staffs as intelligence components and, therefore,
do not subject them to the same procedures as intelligence collection agencies such as
NSA, DIA, and the Services.
4. I must point out that, contrary to the ATSD (IO) memorandum, OJCS, unied and
specied commands, and joint task forces in compliance with your memorandum have
never refused to establish an intelligence oversight program and have never contended
that they are not subject to the requirements of EO 12333 and implementing DOD direc-
tives. Rather, OJCS has sought to implement these directives by preserving the important
distinction between intelligence consumers and collectors and by requiring compliance
with the specic provisions of these directives in the event intelligence staffs are used
as intelligence collectors. One critical, underlying reason for preserving this distinction
is, of course, to avoid setting a precedent for possible oversight by congressional intelli-
gence oversight committees. Director of the Joint Staff Memoranda of 29 November 1984
and 2 May 1985 demonstrate the intent to follow the broad guidance established in the
Executive Order. Additionally, because of the inference of noncompliance in the ATSD
(IO) memorandum, I also point out that there has been full compliance with your request
for an annual oral brieng by CJCS concerning “sensitive” national security activities in
compliance with your memorandum of June 1985.
5. Throughout the contact with ATSD (IO) on this subject, OJCS personnel have
stressed a willingness to establish a program to ensure that intelligence staff personnel
are familiar with the procedures of the governing directives and are aware of the obliga-
tion to report any questionable intelligence activity should they be required to conduct
intelligence collection activities.
6. Notwithstanding that the intelligence staffs of the OJCS, unied and specied com-
mands, and joint task forces are not technically required to comply with the provisions
of DODDs 5240.1 and 5240.1-R unless they are used to conduct collection activities, I
have determined as a matter of policy that appropriate OJCS and joint intelligence staffs
fully comply with these directives. Accordingly, unless you direct otherwise, I will issue
a memorandum directing that these intelligence staffs, as a matter of policy and not as
a legal requirement, comply with these directives. I trust that this decision will meet the
oversight requirements of the ATSD (IO) and, at the same time, preserve the distinction
between intelligence consumers and intelligence collectors as well as providing congres-
sional intelligence committees an opening they might exploit in their quest for greater
oversight of OJCS.
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Excerpts from Remarks at the Navy League Joint Services Luncheon
Sheraton-Washington Hotel, Washington, DC | March 27
Let me begin my remarks with just a few words about our host, the Navy League. I have
always had the highest respect and admiration for the League. I’ve had a great deal of
experience with it, with its activities, and with the ne people who make it work so well.
The impressive events of this exposition are just the latest example of a long and multi-
faceted tradition of public and national service.
You know how much tradition means to the Navy. I understand you have already had
a couple of spirited speeches about the Navy; I don’t consider my responsibilities neces-
sarily naval now, but I do take great pride in my Navy background and Navy traditions.
I came across a piece of memorabilia that I thought I might share with you. I’ll read it to
you: “On the 23rd of August, the USS Constitution set sail from Boston with 475 ofcers
and men; 48,000 gallons of fresh water; 7,400 cannon shot; 11,000 pounds of black
powder, and 79,400 gallons of rum. Arriving in Jamaica on 6 October, she took on 826
pounds of our and 69,000 gallons of rum. She then headed for the Azores, arriving on
the 12th of November. She provisioned 550 tons of beef and 64,000 gallons of Portuguese
wine. On 13 November, she set sail for New England. In the ensuing days she defeated
ve British men-of-war, sank 12 British merchant ships, salvaging only their rum. By
27 January, her powder and shots were exhausted. Nonetheless, she made a raid on
the Firth of Clyde. Her landing party captured a whiskey distillery, transferring about
40,000 gallons. She then headed home. The Constitution made port at Boston harbor on
the 23rd of February with no cannon shot, no powder, no food, no rum, no whiskey, no
wine, but with 48,000 gallons of stagnant water.”
But more to the point, and to be a little more serious for a moment, the League has
always been a prominent voice speaking out for national defense. In fact, for years, and
in various ways, the League has led informed discussion on strategic issues not only
inside the Washington Beltway, but outside it as well. Its efforts have markedly enhanced
the level of public education about the Nation’s security problems and posture, and more
important, they have helped to move our Defense policies in directions that make the
world a less dangerous place.
These activities have earned the admiration of all of us, particularly those now on
active service, and those who lead the Armed Forces are especially indebted to you. Part
of our responsibility is to explain our Defense needs to our public and to their represen-
tatives in the Congress. In recent weeks I have been extensively involved in that job of
explanation, here in Washington and also around the country. It’s a demanding task,
not always a rewarding one, and I deeply appreciate the amplifying voice of organizations
like the Navy League.
Remarks at the 28th Senior Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, US Department
of State
The Pentagon | April 14
Welcome to the Pentagon. It is a distinct pleasure for me to be able to greet you this
morning and to contribute to your very important program of study. The subjects you are
examining in this seminar—the domestic underpinnings, and the interrelationships, of
American foreign and security policies—are key determinants of how our nation fares in
dealing with international challenges. I envy your chance to reect on them in a setting
removed from the press of everyday events.
I have been thinking about these matters a great deal lately, especially as I prepared
for several extended sessions of congressional testimony explaining the rationale for our
Defense programs. Those travails—and the ongoing public debate about what empha-
sis Defense should receive in the budget—amount to a very large, and very important,
“practical exercise” in the interplay of domestic forces and national security policy.
I’d like to share with you some reections on all that. The points I would like to leave
with you are, rst, that just as you need to understand America in order to make and
implement policy for the Nation (your seminar takes this as its premise), so does America
need to understand you and the perspectives and capabilities you represent. There is a
need for mutual understanding and communication in other words.
Second point is that, from my own standpoint as Chairman, we need especially to
promote better understanding of the everyday contributions of military strength in the
Nation’s life. That would make the resource allocation scramble, in my view, much more
likely to produce results that serve the Nation’s strategic interests well.
A few years ago, Professor Michael Howard wrote an article in the journal Foreign
Affairs about “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.” Perhaps you remember it. His point
was that Western strategists tend to focus on one element of strategy, the operational—
how to conduct campaigns and to win wars—while neglecting others that are equally
important, including societal solidarity and public support for government policies.
Jean-Francois Revel’s now famous and gloomy book about the disabilities of democracy
explored that theme at some length, but from another angle. His concern is the weakness
of the social dimension of strategy in times that seem tranquil, or normal, to democratic
people—when their survival is not obviously at risk. He said that free societies do not under-
stand that, even in what appears to be “peacetime,” they are confronted by a voracious Marx-
ist-Leninist “democracy-eating machine” that works incessantly for the Free World’s demise.
Revel has a wonderful gift for epigrammatic expression, of course, but behind the hyperbole
there is this telling point that many of our citizens do indeed tend to forget. Descendants of
Lenin understand very well the competitive and conicting nature of international relations,
and they struggle constantly and by all means to bring about their ascendancy and our
eventual decline and subjugation, and do this outside wartime scenarios.
It is very hard for us to maintain public support for the policies needed to deal with
that challenge. This isn’t a new problem. The American tendency to take peace for granted
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is a recurrent one; it has produced a familiar pattern of peaks and valleys: declining
Defense budgets and atrophied military strength in “peacetime,” and then immense
surges of effort when the dogs of war bark literally at our doorstep.
It is obvious enough that we can’t wage a war without solid public support. But it is
just as clear to me that we can’t maintain and manage the peace successfully without
support for programs that produce sustained military strength. In my view, our current
budget debate illustrates exactly this problem, and it is one that will bedevil your time
in leadership as it has my own. Gramm-Rudman is just the most prominent manifesta-
tion of something larger: the threatening erosion of the consensus for Defense programs
that brought the Armed Forces such impressive gains in the last few years. A number of
factors have brought this about:
• The waste/fraud/abuse headlines simply do not go away, for one thing, and the
image of a proigate military, though distorted, has been hard to dispel. Actions
taken by the government in the last 24 months have gone far toward correcting
our major deciencies, and other remedies are on the way. As a result, I sense that
this issue is no longer as prominent as it was, but it still has residual inuence.
• There’s also a lot of specious and confusing rhetoric being thrown around that
holds Defense programs responsible for the budget decit. It is, of course, patently
wrong, unfair, and dangerous. But it convinces a lot of people, at the emotional
level, that Defense programs have to be cut because of, as they say, “scal reali-
ties.” In testifying before the Congress in the last few months, I’ve heard a great
deal of talk about scal realities. When people argue that we can’t afford Defense
expenditures, they are really saying that they have other things they would rather
fund. Incidentally, they never mention “military realities.”
• Another difculty is that many Americans do not understand the everyday contri-
butions of American strength in the Nation’s life. In part this stems from a habit
of thought, highlighted by Revel and others, that distinguishes sharply between
peace and war. In times that look “peaceful” to many Americans, it’s hard for
them to feel any immediate threat justifying military strength. My colleague Jim
Watkins, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], has thought long and hard about
this problem. He characterizes today’s world as “violent peace,” trying to make the
point that reality is much more mixed than the peace–war dichotomy suggests and
that we need tools to deal with a wide spectrum of conict scenarios. Because we
are not at war in the traditional sense does not mean that we are not threatened
or that our enemies are not working for our destruction, or that military strength
is not necessary.
• But perhaps the central difculty for those of us who have been making the cur-
rent case for preserving US strength is that we confront a genuine dilemma. On
the one hand, we acknowledge what is true: that we have made great progress
in the last few years. On the other hand, we must ask for still more effort, indeed
more sacrice. The public, and the Congress, hear the rst part, the progress
we have made, and they note that we are “at peace.” It’s hard for them to inter-
nalize the second part, too: that we need more, in a time when the pressures on
resources are becoming more and more intense.
I have testied before the Congress that the current status of our Armed Forces is
sound, thanks to the advancements we have made in recent years that reversed the
most alarming downward trends of the 1970s; but, I have also said that there is still
much to do to insure the nation’s future security, particularly in the face of a steadily
increasing Soviet threat and Moscow’s broadening use of surrogates. We are midstream
in a process of modernizing the Armed Forces, and we need to keep that momentum and
to develop a rational defense policy and posture for the long haul. For that, we need the
strong, patient, and continuing support of the American public—which means we have
to rehabilitate the public consensus for defense that brought us the gains of the early
1980s. That’s easy to say, but it will be far from easy to do.
There is a critical job of communication ahead of us. It involves more than just
answering uninformed allegations about inefciency or fending off unrealistic proposals
for altered strategies. It is a matter of promoting wider understanding of the rationale for
military strength.
The American people must understand and support our defense rationales not just
in time of war, or when the President sends forces in harm’s way, but also in relatively
tranquil times when most citizens prosper in their chosen civilian occupations.
The message that the American public needs to understand is, in fact, the second
point I wanted to make this morning: that strong armed forces are the indispensable
undergirding of all other components of national strategy.
American military strength underpins everything this nation does in the world, but-
tressing other tools of policy and making America a more effective nation internationally.
We can use the sea lanes for vital commercial pursuits without interference because our
strength permits it. Recent events in the Gulf of Sidra testify to the need for strength
to afrm navigation rights conferred on us—and on all nations—by international law.
Every day, US military strength protects—usually in less visible fashion than we needed
in Mr. Qadda’s case—all our international communications. It solidies our alliances,
which in turn enhance our own security. It permits us to pursue arms control with
condence—indeed, the credible strength produced by our defense programs in recent
years is what has nally brought Moscow back to the arms control table. More generally,
American military power provides the Soviet Union and its kindred regimes the incentive
to seek peaceable solutions to international problems.
Further, US strength provides enormous benets to our friends and allies and plays a
key role in fostering democratic institutions and practices around the globe. Our military
shield in the Far East has permitted free nations there to concentrate on internal devel-
opment and to realize their own potential, at their own pace and in their own fashion.
In Europe, the American strength reected in forward-deployed forces is not only the
military but also the political cornerstone of the alliance. In the Middle East and Central
America, it is clear that leaders there want a backdrop of American strength for their
efforts to build functioning and pluralistic societies. I have seen all this rsthand and
have heard it directly from leaders in those regions.
In the end the message comes to this: US military strength, as the undergirding of
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American activities and policies in the world at large, is an indispensable pillar of Amer-
ican freedom and the freedom of friends and allies around the globe.
It is that nexus between military strategy and strength, on the one hand, and effec-
tive management of the peace, on the other, which we have to illuminate for the general
public. You can, and should, help. Your backgrounds, and the course of study and reec-
tion you are undertaking in this seminar, make you uniquely qualied to contribute. I
urge you all to continue to develop your thoughts on these matters and to participate in
public discussion of them, as time goes by. The Nation will be better informed, and better
off, if we all nd ways to enhance the public dialogue on these matters and on security
issues in general.
And now, for the time remaining, I’d like to focus on any questions you might have,
on these or other subjects.
Interview Comments with Time, Newsweek, and US News & World Report on
the Attack on Libya
April 16
You probably saw this chart the other night, which is basically the route which the F-111s
and the tankers took from England.
All the time zones used are Eastern Standard Time; England is ve hours, Libya
is seven hours different. That is one of the most confusing things about an operation
like this. We are talking about three or four different time zones. I used Eastern Stan-
dard Time; that’s what I’m more familiar with. I followed it right here on the clock. We
started the operation at 1213, and they actually began taking off. It took them an hour
or more to get the entire group off. They went in a number of ways. You can see from
the chart they came from a number of airelds. This includes F-141s and F-111s, which
are suppression birds, electronic suppression, as well as tankers. The total route was
about 2,600 nautical miles. The hack-marks are fuel. They had four fuelings on the
way and two fuelings on return. We actually took off with more birds than we needed,
so that if systems went down early in the raid we could send some back and substitute
birds that were diverted.
And then some tankers went back with them. The reason I mention this is because
there is a report out of England today, that some F-111s were driven off and returned
with ordnance. The birds that were returned did have their ordnance, and anti-air had
nothing to do with actions emanating from Libya. It had to do with some system that
had gone down—the radar or the navigation system. Another bird was substituted, and
those returned.
Q: How many returned?
A: We had six spare birds, so six were bound to return one way or another.
Q: Was this before the refueling points?
A: No, I don’t think it was before. The birds that returned from Libya did not have ord-
nance on them. It just makes sense, if you think about it. When you come home, it’s not
going to carry as much weight, no matter what is over the target. That report that the
gentleman gave is wrong. The America and the carriers deployed in this conguration
and the American Coral Sea started launching about 1745 hours in the afternoon. They
put in the air not only attack birds but they also put in the bulk of the support package
for both the Air Force attack and the Navy attack. I’m talking about things like P-2Cs,
which coordinate our lanes and trafc control; our E-3s which is electronic suppression;
our A-7s and F-18s, which can be used for HARM [high-speed anti-radiation missile],
strikes, and suppression. The F-18s and F-14s can be used for counter-air and air-to-air
in case it’s necessary to protect the force. They were deployed over the entire area.
Q: There were Tomcats up?
A: The F-14s are Tomcats. About 1854, the circus started seriously. The last tanking
was done with the F-111s. After the last tanking, the various aircraft went down to a low
level at one end.
Q: How low?
A: All the way; somewhere below 500 feet. The carrier attacked and they did the same
thing. About six minutes before they came in, our attack force was at low level to avoid
running them up. We thought we had threatening missile electronics, and we attempted
to suppress with strike force to suppress them. Following closely upon that, of course,
right at 1900 was the rst strike. The raid on what we characterize as Sidi Bilal, the raid
on Azizzia, the raid on Benghazi Barracks, on Benina—all came in at 1900.
Q: The six minutes before the rst raid came was when you began suppression for that
fact to 1850. There was no indication that the Libyans were responding or even had
detected the attack until the planes went up and red the HARMS and strikes?
A: That is a little confusing. The honest answer is that we don’t totally know. But
number one, we achieved surprise. That is pretty clear. There was some talk about
the Libyans confusing contacts, that there had been something going on probably as
early as ten minutes, but no denite period in the raid with orders to shoot or re or
anything like that.
Q: They didn’t detect the planes leaving the carriers? Everything was kept low enough
that their radars didn’t detect them?
A: No, they did not. The target, which was the Tripoli Military Airport, was not attacked
until around 1906 hours. All the A-6s had cleared the area and had reported what we call
“feet wet” by 1911 hours. They didn’t report it at 1911 hours, but the attack was minutes
long, and we had subsequent reports received that all the F-111s were accounted for. That
was the rst report. Then we received the report that they were not all accounted for.
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Q: When was the second report?
A: I don’t know. I’d say after about four or ve minutes.
Q: Your assumption is that there is no question that the F-111 was in that specic region
when we lost him?
A: We will talk about that in a few minutes. I’ll tell you what I know about it. I don’t know
everything about it.
Q: Those reports went from the aircraft to the America?
A: They went to the tanker, which was on the America.
Q: There is no indication then that Soviet ships may have been tracking the eet out in
the Mediterranean? Were there not ships out there tracking?
A: We have no indication that they did.
Q: They didn’t even know where you were? They don’t stay close enough?
A: They try. I don’t want to elaborate too much, but we made an effort. Generally, in
peacetime operations, the Soviets are in close vicinity and they can usually, when they
see t, intercept us. And when they do, they can track us, depending on the speed of the
ships. Sometimes carriers can run away from them. When they do that, they report it,
and somebody else runs up. But we timed the attack, and we knew where they were, and
we made an effort. I don’t know how much of an effort they were making, but we know
very little about the Soviets. All we know is that they were there, and we assumed they
were trying to intercept us, and we made an effort to avoid them.
Q: Just to clarify: there were no Libyan ships at sea?
A: Please understand that in all this, despite the conventional wisdom, there are a lot of
things we don’t know. Hostilities are a tough proposition, despite what the media says.
We don’t exactly know what the solution is, but we knew what we wanted to do.
Q: There were no Libyan military ships at sea that you know? No Libyan aircraft?
A: Again, we didn’t have evidence that there was. But you understand we were not
searching this area, because we were trying to achieve surprise. Sometimes we would
be reconning there, but in this case we were reconning nothing because we wanted no
indication that something was going to happen. Now, we might have, as we came in to
sea, seen some Libyan ships—but we didn’t. If that would have been the rst time, we
would have run into them.
Q: No Libyan aircraft in the air?
A: No. There was no Libyan aircraft as far as we know. We were prepared for them. Let
me just nish the times and we can come back to that.
When they cleared the area, the F-111s went back up to refuel again and to congregate
and check out who was there. That was the rst indication that one was missing. They
lingered awhile to sort that out and alert the America and form a search and rescue oper-
ation. Then the F-111s started back and did two fuelings on the way home.
One aircraft developed an overheating line coming around the corner and the main
emergency line eroded. It had nothing to do with being hit. It was just an operational
incident. By then the fuel had gone. They had been in the air for 5,000 miles, 9-10 hours,
something like that. The last airplane landed in England at 0310 hours.
Okay, having gone through the whole thing like that, I think it is important rst of all
to talk about the target, which was part of the planning process. It was a very complex
time involved. Not only because of the character of the mission, but—let’s be real candid
about it—the nature of the world today is such that it’s not like planning a World War II
raid. When we are going to put out an oil renery and we y from A to B and we get so
much ak, then go in there and kick the hell out of them. We wanted targets that would,
rst of all, achieve the purpose of the political objective, which others have spoken to as
well as the Secretary of State and Secretary Weinberger. But you don’t stop there when
you select targets in this day and age. Naturally, it’s not only important in a moral and
ethical sense but also in a political sense that we are as secretive as possible. So, when-
ever we start saying we are going to reduce our losses, we talk night attack. That means
that you are probably going to have to make a low-level night attack. You are going to
have to rely on your sensor systems which means that your targets are distinguishable
by radar or some fashion like that.
Preferably, choose targets with the biggest payoff and the least amount of collateral
damage. It’s as simple as that. So we don’t have to come around again. And preferably,
which incidentally we didn’t have a choice in Libya, should not be in a heavily defended
area. Unfortunately, almost every target that is worth hitting is in a heavily defended
area. But those targets may not be radar distinguishable, and if you drop something on
it, you are not sure you hit anything. You just kick up a lot of dust. That doesn’t make
a lot of sense.
Q: Are you talking about camps in the desert?
A: Terrorist training camps. Terrorist training camps are interesting things. People keep
talking about terrorist training camps. There are usually a few with a bunch of tents.
Guys get out early in the morning to do their thing—shoot some bullets at targets, what
have you. So what kind of target is that? Our main parameter is collateral damage. To
pick a target is a very important part of our targeting process. There is no way you are
going to eliminate all collateral damage, but you can certainly try. We tried very hard.
You can try in the planning process. You can try in the rules of engagement process.
Q: One point references giving guidelines to pilots. What guidelines can you give?
A: There are some things you can’t say. But in regard to targets, we give careful instruc-
tions that we try to avoid collateral damage. What they do, of course, is try and plan their
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bombing patterns and so forth to do certain things like that. Then they are told that this
is a night attack. You have to depend very heavily on technology, and they told the F-111s
that when they ran the area, there might be some possibility of collateral damage; if all
our systems were not working, we were not to drop. We would not do that during war
in the conventional sense. If a man is over the target with ordnance, no matter what is
working, he’s going to let it go. We don’t do that. And we had very few planes that didn’t
get off because their systems weren’t working.
Q: What do we know now about that, and how?
A: Let’s get into that in a minute. I just want to say a thing about forces before we do that.
We, of course, had the two carriers on the scene. It was logical and natural. We had those
forces there to use them. It was clear to us that if we wanted to hit the target that we hit and
do a reasonable amount of damage, having concluded that it would be difcult for the two
carriers alone to do what we wanted to do. So we wanted some help, and given the political
situation in Europe, the best place to get it was our aircraft base in England, particularly,
since our F-111s are very well suited for what we wanted to do, for several reasons.
They have the technology. They y low at night. They train to y low at night, and
they are trained to do the kind of work that was involved here. They carry heavy loads,
and they also added a very important element. When you are looking at the carriers,
you get another element of surprise. Using that, we thought we could do it in one night
without having to re-attack. Cut down our losses and make the attack more effective,
administer in a shorter time….
I think that certainly from a professional standpoint, that it was quite an achievement:
to get that many aircraft that far with ordnance.... Also, the coordination between the
Air Force and the Navy was impressive.
These planes are arriving from 2,600 miles away. I was standing in the Command
Center knowing that the attack was going at 1900. And 30 seconds after 1900, I was
listening to a guy on CNN in Tripoli, and he said, “My God, there’s an airplane overhead.”
That’s an amazing thing to know that we wanted them to be in at 7 o’clock and this guy
is looking out his window saying, “My God, there’s something going on here.”
Q: Did the Libyans have some signicant radio monitoring?
A: We can’t afford to assume otherwise. In any event, I’m very proud of the team. You know,
we get a lot of criticism in my business about not working together, and there wasn’t a single
instance that I know of in the pre-planning and planning stage, and then the execution
phase, where there was an argument or difculty or any problem we couldn’t solve.
We worked very hard to achieve surprise, and I thought we were reasonably success-
ful with that. We can live in that SAM environment, and we don’t know as much as we
would like to know about the effect of our HARMS, because we are more interested to
nd out what happened to the targets.
Some of these radars at SAM sites are spread around the countryside, and it’s been
difcult to nd out exactly what happened at the targets. We know we put a bunch of
them out of commission, because they just quit radiating. And we heard some guys say,
“My radar doesn’t work.” They told the SA6 site to re, and he said that “…it was out…
it’s gone…we can’t do it.” We could not live probably in that SAM environment, extensive
as it is. And it is extensive. It is probably the most heavily defended site today in missiles
as anywhere in the world.
Interview excerpts on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Soviet threat, and US naval
military readiness with Sea Power magazine Editor-in-Chief James D. Hessman
and Contributing Editor Vincent C. Thomas
April
Sea Power: How rapidly will our defense risk increase if you fail to get the 3 percent
Defense growth that you, your colleagues in the Joint Chiefs, and Defense Secretary
[Caspar] Weinberger believe that you need?
Crowe: First of all, I believe you have to look at it on a broader basis than in terms of
just one year. Is it going to be just one point on a graph, or are we seeing the beginning
of a steady trend over the next few years. If it is the latter circumstance that we are con-
fronting, then I believe we are going to be back in the slump of the 1970s very quickly. If,
on the other hand, we are seeing only a dip, and then the budget begins to climb again,
I would hope we could overcome this problem and get back to modernizing, updating,
and correcting our deciencies in a year or two. But those are uncertainties about which
I don’t have answers at this point.
Sea Power: If you do sustain cuts, what will be the plan of attack on your part, and [on the
part of] the Secretary of Defense to get across your concerns about the increases in risk
to the American people—and, through them, to the Congress and to the media as well?
Crowe: I believe we have to be a part of the educational process and must make certain
that our voices are heard. Whether they accept our judgment is another point, but we
would like our day in court. And it is a problem not only for the Secretary of Defense
but also for the military and all the service leaders and all the major commanders. They
all have to be on the circuit and they have to be speaking up, because who else has the
information that you need to make these kinds of decisions? And the fact is that we are
facing a burgeoning threat.
Secretary Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense during the Carter administration, said
many years ago, “We build, they build. We stop, they build. We start building again, they
keep right on building.” And that has not abated, and I see no prospects for it abating.
Sea Power: How do you analyze the change between what you saw when you rst went
to CINCPAC and CINCSOUTH and what you see today?
Crowe: It is interesting that you bring up those different parts of the world. Of course,
there are many differences in those two commands, particularly in the cultures in the
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parts of the world where they are located, and the societies, and so on. But for the pur-
poses of what we are talking about, the real constant in both parts of the world was
the Soviet global threat. We were seeing them increase their strength when I was in the
Mediterranean; they not only were modernizing their forces in central Russia but also
the forces of their satellites in Bulgaria and Romania. They were lling out their cadres
in the Caucasus, and they were modernizing their air defense and their offensive air in
the Mediterranean. It was really imposing and impressive.
Then you turn around and go to the Pacic, and what are you looking at? You are
looking at an increase from the 1960s until 1982 from 20 to 53 divisions on the Chinese
border and seeing a buildup from around 1,200 to almost 3,000 offensive combat land-
based aircraft. You are seeing a third of their entire SS-20 IRBM (intermediate range bal-
listic missile) force in the Pacic, as well as 80 Backre bombers. The largest of their four
eets is there, and every year they augment that eet with new construction. There are
86 major combatants in that eet and over 60 nuclear submarines. It is quite an armada!
To top that off, they have facilities in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cam Rahn Bay; the
latter is, of course, the largest forward-deployment base the Soviet Union has.
Sea Power: The Soviets always have had a huge numbers edge. Now, as you point out,
they have a true global presence and are increasing that all the time. You also told Con-
gress that you were concerned about the United States losing its technological edge. Can
we keep that edge, and what do we have to do to keep it?
Crowe: I believe people must understand about the basic problem that senior military
commanders in America face. When I was testifying before Congress, I must have heard
a dozen times the terms “political reality” and “scal reality.” In my view, it is just as
important to understand “military reality.” And there is very little talk about military
reality. It seems to be overwhelmed by scal imperatives or whatever else you might want
to call them. But from a basic standpoint, for forty years the United States has understood
that, vis-à-vis the Soviets, we were going to ght outnumbered. And a military man of
my generation has lived with that so long that we accept it. We always have understood
that we cannot match the Soviets weapon for weapon, bullet for bullet, man for man.
So the American military leadership has assumed that we have to compensate for
that in a variety of ways. And one of the fundamental ways we compensate for it is to
participate in a coalition, in some alliances. But that doesn’t solve the problem in itself.
We have striven for years now to take advantage of our technological superiority and
quality, and in that way compensate for some of the inferiority in numbers from which
we suffer. And this, of course, is your question.
But an important part of that has not only been quality of equipment but quality of
people, which means you have all those things that attract good people. You have to have
sufcient pay, you have to have amenities, you have to have a quality of life that attracts
the type of people we know are necessary for our outnumbered forces. It also means
the best leadership you can get, so that you make the wise tactical decisions that help
compensate for being outnumbered.
It also means intense training. You can do a lot of things with people who are well
trained, even though they are outnumbered. The point I am trying to make is that,
because of that basic asymmetry that we face, we have built a philosophy that requires
a lot of things, and these elements are interdependent. You not only have to have good
equipment but you have to have good training, you have to have good people, you have
to have good logistics support.
If you have all those things, you will have an effective deterrent even though you are
outnumbered. And the military leadership in this country has been fairly successful in
seeing that we have those elements, even though they didn’t know how much money they
were going to get the next year, or how much in the long run they could plan on. They
had to live with a one-year budget system.
But, conversely, that means that when you start cutting back there is not one of those
things that you can cut back without really carving into your philosophy. Many people
would say, “Well, it takes longer to build equipment than it does to train, so we will cut
down on your training this year, and then if we have a crisis you can train quickly.” But
given the fundamental problem we have, if you cut out any one of those four elements,
we deteriorate very rapidly.
Sea Power: Your number one priority right now, we would judge from hearing your tes-
timony, would have to be people, would it not?
Crowe: Absolutely! From my perspective, and I believe the Joint Chiefs all share this point
of view, that is our number one priority. You can ght sometimes without some things if
you have good people, but no matter what other advantages you might enjoy, if you don’t
have good people, and particularly when you are outnumbered and outgunned, you will
lose. Good people are the most crucial element.
Statement on Nuclear Testing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC | May 8
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
I appreciate this opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on various proposals to
ban the testing of nuclear weapons. You have asked me to address the issue of nuclear
testing broadly and comprehensively, with emphasis on:
• The relationship between nuclear testing and defense policy;
• Linkages between testing and deterrence, the prime mission of our nuclear forces;
• The military impact of nuclear arms reductions and associated proposals for a
comprehensive test ban;
• Safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness considerations embedded in the
technical aspects of nuclear testing; and
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• Issues surrounding compliance with and verication of existing limits on nuclear
testing.
Nuclear Deterrence
To begin, I share the view of many on this committee that the world would be better off
without nuclear weapons. But until that occurs, some of us have to mind the store, mak-
ing sure that we have a nuclear deterrent as reliable and as credible as we can make it,
with minimum risk to our national security, as Secretary Weinberger stated in his FY
1987 report to the Congress.
We seek to prevent war by persuading potential adversaries that the cost of attacking
us will exceed any gain they could hope to achieve. This is the core of our defense strategy
today, as it has been for most of the postwar period.
I am not sure that the Soviet military establishment looks at deterrence in exactly the
same context. I do know that we and they approach the strategic balance in far different
ways. For their part, the Soviet Union takes a very robust and multifaceted approach
toward this balance:
• An unusually large mix of nuclear offensive forces: 10 types of ICBMs, 3 classes of
ballistic missile submarines, 6 types of SLBMs, 6 types of nuclear-capable bomb-
ers, 5 cruise missile variants, 2 types of long-range intermediate-range missiles,
and a host of theater nuclear-capable weapons positioned to strike across the
Warsaw Pact front with NATO;
• An air defense system with extraordinary radar coverage and interceptor density
around the nation’s periphery;
• The world’s only operational ABM system featuring interceptor missiles with both
conventional and nuclear warheads;
• An anti-satellite system operational for more than two decades, including missiles
with a conventional warhead designed to blast satellites out of the sky;
• A shield of earth, rock, concrete, and steel around many of their nuclear forces,
coupled with a concurrent program hardening command, control, and commu-
nications facilities and equipment; and
• A heavy emphasis on damage limitation through civil defenses.
Thus, while the Soviet Union has pursued a comprehensive nuclear testing program
over time, that program is only one component of a military strategy forged around a
massive array of offensive and defensive forces. These forces are composed of conven-
tional and nuclear arms which support a doctrine concerned with the essence, purpose,
and character of a possible future war and the preparation of the country and its armed
forces for conducting such a war.
For our part, we have never tried to emulate the Soviet “fortress” mentality. Nor
do we replace our strategic offensive forces at the same pace as one sees in the Soviet
Union. Instead, we have historically let our deterrent rely heavily on the incremental
modernization of existing launch platforms with recurring emphasis on nuclear weapon
technologies. To illustrate this point, over the years, we could have emphasized large
ICBMs and mega-tonnages in warheads; instead, we leaned toward more accurate
missiles and new warheads of lower yields.
We might have moved more quickly toward an entirely new design for our ballistic
missile submarines, featuring larger tubes or more missiles per submarine, or a larger
inventory of SSBNs; instead, we applied the multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) solution. Similarly, in the mid-1970s, a decision not to replace the aging
B-52s was accompanied by development of an entirely new weapon system centered
around cruise missiles. For better or worse, many of these decisions were made on the
basis of scal constraints. Sometimes, they were accompanied by an illusion that nuclear
disarmament was just around the corner. In any event, improvements to our systems
placed proportionately greater emphasis on weapons rather than proliferation of basic
platforms. This in turn led us to rely on a comprehensive nuclear testing program. We
know it, and the Soviets know it. That is why they have pushed weapons and nuclear
testing to the foreground in propaganda and in recent nuclear disarmament proposals.
Today, of course, we are forced to replace aging platforms with the new Trident sub-
marine, the B-1 bomber, and the Peacekeeper. We fully expect that these new platforms
will be around for a long time—the mainstay of our nuclear deterrent force. In turn, we
must retain the exibility to make incremental improvements in weapon systems designs
and validation of such designs through the nuclear testing program in order to ensure
that these systems remain an effective and credible deterrent.
The Strategic Balance
Because the United States and the Soviet Union approach the strategic balance in such
different ways, we also nd occasional confusion over where the two sides stand in that
balance. When one limits the discussion to offensive nuclear arms, it is possible to con-
clude that we lead the Soviets in some areas and they lead us in others, resulting in a
situation perceived by some as rough nuclear parity.
But if we consider the totality of Soviet military forces and capabilities—offensive
nuclear arms, together with other nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological warfare
components of their strategic posture—we nd that the United States and its allies are
considerably underpowered in comparison with the USSR. To restore and stabilize the
strategic balance—and in seeking to reduce our current reliance upon offensive nuclear
arms—we are moving ahead with efforts to determine the technical feasibility of a strate-
gic defense. In the interim, the need to maintain an effective triad is clear. We must leave
the door open for the incremental improvements necessary to ensure that effectiveness.
Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Proposals
As you know—and might expect—nuclear testing gures prominently in recent nuclear
disarmament campaigns and proposals by the Soviet Union. With respect to nuclear
testing in general, the Soviet Union has been reaching for the high ground in political
and social rhetoric, condemning in particular the US program. In reality, however, the
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ofcial Gorbachev proposals of mid-January do not contemplate a worldwide ban on
nuclear testing until the late 1990s—more than a decade from now. In the interim, these
proposals suggest only that the United States and the Soviet Union join in a moratorium
or delay in nuclear testing—an arrangement which can be broken and which, in fact,
worked very much to our disadvantage in 1961 when the Soviets broke out of a three-year
moratorium with the most intensive nuclear test program in history. Even their recent
suspension of nuclear testing seems to have been a temporary expedient. They are now
gearing up for a resumption of such tests.
Nuclear Disarmament and National Security
You also will nd that the Soviet proposals of mid-January weave the whole issue of
nuclear testing into a much broader package which, through the year 2000, would
enhance their security and exibility while undermining the foundations of US and allied
security. We should not expect otherwise. But even if we are able to nd a more equitable
road to nuclear disarmament that road will have its own asymmetries, uncertainties,
and potential instabilities in the East-West military balance.
As the process evolves, both sides can be expected to place a premium on the surviv-
ability, reliability, and effectiveness of that last component of their nuclear capability. In
this regard, General Secretary Gorbachev was correct when he noted, “the interrelationship
between offensive and defensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof.” What he did
not mention are some very obvious efforts by the Soviet Union to strengthen such linkages
within their own force structure, including but certainly not limited to an earth and space
shield for many of their nuclear strike forces, national command structure, and commu-
nication assets. For deterrent purposes, it is absolutely essential that we be able to place
such protected targets at risk. To do this, we must be able to perfect our nuclear weapons,
as necessary, and that in turn requires continuity within the nuclear testing program.
We also face major uncertainties surrounding the mix of launch vehicles apt to evolve
from a nuclear disarmament process. We don’t know whether the Soviets will emphasize
mobile or hardened ICBMs, more dispersed and sheltered bombers, or ballistic missile
submarines, some of which may be berthed in coastal tunnels. In any event, uncertain-
ties surrounding the evolving mix and location of Soviet offensive forces underscore the
importance of remaining exible in weapon system design and validation of such designs
through testing.
Lastly, the whole process of eliminating nuclear weapons on a worldwide basis is
fraught with extraordinary problems of compliance and verication. We do not know,
in the rst instance, whether nuclear disarmament is an achievable proposition by the
year 2000. Further, we have no way of knowing whether a nuclear disarmament treaty,
even one pursued diligently by the United States and the Soviet Union, will capture the
last weapon on earth. Thus, we will have to maintain a deterrent to nuclear attack right
down to the last moment and, from a US and allied security perspective, we want that
deterrent to be as effective and credible as possible. Nuclear testing is required to guar-
antee this. To put all of this in perspective:
• A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, now or later, will contribute absolutely
nothing to nuclear disarmament. It will not eliminate a single nuclear weapon.
• Conversely, continuation of a comprehensive nuclear testing program can assure
that we go down the road of nuclear disarmament with minimum degradation in
the safety, security, survivability, reliability, and exibility of our nuclear deterrent
and, in turn, minimum risk to our national security and that of our allies.
Technical Requirements
Thus far, I have focused upon the strategic and military requirements for nuclear test-
ing. Let me now turn to the technical side. In general, the design and development of a
nuclear weapon represents a great extension beyond the usual engineering experience
of any technology on which we depend:
• Temperatures of 100 million degrees, or hotter than the surface of the sun;
• Pressures higher than in stars;
• Operations measured in millionths of a second; and
• Internal velocities of 100 kilometers per second.
Safety and Security
These characteristics demand, rst and foremost, the highest standards in safety and
security. We can never rest on our oars. Similarly, we must ensure that all of the com-
plex mechanisms of achieving safety and security do not, in some unexpected fashion,
degrade the reliability of that weapon as part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. We can
satisfy ourselves on that score only by maintaining a nuclear testing program. A strong
emphasis on safety and security also reinforces our concerns about nuclear arms control.
We go to great lengths to minimize the possibility of unauthorized access or tampering,
radiation exposure to troops engaged in weapon maintenance, and hazards associated
with an accident during storage or transportation.
Further, the basic precept that American-built products should be put through a
program of rigorous testing is deeply entrenched in our industrial culture and in laws of
the land. We insist that a vast range of commercial goods possess a requisite degree of
safety and reliability, and we ensure this through testing at the factory by the National
Bureau of Standards or some other independent agency. Similarly, the Department of
Defense is under constant pressure to assure that conventional weapon systems—tanks,
ghting vehicles, aircraft, missiles, and so on—perform as designed and expected on
the battleeld. In this context, I frankly do not understand why Congress would want
to suspend testing on one of the most critical and sophisticated elements of our nuclear
deterrent—namely, the warhead.
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Weapons Reliability and Effectiveness
With respect to weapons reliability and effectiveness, we are dependent upon the testing
program in ve distinct ways.
• It gives us condence in our existing stockpile of nuclear weapons. Our hope is
that we will never have to use such weapons, but like other systems not used
over many years, we must be sure that they will perform as designed—and that
our potential adversaries are aware of this fact. We require this same condence
of our conventional war reserves (ammunition, missiles, etc.). It is inconceivable
that we would place weapons constructed of the most exotic materials known to
man and incorporating the most advanced physical principles on the shelf for an
indeterminate period of time without ascertaining the indiscriminate effects of
aging.
• Testing provides information essential to the effective employment of nuclear
weapons—condence that the right weapon is applied to the right target. The
lethality of nuclear weapons, theirs and ours, against hardened targets is one
of our major concerns. So too is the expected survival and performance of such
weapons in a nuclear environment featuring the synergistic effects of blast, high
intensity radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
• Testing enables us to determine critical nuclear effects on such nonnuclear sys-
tems as surveillance, command, control, and communications systems. For exam-
ple, it is common knowledge that radiation can be a serious problem. We must
continue to explore the nature of the entire spectrum of nuclear effects problems
and develop xes to deal with them.
• It helps us to verify that a weapon modied for reliability, security, or safety rea-
sons, or a weapon tailor-made for a new delivery system, such as cruise missiles,
the Peacekeeper, or the Trident D-5, will emerge as a reliable and effective com-
ponent of our nuclear deterrent forces. At one time, for example, we had to recall
all of the Polaris warheads because of reliability problems that degraded inventory
effectiveness by as much as 75 percent. Only nuclear testing allowed us to verify
that Polaris modications had solved the problem.
• And, testing helps us design entirely new weapons of smaller size and weight for a
given yield. For years, the United States has led the world in this aspect of nuclear
technology, with considerable savings in the size and cost of delivery systems. But
each new delivery system and associated weapon requires thorough testing before
it can be counted as part of our strategic or tactical nuclear deterrent.
Overall, nuclear testing is a bargain in the maintenance and modernization of our
nuclear forces. But the lack of testing can make this process more costly over the long
haul. To illustrate this point, if we had to assess weapon reliability and survivability
based upon paper calculations, unsupported by empirical tests, we would encounter a
number of unacceptable uncertainties and unknowns, the nature and extent of which
we would be unable to determine. One could conceive of these unknowns translating
into compensatory measures that could result in markedly different types of weapons
or, possibly, a requirement for more weapons per target than we plan today. That’s an
expensive proposition no matter how you look at it.
In all of this, I would emphasize that we do not detonate a weapon underground sim-
ply for stockpile reliability, weapons development, or physics studies of new concepts.
The Department of Energy and the Defense Nuclear Agency have a broad-based schedule
of scientic and technical observations, supported by an extensive array of measuring
devices, to study effects on the various nonnuclear components of our strategic deter-
rent forces as well as those incorporated in command, control, communications, and
intelligence systems. While I do not want to get into details, it is not uncommon for these
tests to produce technical surprises, something not predicted in either simulations or
computer-based analyses.
I believe that the Soviet military has a similar range of technical requirements. Cer-
tainly, this was suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement last March that
“during seven months of non-testing the Soviets had paid a price militarily” and their
subsequent decision to resume testing. Thus, on purely military grounds, I suspect both
sides agree that nuclear testing is essential. In turn, this tends to push the whole issue
of testing toward compliance with existing agreements.
Verification and Compliance
As this committee is aware, the US government has been trying for several years to get
its arms around the verication and compliance problem. So far, objective results are not
very assuring. Most government experts agree that seismic techniques, used to estimate
the yield of a Soviet nuclear test under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, are inadequate to
ensure effective verication and compliance. Others have testied that, even with seismic
sensors, it is possible to circumvent this technology by testing in cavities, thereby decou-
pling the energy of an explosion from the surrounding medium; or testing in outer space,
in remote areas, or in the atmosphere above parts of the world, areas where attributing
the test to a particular country would be extremely difcult.
In the interest of exploring the technical side of verication, the President has repeat-
edly sought an honest exchange of views with the Soviets. They have been invited, for
example, to measure the yield of a US nuclear test using any instrumentation devices they
deem necessary. But they have refused to participate in this relatively straight-forward
approach to the problem. Additionally, the President offered to demonstrate, in the third
week of April 1986, a new direct-yield measurement technique, known as CORRTEX,
which US scientists believe will enable both the United States and the USSR to improve
verication and ensure compliance with the current Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
The CORRTEX method has a number of features important to understand. It does
not replace remote sensing by seismic detectors; rather, it would eliminate some of the
uncertainties associated with remote sensing by on-site measurement of specic nuclear
tests. The US government does not intend that such measuring be accomplished by a
third party. Americans would monitor Soviet tests, and citizens of the Soviet Union would
monitor our tests.
The Soviet government turned aside the President’s latest proposal. Instead, Moscow
continues to maintain that agreement on methods of verication and compliance will
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not be difcult if we ignore problems associated with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and move on to a more comprehensive moratorium on nuclear testing, a maneuver that
would completely ignore effective verication concerns in a regime where these factors
are even more critical and demanding. I have trouble with their “good faith” approach,
particularly when other aspects of their nuclear disarmament package envision a con-
tinuing military struggle for world power and inuence. I doubt the Soviet Union will
ever be able to square this circle. Thus, we must assure that verication and compliance
mechanisms surrounding any nuclear testing arrangement be as direct, straight-forward,
and objective as possible.
Summary
To sum it up, I believe that the US way of managing its nuclear deterrent and the strategic
balance is far less burdensome on our society and our economy than the Soviet way. But
you must recognize that our approach to nuclear deterrence puts a premium on high
technology rather than brute force. So too does our effort to develop a strategic defense
unaccompanied by a government and a people digging in for survival.
In defense planning, we are drawn toward nuclear testing by one simple fact: we
expect to achieve effective deterrence from a relatively small mix of strategic nuclear
forces in service over a relatively long period of time. To maintain that effectiveness and
credibility over time, we must have a weapons modernization and maintenance program
supported by rigorous underground testing—the only environment left to us. We cannot
assume, even in view of the Soviet proposals, that nuclear disarmament is just around
the corner.
For something as exotic and potentially lethal as a nuclear weapon, such testing also
is embedded in the highest standards of safety, security, and survivability, as well as
reliability. We should regard with the utmost concern any suggestion that we could allow
our nuclear weapons stockpile to degrade “gracefully” over time.
Further, virtually everything about the nuclear disarmament process—asymmetries,
uncertainties, and potential instabilities in the evolving military balance—suggests that
a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should only occur toward the end, rather than
at the beginning, of this process. Certainly, this is the case for the United States and its
allies, if not for the Soviet Union.
Overall, I believe we stand a better chance of achieving near-term progress in nuclear
disarmament by approaching weapons reductions directly rather than obliquely through
a comprehensive test ban. The United States has formally proposed such reductions in
both theater systems and strategic systems. The Joint Chiefs fully support these propos-
als and would welcome a constructive response by the Soviets to them.
Excerpts from Remarks at a Joint Chamber of Commerce/Kiwanis/Lions/ Rotary
Luncheon for “Bill Crowe Day”
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | May 15
What I’m trying to say in a sort of roundabout way is that it is a very special treat for
Shirley and me to take this brief respite among friends and to collect our thoughts in
the state where we grew up.
I want to tell you a story that I acquired in 1984. I had come back for the graduation
ceremony at OU. I was given an award there, and I brought with me a few members of
my staff from Hawaii who were sort of a cross-section of this country. They were with us
for the two days we spent here, meeting people and seeing things in Oklahoma. As we
were ying out, I was talking to two or three of these ofcers, and they said, “You know,
we’ve been all over this country, and it’s just great to visit a place where the people are
proud of where they live. And it’s not true everywhere.” They just were amazed at how
proud Oklahomans are to be here, to live here, and of their state. And it’s a great tribute
to you. Shirley and I, likewise, are very proud to call this state our home. Sooners, you
know, just make no bones about the strong attachments they have to family and to the
free way of life. They seem to have a special feel for this country and its values. And as
today’s events show, they have a deep sense of patriotism and appreciation for the people
in uniform who secure the Nation’s interests all around the globe, every day.
Remarks on Career Reflections: Thoughts for 1986 USNA Graduates at the
Graduation Ceremonies, US Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland | May 21
Admiral [Charles R.] Larson, members of the Naval Academy faculty and staff, proud
parents, guests, and above all, graduates of the Class of 1986:
It is an understatement to say that I am thrilled to be here today to share with you the
sense of excitement, anticipation, and freedom that attends all graduation ceremonies.
Forty years ago I went through a similar commencement. As a matter of fact, the only
substantial differences that I can detect are that there are some very talented young
women graduating today and the admirals seem to me to be much younger and hand-
somer than the ones who attended in 1946. It’s amazing what four decades will do to
your point of view.
One other thing experience tells you is that commencement addresses fade rapidly—
perhaps in a matter of seconds—but what will not be forgotten today is that the Class of
1986 has successfully completed a challenging four years and is graduating. You have
crossed all the rivers, slain all the dragons, and knocked aside the windmills which four
years ago stood between you and a diploma and a commission in your nation’s military
service. Today, we are rightly celebrating those achievements, and on behalf of all the
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parents, guests, and friends assembled, I salute you and extend our warmest wishes
and congratulations.
Speaking of parents, I strongly believe that they, likewise, should be accorded special
recognition today. I am condent that our graduates would be happy to divide their glory
with you. After all, you have made a substantial contribution to the whole process—
including encouragement, comfort and solace, no doubt some worrying, and probably a
respectable amount of nagging and praying. At the same time, if my own experience is
any guide, you have also paid a physical, mental, and psychological price. I feel it appro-
priate, therefore, in the name of new Ensigns and 2nd Lieutenants, to thank the parents
for their vital role. Would all the parents please stand so we can acknowledge you?
One further aside. If as parents you have found the road to this day unduly taxing,
you might prot from a bit of advice saw I on a bumper sticker a few days ago. It said,
“Avenge yourself—live long enough to be a problem to your children.”
As a rule, a graduation speaker is never given a topic, but at the same time is expected
to inspire and encourage his listeners with stirring remarks about nothing in particular.
Today’s event was no exception. I learned early in my life that people in the academic
world have a strong tendency to speak in generalities and, when you most want specic
answers, to leave you on your own. As a young and struggling student I had a number of
teachers insist that a man becomes what he thinks about—that was, of course, designed
to encourage studiousness and high thoughts. But if it was true that I would become
what I thought about, by the time I was eighteen I would have become a girl.
In any event, lacking a subject or denitive instructions, I turned to my own experi-
ence for help. As I contemplated the 40 years since I graduated from this institution—
since I faced the world as you do now, with a degree but little work experience; with high
hopes but little actual know-how—a few special thoughts seemed to spring out. They
are not specic directions but philosophical benchmarks which have made it easier to
keep my bearings under pressure; to adjust to change, to disappointment, and also to
good fortune. In sum, they concern how you use your education in making your way in
today’s complex world, either in or out of the Service. I would like to share these thoughts
with you for the next few moments.
There is a strong tendency today in this country—especially among speakers on
occasions such as this—to deplore the state of the world and to wring one’s hands and to
fantasize about the past—the good old days. These prophets of doom overlook an awful lot
that has gone on in the past and simply ignore the steady progress that has been made
over the centuries. This is not to say that we don’t have global anxieties. Clearly our own
society has strains; we live under a number of clouds. You have no doubt discussed them
in many a classroom, seminar, forum, and bull session. But to conclude that because
we have serious problems we are going to the dogs is sheer nonsense. Paul Harvey once
said, “In times like these, it’s useful to remember that there have always been times like
these.” I think that’s excellent advice.
The European of the 1400s who experienced the Black Plague—who didn’t even know
why his friends were dying—would not agree that we have not progressed; neither would
the Spanish seaman who sailed with the Armada; nor the Bedouin Arab who lived for
centuries on the margins of starvation; nor those unfortunate peoples overrun by the
Mongol conqueror Tamerlane; nor Galileo, who would be ecstatic over the advances of
modern science. These are only a few examples from countless thousands.
In fact, previous ages have faced more disease, more poverty, more hunger, more
corruption, more racism, and more killing than your generation. The globe since its
beginning has confronted terrifying challenges, and yet it is still revolving on its axis. It
is more exciting and vibrant today than it ever has been.
Art Buchwald, another famous philosopher, put it this way, “I don’t know whether this
is the best of times or the worst of times, but I can assure you it’s the only time we’ve got.”
He cites Watergate as the ultimate test. Two hundred million people were able to change
Presidents overnight without “one tank or helmeted soldier in the street” or “one bayonet
being unsheathed.” Any country that can do that can’t be all bad.
The bottom line is: You should direct your energies to further improving our condition
without being burdened with worrying about our decline and fall. And you should help
others to do the same. With time, you will discover that such an attitude not only better
accords with the facts but it will assist you in leading a more balanced and fruitful life.
Of course, it takes more than optimism to thread the rocks and shoals which block
the way. In my experience, the greatest joy a human being can know is the joy we cel-
ebrate today—accomplishment—the joy of completing a job well done. This joy can be
boundless when we make full use of our minds, our talents, our time. But there are no
guarantees with either your diploma or your commission. They may widen your oppor-
tunities, but “future” achievement, results, and satisfaction depend on what you have
yet to do. An individual who does not continue to learn and grow as a person is no better
than one who cannot. Newton D. Baker wisely pointed out that, “The man who graduates
today and stops learning tomorrow, is uneducated the day after.”
Think of your life as a piece of farmland. It can only return to you what rst you give
to it. Making full use of your abilities, your plot of ground will return to you and yours
an abundance that will amaze and delight you. I never use that analogy that I’m not
reminded of the small town minister who was driving through the countryside. He came
upon a particularly well-tended farm. It was green and productive and just generally
impressive. He stopped and walked over to the fence and saw the farmer who obviously
worked the land, and he said, “Brother, the Lord has seen t to give you an awfully won-
derful farm.” The farmer thought about it a minute and said, “Well, I guess that’s right,
Pastor, but I wish you’d seen it when he gave it to me.”
Let me assure you that these thoughts apply to all jobs and all stations in life, and
especially to a military career. You will soon discover, as you disperse and report to your
rst duty station, that you do in fact have a great deal more to learn and that, in turn,
Service life has a lot to teach. In fact, if you want some specic home-cooked advice, I
would recommend that early in the game every Ensign and Second Lieutenant latch on to
one or more good chief petty ofcers, or gunnery sergeants, and absorb their wisdom. You
will greatly prot from what experience has taught them and the depth of their knowledge.
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If you are genuinely willing to learn, they will be happy to share it with you. In return,
they will expect enlightened leadership. Leaders, not technicians, are the number one
product of this institution, and that’s what is most needed in the eet. Believe me, lead-
ership can and does make a crucial difference in every successful group—and this is
even more true in a platoon, a ship, or a squadron where men may someday be ordered
to perform at the risk of death. A winning military capability is inevitably built upon
quality leadership.
Successful commanders differ greatly in their styles and techniques—but they have
a few common qualities. They know the mechanics of their business; they inspire others
to excel; and they always keep the organization’s fundamental goals rmly in focus. I
urge you to cultivate those talents. Both you and our country will prot from such efforts,
whether you make your ultimate career in or out of the service.
In preparing these remarks, I read several graduation addresses. In practically every
instance the speaker mentioned that his career had on one or more occasions taken a
completely unforeseen turn—normally for the better. In most cases, this good fortune
was not the result of clever manipulation or some master plan, but opened up because
the individual had drawn attention to himself by doing a good job—often a job that had
little direct relation with the new offer.
At times the path ahead of you will be difcult, boring, discouraging, and certainly
not well marked, but if you remain fully engaged, and take each step as well as you
can and keep on walking, you will ultimately reach high ground. In this regard, you
enjoy an advantage you must never overlook. As graduates of the US Naval Academy
you are part of a long and impressive tradition that you can call on in times of strife
and peril. You are steeped in the history and the standards of the world’s foremost
navy and Marine corps team. You inherit a code of perseverance and victory second
to none, and it rests on the achievements of men like Farragut, Dewey, Sims, King,
Nimitz, Spruance, and a host of others. I can testify that there will be times when you
will personally draw on the Navy’s traditions for strength and that you will, in turn,
nd them genuinely sustaining.
Right now I suspect that most of you feel that you are approaching the future with
comparatively open minds, willing to entertain new ideas and varying points of view. In
fact, you probably deplore what appears to be the narrow outlook and predictability of
many of your elders. Mark Twain said, “You tell me where a man gets his cornpone, and
I’ll tell you what his opinions are.” He was right about that, of course. Senior military
leaders, not unlike bankers, doctors, journalists, farmers, lawyers, stock brokers, and
television executives, all develop their own stereotyped view of the world, which often
leaves little room for change or invention or appreciation for the opinion of others.
Don’t forget, they were once just like you—new graduates dozing through a com-
mencement ceremony and determined to remain open-minded. But it didn’t work that
way. They entered their profession and were gradually entrapped in its patterns of think-
ing and doing. The columnist Jane Bryant Quinn dubbed such people “prisoners of their
vocabulary—the vocabulary of their work world. Their minds pick up today’s ideas, then
close and sink like a stone.” In turn, their intellects soon “vanish without a trace.” In
other words, they became “the narrow-minded adults, whose existence they once failed
to understand.” I urge you to reject that path and to nourish the spirit of inquiry which
the last four years has imparted to you. This involves keeping a broad circle of acquain-
tances, wide reading, developing interests outside of your work, seriously listening to
others, even your critics, and constantly seeking fresh points of view. Quinn says, “You
should begin to worry when you start sounding like everyone else you know.”
I personally witnessed a man wrestling with this problem a few months ago in New
York City. I was in a taxi and asked the driver who he was going to vote for in the next
election. He said that his whole family—including his grandparents, parents, and broth-
ers—had always voted for Party X. I surmised that, therefore, he would vote for Party X
this time. He said, “No”—he was going to vote for Party Y. He went on to explain, “There
comes a time in every man’s life when he must ignore his principles and do the right
thing.” I could not have put it better.
Your mind is something like a parachute. It won’t help you if it won’t open when you
need it. But do not underestimate this task. Given the pressures and the specialization of
the modern world, and especially of the military profession, you will have to work continu-
ously at keeping an open and questioning mind. But the rewards are great. This capacity
is the foundation on which a man or woman can build genuine integrity and self-esteem.
You could pay no greater tribute to the Naval Academy or to yourself than winning the
constant ght to maintain your intellectual freedom, independence, and perspective.
Let me offer one more piece of amateur wisdom. As you progress and mature, noth-
ing will stand you in better stead than a sense of humor. In a perfect or ideal world, this
would not be so important. We could be serious about every subject without harm. But,
unfortunately, life does not meet that criterion. There is no line of work, no endeavor,
no institution, no achievement, no failure that doesn’t have its ludicrous or ridiculous
aspects, and to recognize that simple lesson is a rst step toward maturity.
Alan Alda, better known as Hawkeye of “Mash” fame, expounding on his own phi-
losophy, contends that “to be playful about the most serious things is a trait of the most
dedicated person.” He insists that “to kid authority is to humanize it” and to endow it with
“a strength that rigidity will never give it.” He suggests that such an approach is a “mark
of closeness and involvement, not antagonism.” He may have been rationalizing his own
rather irreverent attitudes, but I do believe there is a great deal of truth in what he says.
I must emphasize that I do not just mean the ability to appreciate a joke or tell a
good story. In my book, a man who cannot make fun of himself does not have a sense of
humor. The fringe benets of being able to laugh at your own frailties, pomposity, pre-
tense, or mistakes are many. It is an essential part of remaining humble, relaxed, and
in touch with reality.
I watched Mr. George Burns on television the other night. At the age of 90, he is still
going strong. He said that in his career he had tried singing—no one listened. He tried
dancing—no one liked it. He tried comedy—no one laughed. He tried serious acting and
everybody laughed. But, by the time he discovered that he didn’t have any talent, he was
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too big a star to quit. His sense of humor has kept him healthy and successful for more
years than most of us will see.
When asked what would happen if there were no stories in the world, a third grader
replied, “People would die of seriousness.” That’s not too farfetched. In essence, a genu-
ine sense of humor oils the gears of personal relationships, lends perspective to complex
problems, and above all, helps to keep you sane when the world closes in—and believe
me, it will close in at times. I simply cannot imagine going through this life without lots
of laughter.
It is hard to believe that it has been four decades since my own graduation. For me,
the years of following the ag, literally around the globe, have been full of challenge,
and in the end they have brought me quite unexpected responsibilities. Now I am the
last one of my class—826 strong—on active duty. Those years included a great deal of
conict and crisis for my country; they spanned Korea and Vietnam and all gradations
of troubled peace. Nevertheless:
• Our people are still free, and prospering;
• The prospects for the future spread of democracy are bright;
• Hopeful peoples around the globe still look to the United States of America for
inspiration and help; and
• The enemies of freedom have been more often thwarted than successful, and their
star is in decline, more and more as time goes by.
My class has played a signicant role in that drama, both in peace and war. Of my
classmates, two were POWs in North Vietnam for over seven years, two are Medal of
Honor winners, 34 attained ag or general rank, and an impressive number are CEOs
or heads of their own companies. One has served as President of our nation. The list
could go on and on. Your class will likewise be heavily involved in shaping US foreign and
military policy and in every aspect of our national life over the next forty years. It will
be an exciting journey, and I envy the prospects and challenges you will face. President
Lincoln in the Civil War used to tell his generals, “Gentlemen, always remember, when
you are in the eld, you are the republic.” That is no less true for the Class of 1986—you
are the republic!
In preparing for this address, I tried desperately to recall the events of my own grad-
uation, but with very little success. If you choose to remember anything about today,
perhaps you could recall that the remarks were given by a JCS Chairman who didn’t talk
about congressional appropriations, that he was high on life and service and on doing a
good job, that he counseled open-mindedness and believed that people should laugh a
great deal—particularly at themselves.
With that, I commend the keeping of our country’s ideals and institutions into the
hands of the Class of ’86. May you always have fair winds and following seas.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, Strategic Air Command, Offutt
Air Force Base, Nebraska
June 23
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, and men and women of the United States
Strategic Air Command:
It is indeed a great honor to participate in this ceremony, to witness a transition of
leadership at the helm of this rst-rate command. It is a great pleasure also to visit the
state of Nebraska once again. Military people have always said that any duty outside
Washington is good duty, and that, by the same token, any trip outside the Washington
beltway is a good trip. I certainly don’t disagree with that folk wisdom, and I confess that
I do welcome these brief escapes from the Washington swirl, but this visit today—and
this event—have special signicance and meaning, for several reasons.
It is most gratifying, rst of all, to be part of a gathering that includes so many prom-
inent Nebraskans—and I say this in all sincerity, despite my deep roots in the great state
of Oklahoma (and my fondness for the Oklahoma football team). Our presence here today
recreates, in a symbolic sense, the partnership that built this great nation and each of
its states: citizens who have used their freedom well, and people in uniform dedicated
to preserving that freedom and protecting those accomplishments. In these ceremonies,
we renew the great civil-military tie which has always been strong here in the Nation’s
heartland, and which we together must carefully nourish in the years ahead to secure our
society from the persistent efforts of those who would seek to harm it or to bring it down.
To keep that partnership healthy, we must always remember what it reects: the
historical combination of the fruits of peace and the military strength that keeps the
preconditions for peace rmly in place. The American people are free, and their prospects
are good, because the Armed Forces have raised a shield against the enemies of democ-
racy, whose efforts never slacken. For forty years the Strategic Air Command has been
a central element of the strength that has deterred war with our most dangerous, and
most determined, adversaries, and that has permitted the citizens of this nation to go
about their civilian pursuits so successfully, Through the years, the men and women of
SAC—116,000 strong in 100 locations around the globe—have had much to be proud of.
In recent years especially, the ongoing modernization of our strategic forces has brought
important new systems and capabilities on line and placed others in the pipeline. All of
you, from General [Larry] Welch on down, can be proud of these tangible enhancements.
But the nal measure of your accomplishment is the preservation of peace for the
United States and its allies around the globe. You deal daily with the most awesome
responsibilities of the nuclear age. Your success in that endeavor ranks among this coun-
try’s—and indeed mankind’s—highest achievements. Moreover, you have not only helped
this nation deter war but you have also provided a powerful incentive for our enemies to
return to negotiating tables where reductions in armaments can be pursued. You have
helped to keep the peace and also to make it safer. There is no nobler mission, nor any
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higher accomplishment in the annals of our military services. It is a great honor for me
to have a chance today to recognize and applaud your efforts. You deserve the best—and
you have certainly been blessed with the nest leadership the Nation can provide.
As you say goodbye to General Welch, we in Washington prepare to welcome him to
his new responsibilities as Air Force Chief of Staff. He leaves behind an impressive legacy
of achievement despite a relatively short tenure as your commander.
He has led the Strategic Air Command at a time of great pressure on the Nation’s
resources, and also at a time when we have made determined efforts to restore the health
of our deterrent. He has been a forceful and persuasive advocate, and he has done much
to help us maintain the modernization momentum we need. His successor, General John
Chain, will be challenged to continue that effort, which the President himself has declared a
rst priority for this nation. I can think of no one better suited to that task. Having worked
with John and observed him for many years, I have the greatest respect for his talents, and
I know—and the President knows—that SAC is getting a very ne commander.
When we—you and I—depart these proceedings today, there are three good reasons
why we ought to feel good about this nation and about its future prospects. The rst is that
the change of command we are observing demonstrates not change of direction or resolve,
but reafrmation and rededication. It displays, for all to see, the continuity of enlightened
and talented leadership that has become, thankfully, characteristic in America’s Armed
Forces. The second reason for optimism and condence is the evident strength and cohe-
sion of SAC, and ultimately the capabilities and commitment of its people. You have made
this command work so well that many of our citizens elsewhere take your product—
peace—literally for granted. It can be a thankless job, but there is no more important one
in America, and you have done it well. And the third cause for encouragement is the health
and vitality of the civil-military tie here in Nebraska, the bond that animates and sustains
all of us who wear the uniform. As these are reasons all Americans can have condence in
their defenses, they are also signals to friends and enemies alike that America’s position
as leader of the free world’s defenses remains strong and determined.
In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, I extend
our very best wishes for both General Welch and General Chain, and their families, as
well as the whole Strategic Air Command, in the days ahead.
Statement on the Reorganization of Special Operations Forces before the House
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness
July 16
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I welcome this opportunity to testify on the future organization of our Special Operations
Forces. I will not repeat, word for word, the JCS position on this subject, forwarded to
you by Secretary Weinberger’s letter of June 26th. Rather, I would like to focus on things
that are working right, areas where we agree changes are necessary, and why the new
Special Operations Force Command is recommended over other alternatives.
First, a few descriptive words about Special Operations Forces are in order. They
are specially trained, equipped, and organized to conduct operations against strategic
or tactical targets in pursuit of national security objectives during peace or periods of
hostilities; they can support conventional operations or be employed independently when
conventional force is either inappropriate or infeasible; and traditionally, they have been
manned by volunteers of high physical and mental agility, relatively free of administrative
burdens, very mobile and lightly equipped, and often acting as small units or individuals
in hazardous or otherwise unusual missions.
Today, like other warfare specialists—pilots, submariners, and paratroopers—Special
Operations Forces are prepared for combat by their parent Services.
SOF Organization
With respect to overall organization, I nd a mixed picture of things working right and
arrangements which could be improved. There is little question that a great deal of prog-
ress has been made in the last few years. In 1981, the SOF budget was around $441
million; the 1987 budget request calls for $1.3 billion; and there are urgent calls for new
equipment across a broad spectrum and marked force structure increases. I seldom hear
complaints about the selection, training, and qualication of volunteers. They either make
it or drop out, depending upon how they are judged by professionals in the business.
This up-front quality control is especially important for a force expected to increase in
size over the next ve years.
Civilian Oversight
I have no problems with civilian oversight of activities conducted by our Special Opera-
tions Forces. Given their focus on overseas rather than domestic employment and nec-
essary coordination with the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs seems to be a logical place for such oversight to reside.
With respect to in-theater arrangements, I can verify that the CINC’s Special Operations
Command (SOC) is an appropriate and satisfactory arrangement whereby the CINC nor-
mally exercises command and control over Special Operations Forces.
We would not want it any other way for global conventional war planning or for major
contingencies short of general war within the unied commander’s theater—like those
requiring us to:
(1) Deter state-supported terrorism or subversion;
(2) Inject various forces to safely evacuate Americans from a country in turmoil; or
(3) Quickly reinforce a friendly country or government under attack.
Next, I believe that National Command Authorities (NCA) are generally satised with
the organization of one small but important element of our Special Operations Forces—
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JSOC. This element has a high state of readiness, and it can be called into action quickly
under a very streamlined national command and control system. I have personally
observed the system work under stress and nd no reason to change it.
Preparation
At the same time, the Joint Chiefs agree that Special Operations Forces could be better
prepared for combat, especially as a multi-service team, and initiated a review a few
months ago to examine the subject from a number of perspectives—e.g., Congress, JCS,
Service Departments, and CINCs. It quickly became clear that there was considerable
confusion among different groups as to what the capabilities of Special Operations
Forces were and as to what missions they could perform. With a force growing to 30,000
or more active and reserve personnel, there is a genuine need for much more emphasis
on joint or unied training and exercises, a standard doctrine, developing special use
equipment, supporting intelligence, and more imagination concerning their combined
utility in support of national security objectives.
Similarly, today’s circumstances require an increasing stress on Special Operations
Forces in the professional educational patterns of all Services. We also know that small
forces invariably have difculty competing against larger forces for budget dollars in gen-
eral and new combat equipment in particular. This problem is going to grow rather than
diminish over time, especially if Congress continues a downward path in real spending
for defense. Every warfare community will be circling its wagons and bracing itself against
deep cuts in force structure, modernization programs, manpower, and operations and
maintenance funding. For our Special Operations Forces to survive and ourish in this
budget environment, more top-level support will be essential. As I understand it, these
concerns are very similar to those expressed by Congressman Daniel and this committee.
Special Operations Forces Command
To meet these challenges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have now recommended to the Sec-
retary of Defense that a new Special Operations Forces Command be created under
a three-star general or ag-rank ofcer. Conceptually, this command would have the
following characteristics:
• Headquarters for the command would be located in Washington, DC. The com-
mander would report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS in the same
manner as a Unied or Specied Commander.
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as spokesman for the com-
mander or, depending upon the outcome of pending legislation, overall supervisor
on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
• Special Operations Forces would be assigned to the Command after achieving
certain skills at the level of individual or team training, which would continue to
be a service responsibility. The new Special Operations Forces Command essen-
tially would take the ball from there, preparing all Special Operations Forces to
operate jointly.
Such joint preparations would include war-ghting concepts, doctrine, focused mil-
itary education, training, equipment development, interoperability, and readiness. The
SOCOM commander would, of course, be the senior adviser to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In the rare event of an operation that was outside of the charter of JSOC,
and which was not assigned to a unied commander, the SOF commander (suitably
reinforced) could assume direct control of the operation, if directed to do so.
Planning
Turning now to resource planning, the separate Services would continue to program,
procure, and maintain equipment assigned to or earmarked for Special Operations
Forces. Similarly, the Services would be responsible for maintaining the personnel
pipeline to units assigned to the CINC. To me, these supporting arrangements make
a great deal of sense, especially when you want combat forces relatively free of admin-
istrative burdens. Moreover, I see no organizational structure that could cut Special
Operations Forces off from Service resource and logistic support without becoming
prohibitively expensive and creating a completely separate Service with all the admin-
istrative machinery that involves.
Having concluded that it was necessary to develop initiatives to more closely monitor
Service support of the Special Operations Force Command and to integrate the efforts
of the logistics services into a smoothly working entity:
• The Special Operations Force commander will have a major voice in resource
planning, following practices now common among Unied and Specied Com-
mands. This includes an early opportunity to review Service Program Objective
Memoranda, to recommend such changes as he deems necessary, and to attend
all meetings with Unied Commanders.
• The Commander also will have direct access to the Chairman for purposes of
voicing requirements, positions, and priorities to be addressed in the Defense
Resources Board. As Secretary Weinberger informed you, I have accepted personal
responsibility as military proponent for Special Operations Forces. Additionally,
Assistant Secretary [Richard] Armitage, who already is lashed into planning,
programming, and budgeting activities for Special Operations Forces, will join
me in monitoring and sponsoring resource requirements of the Command.
If we trace the problem back to Service support, that is where we will seek solutions.
Personnel Aspects
With respect to the personnel aspects, the JCS want to see the Special Operations Force
preserve its community spirit, with pride in the past and condence in the future. But
frankly, we are wary of philosophies holding that one community is more elite than another.
I have seen this approach in the past—in the long run, it does not work. Even SOF people
will not all like an elite label—if it means divorcing themselves from their parent Services.
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We can see that they become more integrated, achieve greater stature as a multiser-
vice community, and receive proper recognition and promotion. We have done it before
with other communities. It takes a top-down push, and we are going to give that push
with both the creation of a Special Operations Force Command and the commitment of
the Chiefs of Service to a more vigorous SOF program.
Plan of Action
Administrative mechanisms are now in motion to have our SOF reorganization plan in
place and functioning within about six months. It will take time to shake down such an
organization (true of any scheme), but I am rmly convinced that it will work and do so
without alienating the SOF from the parent Services.
Summary
To put all of this into perspective: Many arrangements peculiar to our Special Operations
Forces are working well—excellent personnel quality control, civilian oversight within the
Department of Defense, command relations within the unied commands, and separate
arrangements for JSOC. At the same time, we all agree that the time has come to develop
a new organizational structure which will keep pace with the revitalization program,
more fully exploit their potential across a spectrum of contingencies, better integrate
them as a combined force, and assure that their resource requirements receive top level
attention in a scally constrained environment.
The JCS have developed what we consider to be a forward-looking plan of action to
deal with these challenges and opportunities. Though this plan may not go as far as
some would like, and many of the specics have yet to be eshed out, it does have several
qualities to commend it. It:
• Affords the Special Operations Forces community an unparalleled opportunity to
apply their professional knowledge, skills, and imagination to new war-ghting
concepts, doctrines, and plans in support of national security objectives;
• Provides a greatly expanded and open-ended opportunity to regularly train and
exercise as a multi-service team;
• Gives them a voice in the resource planning process they have never enjoyed
before; and above all,
• Enjoys strong support from civilian as well as military leadership (of all the Ser-
vices) within the Department of Defense.
I urge the Congress to give this plan of action a fair chance to succeed. Nothing pre-
vents us from reviewing the situation annually, near the end of our SOF revitalization
program, or whenever Congress considers it necessary to ensure that the SOF community
is moving smoothly and effectively into the next century.
Remarks at the Banquet held by the National League of Families of American
Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia
Washington, DC | July 19
It’s a genuine privilege to be here this evening. I have followed the efforts of the National
League of Families since its founding. All Americans are indebted to the League for keep-
ing the Nation’s attention focused on the POW and MIA issue. Your membership literally
led the way in turning the government from an agnostic, head-in-the-sand approach to
an active POW policy during the war. The end of hostilities did not quench your deter-
mination, and you have not allowed the nation to forget its debt and obligation to those
who fought and may still be serving. Today, the League’s voice is respected throughout
the land as a spokesman on this issue.
You can be justly proud of your organization. In passing, I should note that your Exec-
utive Secretary, Mrs. Ann Mills Grifths, enjoys an enviable reputation in Washington
for her skill, integrity, and dedication. Similarly, she has become an international gure
and is particularly well known in Hanoi, where she has represented your interests so
ably and rmly. You are indeed well-served by her stewardship.
This evening I want to do three things:
• Assure you that you are being listened to;
• Briey discuss some recent signs of progress; and
• Look at the future.
I am well aware, of course, that over the years your organization has had to overcome
inertia, apathy, and direct resistance in a number of quarters, starting in Washington.
Dealing with North Vietnam has proven to be protracted and, at times, infuriating. Given
the high frustration level, there is a natural tendency to overlook your successes and to
question whether your message has fallen on deaf ears. I want to reassure you that it
has not. In fact, your record of accomplishment is a proud and positive one—and, more
important, it promises to be an enduring one.
The Nation has become sensitized to the problem of our unaccounted-for Servicemen.
The media—TV, newspapers, and magazines—furnish daily evidence of this trend. I
speak in every corner of this country, and I am always queried on the MIA issue. I can
conrm from personal experience that the knowledge of and devotion to your cause is
alive and healthy throughout our country. Moreover, this groundswell is not receding
but building. I predict it will continue to do so until the goal is achieved.
As Mike Armacost mentioned this evening, you have a President and administration
solidly committed to resolving this issue. Just this morning President Reagan reafrmed
his interest and support in a moving radio address. Obviously, with him it’s a matter
of nonpartisanship, commitment, and conscience. He has literally set the tone not only
for the bureaucracy but for the Republic as a whole. The succession of national leaders
appearing before the League, pledging their support, testies to the key role you are
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playing. The bottom line message has been—and will continue to be—that the US gov-
ernment is going to persist until the fullest possible accounting is rendered.
In the Armed Forces, from top to bottom, we have a very personal interest in this
issue, especially those of us who saw action in that war. Many who fought in Vietnam
have a lingering sense of uneasiness. For some of us, it was the unsatisfying outcome.
For others, it was the ambivalent attitudes on the home front. For others, it was the sights
and smells of a particularly brutal war. But, most poignantly, all veterans of that conict
share the searing memory that some of their comrades remain unaccounted-for and may
still be held against their will in Indochina.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff embody this feeling. General John Wickham, the Army Chief
of Staff, who is present this evening, led a battalion of infantry soldiers in combat. He was
severely wounded in battle. General Larry Welch, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, also at
the head table, ew over 120 missions over North Vietnam. General P. X. Kelley, the Marine
Corps Commandant, commanded both a battalion and a regiment, and I might tell you a
very interesting story. On the 4th of July, General Kelley announced his decision to retain
in place the magnicent cross at Camp Smith in Hawaii. Eighteen hundred feet above sea
level, it is lighted at night and can be seen for many miles. It is dedicated to the memory of
our Vietnam MIAs. His decision was made in the face of a concentrated campaign by civil
libertarians in Hawaii to remove it. He has no intention of changing his mind.
For myself, I had the privilege to ght alongside all our Services and with Vietnamese
combat units in the Delta as the senior advisor to the Riverine Force. Rest assured that
the JCS, individually and collectively, does not only remember but are unied in our
commitment to those left behind.
The government’s determination has been manifested in a very tangible way by the
machinery that is in place to deal with this issue. You are too familiar with it for me to
dwell on the details. Sufce it to say that it ranges from Colonel Childress’ ofce in the
National Security Council, to the Ofce of International Security Affairs in the Pentagon,
to a large dedicated section in the Defense Intelligence Agency, to elements in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the State Department, to very active oversight committees
in the Congress, and to the specic JCRC and CIL [Central Identication Laboratory]
organizations in the Pacic. There are, of course, occasional criticisms about particular
performance, but this does not obscure the fact that there are a great many dedicated
and skilled people throughout this network laboring to overcome the barriers. Moreover,
we are striving constantly to improve our organization and to be responsive to our critics.
I assure you this is not a temporary structure, but is geared for the long pull, and if a
breakthrough occurs in Hanoi, it will be expanded accordingly.
One further note: I am personally convinced that in the nal analysis the most signif-
icant contribution of the League will probably be felt by future generations. Historically,
it has been difcult for Americans to deal with the aftermath of a painful conict. Time
and again, an armistice is negotiated and in the rush to return to peaceful pursuits,
arrangements to adequately account for the missing have either received short shrift
or suffered in implementation—e.g., World Wars I and II and Korea. I don’t believe that
will happen again. Due to the remarkable and lasting progress you and veteran groups
have made in stirring America’s conscience, our citizenry and future governments will
never again write off any war until a full accounting has been concluded. That’s no mean
achievement; you can take great pride in it.
Yes, you are being heard.
At this annual meeting you’ve met with a whole constellation of ofcials who have
had substantive roles in moving this problem forward in government-to-government
dealings and at the technical level. Policymakers and technicians alike have provided
you information on where we are and what we are doing. Let me briey summarize some
of the recent progress.
We have rened our intelligence priorities and brought the entire intelligence appara-
tus to bear more directly on the problem. The Pentagon has more than tripled the man-
power assets at DIA since 1981, and similarly reinforced the identication lab in Hawaii.
And our staffs—including my own personal staff—have been augmented with full-time
advisers in uniform. Across the board, at all levels, we are working on this problem longer
and harder—and hopefully smarter—than ever before.
Since the last League of Families meeting, there has been a long-overdue increase in
responsiveness by the governments of Vietnam and Laos on a spectrum of US concerns.
We have had four policy-level meetings with the Vietnamese, including the highest-level
US government delegation to visit Hanoi since the end of the war. This week Mrs. Grif-
ths briefed me on the last trip—it was another successful step in the agonizing process
of moving forward. Our delegation delivered a letter formalizing the understandings and
commitments of Washington regarding Vietnam’s two-year work plan. Specic agreements
reached on that visit will put technical meetings back on track and provide for exchanges of
information, expertise, and further visits that will facilitate cooperative efforts in the future.
You are aware that we have taken major steps in joint crash site excavations. Last
November and December, the rst such project was conducted with the Vietnamese, at
a site near Hanoi. And in February, the second joint US-Lao excavation took place, in
Savannakhet Province. We were gratied that the second effort in particular did recover
remains that are now being examined. The work near Hanoi was by comparison dis-
appointing, but its very occurrence was a breakthrough of sorts, demonstrating at last
the willingness of the Vietnamese to permit joint excavation efforts and also evidencing
excellent cooperation on their part. These are hopeful signs for the future.
Overall, remains of our Servicemen have been repatriated at an increased rate—more
than fty since Hanoi’s announcement last July of their two-year work plan. For our
part, we are prepared to surge forward in response to signicantly accelerated progress
on this issue. We will be ready to do whatever is required. You have my word on that.
Turning to a more sensitive subject, I want you to know that the JCS have taken a
searching look at the possibility of live prisoners being held in Indochina, and we fully
support the President’s current policy. The US government operates on the assumption
that at least some Americans are still held captive (which we believe is the only responsible
position to take). Moreover, every report is tracked to the best of our ability with all the
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resources at our command to afrm or disafrm it—there are no exceptions. Should any
report prove true, we will take appropriate and decisive action. For us, as for you, this is
a most haunting prospect: that our comrades in arms may still be serving their country,
but in captivity. The Indochinese governments are very aware that the live prisoner issue
is our highest priority.
Finally, I want to say a word about the ongoing work at the Central Identication
Laboratory. I know that this morning you received a CIL brieng and that their work is
currently under close scrutiny. Here are my own thoughts.
Let us make no mistake on this subject: Fate has dealt us the cruelest of hands;
crash sites and gravesites that in many cases are not known with any precision or are
inaccessible; the inexorable ravages of time, weather, and untold jungle elements; the
trauma of violence; and suspicious foreign custodians.
Consequently, successful recovery and identication presents a host of challenges.
Nevertheless, we persist, and will persist. Like many of you, I have personally witnessed
the devotion and professional skill applied by our people in the JCRC and the CIL. I have
never failed to be impressed and, yes, moved, by their dedicated work.
This is what America is all about: mustering expertise and technology to overcome
adverse and unkind circumstances and then making these techniques and ndings open
to the public. We are not omniscient, certainly, but we grapple with the challenge with
good and committed hearts and with skill and sincerity. I urge you to keep the whole
picture in balance when addressing identication issues.
I wish my list of recent progress was longer, but that is the nature of this frustrating
matter. Still, our humanitarian appeals have at last found some resonance in the other
governments with which we must deal. And the prospects for future movement are the
best they have been in years.
Now, looking to the future—despite hopeful signs—we must be realistic. The fact is
that this is a painful process and nal success remains elusive. It will still depend on
determination, hard work, and stamina.
As for those of us in government, we must persevere—continue to chip at the rock in
every way open to us. We must keep seeking answers, tracking leads, applying resources,
looking for imaginative suggestions, and making clear to the Vietnamese, the Laotians,
and the Cambodians that we mean it when we say that we will be satised with nothing
less than a full accounting. I cannot promise that it will be done in a way that always
satises everyone, or that each step will be neat and tidy, but I can pledge to you that
the US government in general, and the JCS in particular, will remain staunch and true
to their commitment.
What should the League do? In a few words, “Keep the pressure on.” Keep us honest.
As the younger generation would say, continue to do your thing. Of course, there are
reasonable limits as to what can be demanded or expected, but a great deal has been
accomplished because of your strong loyalty to your loved ones and your resolve to see
that the nation pays its debt to those who sacriced in its behalf. This conference is a
graphic example of the Republic at work, as you meet with those in government seized
of these issues. Dialogue, debate, and reasoned argument are all a proper part of the
process, and you must continue to use those instruments to inuence policy, and to keep
the issue moving ahead. You must not ag now—in sum, keep the pressure on.
At the same time, all of us must maintain our perspective. We are Americans and we
share a common goal—a full accounting. In our own councils, clash and disagreement
are both appropriate and protable. But as we move out to other arenas, there is a need
for coming together and for joint commitment, the two most vital ingredients in dealing
with communist governments. Disunity will only serve the interests of those who do not
share our goals and who do not wish us well. The key to resolution lies with the Indo-
chinese governments. It is to them that our maximum efforts and our unied message
should be directed. As the President said today, “We will continue to make progress as
long as we stick with the facts and keep faith with each other and demonstrate the unity
so fundamental to our cause.”
Let me close by quoting a passage from the Book of Jeremiah that speaks to the
families engaged in this noble endeavor. “Thus said the Lord, ‘Refrain thy voice from
weeping, and thine eyes from tears; for thy work shall be rewarded, and they shall come
again from the land of the enemy.’”
Thank you for inviting me tonight, and for your unstinting efforts on behalf of your loved
ones, and my comrades, who have not yet come home from the war. May God bless you all.
Letter on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to the Honorable Jim Wright,
House Majority Leader, House of Representatives
Washington, DC | August 5
Dear Mr. Wright:
I fully support the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative and urge your continued back-
ing of this important national program as you address the difcult budget decisions
before you. Funding for SDI substantially below the FY 1987 President’s budget would
jeopardize a balanced and efcient follow-on effort to the promising initial research. Our
signicant commitment to SDI has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to
seriously discuss nuclear arms reductions. Further, SDI technology research will have
important applications for conventional force capabilities, especially as a potential solu-
tion to the theater tactical ballistic missile threat we face together with our allies.
SDI is a vital component of our total program for responding to the Soviet strategic
threat. The three elements of this broad, continuing program are to modernize our
offensive nuclear retaliatory forces, attempt to negotiate radical reductions in offensive
nuclear arms, and take vigorous steps now to research future options for ensuring
stability over the long term through effective strategic defenses. Since each of these
efforts is interdependent and complementary, to reduce our commitment to one is to
undermine the effectiveness of the others.
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While much remains to be done, we have made excellent progress. To continue that
progress, and our commitment to investigate effective strategic defenses as a means of
self-protection and deterrence, I strongly urge you to fund SDI at a higher level.
Letter on JCS Reorganization to Chairman Barry Goldwater, Senate Armed
Services Committee
August 13
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing this letter to ensure that the conferees on the pending legislative proposals
relating to the reorganization of the Department of Defense are aware of my views on
the major issues relating to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the unied and
specied commands. I have consulted with the other members of the JCS and the com-
batant commanders, but I want to stress that these are my own thoughts.
At the outset, I ·must note that I fully support the views of the President as expressed in
his message to Congress on April 24. Additionally, I want to point out that I recognize and
applaud the hard work and conscientiousness that characterized this effort in both Armed
Services Committees. Moreover, although I would have preferred a different result in some
areas, I want to state for the record that I agree with the general thrust and the vast major-
ity of the legislative provisions enacted in both chambers of the Congress on this subject.
I have approached the proposed legislation, which, if enacted, would be the rst
comprehensive reorganization of the Department of Defense in 23 years, as creating
a structure within which the Department will have to operate for another two to three
decades. With that perspective, I must express my concern with three features of the
House draft and two features of the Senate version.
On the House bill, I am very concerned with those provisions on Joint Personnel Man-
agement which I believe would result in the creation of an elite category of “joint special-
ists” who would enjoy special advantages with respect to assignments and promotions.
I believe that the ofcers detailed to joint assignments must be of the highest quality. I
am convinced, moreover, that the quality of those personnel has risen dramatically and
that the Services are committed to continued progress in that area. I do not believe that
the creation of a separate and elitist cadre is the wisest course. Similarly, I am opposed
to any action that could threaten the integrity of the Military Departments’ promotion
selection process. I would prefer no legislation at all in this area, but I can support the
alternative proposal submitted by the Department if legislation is mandated.
The integration of the civilian secretariat and military staffs also contains signicant
drawbacks. First and foremost, despite report language to the contrary, the actual bill
provisions create uncertainty as to the authority and responsibility of the senior military
member in each Service. My interest, of course, is to ensure that Service Chiefs are free
to render independent and objective advice, as members of the Joint Chiefs·of Staff, to the
President, the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and to me. Additionally,
although not of equal importance, integration would appear to relegate the Service Chief to
a position roughly equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary, a reduction in status which
will have a deleterious effect upon morale and leadership in the Armed Forces.
The provisions in the House version which would substitute the term “Command”
for “full operational command” with all that it implies, impresses me as unnecessary.
The JCS last month completed a comprehensive revision of JCS Pub 2, “Unied Action
Armed Forces.” The major focus of the revision was to clarify and broaden the authority
of the combatant commanders (after consulting with those same commanders). This was
accomplished by dening and implementing the concept of “full operational command”
in a manner that gives the CINCs the authority they need to perform their missions. I am
enclosing a copy of the letter I sent to you and Chairman [Les] Aspin, which contains more
detail on the revision of JCS Pub 2. Members of the Joint Staff have briefed interested
members of your staffs, including Jim Locher and Arch Barrett, in detail on the revision.
Concerning the Senate version, I must echo the views expressed by the President
concerning the provision that would specify that the term of the Chairman shall expire
not later than six months after the beginning of a new presidency. I oppose any provision
which directly or indirectly might tend to politicize my ofce.
My last concern relates to reduction in headquarters personnel as it relates to combat-
ant commands. I have difculty understanding the logic of increasing the responsibilities
and authority of the combatant commanders while mandating personnel reductions at
their headquarters without an opportunity to assess the impact of the reorganization
legislation. I realize that the reductions do not have to be effected until 1988, and I under-
stand that the combatant commanders will have the authority to allocate the reductions
within their commands, including their component commands, but I still believe that a
reduction should not be mandated at this time. Perhaps the matter should be revisited
by the Congress within a reasonable period of time after the reorganization legislation
has been enacted and implemented and the personnel impacts evaluated.
Finally, I would like to once again echo the President by urging the Congress to
exercise restraint by not legislating that which can be accomplished through executive
action. I pledge my full cooperation and that of the Joint Staff, moreover, in conducting
any study which might be mandated in lieu of legislation. I appreciate your consideration
of these comments.
Excerpts from an Interview with David Hartman on “Good Morning America,”
ABC network television
Oc tober 11
Hartman: Looking at the military, we had that system, the Joint Chiefs, and the way it
functioned for a lot of years. You say, wait a minute, this is a better system. What was
so bad about the old system, and how is the new one going to, you hope, work better?
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Crowe: I think this is one of the misleading things about all the rhetoric we’ve heard for
the last year on reorganization. I don’t believe the old system was broke so much. As a
matter of fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually handled thousands of issues and dealt
with many crises very successfully.
On the other hand, circumstances and things have changed with time. Our tech-
nology is a great deal more complicated. We have a lot more issues now. We’re thrust
into more things with terrorism, Soviet surrogates, limited intensity conict, and I don’t
believe anybody would say there wasn’t a need to update the organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The legislation that has been passed this week codies some things that
have already been done by the Defense Department and by the Pentagon, and it makes
some modest changes which we will implement with enthusiasm, and I hope that will
make it better to do our business.
Hartman: How does it increase your authority, as I just suggested? Does it give one
person the ability or authority to make more decisions on behalf of everybody and cut
down on the amount of bickering back and forth kind of thing, interservice rivalry and
all of that?
Crowe: I think some of the things that have been claimed may be a little bit exaggerated.
It makes me the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense but, of
course, I will still have to consult with my Chiefs. I depend on them for their expertise.
No single man knows all about the military. I will have more control and authority over
the Joint Staff. These are modest steps that I think will facilitate our everyday business.
It won’t change the basic fundamental way we do our business dramatically, but it will
change some.
Hartman: Earlier this morning, we were talking with Jody Powell and some other jour-
nalists about this whole supposed disinformation campaign, and Bernie Kalb resigned
yesterday from the State Department, saying that now it appears that, you know, the
government has lied to the press and, therefore, to the people of the country and so forth.
You are on record, at least in the Washington Post, as saying you disagree with the idea
of trying to psyche out Qadda. What’s your view on this whole supposed disinformation
campaign and what good or ill can come of it?
Crowe: Well, the events of the last week prove again Washington is a pretty tough town.
That’s one of the things I discovered when I returned to Washington. Every day I feel
more and more close to Harry Truman, who said, “If you want a loyal friend in Washing-
ton, you better go buy a dog.” But I can’t comment on any advice that I gave either the
National Security Council or the President, but I never, at any time, heard any intention
discussed to deceive either the press or the American public. On the other hand, I have
a certain amount of sympathy with raising the threshold of uncertainty in Mr. Qadda’s
mind. He’s a terrorist. He’s an enemy to the United States. He’s tried very hard to do us
harm, and he’s going to continue to do so. And certainly, from my perspective as a mili-
tary man, where I sit with my responsibilities, he’s an enemy of our country.
Hartman: And will you continue to try to, as Secretary Shultz said yesterday, move the
eet around, move the planes around, and do lots of things.
Crowe: There are all kinds of things that you can do that are subject to more than one
interpretation, and we leave it up to him to try and nd the right interpretation. That’s
his problem. That’s my problem when I’m dealing with enemies of the United States, or
other military forces, or other events, and of course you can do that.
Hartman: The President is on his way to Iceland. The number one item on the agenda
is arms agreements. How useful would some kind of arms agreements with the Soviet
Union be, whether on nuclear arms or on conventional arms, where our military and our
preparedness is concerned?
Crowe: It’s not appropriate for me, on the brink of Iceland, to comment on the events
there, specically, but on the general subject of arms control, I think it is important to
understand that the military is behind that. We feel if we can get equitable and veri-
able agreements, it would be a great step forward for this country, and all of the services
support that strongly. Events of the last few months suggest that we may be approaching
promising times in at least some aspects of arms control, and I certainly hope so.
Hartman: You are quoted as suggesting that the President should not compromise on
the Pershing missiles deployment in Europe. Why are those Pershings so important?
Crowe: I think on the specic mix, you have to know what kind of agreement we are
talking about, the total numbers, and so on. But the ground launch cruise missiles and
the Pershing missiles have different characteristics.
The Pershing is a ballistic missile. It is more accurate. It has considerable range. It
is more difcult to defend against and to counter, and that kind of mix gives us a better
military capability, more deterrent capability, and in turn, more leverage in arms control
negotiations.
Hartman: The Labor Party in England is suggesting that if they come to power, they’d
like to get all American nuclear missiles out of there, all nuclear capability out of Britain.
How much would that damage NATO?
Crowe: It’s difcult to predict, of course, with any specicity, but if the Labor Party car-
ries out its platform as currently constructed, and is elected, it would have incalculable
consequences for NATO and also, I would think, serious reverberations for the unity of
NATO, throughout the alliance. It could be a watershed year if the Labor Party was to
carry out those programs.
Hartman: To what extent do you agree with those who say that we are shouldering too
great a share of the defense capability in Europe? And with so many men and women of
our Armed Forces over there, ought we let them pay more of their own freight and pull
some of our people out of there?
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Crowe: As a military man, of course, an American military man, I would always like to
see our friends and allies both in NATO and the Far East shoulder more of the military
burden. I don’t think that takes the responsibility from the United States. It’s one of the
problems of being a leader of the free world.
And as Americans, we have to make a decision. If you like to be the leader, and if you
like to carry the responsibilities which we have historically carried now since 1945, there are
certain things you have to do and should do. At the same time, I think our friends and allies
could do more. We encourage them to do so, and we’re constantly working on that problem.
Remarks at the World Peace Luncheon for Veterans on Armistice Day
Birmingham, Alabama | November 11
Thank you very much for that kind introduction. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to
be with you today and to participate in these ceremonies of remembering our Veterans. In
appreciation for America’s Armed Forces, it is especially meaningful to me that so many
members of the Birmingham community—and indeed from all over the state—have joined
in these events. Symbolically, our gathering commemorates a vital partnership that built
this great nation and that has sustained it for two centuries: citizens who have used their
freedom well and people in uniform dedicated to preserving that freedom and protecting
those accomplishments. Today’s proceedings send a strong signal to all Americans that
this partnership is still alive and well in the great state of Alabama. This, of course, is
no surprise to you or to me. The bond between US military forces and Alabama commu-
nities has been a close one for many years. But I refer today to something deeper: the
long Alabama heritage of patriotism, decades of courage in peace and in combat. This
state’s citizen-soldiers have forged an admirable record that says a great deal about the
fundamental strengths of this nation itself.
The Fourth Alabama Infantry Regiment fought brilliantly under General Lee’s com-
mand in the Civil War. Little about that conict can be recommended to our own time,
but down in the foxholes of the Civil War the tenacity of Alabama soldiers in the hardest
ghting of that awful war became legendary.
Three and a half decades later, two regiments of Alabama Volunteers responded
instantly to President McKinley’s call for help in the war against Spain. Alabama’s Gen-
eral “Fighting Joe” Wheeler, who had led Confederate cavalry thirty-ve years earlier,
commanded the US Army’s cavalry division at Santiago. In 1916, another generation of
Alabamians—members of the Alabama National Guard—saw action in Arizona during
the Mexican border disturbances, and in World War I, they fought gallantly in a brigade
commanded by Douglas MacArthur. During World War II, the 167th Infantry Regiment—
the organizational descendant of the Fourth Alabama—again rallied to the cause of
national defense, this time with the 31st (Dixie) Division. It trained many Alabamians
for combat throughout that global war, and later joined its old World War I commander,
MacArthur, for his campaigns in the Pacic.
Since that time, the world, the nation, and this state have moved on, through decades
of troubled peace. But the Nation has always been served well by patriots from this state
who have brought their spirit and dedication to the military profession. More than twelve
hundred names of your citizens are inscribed on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington,
in abiding and grateful remembrance of their sacrice.
In these ceremonies we pay our respects to all those who have answered the nation’s
call to arms in times of greatest need and to those whose service today keeps America’s
defenses strong. All around us we can see, Birmingham, and what her fellow citizens
have been able to achieve. Under the protection of this city, once just a railroad junc-
tion, Birmingham grew in less than a century into a major industrial and commercial
metropolis. To the south, Mobile became a major ocean terminal, connected by open sea
lanes to all the world’s trading centers.
Great universities—like Alabama, Auburn, and Tuskegee Institute—emerged, attest-
ing to what good minds can accomplish in a free society. The institutions and practices
of a lively democracy are in evidence everywhere. And amidst all the growth and prog-
ress, Alabamians carefully honor and preserve their rich heritage—traditions of grace
in tranquil times, of valor in war, and of joining together to surmount the challenges of a
troubled age at home and abroad. The benets of liberty have been convincingly displayed
in the accomplishments of this vigorous community and this state. It is our challenge now
to preserve these benets and to stay on the course that has been so successful. To do
so, we must nurture the civil-military relationship, which sustains the nation’s defense.
I spend a lot of time in Washington trying to do exactly that: communicating the need
for a strong America; telling people, especially in the Congress, about our military forces
and about their contributions and requirements. And it is now clear to me that, if we are
to have the strength we need, we must widen our citizens’ understanding of the role of
America’s military forces in the Nation’s life.
What we need is, in essence, what we are doing today: recognizing America’s armed
forces, deliberately celebrating their contributions, and appreciating the benets all Amer-
icans derive from a strong national defense. It is imperative for our citizens to understand
that America’s Armed Forces do a great deal more than shield the nation from attack in
major war. Military strength underwrites this country’s dealings with the international
community and provides the very cornerstone of our foreign policy. It permits untrammeled
use of the sea lanes, productive communication and commerce with friends overseas, and
condent approaches to arms control negotiations. It cements alliances which, in turn,
enhance our own security. It restrains mischief-makers and promotes stability. It signals
the seriousness of our commitment to our principles. In fact, our strength has been an
indispensable pillar not only of American liberty but also the freedom and prosperity of mil-
lions of hopeful people—people all around the globe. During my time in NATO, I observed
rsthand that our military contribution to that coalition literally anchors its unity and
political structure, in addition to forming the centerpiece of its defense.
You would think our history would be helpful here. Four times in the last ninety years
we have let our defenses sag and then were forced into combat dangerously unprepared. In
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each instance, we paid an exorbitant and needless price in lives, treasure, and instability.
Americans seem to have painfully short memories. I heard a wag say that we remember
the Alamo, we remember the Maine, we remember Pearl Harbor; when we win, we forget.
I know of no military leader in our nation who desires war. To keep peace is our fun-
damental mission, but we must remember that freedom is not free. It requires constant
effort, vigilance, and at times, sacrice—the sacrice for which this republic is famous.
Many great societies have stressed freedom but neglected their security and are now
history. We need both freedom and security.
I am convinced that our current broad-based approach—diplomatic, economic, and
military—is sending the right signal to potential adversaries abroad; a signal that the
United States—the world’s greatest nation—will continue to play a leading role in pro-
moting stability and assisting its allies around the globe. At the same time, however, it
is imperative to recognize that our military strength underwrites these policies and is
an indispensable pillar of freedom and progress.
In my view, our deterrent policy has worked well. If it is to continue to do so, we must
match the growing Soviet buildup with a consistent and rational defense policy geared for
the long run instead of one marked by the peaks and valleys which have characterized so
much of our peacetime history. If your military is to be successful, it needs good people
and good hardware. But all the people, ships, aircraft, tanks, and guns provided by an
increased defense budget won’t be worth much unless our nation’s military forces are
strongly and staunchly supported by all Americans. The military is not an organization
apart, but an integral segment of the society which it serves. It will only be as good as
that society wants it to be.
Remarks at the 1986 National Convention of the Retired Officers’ Association
San Antonio, Texas | November 19
Thank you very much, George.
You mentioned my Oklahoma background. It’s not always easy being from Oklahoma.
In fact, it takes a certain amount of courage to admit it this deep into Texas. Our rivalry
is a longstanding one; as they say, the Oklahoma-Texas game is not a matter of life and
death; it’s much more important than that. My wife and I used to live in California, and
I was harassed a great deal about my Okie origins. I nally developed a retort which
I thought handled that sort of situation. I used to tell those Californians that I didn’t
understand why they complained about the Okie immigration, since it raised the intel-
ligence level of both states.
Putting the Midwest aside for a moment, I’ve been in my present post nearly a year
now, and I can attest to what many of you know implicitly from personal experience—that
Washington can be a tough town on occasion. Every day I’m learning why Harry Truman
said, “If you want a loyal friend in Washington, you’d better go buy a dog.” That would
have been a lot funnier if he was kidding. So, to hedge our bets, my wife and I have two
dogs. I’m not so sure that’s sufcient.
I saw a character on television the other night that reminded me of myself on the
program “Cheers,” which I’m sure that many of you watch. Someone asked him how his
day went, and he said, “It’s a dog-eat-dog world out there, and I’m wearing Milk-Bone
underwear.” I often feel like that.
We had been out of Washington for about ve years, when we came back last summer.
I had forgotten some of the harsh realities. I rediscovered, for instance, that it’s a fairly
expensive place to live. I have a friend who said he received a letter from a lady saying that
her son had obtained a job in Washington at $30,000 a year, and she wanted to know
if he could lead a good Christian life on that. He wrote her back and said, “Madam, on
$30,000 a year in Washington, he can’t lead any other kind.” So it’s no wonder that you
have decided to hold your convention in more civilized surroundings, particularly in a
city with a history such as San Antonio has. I think you were wise.
The everyday problems in Washington aside, it’s a distinct pleasure for me to be here
today, among so many people who are devoted to keeping this nation strong and secure.
It’s gratifying, moreover, for an old submariner to be invited to deliver this address. My
life is certainly a great deal different today than it used to be when I was a younger ofcer
in the old and rather smelly diesel submarines of the “silent service.” I didn’t do much
speaking in those days. In fact, there are a lot of things I didn’t do in those days, and
perhaps I can tell you a story that illustrates why.
It’s a story that’s very famous in the submarine force, about a diesel submarine that
was in port for a few days. One night one of the sailors went ashore and had quite a bit to
drink. He came back from his liberty leading a skunk on a leash, and he wanted to bring
the skunk aboard. And the petty ofcer at the gangway watch said, “No, you can’t bring
the skunk on this submarine. It’s just not possible.” And this sailor thought about that and
then he said, “Well, Jones up in the forward torpedo room has a dog. Why can’t I bring this
skunk aboard?” A big argument ensued; nally the duty ofcer showed up, but he had
no more success than anyone else. Finally, he said to the sailor, “Well, have you thought
about the smell?” and the sailor said, “Yes, I have, and he’ll get used to it just like I did.”
In a more serious vein, it is a great privilege to be able to appear at the national con-
vention of this ne organization. For almost a half a century the Retired Ofcers Asso-
ciation has been a prominent voice speaking out on national defense issues, effectively
leading informed discussion on these issues not only inside the Washington beltway but
all over our country. The Association’s efforts have markedly elevated the national debate
about these issues and have helped to move our defense policies in directions that make
the world a less dangerous place for America. Its work has benetted not only the retired
community but also all those who serve in active service in our Armed Forces. Every one
of you can be justiably proud of the contributions of this organization.
This afternoon I would like to take just a few moments to share with you some of my
views on the state of our armed forces and the role which they fulll in today’s world.
I have spent a great deal of time in the last few months talking to audiences over the
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breadth of the Nation—including the Congress—about these subjects and about the
necessity to keep our Armed Forces strong and healthy.
This education effort has proved to be a rather demanding task, but I believe rmly
and sincerely in the importance of civil-military dialogue in our country. National defense
is just too important to be left to the professionals alone. It’s absolutely imperative for
the American public to have the best possible information about our security posture
and our defense needs. This is a burden that all of us who are devoted to a strong Amer-
ica can take up with great benet to the Nation, and that includes the Retired Ofcers’
Association with its impressive reservoir of defense expertise. In large part, our ability
to fashion an effective defense posture will rest, just as it has in the past, on our success
in this communications effort.
In that vein, I would like to share with you some of my personal perspectives and
concerns as I now see things from where I sit in the Pentagon. I believe it is important to
emphasize three particular areas where the level of understanding is often supercial
in this country: the central role of the Armed Forces in American life, the spectrum of
threats that we face, and the current state of our Armed Forces.
At a high level of generality, of course, everyone is familiar with some of the basics.
America’s national security goals have never been complicated or mysterious. They have,
in fact, remained essentially unchanged since I entered the Naval Academy in the early
1940s. We want to:
• Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United
States;
• Promote US and allied vital interests around the world; and
• Shape an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions
can survive and prosper.
Now, these are not just empty words. They genuinely describe what our military forces
can do for us. Those forces have provided a great deal more than simply a shield against
direct attack. That same power underwrites all of our political and commercial dealings
with the international community, our use of the sea lanes, our communications with
friends overseas, our approaches to arms control negotiations, and our credibility in deal-
ing with mischief makers. It cements alliances which, in turn, enhance our own security.
In fact, our strength has been an indispensable pillar not only of our own freedom and
afuence but also the liberty and prosperity of our friends and allies around the globe.
And that’s a fact of international life today.
During my time in NATO, I observed rsthand that our military contribution to that
coalition literally anchors the unity and political structure of NATO as well as furnishing
the centerpiece of its defense. Above all, it has given us the longest period of uninterrupted
peace that Western Europe has enjoyed in centuries.
When I served as USCINCPAC, a succession of Asian leaders emphasized to me the
importance of a strong and vigorous America with forward-deployed forces. Behind the
bulwark of our power, they have been able to seek prosperity and political maturity in
their own fashion and at their own pace. Asian leaders stressed that to me time and
time again. I have visited recently in Central America and the Middle East. The leaders
in both of those areas have made it graphically clear that they want a powerful America
as a backdrop for their efforts to build free and functioning societies.
The bottom line is that our military strength provides us a host of benets in terms of
both national security and foreign policy every day of the year. Americans—and millions
of hopeful people around the globe—are able to go about their peaceful pursuits and to
move closer to fullling their aspirations because the strength of the US Armed Forces
operates, largely invisibly, to contain our adversaries and to facilitate our economic and
foreign policies.
I know this because I have witnessed it rsthand in every corner of this globe, and
I have lived it. And so have many of you. You know it for the same reasons. But for the
general citizenry, the role of those armed forces in their everyday lives tends quickly to
be submerged in the press of day-to-day domestic business. Consequently, I believe that
it is vital to remind Americans continually of these realities.
Of course, the nature of the peril we face complicates the challenge. Again, I am per-
suaded that there is a general lack of awareness of the diverse character of the threat,
particularly the threat of today’s world. Security challenges now wear many faces other
than the specter of a conventional or a nuclear war with the USSR. American interests
are threatened on a number of fronts; terrorism can occur anywhere on the globe, at
any time, and that has become a greater threat than ever; the diverse activities of Soviet
surrogates (for example, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Libya, South Yemen, North Korea); and
proliferating local conicts in the Third World: Angola, Beirut, Chad, Iran-Iraq, Cambo-
dia, Afghanistan.
But the American public is not used to thinking of the world—much less the threat—
in such terms. Henry Kissinger, a philosopher of some note, once observed that we tend to
think of “peace” and “war” as two entirely separate and incompatible spheres of activity.
In the everyday world, of course, reality is much more blurred than that. Admiral Jim
Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, uses the term “violent peace” to make the
point that today even a “peaceful” globe is marked by competition, conict, and strife.
Any newspaper testies to the fact that he is right.
But our citizens have little incentive to follow these trends and themes. Most of all,
the relative tranquility of their lives here at home numbs them to the signicance of
Soviet activities, which are designed to not only promote the spread of Moscow’s values
and institutions but also to undercut and limit the prospects of pluralism wherever the
free world is vulnerable.
The Kremlin understands very well the fundamentally competitive nature of the
international community and seeks deliberately to take advantage of it at every turn.
The Soviets have never altered their original goal of overcoming the West, either through
political or military means. And make no mistake, they will use their power brutally and
directly when they believe the military calculus is in their favor—witness Afghanistan.
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It has always fascinated me that, while many nations use force against their enemies,
the Soviet Union doesn’t hesitate to use it against its friends when it feels it’s necessary,
as members of the Warsaw Pact can testify.
Moscow’s burgeoning military capability is well documented, and many of you are
very familiar with it. Time does not permit me to belabor the statistics here. Sufce it
to say that this growth is unprecedented—also unprovoked—and on sheer momentum
alone the Soviet buildup will carry well into the 1990s, if not longer. Like it or not, it is an
increasing threat, not a decreasing one. Every year it increases in qualitative as well as
quantitative terms. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once observed that “when
we build, the Soviet Union builds, and when we stop building, the Soviet Union builds.”
The 1980s have shown, not surprisingly, that when we resume building, the Soviet Union
continues to build. Those realities pretty well speak for themselves.
The result is not only an impressive Soviet military apparatus but also an expand-
ing proclivity for the Kremlin to project that power, to foster instability, to encourage
surrogates, to promote terrorism, to support small but erce regional conicts, and to
encourage anti-American regimes to challenge Washington in a variety of ways and
places. It is imperative for Americans to recognize these developments and to confront
them squarely. We ignore them at our peril.
Faced with these diverse and ever-present prospects of harm to American interests and
people, the Pentagon must build forces that can cope with the full continuum of challenges.
We do the best we can with the resources that the Congress sees t to provide. And I
am convinced that the current state of our armed forces is sound by any commonsense
measure, thanks primarily to substantial improvements which have been made in the
last six to seven years.
With the encouragement of the Administration and the help of Congress, the depress-
ing trends of the 1970s have been reversed, and we have seen our military capability
improve in every category, in every dimension—personnel, readiness, modernization,
sustainability, force structure. Personnel is a special high point; our young people are
the best that I have seen in over forty years of service. And I might say, to digress for just
a moment, that the most rewarding aspect, as many of you well know, of a career in the
service is the opportunity to associate day in and day out with young American men and
women. And despite some of the rhetoric in the press, I feel the future of the country is
in good hands. I see evidence of their capability, their devotion, their courage every day.
This remarkable turnaround in our military fortunes has been accompanied by a
resurgence of pride and morale at every level. I see it throughout the world in all of our
services. The spirit is the best that I have experienced in my career.
But I likewise believe strongly and genuinely that we must carry to fruition the
President’s programs, which he laid out early in his administration. Though we have
done well in restoring capabilities that had dangerously atrophied in the 1970s, and the
progress thus far is encouraging, there is much yet to be done. Just to give you some
hasty examples:
• Only one-third of our armor units have the newest M-1 tank;
• At this reading, only one-fourth of our battalions have the Bradley ghting vehicle;
• One-third of our Air Force has yet to receive F-16s and F-15s;
• Over half of our carriers do not yet eld the F-18s; and
• Only one-third of our attack submarine force is made up of the latest units.
I could go on and on. But the bottom line is that we still have much to do in our
modernization programs.
Aside from these measures of the incompleteness of our progress, consider all the
pressures on us to do more and to do it better, in the realm of Special Operations Forces,
in limited intensity conict, and in counterterrorism and even drug enforcement, in
which the military is becoming more involved every day. In a similar vein, we have new
missions and new command responsibilities. Fifteen years ago, for instance, there was
no Central Command; today, it is a major headquarters which does all the planning for
possible United States involvements in South Asia. Fifteen years ago, there was no Indian
Ocean Task Force; today we are deployed in that area 365 days a year.
These unfullled goals and new demands place a high premium on sustaining pub-
lic support for defense. Unfortunately, our budget problems and decit difculties have
spawned a lot of specious and confusing rhetoric in the media and elsewhere about
our defense programs. I know you are familiar with this phenomenon. Some critics
would make defense spending the scapegoat for mounting budget decits. Others have
attempted to disconnect decisions about America’s military strength from the threat,
from our society’s rising prospects and prosperity, from the decades of peace that our
allies have enjoyed, and from the improving prospects for meaningful arms control. That
simply cannot be done. You cannot “de-link” our strength from those achievements;
they are interrelated. Above all, we cannot allow these detractors to obfuscate the real
issue—America’s security in a trying and challenging era. Make no mistake about it, we
are engaged in a contest that is a marathon, not a sprint. But the real question is not
what kind of race it is, but whether we are going to stay the course.
My point is not that we must match the Soviet Union or anyone else, for that matter,
weapon for weapon, gun for gun, or man for man. We all know—in fact we insist—that
our humane and decent society must do many things in addition to building strength.
We know, therefore, that in a major war or other engagement with the Soviets, we are
going into battle outnumbered in both manpower and equipment.
Military leaders of my generation have accepted that for many years, and we move on to
nd ways to compensate—with quality weapons systems, excellent people, realistic train-
ing, broad and responsive logistics support, and the help of our free world friends and allies.
But that makes it a “sporty” course; a package that leaves little room for error, and
no room for shaving funds in the areas that I have mentioned. The programs of the early
1980s have given us the right impetus. America is a safer place as a result, and the
prospects for what many of our citizens understand as peace are higher. The job simply
isn’t nished, and the outcome of this year’s budget agonies leaves us short of where we
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need to be. Moreover, given the state of the public mind on these matters, I suspect that
we will face a similar struggle next year, and perhaps even longer. We can live with one
or two points on a descending curve, but several years of declining appropriations would
return us to the doldrums of the 1970s, and that, given the threats we face, would in my
opinion be disastrous.
You would think that our history would be helpful here. Four times in the last ninety
years we have let our defenses sag and then were forced into combat dangerously unpre-
pared. In each instance, we paid an exorbitant and needless price in lives, treasure, and
instability. Americans seem to have painfully short memories. I heard a wag say that
we remember the Alamo; we remember the Maine; we remember Pearl Harbor. When we
win, we forget.
This, of course, is why I put so much stress on communicating military views, con-
cerns, and needs to the civilian community.
No military leader in our nation desires war. To keep the peace is the fundamental
mission of the Armed Forces, and the primary measure of their success is their ability
to deter conict. But we must constantly remind our citizens that freedom is not free.
It requires continuous effort, vigilance, and at times, sacrice; the type of sacrice for
which this Republic is famous.
It is imperative for Americans to recognize that:
• Our military strength underwrites our foreign and economic policies and is an
indispensable pillar of our liberty;
• The threat is real, diverse and part of the everyday world; and
• We have some ways to go in improving our armed forces before we can face the
future with genuine condence.
If our deterrent policy is to continue to work well, we must match the danger with
a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run instead of one marked
by the peaks and valleys which seem to have characterized so much of our peacetime
histor y.
If the US military is to be successful, it needs good people and good hardware. But
above all, it needs the patience and continuing support of all our citizens. Our military
is not a separate and distinct community. It is an integral element of the society it serves,
and in the end, it will only be as good as that society wants it to be.
With that, I’d like to say again what a genuine pleasure it is for me to be here and talk
to a group that has contributed so much to our national defense. Thank you very much.
Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Policy Panel
on Arms Reduction Proposals at Reykjavik
November 25
Mr. Chairman:
I appreciate the opportunity this hearing affords me to contribute to your review of the
arms reduction proposals made at Reykjavik. I believe it would be helpful this morning
if I sketched some of the background regarding JCS participation in this process before
addressing specic queries.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been closely involved with the arms reduction process
since its inception, and I believe have historically had an inuential voice in shaping US
proposals. In turn, the JCS have consistently supported this Administration’s efforts to
reach equitable, veriable, and militarily sufcient agreements. This included initiatives
to reduce Soviet INF missiles in Europe and worldwide, the 50 percent proposal rst put
forward in November 1985, and also the President’s July 1986 letter to General Secretary
Gorbachev. This last communication proposed negotiations which could hopefully lead
to the ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, but mentioned no specic time frame.
Throughout the short ten-day workup to Iceland, the Joint Staff participated in the
pre-summit preparations. I should stress that this process involved not merely NSC or
NSPG meetings, but a variety of everyday informal staff contacts with other agencies
and scheduled meetings with a number of interagency groups that are part of the NSC’s
supporting structure. Incidentally, the security consultative mechanisms in the govern-
ment are richer and much more pervasive than I believe they are often given credit for
in the media.
As far as process goes, I do not know of any of the regular pre-summit preparations in
which the JCS did not participate in some fashion. Moreover, I had a representative, General
[John] Moellering, who went with the team to Reykjavik and participated as an adviser.
As to Iceland itself, obviously the discussions concentrated more on arms control
details and went much further with arms reduction proposals than had been anticipated
in the preparations.
While no agreements were reached, it is important to note that an unusually wide
range of issues were considered and unprecedented progress was made in narrowing the
differences between the two sides on a number of thorny questions—some of which have
frustrated negotiators for years. I suspect this was possible only because the two heads
of government were present. In evaluating the outcome, I think it is fair to point out that
the President has an obligation not only to be cautious in these matters but also to seize
opportunities when they arise.
Given the turn of events at Reykjavik, the US side appropriately seized the opening to
break new ground and move the arms reduction process forward. In the nal analysis,
it should be kept in mind no agreements were reached and, despite some public hand
wringing and gnashing of teeth, our fundamental interests are still intact. At the same
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time, I would suggest that the whole arms reduction dialogue has taken a signicant
and historic step forward as a result of Iceland.
The challenge now is to capitalize on these events in ways that do not jeopardize our
security but also that do not return to the depressing stalemates which have charac-
terized so much of our past history. I am condent that the President wants to do just
that, and also that it can be done if we keep our heads and don’t permit self-criticism to
consume us. I genuinely hope that the Congress will be looking for constructive ways to
work with the President in this process.
Remarks before Senator Barry Goldwater on his Retirement
The Pentagon | December 10
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to welcome you to these ceremonies, as we
pay tribute to a man who has been one of this nation’s most prominent citizens and
leaders for more than three decades, Senator Barry Goldwater.
Every American owes this strong advocate for national defense a great debt of grati-
tude, and we in the Pentagon feel privileged to have this opportunity to show our appre-
ciation today, as he prepares for what some have called “retirement.”
Not long ago a report in the local media quoted Senator Goldwater to the effect that
the new DOD reorganization law bearing his name is, in his words, “The only thing I ever
did that was worth a damn.” Now, I certainly don’t want to quarrel with the Senator here,
but I would like to take this opportunity to present a different viewpoint. Even aside from
any judgments history may render concerning that legislation, I would argue that Barry
Goldwater’s legacy to his nation is much larger than that particular assessment admits.
Especially for those who have devoted their professional lives to the cause of national
defense, two dimensions of his career in Washington have been notable. The rst is the
role he played in the resurrection of American spirit after our experience in Vietnam and
the debates and doubts of the 1970s. Most of you remember those times well. In many
quarters, the people in our Armed Services were ridiculed and even reviled; public cyn-
icism about leadership and about the process of national governance was widespread;
the country’s international vision was clouded, and its defenses fell into disrepair.
Through all that turmoil and confusion, Barry Goldwater stood on high ground as a
visible standard-bearer for values of patriotism and national service. He kept the faith of
our founders, and with clear-eyed focus on national purposes and needs, he marked the
place for his fellow Americans to return to after years of disillusionment, disappointment,
and strategic wandering. The restoration of strength and stature this nation has achieved
in the 1980s rests, ultimately, on that solid foundation. Indeed, it could not have been
achieved—and cannot be maintained—without it.
Senator Goldwater’s second large-scale contribution has to do with his continuing
example of seless, straight-shooting service to his country. First and always, his ani-
mating concern has been a concept of the national interest, not something smaller. His
career has provided an abiding lesson for all citizens, for all those who aspire to civic
leadership, and especially for Americans who now wear the uniform of our armed forces
in times that are better and safer because of his work.
A quarter century ago, just as he was rising to national prominence, Barry Goldwater
did something that’s now all the rage in Washington: he wrote a book. Its title featured a
word—“conscience”—that doesn’t appear much in the writings we’ve seen lately. Twenty
years later, he wrote another book entitled “With No Apologies.” It is an inspiring tes-
tament to Barry Goldwater, and to this country, that a man who came to Washington
dedicated to abiding principles, and who never shrank from any battle, can now leave
justiably condent of his delity to those core values. So much for the cynics, carpers,
and hangers-back. As we go forward in the effort to enhance this republic’s defenses, I
know we will continue to hear from Barry Goldwater. He will always prod us to do better.
And just as important, we can be sure that he will keep the need for national strength in
the forefront of a public mind that has tended—all too often in our history—to overlook
that inescapable fact of international life.
I would submit that keeping America strong is doing the right thing, and I am con-
dent that Barry Goldwater will always be in the vanguard of that effort. With that, and
before we give the Senator himself a chance to make some typically modest denial of
all these accolades, I am very pleased to turn over the microphone to a man who has
led the massive turnaround of our military fortunes that Barry Goldwater helped make
possible—as determined and effective a patriot and leader as the Senator himself, our
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger.
103
1. Ensign William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, upon graduation at the US Naval
Academy. (June 1946)
2. Lieutenant(jg) Crowe serving as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the
Commander of the US Atlantic Fleet’s Submarine Force. (1952)
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3. Admiral Crowe’s swearing in ceremony as
the 11th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
attended by President Ronald Reagan and
Mrs. Shirley Crowe. (October 1985)
4. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, with the Joint Chiefs: General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA; General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF;
Admiral James D. Watkins, CNO; and General Paul X. Kelley, CMC. (1985)
5. Farewell ceremony for Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger hosted by President Ronald Reagan and Admiral Crowe. (November 1987)
6. Welcome ceremony in honor of Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev,
USSR, hosted by Admiral Crowe at the Pentagon. (July 1988)
7. Admiral Crowe on the set of “Cheers”
with Ted Danson (Sam Malone).
(February 1989)
8. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, with the Joint Chiefs: General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., CMC; Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, CNO; General Larry
D. Welch, CSAF; General Carl E. Vuono, CSA; and General Robert T. Herres, USAF, the first VCJCS. (1989)
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Statement before the Senate Budget Committee on FY 1988–1989 DOD
Authorization
January 13
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today and report on the overall condition
of our military establishment. A considerable amount of water has passed under the leg-
islative bridge since my testimony on the FY 1987 budget. In that budget the Congress
chose to cut the President’s Defense request dramatically and, for the second year in a
row, to legislate negative growth in our appropriations. Throughout this process, I heard
a great deal about the “scal” and “political” realities that dictated such action, but all
too little about the “military” realities we face. This year, I believe it is imperative to go
back to fundamentals—i.e., to review the strategic landscape and to consider the “mili-
tary” realities carefully before deciding what resources will be committed to our defense
over the next two years. In an attempt to aid this process, I will this morning address
four subjects:
• Linkages between strategy, force structure, hardware, and people;
• The East-West balance, including capabilities of US and allied forces in compar-
ison with our potential adversaries;
• The President’s budget; and
• A brief look ahead.
Linkages between Strategy and the Military
To begin, the role of US military forces is shaped by national security policies which have
remained essentially unchanged since the late 1940s:
• Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United
States;
• Support US and allied vital interests abroad; and
• Encourage an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institu-
tions can prosper.
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These policies genuinely describe what our strength, especially our military potential,
can do for us in an often violent and turbulent world. The main point to keep in mind is
that our military forces contribute to achieving these objectives every day, not just when
the nation is under direct attack.
Defense Policies
Our military posture is further shaped by some basic themes which have evolved in the
post-World War II era. We strive to:
• Deter wars rather than ght them. This strategy of deterrence aims to make war
or the threat of war too risky for any hostile power or combination of powers to
contemplate.
• Optimize our collective security arrangements and forward defense posture
through combined defense planning with allies in Europe and Asia and through
vigorous security assistance programs. At the heart of this policy is the principle
that the capabilities of the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts. In turn,
our coalitions present potential adversaries with formidable political, psycholog-
ical, and ideological challenges—as well as enhanced military power.
• Maintain robust central reserves supported by global mobility. Many of our treaty
commitments are bolstered primarily by our power projection forces. Indeed, many
strategists in and out of the Pentagon now recognize that real-world deterrence
depends upon our inherent capability to “get there rstest with the mostest,” deal
effectively with the threat at hand, and withdraw just as quickly from the scene
of action.
• Pursue a vigorous arms reduction policy which seeks equitable, effective, and ver-
iable arms agreements with potential adversaries. For more than fteen years,
we have been trying to engage the Soviets in an agreement which will sharply
reduce offensive nuclear arms.
Military Strategy
Historically, the United States has attempted in peacetime to maintain sufcient
capability to blunt initial attacks on our own interests and to form a nucleus around
which we can expand for major hostilities. In practical terms, this means that we do
not attempt to match potential adversaries weapon for weapon and man for man, but
to develop quality forces and “edges” (marginal superiorities) that will deter our ene-
mies by keeping their level of uncertainty high or allow Washington to manage crises
in a manner that will prevent them from escalating or getting out of hand. In essence,
we are betting that in a major war we can expand our peacetime forces and bring our
total resources (technological, industrial, personnel, economic, political) to bear so that
we will ultimately prevail. This is an appropriate policy for a democracy, but it also
leaves little room day-to-day for miscalculation. More important, it means that, since
we operate on the margin, seemingly small reductions in our peacetime capability may
result in large increases in the risk. It is imperative that the Nation understand this
fundamental relationship.
Over the course of time, we have followed a number of principles in determining how
to build and deploy our forces. For instance, we attempt to:
• Plan in a total force context—i.e., active and reserve forces of the United States and
its allies, host nation support in forward areas, various types of combat service
support from civilian sectors, and allied military enhancements underwritten by
our security assistance program;
• Exploit the deterrent value of nuclear forces while avoiding a nuclear war;
• Defend forces in-being against an initial attack at a time and place of the enemy’s
choosing;
• Emphasize our qualitative advantages—technical, personnel, and organiza-
tional—to defeat an adversary who will normally outnumber us on the eld of
battle;
• Expand our forces rapidly in the event of major crises, and especially in all-out
war; and
• End any conict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.
Given our built-in pluralism and constrained resources, it is very difcult to bring
all of these policies and principles together, even when you are not worried about static
or sagging expenditures for Defense.
The East-West Balance
Cutting across the strategic landscape—and in many respects dominating it—is the
East-West balance. In my view, a number of factors are imperative to consider: geography,
economic defense potential, allied contributions, and military trends over time.
Geography
Geographically, the Soviet Union has a very large border and airspace to defend—much
larger than ours—and a disadvantage in its limited access to the open oceans and
non-European friends. For our part, the United States is much more dependent upon
its use of international airways and oceans, not only in its daily commerce but also in
cementing its far-ung alliances. Thus, geography tends to provide a mixed picture of
inherent strengths and weaknesses.
Economics
On the other hand, economic defense potential clearly favors the United States and its
allies as compared with the Warsaw Pact. Today, for example, our gross national product
is nearly twice that of the Soviet Union. Similarly, NATO as a whole continues to outpace
the Warsaw Pact by a factor of two-to-one.
Today, we also see the Soviet Union struggling to overcome weaknesses endemic to
its system: the difculties of running a “command” economy with no measure of prot
and loss, depletion of their European mineral base, challenges of developing alterna-
tive resources in Siberia, lack of discipline among workers, management shortcomings
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revealed in the Chernobyl disaster, and a host of problems keeping political and economic
relations with Eastern Europe on an even keel.
Thus, by general measures of economic strength, the United States and its allies are
considerably stronger than the Soviet Union and its allies. But how the money is spent
also is a critical factor. Like Axis powers in the 1930s, the Kremlin continues to stress
armaments at the expense of all other sectors of the economy.
Allied Contributions
With respect to allied contributions, Western Europe routinely accounts for about 30
percent of all military expenditures by NATO members and provides about 60 percent of
the active military personnel, as well as 60 percent of the ground and air combat units.
Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan also eld the bulk of deterrent forces, numbering
600,000 and 250,000 military personnel, respectively. By comparison, we normally have
about 130,000 military personnel stationed ashore and aoat in the Western Pacic.
On the other side of this coin, few of our allies have a nuclear deterrent of their own
and, in the postwar years, many stressed ground and air capability rather than naval
strength in their defense planning. Thus, in the overall scheme of things, it is necessary
for the United States to place a high priority on its strategic nuclear umbrella, global
maritime superiority, and strategic mobility forces.
For its part, Eastern Europe normally accounts for about 15 percent of all military
expenditures by the Warsaw Pact. The USSR shoulders the other 85 percent and, in turn,
dominates the Pact’s High Command, military strategy, force structure, and hardware.
In this situation, it is relatively easy for the Soviets to achieve economies of scale in
military production and standardization of equipment and tactics among Warsaw Pact
forces. But they can never be certain that the forces or peoples of Eastern Europe will
rally around a call from Moscow. I suspect that this one uncertainty weighs most heavily
on the minds of the Russian leaders.
On balance, our allies shoulder a much greater defense burden in Europe and Asia
than do allies of the USSR. Of course, we would prefer that many of them do even more,
and we strongly encourage them at every opportunity. Nevertheless, their contributions
are most signicant and count heavily as a factor in our favor.
Trends in the Military Balance
Still, overall trends in the military balance give us little cause for optimism and strongly
call for greater US effort. Our strategic nuclear deterrent is neither as secure nor as
dominant as it once was. Particularly disturbing is the Soviet emphasis on strategic
defense—the steady hardening of command and control facilities, a very robust defense
against air-breathing threats, and an ABM system with potentially nationwide coverage.
Concurrently, we see their large ICBM force becoming more hardened and mobile, their
submarines more quiet, and their bombers more capable of intercontinental missions.
Soviet conventional capabilities on and around the Eurasian continent are much
greater than they were two decades ago. In these forward areas, we have always been
considerably outnumbered by Soviet ground and air forces. Now we are also seeing our
qualitative edge erode.
Soviet surrogates in Asia, Africa, and Central America are more heavily armed and
troublesome than they once were. In turn, they are much more inclined to support
terrorism, subversion, and greater forms of aggression against their neighbors and the
West in general.
While the likelihood of a major Soviet assault on Western Europe is perhaps remote,
the coercive threat of Soviet military power will loom over the Eurasian continent for
many years to come. Moreover, the Soviet government has never departed from poli-
cies holding that its allies and surrogates in the Third World must remain strategically
subservient to Moscow and that the rest of the world is an open eld for destabilizing
actions. Further, we see no slackening in tomorrow’s military investments. By their own
admission, such expenditures will continue on an upward slope—just as they have over
the last four decades. All of this puts an enormous burden on the Soviet economy, but I
see no sign that the system cannot sustain such an effort.
In my view, these and other indicators strongly suggest that we must prepare our-
selves for a marathon, not a short-term sprint, in the military competition with the USSR.
That thought must be a cornerstone of any successful US strategy.
Yet, this is one of the most difcult ideas to get across to the US Congress and the
American people. Frankly, our history would argue that where military preparedness is
concerned, we are notoriously short-sighted.
Net Assessment of Military Capabilities
Moving on, I recognize that this committee is interested in more than broad trends in the
East-West balance. You want to know more specically how the capability of US Armed
Forces and those of our allies compare with those of the Soviet Union and its allies.
Strategic Forces
First, strategic forces. There is no question that in the static sense the Soviets have
reached strategic parity or better. This is one of the major shifts in the balance between
the two superpowers wrought in recent years. They have clear superiority in ICBMs and
overall mega-tonnage. Hardened communications (C3) and passive defense measures give
them a survivability US forces do not yet have. Likewise, the Soviets are further along in
shifting to mobile missiles and are posturing themselves for a possible ABM breakout.
On the other hand, the US ballistic missile submarine force is less vulnerable than
that of the Soviets and we have a more effective bomber force still capable of penetrating
the USSR. Moreover, the President’s strategic modernization program if fully imple-
mented—MX, D-5, B-1, ATB, C3 initiatives, and small ICBM—will prepare us for the
long haul, keep pace with Soviet improvements offensively, and correct our more glaring
deciencies.
Thus, all things considered, I am relatively condent that strategic forces and pro-
grams which are being proposed will deter a direct nuclear attack on the United States
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and our allies. But I must reemphasize, for that judgment to continue to be solid, it is
imperative to stay the course with our strategic modernization programs.
Maritime
The maritime picture is the second major shift in Soviet strategic policy. Throughout the
immediate postwar period, the United States enjoyed undisputed mastery of the seas,
but the Kremlin was not easily discouraged. By the late 1970s the Russian Navy had
made tremendous inroads into our margin of superiority, and the trends were even more
alarming. We have now reversed these curves—particularly in overall shipbuilding—but
the Soviets are on the high seas to stay.
Our main concern is a “blue water” Russian eet pushing its area of operations fur-
ther and further from the homeland. By stretching our forces and tactics to the limit
and working harder to understand Soviet naval thinking, we still hold a slim margin
of superiority on the high seas. But whether that margin holds up will depend, in part,
on our reacting quickly to indications and warnings and our willingness to match their
forces and efforts. As an example, we must take full advantage of the superiority of our
nuclear attack submarines and carry the battle to the Soviets in the forward areas.
Without such pressure, we could expect to see a major breakout by Soviet naval units
and formations on to the sea lines of communications.
While we still enjoy an advantage in seaborne air, amphibious forces, underway
replenishment, and in support we receive from allied navies, a signicant challenge on
the high seas is growing out of Soviet success in:
• Deploying very advanced anti-ship missiles, which are constantly improving;
• Increasing their over-the-horizon targeting capability by exploiting space;
• Improving submarine propulsion (speed and quietness) and metallurgy (depth); and
• Steadily improving their ASW capabilities.
In essence, we cannot afford to relinquish naval superiority to the Soviets. To do
so would jeopardize our coalitions, economic and trade dependencies (which are now
necessary in war as well as peace), and capabilities to project our power overseas. Our
ability to prevail at sea is a cornerstone of our overall strategy.
NATO/Warsaw Pact
Turning to the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance, major trends are generally adverse to NATO.
I have already spoken to the implications of strategic parity. Moreover, we have essentially
no deterrent to chemical warfare in NATO or elsewhere. This is a crucial weakness when
confronting the USSR. Reinforcing this trend has been the extensive Soviet moderniza-
tion, expansion, and reorganization of their theater forces.
Further, the Soviets are better able than NATO to conduct theater nuclear war in
Europe. Today, they possess a pronounced superiority in numbers of intermediate nuclear
forces, both long- and short-range. Similarly, our one-time lead in battleeld nuclear
systems has disappeared. In light of these developments, conventional forces assume an
added signicance. The Soviets have always had imposing ground forces, but the gap
in numbers of modern weapons continues to widen. In ground equipment, they lead the
United States, and also NATO, in virtually every category by ratios ranging from 1.5 to 1
to 6 to 1. Moreover, we have lost our lead in surface-to-air missiles and anti-armor capa-
bility. Similarly, NATO’s qualitative edge in ground systems may have eroded somewhat.
On the other hand, NATO ground forces on the Central Front have made progress in the
use of combined arms and in the elding of modern equipment. Similarly, the sustain-
ability of US forces has improved markedly over the last few years. Unfortunately, the
stocks of certain munitions among the allies have not improved appreciably and could
be exhausted too quickly.
On the plus side, the NATO qualitative edge in tactical aviation, while somewhat
diminished, has not disappeared. It is not clear, however, what this will mean against
the numerical advantages of the Soviet air forces, offensive and defensive, which run in
the neighborhood of 2.0 to 1. I have complete condence that the quality of our pilots
and weapon systems would permit us to exact high exchange ratios, but overcoming the
impressive numbers of Russian medium-range bombers, ghter bombers, interceptors, and
surface-to-air weapon systems will be a sporty course. The outcome is difcult to predict.
We will, of course, have the support of our naval forces in Europe and, as I mentioned
earlier, the Soviets have yet to surpass our lead.
To put all of this into perspective, NATO capabilities are still deterring a war in
Europe. Surely, the prospect of having to ght sixteen nations at once remains a sobering
one for the Kremlin.
But if, for some reason, war breaks out, maintaining a successful forward defense
will be a “near thing” under the best of assumptions. Barring a major change in the
dynamics of the competition, NATO can no longer hope to offset Warsaw Pact numbers
merely by improving the quality of its equipment or relying on the dedication of people
defending their own territory. In the nal analysis, the military balance in Europe is not
encouraging and needs a great deal of tending—politically as well as militarily.
East Asia
Until the late 1960s, Moscow paid little attention to the defense of its eastern provinces
and its strength in the Western Pacic. With the Peoples’ Republic of China’s (PRC)
breakaway from the Soviet orbit and the burgeoning afuence of East Asia, the Kremlin
began to buildup its forces in the region—not by drawing down in Western Europe, but
by commissioning new units and increasing defense production to help them.
Overall, the balance on the Chinese border favors the Russians in every way except
manpower, and as yet the Chinese have been unable to turn things around—preferring
to put their current priorities elsewhere. The one exception is Chinese nuclear capability,
which provides “minimal deterrence” of a sort. Nevertheless, China looms large in the
Kremlin’s calculations—witness the gradual buildup from twenty to fty Soviet divisions
on the Chinese border.
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On the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang has made a determined effort to outstrip the
South’s forces. Besides this general buildup, several recent initiatives are particularly
worrisome—the relocation of a number of second echelon divisions close to the DMZ
[demilitarized zone] and recent emphasis on improving special operations forces both
quantitatively and qualitatively. However, as long as North Korea is not directly assisted
by the Soviet Union, United States augmentation—especially our air power—should make
the difference in deterring or, if necessary, defeating the North. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the Peninsula is an unstable focal point with a signicant threat of major war
lingering on the horizon. In the context of global hostilities, the East Asian area presents
both opportunities and challenges to US planners. We have signicant leverage against
Soviet naval and air forces in the region, which both reduces the threat to our sea lines
of communication and constrains the Kremlin’s ability to accomplish its strategic goals
in the Far East.
Further, our political relationships generally work in our favor. It is clear that PRC
forces tie down substantial Soviet ground and air deployments in the region and that
Peking puts considerable stock in its US tie. In a similar vein, Japan is a pillar of US
strategy in the Pacic. Without Japanese cooperation, it would be difcult to bottle up
the Russian eet, augment South Korea, and nd sufcient bases to support continuing
operations against the Soviets. Likewise, the health of the US-Philippine relationship,
politically and militarily, impacts heavily on the regional balance.
Obviously, the rmness of US alliances will rest to a great degree on our ability to
successfully confront the Soviets in the region and, in the event of war, to keep open our
sea lines of communication to the Western Pacic. While predicting what the Soviets will
do is a hazardous business, I am inclined to believe that any US-Soviet confrontation
in the Pacic will take its lead from events in Western Europe or elsewhere. This means
that we would most likely be ghting a containing action as well as supporting our Pacic
allies. While the prospects for achieving our objectives in Asia are encouraging, there is
clearly a great deal to be done before we can confront the future with condence.
Power Projection
Turning to power projection, the Soviets have long been able to project military power
successfully adjacent to their borders. Basically, the Russians’ continental location and
large resource base give them an asymmetrical advantage vis-à-vis the United States
when applying force in Western Europe and along their immediate periphery—witness
events in Afghanistan.
In the last decade, the Kremlin has increased its ability to project forces, employing
cargo aircraft, naval units, and nonmilitary shipping, although Washington continues
to enjoy a distinct advantage where long-range lift is concerned. However, the Soviets
have developed a style of power projection that avoids confrontation with US units—e.g.,
through the use of Cuban proxies, arms sales to clients, covert operations, and inter-
vention in areas where US action is not anticipated. I am generally condent that in a
direct confrontation, US forces would be able to defeat Soviet troops operating far from
the Soviet Union. In peacetime, however, we will continue to see the Soviets selectively
intervene (projection of inuence) in regional conicts around the globe where they believe
the calculus genuinely favors them.
Special Operations Forces
Because they so often operate behind the scenes, straight one-on-one comparisons of our
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Soviet “Spetsnaz” are difcult to derive and sensitive
to portray in an open fashion. Nevertheless, several points are worth noting. Both sides
depend upon such forces to complement conventional forces in general war planning.
But the Soviet side tends to use its Spetsnaz more routinely in low-intensity conict, as
during the Czechoslovakia invasion of 1968 and in the current Afghanistan campaign.
Their capability for covert and clandestine operations also ts into the Kremlin’s policy
of keeping pressure on the West through state-supported intimidation, terrorism, and
subversion—and making sure that no surrogate ever gets out of the Soviet camp. In
short, the Brezhnev Doctrine and Spetsnaz go hand in hand.
Against this background, there is no question that our SOF have become very good at
the business of counterterrorism. In 1981, our capability was very limited; now, we probably
have the best in the world. But this is a rather narrow eld, and we are still groping to t
our SOF—and other forces—into an overarching strategy to meet the threat of low-intensity
conict. Further, progress should be possible with more focused organizational arrange-
ments, including the new Special Operations Forces Command and increased emphasis
on procuring the specialized equipment and training for these types of operations.
Overall, I believe we are building a credible and effective capability against state-sup-
ported terrorism, subversion, and other forms of indirect aggression against the West,
but, a great deal of hard, constructive work still lies ahead in this area.
Net Assessment
In summary, it is clear that the investments made in the last eight years have materially
improved the foregoing Net Assessment from the US standpoint. It is equally obvious
that the picture is a dynamic one that the Soviets are working diligently to improve their
position across the board, and that there are still a number of serious gaps in our own
posture. On balance, we still need a number of years’ growth before we can face the
future with condence. In particular, I cannot help but be alarmed by the signal which
a continuing zero or negative growth defense budget would send to both our allies and
potential opponents in Europe. Frankly, such a signal at this time is not justied by the
threat, the political climate, or the military situation.
The President’s Budget
Against this background, the President is starting anew with the 100th Congress by
proposing 3 percent real growth in Defense spending against the FY 1987 baseline.
The Joint Chiefs believe that the budget for FY 1988-1989 supports the Nation’s
strategy and will reinstitute modest real scal growth so necessary to long-term health.
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The Chiefs and CINCs participated in the formulation of the budget, and while it is by
no means risk-free, they are satised that appropriate compromises and trade-offs have
been struck at the resource level which has been set. The budget continues the modern-
ization of the equipment for our forces, both nuclear and conventional; includes growth
in naval force structure; addresses our more pressing sustainability shortages; provides
an appropriate balance between readiness and modernization; preserves the kind of
quality manpower which is the backbone of our forces; and, with an eye to our reliance
on quality technology, continues to emphasize research and development accounts. Sec-
retary Weinberger’s statement has addressed each of these areas in detail. Consequently,
I will only mention some of the more signicant items.
Military Personnel
As I noted last year, our most precious asset is quality personnel—the cornerstone of our
military establishment. This year, the President’s budget continues support for adequate
levels of compensation accompanied by a modest increase in military pay and additional
funding for family housing. This action will sustain a personnel picture which overall
remains healthy. Too often, we are inclined to count people as the intangible factor in
the military balance, so I believe it is useful to cite one area where your support has
paid extremely high dividends. We are the best in the world at operating and supporting
complex weapon systems under night/all-weather conditions. I see this in all of the Ser-
vices and count it as one of our strongest cards in managing crises and deterring our
adversaries. It all ows from the talent, high morale, and competitive spirit of our ofcer
and enlisted ranks.
Strategic Modernization
The Chiefs have consistently made strategic modernization their number one priority.
Our triad of strategic nuclear forces is the umbrella under which all our deterrent forces
operate and undergirds the security policies of our allies as well. In the face of unrelenting
Soviet efforts to modernize their strategic weapons across the board, we have no choice
but to refurbish all three legs of the triad. The MX, small ICBM, Trident, D-5, B-1B, ATB,
and accompanying C-3 programs are designed to give us an updated deterrent which
will see us into the next century.
In a similar vein, the Joint Chiefs support the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative
which will determine whether an alternative to sole reliance on the threat of nuclear
retaliation is feasible. It is both prudent and moral for the United States to explore means
for ending the dominance of offensive ballistic missile weaponry.
Concurrently, the JCS strongly applaud efforts by the President to achieve progress in
arms reduction negotiations. While I believe there are some encouraging signs, I do not
see any immediate breakthrough in the ofng or any reason to relax our strategic mod-
ernization initiatives. Negotiations are not a substitute for force modernization; rather,
negotiations and our modernization efforts are mutually reinforcing.
Conventional Force Modernization
It should be obvious from the comparison of US-Soviet forces that we have some press-
ing needs in our conventional forces which must be corrected if we are to move into the
1990s with condence. The number one priority is to maintain our qualitative edge on
the eld of battle, and the President’s budget takes a positive step in this direction—in
both procurement and R&D [research and development] funding. While we have made
great progress over the last few years, it is also important to stress that we are only
midstream in the conventional force modernization process. To cite some expected end
FY 1987 gures:
• About 25 percent of the Army’s active mechanized battalions and 40 percent of
its tank battalions will be re-equipped with the Bradley ghting vehicle and M-l;
• From 50 percent to 65 percent of our tactical air wings will have received new
ghter/bombers;
• Some ve out of fteen carrier battle groups will have AEGIS; and
• About 36 percent of our submarine force will be operating basic or improved ver-
sions of the 688 Class.
More progress will be made as equipment currently in the pipeline reaches our com-
bat forces. But it should be clearly understood that we are stretching out and, in turn,
delaying the modernization effort.
As explained in the OMB Budget Summary, this is a direct consequence of scal
austerities and, in some cases, a deliberate decision to buy more modern munitions and
fewer platforms. Only in FY 1989 does procurement in general resume an upward slope
and that, of course, is contingent upon congressional approval of the President’s two-year
budget request. The bottom line is that many of our active and reserve units will remain
behind the power curve in quality, particularly as reinforcements for NATO.
Chemical Warfare
Of special note are the requested funds for chemical weaponry. These programs are
necessary to offset a serious disadvantage on the battleeld and to counter offensive and
defensive asymmetries strongly favoring the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the
American ghting man in the eld, it is difcult to overemphasize this request.
Special Forces and Low Intensity Conflict
With respect to Special Operations Forces, this budget continues to place considerable
emphasis on procuring equipment and weaponry. There is increasing recognition of the
value of these specially tailored assets in today’s world. In turn, there is a new determi-
nation to see that not only organizational but equipment deciencies are corrected and
that these forces are brought to an even higher state of readiness. The requested funds
for SOF equipment will pay a high return in capabilities desired by both the President
and the Congress.
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Sustainability
The FY 1988–1989 budget proposes to continue the trend of the last few years in improv-
ing our sustainability, which includes war reserve stockpiles (munitions and spares),
transportation capabilities, and industrial surge capacities. We worry about potential
“war stoppers” or their impact on the theater nuclear threshold.
In the past four years, funding for ammunition has grown by over 25 percent; spare
parts funding has doubled; and ammunition inventories of all Services have improved
substantially. In Europe, for instance, ground ammunition tonnage is up 18 percent, and
it has almost doubled in the Pacic. Munitions deciencies which plagued us for years
are improving steadily, but at the current rate of expenditures, it will be several years
before we can near our goals and breathe easier.
We simply must stay the course if we want a genuinely sustainable force, as well as
a modern and well-trained one. Otherwise, we will be spending a great deal for modern
equipment with one hand and then reducing its effectiveness with the other.
Budget Overview
The peacetime strategy and Defense spending of the United States seek to maintain the
cutting edge of our deterrent forces, active and reserve, while counting on our economic
and mobilization potential to cope with any clear and present danger to the United States
and its allies. Everything about this deterrent stance hinges upon the quality of our
people, hardware, munitions, and logistic support.
Overall, this budget addresses adverse trends in the overall balance, stresses our
qualitative advantages, reduces deterrent risks over time, and avoids the dramatic trade-
offs which would distort the force structure as we move into the 1990s. While by no
means risk-free, the President’s budget is a prudent approach to the problem of maintain-
ing an effective and balanced deterrent across the full spectrum of potential hostilities.
As the President’s principal military advisor, I wholly support the defense budget for FY
1988 and FY 1989, and I urge the Congress to do likewise.
Looking Ahead
Looking ahead, this may well be a critical year in the national security debate. Recently
mandated across-the-board cuts in funding and ofcer strength have slowed our prog-
ress in achieving force goals; stretched out force modernization; thinned out some of
our combat units in hardware or people; left us with still inadequate stocks of modern
munitions; and resulted in a growing backlog of equipment and facility maintenance.
Against this background, a considerable amount of reprogramming and ne tuning
has managed to avoid either a hollow strategy or a hollow force—but the overall trends
remain a matter of serious concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCS. We may
be able to live with one or two years on a at or descending appropriations curve, but
we will eventually pay heavily for several years of zero or negative growth. At this point,
it is difcult to forecast the specic impacts, but given the Soviets’ steady progress and
the narrow margins inherent in our defense policies, small reductions in our capabili-
ties could very well provoke a disproportionate change in the risk. Our experience has
conrmed that time and again.
If confronted with no real increase in Defense spending over the next ve years, for
example, it is my judgment that our military risks will increase throughout this decade
(possibly sharply) and into the 1990s. Primarily, this is a function of stretching things
out, delaying improvements in a total force context, and living with sustainability prob-
lems we should be solving at a steady pace. Frankly, it’s a pure function of the United
States marching in place or making heavy tradeoffs, which will sacrice some part of
our structure, while the Soviets move forward in their customary fashion, correcting one
military deciency after another. That’s precisely how we can lose our present ability to
deter and our already slim edge on the eld of battle.
In essence, I would like to see America settle down in the Defense debate—start look-
ing at where we will be in the 1990s. What is most needed is a consistent and rational
defense policy geared for the long run, rather than the peaks and valleys which have
characterized so much of our peacetime history. We have a great deal going for us in
economic defense potential and in partnerships with other free nations of the world. But
we must take the lead and set the pace in this long-term military competition with the
USSR. If we fail to meet this challenge—and let the Soviet-controlled forces dominate
the eld—then we must be prepared to face the consequences of a world starkly different
and less hospitable than the one we are living in today.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonies at NORAD and US Space
Command
Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado | February 6
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, and men and women of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command and United States Space Command:
It is indeed a privilege to participate in this ceremony, which marks a shift of leadership
at the helm of these rst-line commands and honors both the departing and arriving
commanders.
It is a great pleasure also to visit the State of Colorado once again. Military people
traditionally believe that any duty outside Washington is good duty and that, by the same
token, any trip outside the Washington Beltway is a good trip. I certainly don’t disagree
with that folk wisdom. Put simply, I welcome these brief escapes from the Washington
swirl. But this visit today—and this event—have special signicance and meaning, for
several reasons.
It is gratifying, rst of all, to be back in the heartland and to be part of a gathering
that includes so many prominent Coloradans—and I say this in all sincerity, despite my
deep roots elsewhere in the Big Eight (and my fondness for the Oklahoma football team).
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In a sense, the large civilian presence here today at this traditional military rite
celebrates the partnership that built this great nation and each of its states: citizens
who have used their freedom well, and people in uniform dedicated to preserving that
freedom and protecting those accomplishments. In these ceremonies, we renew—and
pay tribute to—a great civil-military tie which has always been strong in the Centennial
State, ever since the days of the frontier forts and which remains obviously vibrant in
this community today. The US Space Command’s seal symbolizes what we are about.
The eagle holds the olive branch and the arrows, symbolizing the joining of the fruits of
peace and the military strength that keeps the preconditions for peace rmly in place.
It is equally gratifying for me today to be able to recognize the ne work of the men
and women of NORAD and the US Space Command—and to tell them how much we in
the remote netherworld of Washington value, and depend on, your work. The message I
bring is simple and direct: the people of North America are free, and their prospects are
good, in large part because you have raised a shield of vigilance and strength over our
country which dees those who would do us harm.
For decades, NORAD has been a central element of our military structure which has
deterred war, frustrated our most determined adversaries, and permitted Canadians
and Americans to go about their civilian pursuits so successfully. This bi-national bond
between Washington and Ottawa is one of the West’s greatest postwar strategic success
stories. Similarly, the US Space Command has applied vision, imagination, and extraor-
dinary talent to nd ways to move our defenses forward into the twenty-rst century.
Together, you have faced the most awesome responsibilities of the modern age,
working to prevent war and providing a powerful incentive for our enemies to return to
negotiating tables where peaceful solutions can be developed and hopefully reductions
in armaments can be pursued. You have helped not only to make the world safer but
a better place to live. There is no nobler cause and I salute you for these achievements.
It is a great personal pleasure for me to have a chance today to recognize and applaud
your efforts. You deserve the best and you have certainly been blessed with the nest
of leaders.
As you say goodbye to General [Robert T.] Herres, we in Washington prepare to
welcome him to his new responsibilities as the rst Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, my co-pilot. He will nd those responsibilities large and still evolving, but he
will be more than up to the task. We in Washington count ourselves fortunate to have
an ofcer of his talent and dedication inaugurating this important post. As a personal
aside, I would add that anyone who once qualied as an astronaut can cope with being
launched into the unknown, even in Washington. Also, because I have some experience
in the matter, I can say with condence that a man who marries a girl named Shirley
has a great reservoir of strength to call on when events close in—and they do close in at
times. Shirley Crowe and I have indeed been looking forward to the return of the Herres
family to Washington.
Excerpts from Remarks at the Princeton University Interfaith Council Breakfast
Princeton, New Jersey | April 27
The subject of this morning’s discussion, “What Matters to Me and Why,” is a truly daunt-
ing one. When you get to be my age, you’ve tended for a long time to take these things
for granted. And in the press of everyday business, you don’t often get the opportunity
to reect on such subjects.
As I prepared these remarks and struggled with the problem of compressing large
ideas into a few words, I thought about my own time as a student at the Naval Academy
and the course of my career since then. One episode in particular stood out—really the
only memory I have of my graduation day at Annapolis. It is a piece of advice offered to my
class by our commencement speaker, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. He told us
to conduct ourselves—no matter what we did or where fortune called—so that we would
always be welcome to return to our hometowns. It’s difcult for me to believe it has been
almost forty-one years since I heard him say that. In that time I have followed the ag
literally to all corners of the earth. Those years have been lled with challenges for our
nation, too many and too familiar for any recounting here. They have been my preoccu-
pation, and in the end they have brought me wholly unanticipated responsibilities. Now
I am the last one of my Annapolis class still wearing the uniform.
What are those values that were so powerful for me and that have made that episode
live on in my memory? Three words summarize them—God, Honor, and Patriotism. I
would suspect that those words are the same ones that have animated many of you, and
your families, in your own hometowns.
I’d be the rst to admit that it is all too easy for them to be obscured by the exigencies
of life in this age. The momentum of change is impressive, if not bewildering, and in many
respects the environment surrounding us—and its challenges—are unparalleled in his-
tory. There are more people on this globe than at any time in the past. An unprecedented
proportion of them are literate and educated. More than ever, people are expressing their
aspirations and inuencing governments. The scientic and technological revolution
impacts every aspect of our lives. Advancements in communications and transportation
alone have shrunk the world incredibly. Scientists claim we are doubling our acquisition
of knowledge every ve years. Assuming they are correct, in less than seven decades we
should know a million times more about our universe than we do today. If you had a
personal library consisting of a whole wall lined with built-in bookshelves, a million-fold
increase in your library would require a continuous wall of bookshelves extending from
coast to coast across the breadth of the United States.
I believe the average American, in seeking the answer to such a question, does not
rely on complicated arguments, nor does he cite the unique tenets of any particular
religious faith. Instinctively, he returns to, most likely, the basic teachings he has
learned as a child, to mention a few: God, country, moderation in all things, freedom
with responsibility, self-respect for all, and emphasis on human dignity and the worth
of the individual.
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These are the benchmarks which undergirded the early years of our great democratic
experiment. Do they have application today? My answer is emphatic: Of course! They
are relevant every day and every way in the actions of moral men and women dedicated
to living fruitful lives within our nation, in the government, in every profession, in all
endeavors, and in every home and workplace.
I stand before you as one of those. My profession is one in which the values I have
mentioned are held high as standards of personal behavior and as the characteristics of
the free society I am sworn to defend. A few years ago, there was a great debate about the
moral problems of war in the nuclear age. It raised important questions about how we can
remain civilized in an age in which technology has given us not only unparalleled creative
capacities but also unprecedented powers of destruction. But these are not new questions.
In every age, men have been challenged to remain faithful to abiding norms while making
difcult choices about what to do. This is our challenge, as well, and I am condent we can
steer the right course. We cannot wish away the unpleasant aspects of the world; we have
to do our best to grapple with what exists, and somehow to make it better.
Channeling our creative abilities and using our strength for purposes that advance
humane guiding principles is the ultimate test for those who govern. We cannot and
should not detach the business of governing, or of defending the society, from those prin-
ciples. They are the standard against which we—and all Americans—should measure
our behavior. This would not be possible without the emphasis that we have historically
put on the individual, his dignity, his welfare, and his freedom. Certainly, neither we
nor our system are perfect; clearly, there is a great deal more to do and we still face more
than enough problems. Yet, the point is that our idealism has been a dynamic force in
the life of our nation—constantly spurring us to greater heights—and it remains so
today. Even Watergate, a most sordid chapter in our political history, demonstrated our
resiliency, patience, and cohesion as a nation. Only a people which had great faith in
their institutions and collective morality could have digested Watergate without more
trauma, without tanks or soldiers in the streets, or without tearing their society apart.
In my view, Watergate was a moral trial rather than a political one, and our fundamental
values stood the test well.
The Vietnam schism provides similar encouragement. No matter what side of the
argument you took or how distressed you were by those events, in the long run our obe-
dience to Democratic principles, our inherent regard for pluralism and the humanity of
our values allowed the country ultimately to overcome this traumatic division.
If there is a threat to us, I believe it is not our ethics but the hypocrisy which we often
practice. When the younger generation shows its dissatisfaction about events, it seems
to me to spring from a sense of discrepancy between what we believe and what we do.
That is where the greatest need for improvement lies.
Let me very quickly turn from the national to a personal level and cite a graphic
example of a man who was not a hypocrite—a military man who found strength in
our traditional values and in his professional ethic when he was put to great peril and
trial—Vice Admiral James Stockdale, a POW in Vietnam for seven and a half years and
a Medal of Honor winner. He had this to say about his experience. (Forgive me if I quote
liberally—but I could not do his testimony justice in my own words):
In prison, we Americans had many mainstays. Mine reduced to a strong three-
legged stool of God, country, and honor. Patriotism formed the honor leg of that
stool. By honor, I mean a mixture of pride and conscience. That is, pride of one’s
country and in one’s self, and a well-developed conscience based on this nation’s
history and its citizens’ obligation to uphold the promise and commitment of our
Founding Fathers.
Alone, sick and suffering, with the agony of having the thin veneer of civiliza-
tion brutally removed from our lives—faith, love, and hope were taken away from
the strongest men as the screws of this extortion environment were tightened, day
by day. The North Vietnamese hacked away at our honor, too, but there they hit
the bedrock of resistance and resolve. We prisoners saw the bottom of the barrel,
and our honor, our patriotism, helped save us from going over the edge into bar-
barism. I’ve seen brave men broken to the point that honor was the only building
block left—but it was there. Patriotism sustained, encouraged, and gave hope.
The immense strength of our history elevated our conscience and helped
maintain our hope and unity.
This is the stuff of the real world and a concrete example of an American in extremis
falling back on central and timeless concepts: God, honor, and patriotism. Jim Stockdale
prevailed over his captors; they never conquered his spirit or the inner man. In essence,
his victory was a spiritual one. What a testament to our idealism, our code, our belief in
country—what a testament to our central hometown values.…
Public Lecture—“America and Her Military” at the Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey | April 28
It’s a pleasure for me to be here tonight. Shirley and I are about midway in my McLean
Fellowship Program and we have genuinely enjoyed the opportunity to revisit familiar
places and see some old friends. We have fond memories of this town and campus. To
say the least, we hold a deep affection for Princeton. I might add that for me, this has
been a refreshing respite from the rigors of the Pentagon. I’ve been in this job for a year
and a half now and have relearned the lesson that Washington can be a very tough town
indeed—as the newspapers may have suggested to you over the past few months. I have
to deal with Congress a lot, and that can be trying, especially at budget time. So, it’s very
satisfying to take refuge in more civilized surroundings, if only briey.
But such burdens aside, I have looked forward to sharing with you some of my thoughts
about the once and future challenges of defending our country. I have always believed
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that it is vital for the military to engage in a continuous dialogue with the public. National
security is too important these days to leave to the professionals alone. America’s ability to
fashion a viable and effective defense rests in large part on our citizens’ understanding of
the challenges we face and our ability to deal with them. Put simply, both the civilian and
the military communities must communicate with each other and work very hard at it.
It is essential to maintain the mutual understanding that can support a genuine civ-
il-military partnership for defense. We already have historically had such a partnership,
though we don’t often think of it in those terms. It was, after all, a civil-military team
that built this country and won our freedom. That combination has defended the Nation
successfully for two centuries, and I see it operating at several levels today: within the
National Security Council arena, in the Department of Defense, with civilian and military
personnel cooperating to fashion our military structure throughout our nation’s history,
civilian communities adjacent to defense facilities, and last but not least, in the country at
large, where many people work diligently to inform themselves and to participate respon-
sibly in the recurring national debate over what emphasis should be assigned to defense.
But those relationships notwithstanding, in times that are generally prosperous
and which appear to be peaceful, the average Americans—and Congressmen for that
matter—are often ambivalent about defense expenditures and especially about the role
military men play in national decisionmaking. Our history is instructive here.
In the rst book of Daniel Boorstin’s trilogy The Americans, he details our colonial
forefathers’ military affairs. The early settlers had come here, of course, from countries
where professional forces had been tools of autocrats and were literally a separate caste
used by rulers for their own purposes, or more frequently, their whims. Quite naturally,
the colonists brought with them deep resentments of professional military, but once set-
tled in the new world, the colonists, in addition to all the rather challenging hardships,
often had to deal with hostile natives.
On a frontier and on the battleeld, the imperatives were clear. As a result, everyone
valued and became accomplished in the business of personal and collective security as
much as they were in the business of shopkeepers or as farmers. It was a matter of sur-
vival. From this lifestyle, a strong militia tradition arose: self-armed citizen-soldiers ready
to drop their personal pursuits at a moment’s notice and rally to the defense of home,
hearth, and community. This custom gave rise to the belief that the colonies were always
prepared for peril, in a sort of effortless way, as a by-product of the colonial lifestyle.
But, as Boorstin notes, in practice the militia tradition was rmly bounded by local
allegiances: people were reluctant to participate in extended expeditions defending dis-
tant communities. As life settled into more peaceful patterns, training in units grew per-
functory at best. George Washington quickly discovered in the War of Independence that
militia troops—the Minutemen—though erce defenders of hometowns, were notoriously
unreliable when committed elsewhere. To ght the highly disciplined British units, a
national force of regulars was needed, but it was hard to lure men away from their local-
ities for extended duty. Short enlistments and lagging re-enlistments constantly imperiled
campaign plans and strategic designs. In Princeton, we today are properly proud of the
famous battle fought here. What is not as well known is that George Washington, after
his earlier victory at Trenton, had literally to beg soldiers due for discharge in a few days
to stay with him. About half did stay and followed him here; but half went home, too.
And though the situation improved somewhat in the later stages of the war, it was never
good. People—and towns—saw to their own defenses rst.
After the Revolution, streams of Americans poured westward. Life for them was in
some respects like it had been for the rst colonists. There were great risks and uncer-
tainties about the simplest things and, of course, security of homes and settlements
was a major concern. They also depended on a strong tradition of self-help for defenses,
but gradually a small professional army began to share the mission of protecting them.
It’s hard for us sometimes to imagine what their lives were like as they pushed across
the Piedmont and Appalachian Plateau and out across the plains and prairie. Homes
were scattered, isolated, and vulnerable. Indian and bandit raids could come at any time.
Naturally, these people valued the protective presence of the Regulars, and were the
strongest advocates—more vocal than many in the military—for full-time professional
units. But back east, where life became more secure and more and more preoccupied with
industry, commerce, and the gentle arts, skepticism about the military establishment
grew, as did criticism about the ways it was used and, of course, the monies it required.
The Civil War aside, which was treated more as a one-time spasm, the need for perma-
nent forces seemed more and more remote as the frontier threat receded. There were
wars and upheavals on other continents, to be sure, but our connections with them were
attenuated. Our country was not at risk, and the strength of the British Navy kept the
sea channels open for commerce.
The contributions of a military establishment became less apparent and were
downgraded except on those infrequent occasions when an unruly world intruded and
demanded that the United States defend its own burgeoning interests and activities and
help others defend their own against blatant aggression. But each time, after a burst of
energy, we demobilized—demilitarized, some would say—when the threats were quelled.
It was the American way.
Some attribute this pattern primarily to the original colonial fear of the “man on
horseback” or basic aversion to a “standing military” that might usurp power. My father,
an attorney with a fascination for history, shared these fears and used to lecture me
at length about the place of the professional soldier in a democracy. On one hand, he
admired valor and was proud of being a World War I veteran. On the other hand, he never
overcame his skepticism of the “brass.”
An equally important factor throughout our history has been the sense of threat.
After all, it is the language of our own Constitution (in the Second Amendment) that
says a well-regulated militia is “necessary to the security of a free state.” That is truly a
foundation principle for us as a nation. But the rub usually comes in recognizing and
acknowledging the threat in a timely fashion. Americans seem to have painfully short
memories. Four times in the last ninety years we let our defenses sag and then were forced
into major hostilities where we paid an exorbitant and needless price in lives, treasure,
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and instability. I heard a wag say that we remember the Alamo, we remember the Maine,
we remember Pearl Harbor. When we win, we forget them.
After World War II, the United States found itself the leader of the Free World with
global concerns. Following another precipitate demobilization, the United States discov-
ered that it could not return to its comfortable pre-war mode. It rapidly became clear
that Moscow had no intention of continuing its wartime alliance with the West. A shat-
tered Europe was looking to Washington for sustenance and protection. In the Pacic,
MacArthur was charged with transforming Japan into a democracy, and nationalists
throughout Southeast Asia and the subcontinent were agitating for independence. In the
background lurked the nuclear weapon, which only the United States possessed.
But the world was moving fast. In 1949, the Soviets exploded a nuclear device. With
the attack on South Korea, American troops found themselves again ghting abroad. Out
of this trauma came NATO, the Marshall Plan, and an overall military buildup, including
the landmark decision to keep forces indenitely forward-deployed in Europe, the Mediter-
ranean, and the Western Pacic. In a few years, these moves were bolstered by a network
of security treaties with other allies. Americans were discovering that international lead-
ership involved a great deal more than diplomatic conferences. This was a marked break
with our past. For the rst time we were to support large forces in peacetime. The 1950s
determined our fundamental commitments and strategic posture until the present day.
These developments, of course, meant that even though we were at peace, the mili-
tary was heavily involved in national policymaking and that Defense procurement would
become inuential in the economy. In turn, Service leaders would assume a higher prole
than in the past. Predictably, our historical ambivalence about things military reasserted
itself. The country did nance increased military outlays and elected a professional
ofcer as President in 1952. Interestingly, before leaving ofce even he saw t to caution
Americans about the military-industrial complex. Academics, exercised about the new-
found inuence of the Defense Department, churned out a host of studies and analytical
pieces on the “military mind” and “men on white horses”—as I discovered when I was in
graduate school at Princeton.
The late Bernard Brodie, in his 1973 book War and Politics, outlined the perspective
I’m talking about. Brodie decried what he termed the “primitive” and “parochial” out-
look of those who rise to high military positions. They were, he felt, too condent in the
efcacy of force and too uninformed about other instruments of policy. Military leaders,
he contended, because of their professional upbringing, are simply not likely to be well-
equipped to advise the President sensibly about “the goals and ends of peace and of war.”
That’s pretty tough criticism—especially to someone like me who is, in fact, charged
to give the President just such advice. And it’s not an isolated attitude by any means. The
Vietnam schism reinforced these views in many peoples’ minds and certainly caused
career ofcers at all ranks to rethink what they were about. While I believe that Brodie
would be pleased if he could see some of the changes that have taken place in the attitudes
and sophistication of your senior military leadership, his views are still held by many and
still represent formidable barriers to mutual understanding. Consequently, it is imper-
ative for today’s senior ofcers to work at bridging this gap and, in turn, to constantly
reexamine their own perspectives.
The post-Vietnam reaction was to cut back defense spending markedly. But neither
Democrats nor Republicans were able to reduce our international commitments success-
fully, although they tried on occasion. The imperatives of our global responsibilities and
the expectations of our allies were just too strong. By the late 1970s, we confronted a
situation where we were deployed worldwide, but with hollow forces. In typical American
style, a backlash set in, and the last six to seven years have witnessed increased defense
expenditure and marked improvements across the board in our military posture.
Despite the ups and downs in security expenditures, the strategic environment,
as usual, refused to stand still. That’s my prime preoccupation. Our interests remain
global. In fact, I think Americans today take that simple assertion for granted—often
without realizing what it implies. While we were distracted by Vietnam and its subse-
quent trauma, Moscow in its plodding but consistent fashion continued to invest heavily
in raw power. I won’t belabor the statistics documenting their military apparatus; sufce
it to say, this continuous investment has produced impressive forces—in fact, forces of
unprecedented strength in the peacetime world.
Moreover, they have steadily improved qualitatively as well as quantitatively. No matter
what assumptions you might make about the Kremlin’s intentions, make no mistake:
they possess formidable military power of global reach. While I believe we are seeing
some encouraging signs in Moscow, we have not as yet detected any tangible abatement
in Soviet military programs—either testing or building.
It is also a fact of life today that security challenges now wear many faces other than the
specter of a nuclear or conventional war with the USSR—such as terrorism that can occur
anywhere on the globe at any time; the manifold activities of Soviet surrogates who seek to
promote instability wherever they can; and proliferating local conicts in the Third World.
The challenge—and the guts of my job—is to see that we are prepared to deal with
this continuously shifting strategic climate. In a very real sense, our past success makes
the task more difcult. Our deterrent policy has worked—certainly as far as major war
and Western Europe is concerned—and, in turn, has freed our citizens and resources for
peaceful pursuits. That they can be so absorbed is, of course, in itself a measure of our
armed forces’ success in keeping the preconditions for peace and progress in place. But
it is also true that the relative tranquility of Americans’ lives tends to numb them to the
harsh and distant realities of the international community. They aren’t used to thinking
of the world as a place marked by conict, competition, and strife, and they lose sight of
the role of military strength in protecting and facilitating their daily lives.
Henry Kissinger—a philosopher and statesman of some note—once observed that
Americans tend to think of “peace” and “war” as two entirely separate and incompat-
ible spheres of activity. Everyday affairs are, of course, much more blurred than that.
Admiral Jim Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, used the term “violent
peace” to describe today’s atmosphere. Any newspaper testies to the fact that he is
right. But for many Americans, it’s hard to connect these reports to our own defenses.
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Yet another complication is the very character of the public discussion of defense
issues—especially at budget time, when the great arguments tend to get cast in terms of
dollars and not—no pun intended—strategic sense, and when there is a distressing ten-
dency to proceed without considering fully all the values and interests at stake. This ten-
dency has become pronounced with the growth of genuine concerns about budget decits.
I spend considerable time on Capitol Hill, and I hear a great deal of talk there about
the primacy of so-called scal and political realities. No one ever really denes what those
realities are, but many clearly feel the debate about allocation of national resources ought
to take its bearings from them. I certainly agree that the discussion has to consider the full
array of challenges confronting the country, but I would argue that it should also include
military realities: i.e., far-ung American activities and interests, the needs of friends,
trends in security threats, and the state of our own forces. But as sensible as that position
may seem, it is sometimes very hard to get it across to congressional interlocutors.
All this, I hasten to add, doesn’t lead to an argument that we must match the Soviet
Union, or anyone else, weapon for weapon, gun for gun, or man for man. Military people
know—in fact, we insist—that our humane and decent society must do many things in
addition to building its military strength. We know, also, that in a major war or other
engagement with the Soviets, we are going to go into battle at sea, on the land, or in the
air outnumbered in both manpower and equipment. Senior leaders of my generation
have learned that this is a fact of life, and we move on to nd ways to compensate with
quality weapons systems, excellent people, realistic training, broad and responsive logistic
support, and the help of our free world friends and allies. But that makes it a “sporty”
course; a package that leaves little margin for error and no room for retreat from the
challenges in any of those compensatory areas.
In my view, because of the renovation of our defenses undertaken in the 1980s, America is
safer than we were ten years ago, the possibilities for meaningful arms reductions are greater,
and the prospects for what many citizens understand as peace are higher. But in today’s
world it is unfortunately true that the business of security is never done. Similarly, leader-
ship of the free world is a tough and protracted job. Like it or not, we’re engaged in a contest
that’s a marathon, not a sprint, and if you’ll forgive me for mixing in a naval metaphor, this
is no time to rest on our oars. The bottom line is that complacency is hardly justied by the
threat, the political climate, or the military situation. This is a time when the country needs,
as never before, to be conscious of the bonds and mutual requirements that hold together its
civil-military team and to look with clear eyes at all dimensions of the world it faces.
I promised a word about the future. Obviously, I believe that for some time we will be
required to invest in keeping our defenses strong. At the same time, there is no question
that the current practice of politicizing defense issues, even small ones, is wasteful in a vari-
ety of ways. Of all the serious studies addressed to Defense reorganization, every one that
I am familiar with recommends dramatic changes in the way Congress addresses security
issues and the need for bipartisanship on defense. Yet when Congress passes reorganiza-
tion legislation, these suggestions are ignored. It’s much easier to rearrange the Secretary
of Defense’s ofce or command lines than it is to alter political attitudes and habits.
The fact remains that the real challenge is to forge some type of consensus on defense
policy and to set aside the political pettiness which marks so much of the annual secu-
rity debate.
There’s no question that we could defend this country better with less money if we had
a consistent and consensual policy that stretched over a number of years. If, instead of the
wildly uctuating curves of military spending over the last twenty-six years, we had main-
tained zero growth for this period, we would have had several billion more dollars avail-
able to defend the country and certainly would have been able to buy more for the monies
expended. Perhaps this may be an impossible goal, although given some of our past national
accomplishments, I have trouble accepting such a conclusion. In any event, the benets
would be so considerable that I believe we should bend every effort to go in that direction.
No military leader in our nation desires war. To keep the peace is the fundamental
mission of the Armed Forces, and the primary measure of their success is the ability
to deter conict. But we must constantly remind our citizens that freedom is not free.
It requires continuous effort, vigilance, and at times, sacrice—the type of sacrice for
which this republic is famous. If our deterrent policy is to continue to work well, we must
match the threats with a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run
instead of one marked by the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of
our peacetime history.
If the US military is to be successful, it needs good people and good hardware. But
above all, it needs the patient and continuing support of all our citizens. Our military is
not a separate and distinct community. It is an integral element of the society it serves,
and in the end, it will only be as good as the American people want it to be.
Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Investigations
Subcommittee on Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986
May 1
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee:
I greatly appreciate your invitation to appear this morning in order to review imple-
mentation of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act and, in particular, Title
IV provisions pertaining to Joint Ofcer Management.
The Joint Staff
Seven months have passed since enactment of the Defense Reorganization Act. During
that time, we have:
• Welcomed a new Vice Chairman who is clearly and effectively performing duties
intended by Congress and approved by the Secretary of Defense;
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• Firmly placed the Joint Staff under the Chairman’s authority, direction, and con-
trol; and
• Fully complied with those provisions of the Act which allow me to select the “most
highly qualied” ofcers for duty on the Joint Staff, choose a representative on
Service promotion boards, and assess the results of such boards.
General Herres and I are very much involved in this process. In fact, it is the type of
challenge which has required our personal participation in the stafng as well as the
decisionmaking. Overall, we are satised that the Joint Staff has good people and that
even better people are being nominated by the Services as incumbents move on to other
assignments. With respect to promotion rates and selection for command, equity and
fairness are qualities we will have to evaluate over the long haul and, if warranted, on a
case-by-case basis. We have already placed into practice the monitoring process.
Joint Personnel Management
Turning to the area of Joint Personnel Management, the 99th Congress recognized that
it was breaking new ground with a limited amount of data and information concerning
how Title IV would actually work. Wisely, the door was left open for a review of the situ-
ation—the main reason we are here today.
First, I know that you are interested in what we are doing to implement Title IV as it
now stands. Following initial guidance by the Congress, DOD has implemented the Act
and is proceeding to formalize it with comprehensive policy directives. One directive,
which will be issued shortly, deals with such issues as: (1) assignment of graduates from
the Armed Forces Staff College and National Defense University; (2) expected joint duty
tour lengths; (3) guidance to promotion boards pertaining to the consideration of ofcers
who are serving in or have served in joint duty assignments; and (4) completion of the
CAPSTONE course by ag and general ofcer selectees.
Additionally, we have looked at the detailed provisions of Title IV and in the process
have:
• Identied some 8,000 to 9,000 joint duty assignments within the Department of
Defense, about one-tenth of which will be in the Joint Staff;
• Considered the congressional mandate that approximately one-half of these
assignments will be lled with a joint specialist or nominee, including 1,000 crit-
ical billets requiring this specialty;
• Examined the long-term impact of other requirements mandated by Congress
such as those related to joint duty tour lengths and professional qualication of
joint specialists; and
• Assessed how the Act would affect the military profession as a whole.
Our analysis and future projections suggest that the community of ofcers with joint
duty experience could be strengthened somewhat by modifying slightly some provisions of
Title IV. Rather than dwell on the entire package, I will focus on areas of primary concern.
Joint Duty Tours
Our rst priority request would shorten joint duty tour lengths from 3½ to 3 years at
the grade of 0-6 or below and 3 years to 2 years for ag and general ofcers. I strongly
support this proposal for two reasons:
• It still provides stability in joint duty assignments while allowing somewhat greater
exibility in the management of ofcer personnel. In particular, I would like
ofcers in the joint community to “return to the eld” as often as practical and
sharpen their technical or warghting skills within or alongside the combatant
forces. I feel very strongly about this side of their qualications and believe this
is an essential part of an effective joint ofcer.
• By shortening joint tours somewhat, this initiative also allows more ofcers to gain
such experience as they progress through the ranks. I believe that this opportu-
nity will benet the Department of Defense as a whole, as intended by framers of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
In a similar vein, I would strongly recommend that you allow us to count less than
two-year tours of joint duty for cumulative credit. For example, this would include of-
cers: (1) assigned to relatively short joint tours in remote or unaccompanied locations;
(2) forced to shorten their tour length for reasons of hardship or circumstances beyond
their control; or (3) reassigned within a normal tour from one joint billet to another, e.g.,
from the Joint Staff to one of the Defense Agencies or headquarters staff of a Unied
Commander or a transfer within the Joint Staff.
Qualification of Joint Specialty Officers
Turning to the qualication of Joint Specialty Ofcers, we agree that, in the main, the
requirement should be joint professional military education followed by a successful
tour of joint duty in that order. We are proceeding to work with the Armed Forces Staff
College and the National Defense University to meet this requirement over the long
term. As you know, I have convened a study panel, headed by General Dougherty,
reviewing the joint educational system and also looking at the “jointness” of Service
schools and colleges.
We are requesting, however, two changes in this area of Title IV:
• One change would allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the sequence of a joint
tour and professional military education. This will permit us to capitalize on of-
cers who have successfully completed a joint duty tour by making their “hands
on” experience available to the faculty and other students attending the Armed
Forces Staff College or National Defense University. This “waiver authority” also
will allow us somewhat more exibility and selectivity when lling at least 1,000
billets requiring the specialty. While I anticipate that this exception would only
be used sparingly, I believe it would permit us to bring into the Joint Specialty
some quality ofcers that we may otherwise miss.
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• More important, I would strongly recommend permitting an alternate qualication
path for the joint specialty in addition to the currently prescribed route of PME
plus one tour of joint duty. We are proposing that successful completion of two
joint tours of duty or, if you prefer, a specic time frame such as ve or six years
could be prescribed, which would allow ofcers to be considered. This proposal
recognizes that the career management of our middle grade ofcers already is
stressed by multiple requirements: refresher training in special combat skills,
operational tours of duty, postgraduate education, various types of command
and staff assignments, and technical expertise demanded by both headquarters
and joint staffs. In the broad sweep, it is not uncommon to nd an ofcer with
two joint tours who is eminently qualied to ll a critical joint billet. I speak with
considerable experience on this subject, not only in terms of my own career pat-
tern but also in observing ofcers who have worked for and with me in the joint
arena. In passing, I should note that these ofcers would still have to be declared
qualied by a review board before receiving the joint specialty designation.
Tracking Promotion Rates
Turning to promotion rates, the law as it now stands mandates equitable promotion rates
for ofcers currently serving or having served on the Joint Staff or those with a Joint
Specialty in comparison with ofcers currently serving on the headquarters staff of their
parent Service. We do not propose to change the “currently serving” aspect of Title IV.
We are concerned about the way prior service is counted and tracked under Title IV.
Essentially, we are recommending that the expectations of Title IV be slightly modied
so as not to inuence an ofcer’s promotion prospects beyond his next in-zone consid-
eration for promotion. For example, an Air Force major who was serving on the Joint
Staff as of 1 October 1986 and subsequently received orders as a major to the Tactical
Air Command would be monitored through his consideration for promotion to lieutenant
colonel in the primary zone. He would not beyond that point be credited for promotion
purposes with previously served joint duty unless he reported for another tour of joint
duty, which would re-energize the process.
I support this proposal for two reasons:
• First, it will not saddle promotion boards with the prospect of unduly having to
consider early career performance in order to meet promotion rates mandated by
Congress. The Chiefs and I strongly believe that performance “in grade” is the
primary indicator of potential for promotion boards to consider, not where the
ofcer was or what he did ten years before the board convened.
• Second, our proposal will encourage repeat joint tours.
Joint Matters in the Headquarters Staffs
The last of our proposals would allow some joint duty positions within the headquarters
staffs—essentially ofcers whose primary duty is to work with and assist the Joint Staff
in preparing papers for the Chiefs and I to address. The vast majority of these papers
require a detailed understanding and integration of Service capabilities. The Joint Staff
cannot do that without substantial, constructive, and forthcoming input from the Ser-
vices. Moreover, even with a strong Joint Staff, we will need people within the Service
staffs who know how to work within the joint system and carry the joint perspective back
to their own staffs. That’s a very important part of the overall process.
Thus, we are proposing that the Chairman be allowed to certify a maximum of 250
billets in the four Armed Forces headquarters as joint duty assignments. That’s less than
5 percent of the 5,170 active duty ofcers Congress has allowed for the headquarters
staff, including those of the Service Secretaries.
Officers with Critical Combat Operations Skills
Even with these requests, we have not solved a number of career management problems
surrounding ofcers with critical combat operations skills. Our Navy nuclear ofcers,
who spend virtually their entire careers at sea or in training, are an excellent example.
Granted, the Secretary of Defense can waive prior joint duty as a requisite for promotion to
ag rank. I am not convinced, however, that this is entirely fair or encouraging to nuclear
submariners or other ofcers who, for one reason or another, are forced to concentrate on
combat operations skills. It tends to place them in double jeopardy—either they won’t be
selected or won’t obtain the waiver required for promotion to ag/general rank. Thus, I
strongly recommend that you query each of the Service Chiefs on his particular problems
and ask if other ofcers should testify on the subject of critical combat operations skills.
Closing Remarks
To sum it up, the Goldwater-Nichols Act is a solid piece of legislation. Even though we
are only seven months into its implementation, we are moving forward not only with the
spirit of reform but also with a host of measures required to put the Act into practice.
Many of these measures, of course, go beyond those dealing with Joint Personnel Man-
agement, including actions by the Joint Staff to support me with net assessments, weave
the Defense agencies into our readiness calculations, and better integrate the operational
plans of our combatant commanders.
By nature, however, Joint Personnel Management has a very high people content.
Thus, we have spent a great deal of time examining this side of the Defense Reorga-
nization Act. In general, we want to nourish and broaden the community of ofcers
with joint experience, achieve as much exibility as possible in meeting Department of
Defense requirements for ofcers with joint duty qualications, establish a challenging
and rewarding career pattern for Joint Specialists, and at the same time ensure that
fairness remains a hallmark of the military promotion system in general. Frankly, it’s a
challenging mandate, even for those of us who work inside of and are familiar with the
personnel management systems of the four Services.
I believe, however, that we have struck the right balance with the proposed alterations
submitted by OSD—a balance which is designed to strengthen the Goldwater-Nichols
Act in principle and practice. In turn, I strongly urge the Subcommittee to consider and
accept these recommendations.
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Excerpts from Remarks to the Armed Services YMCA Luncheon Honoring the
Senior Enlisted Advisors from Each Service
Headquarters, YMCA, Washington, DC | May 11
It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to be here today. I want to say at the outset that it
is particularly gratifying to be a part of the ceremonies today, which are honoring our
Senior Enlisted Advisors and, by extension, all of those who are following through the
ranks and their example.
These people are the strong backbone of all our Services, the Coast Guard included.
Leaders that have risen to the top by making things happen where it counts—on the
ground, on and under the seas, in the skies, all over the globe every day. They are masters
of the many technical skills, but far beyond that, it is their job, rst and foremost, to lead,
to provide cohesion and direction for our people, and to nd that special combination of
man and task needed in all units for smooth and productive operations.
Of course, in the real world, they are caught right in the middle in the leadership
business. Everyone turns to them—and I do mean everyone—up and down the chain
of command. There’s not a senior ofcer in any one of our Services who does not owe a
debt, and probably a very, very large debt, in his career to a noncommissioned ofcer or
a chief petty ofcer who, sometime earlier, broke him in as a young pup, who shared his
wisdom, counseled him to be patient, told him when he was doing it wrong, encouraged
him to hang tough when the world was pressing him, and served as a leadership model
for the young ofcer to follow. That certainly describes my own case. And their inuence
works downward in the ranks to the same effect.
I refer to my own experience in the Navy. For years, I have been intrigued by the rela-
tionship between a good chief petty ofcer and his men—a real combination of technical
skill, browbeating, sympathizing, counseling, and rewarding. He manages to weld them
together in a team, both professionally and personally, and I’ve seen it time and time
again. They will kid him, they will hate him, they will revere him, they will produce for
him, they will swear at him, but above all, they obey him when the time comes—and the
time may come when he asks them to die for him. Men don’t ght for ideals as much as
they do for their comrades and their leaders. And good NCO’s and Petty Ofcers under-
stand that and build on it. And in the end, the business of defense literally depends on
them. To steal a phrase from that great philosopher Reggie Jackson, “They’re the straw
that stirs the drink.”
I might add that it is typical of the Armed Services YMCA to focus on the contribu-
tions of these key people today. What a debt we owe to your organization! The Armed
Services YMCA provides support and help to thousands of young military people
who are serving their country in unfamiliar new environments, and I think it was so
well-illustrated by the short lm we saw. It operates more than fty units of service
throughout its twenty-ve branches. It is afliated with six YMCA associations. The
network reaches throughout the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, the Republic
of Panama, and the United Kingdom.
The YMCA continues to provide some of the same types of services that began
during the Civil War 126 years ago. But it has now extended its reach to the total mil-
itary family, married and single, and their needs. The YMCA also is an important link
between the military and civilian communities, to the young military families assigned
to cities and states, and helping military commands enhance the quality of life for
these special citizens. There’s a widespread recognition, at all levels, that healthy fam-
ilies contribute substantially to mission readiness and retention and that wholesome
lifestyles benet not only the individuals of the armed services but the entire defense
establishment as well.
The Armed Services YMCA is the civilian arm that helps promote this kind of lifestyle
that helps enhance our defense establishment in such a meaningful way. I know of no
better example of the civilian-military bond and the fact that our society does appreciate
what Service people do.
I spend a lot of time, in my time in Washington and around the country, working
to keep that civil-military connection healthy in all its dimensions. It requires mutual
understanding and communications at many levels, and that’s a tall order. But I believe
strongly in the merits of a lively civil-military dialogue. Americans need to have the best
possible information about our security posture and our Service needs, especially in a
time when there is great debate about the share of national resources that should be
devoted to defense. This is, by the way, a burden we can all take up with great benet,
and that includes many people in this audience. Not all citizens are as conscious of the
need for a strong military as you are. And don’t forget that, in large part, our ability to
fashion an effective defense posture will rest, just as it always has, on our success in
communicating with our public, our success in communicating our needs, our perspec-
tives, our concerns, and information about the threat.
I don’t think we have those difcult of problems in the defense dialogue, but it is true
that it has been too easy for some Americans, preoccupied with their interests at home, to
overlook the more troubling facts of international life. Among those, of course, is Moscow’s
massive military buildup, the Kremlin’s proclivity to use raw power when the calculus
favors it—as in Afghanistan, and in Russian support for the efforts of kindred regimes
to spread any antidemocratic revolutions and to oppose the free world wherever it is vul-
nerable. Of course, the Third World strife and dissidence racks our newspapers today.
In part, the American tendency to ignore those realities and to overlook the contri-
butions of our Armed Forces in keeping mischief makers at a distance stems from a
habit of thought that sharply distinguishes between peace and war. In times that look
peaceful to many citizens, it is hard for them to feel any military or immediate threat
justifying military strength. But the reality of the matter is this: Americans can absorb
themselves so completely and productively in their civilian pursuits precisely because of
the strength that undergirds all of our foreign policies and keeps the free conditions for
peace and progress rmly in place. Many in this room are intimately familiar with those
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contributions, and have had the privilege of leading the ne people who man our distant
battlements, who patrol freedom’s frontiers, and who work long days to hold themselves
at the ready, in ports, bases, and ships around the world.
In fact, as I look back over a forty-year career, I can say without hesitation that the
greatest reward of a Service career—a professional Service career—has been the oppor-
tunity to associate day in and day out with young American men and women in our
Armed Forces. I have watched them in stress and in boredom, in peace and war, and in
good times and in bad. I’ve seen them unfailingly give 110 percent to every test, often far
from home and without the amenities that other professions might have brought them.
There is no nobler calling and there are no ner people. They are in my thoughts daily
as I make the rounds explaining what they do and what they need.
Here are just a few of the images from my own experience that press forward in
my mind, and I apologize because they are personal and perhaps not as broad as you
would prefer. I vividly remember Chief Gunner’s Mate Wood. I was an Ensign on my
rst ship, a destroyer-minesweeper. For reasons that I never quite fathomed, I was
assigned as Gunnery Ofcer. I had never even seen a ve-inch gun re. The Chief said:
“Don’t worry Boss. Just walk around like you know what’s going on and I’ll make sure
that everything works right.” He was true to his word. He was the rst of a long line of
people who steered me, and others like me, past the treacherous shoals of inexperience
or uncerta inty.
There was my Naval Academy classmate who had a Wingman shot down behind
enemy lines in Korea. He landed his plane in an adjacent eld and attempted to save his
friend. When he pulled him from the cockpit, the Wingman was already dead. Lieutenant
Tom Hudner received the Congressional Medal of Honor.
There was the time I was serving on a submarine that had lost propulsion and unwit-
tingly descended below test depth. A calm and cool First Class Electrician by the name of
Martinez from Brownsville, Texas—that’s when this Oklahoman began to like Texans—on
his own initiative, hastily completed a jury-rig to get power back. His skill saved the ship.
Once, in Vietnam, I was a passenger in a helicopter which suffered a major casualty.
The young pilot of twenty-three, Lieutenant Spence Roberts—I can still see his face—
managed to keep control against great odds, in order to auto-rotate the chopper into a
rice paddy just as if he was going to the bank.
I will never forget watching four sailors and two Marines rush into burning huts in
Vietnam in order to save eight small children. They spent the next three hours ghting
to keep them alive until medical help arrived.
A few years ago, I had the privilege of attending a British Mess Night. The Colonel of
the Regiment presided over the affair, and after the dinner he was showing us around
the Mess and some of the war trophies that they had acquired over the years. There was
a ag that was obviously of American origin and he said, “This was a ag that we took
at the Battle of Breed’s Hill, which you know as Bunker Hill.” He said, “As you can see,
we’ve still got the ag.” Whereupon a young Marine captain that was in our party, without
hesitation said, “Colonel, we’ve still got the hill.”
I watched a young Navy wife face the press three days after she had lost her hus-
band at sea. She announced that she would be proud to have her six-month-old son
choose the Navy as a career. And I have a vivid recollection of watching on TV as Cap-
tain and future Senator Jerry Denton, after eight years of prison in North Vietnam,
exited from a plane from the Philippines and announced to the world that he was
proud to make such a sacrice if it would help his country. He ended by declaring,
“God bless America.”
Now, those are memories! Today, as I make my rounds, I think of young soldiers
crouching in the freezing night air along the DMZ in Korea, and also patrolling on
the West German border for an attack that we hope will never come. I think of the
sailors of the Seventh Fleet criss-crossing an area totalling fty million square miles
from the Bering Sea to the Indian Ocean, twenty-four hours a day. I think of young
Marines guarding our embassies around the world at a time when the threat of ter-
rorism is omnipresent and the highest it has ever been. Regardless of what current
news stories may suggest, the security of these solitary outposts could not be in more
capable hands.
I think of those F-111 crews and pilots who, a year ago, ying at the speed of sound
in darkness only a few hundred feet above the surface, attacked Libyan targets with
seless courage through intense anti-aircraft re. They demonstrated graphically that
this nation will resist terrorism and not sit back passively while an outlaw government
attacks and slaughters innocent Americans around the world.
I think, too, of the American men and women of the Coast Guard, whose vigilance at
sea and in the skies protects our borders and keeps the daily lives of Americans safer.
Unseen by most of our citizens that shield against adversity and close-to-home danger
plays a key part in this nation’s day to day security.
Now, these stories are typical of the people who have felt the Nation’s deepest agonies
and have helped us achieve and secure its triumphs. They are the ones to whom every
leader, military or civilian, and every American citizen owes a deep debt of gratitude.
Here in Washington, we’re great fans of the Redskins, and I confess a personal fond-
ness for the Oklahoma Sooners—that’ a football team, you know. But I would submit
that the really number one team in the country, in this nation, is the one represented
by the honorees at this dais today—the true guardians of freedom and tranquility.
Ceremonies such as this and organizations such as the Armed Forces YMCA provide
great, great comfort to us in many ways, and in times that can be especially trying.
I speak on behalf of all the Armed Services when I say to you that we are truly grate-
ful for your support. You can rest assured that we will carry back to our comrades the
message that the civil-military partnership this nation depends on so critically is alive
and well, even inside the Washington beltway.
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Remarks at the Activation of US Special Operations Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida | June 1
It is a great day, I assure you, for me to join with Deputy Secretary Taft in this ceremony,
to activate the newest addition to our family of Unied and Specied Commands, the US
Special Operations Command.
As we do so today, we in the military mark occasions such as this with a great deal of
justiable pride. But that feeling runs especially strong today, for the Command we inau-
gurate embraces people widely recognized as the most accomplished our Armed Services
have to offer and forces whose capabilities are key to this nation’s ability to navigate through
an uncertain future. In a larger sense, however, the activation of this command represents
a great deal more than the aggregation of talented people and forces. It provides another
signal to friends and potential adversaries of America’s intent to stand tall against the full
spectrum of military challenges we face. And it demonstrates our resolve to guard and
defend the peace and progress in a world that is not universally hospitable to those purposes.
As a former Commander in Chief of US forces in the Pacic, I can attest to the impor-
tance of such capabilities to leaders who will have to ght the battle if war should ever
come. And I can also testify to their value, in times of ostensible peace, as a key element
of the nation’s deterrent posture and a vital instrument of US policy and presence in
endangered or vulnerable regions of the world. It has become increasingly clear that these
specially tailored forces deserve increased attention and effort.
I do not have to tell the majority of those assembled here that the military challenges
this nation confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude
and diversity. Over the last thirty years, every one of my predecessors has expressed
concern about the evolving Soviet worldwide threat and the state of the overall military
balance. Today, this phenomenon has an especially troubling dimension: the Kremlin’s
increasing tendency to act through surrogates. Moscow continues to be successful in hav-
ing its clients act against Western governments and peoples and in using them to exploit
localized tensions and strife in key regions around the world. The result is a burgeoning
terrorist threat, spreading and erce regional conicts, and an increasing willingness of
small anti-American regimes to challenge us and our friends.
Admiral Jim Watkins, the former CNO, characterized the world we face as “violent
peace.” Any newspaper, on any day of the year, attests to the accuracy of that observation.
In that environment, the demands placed on our military forces have continued to grow,
especially in the realm of ambiguous, twilight challenges short of general war.
As we move toward the close of this century and the opening of a new one, there will
be no slackening of that trend. For those of us in the Armed Forces, this means all our
capabilities must be ready to respond to the President’s call, and to our people’s needs.
We will look to our new Special Forces Command for employment in the full range
of operational contingencies. The result will be a critical augmentation of the military
strength that supports this country’s foreign and national security policies. Though this
headquarters may be located within the United States, in a real sense it will always be
a front-line command, one whose efforts will enable Washington to go forward with the
condence betting the leader of the free world. America’s far-ung interests, and the
aspirations of millions of hopeful people around the world, will be safer because of the
capabilities developed and honed under the aegis of General Lindsay and his successors
I have known and worked with General Lindsay for some time: in fact, I was the
culprit who presided at his last promotion. For nearly thirty-ve years, he has been an
exemplary soldier: a devoted infantryman who has led our readiest and most capable
ghting units from platoon to Corps. He excelled in the most demanding staff positions,
and most recently headed the Readiness Command with great distinction. In war and
peace, he has always stayed close to the heart of our military: the troops. The soldiers,
sailors, and airmen assigned to this new organization could have no ner commander. It
is with great condence and pride that I participate in these public ceremonies formally
charging him with his responsibilities as the rst Commander in Chief of the United
States Special Operations Command.
Building this command will require a great team effort and the dedication and perse-
verance of a host of talented people here and in subordinate elements around the world. It
won’t be easy: our critics will be vigilant, and our citizens’ expectations are justiably high.
The great and honored traditions of the units composing the Special Operations Command
will provide solid foundation and sustenance for the effort—so will the support of leaders
in Washington. But also needed—indispensably—will be leadership on the ground—lead-
ership that provides the vision and energy to oversee and direct integrated coordinated
activities and to make the whole truly Joint and larger than its parts. We are fortunate
indeed to be able to entrust this endeavor at its beginning to a man of Jim Lindsay’s caliber.
In that spirit, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I congratulate General Lindsay on
his assumption of these key duties and extend our very best wishes to him, to his family,
and to the entire Special Operations Command, as you move forward in the months and
years ahead.
Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Persian Gulf
June 5
Editor’s Note: On May 17, 1987, the USS Stark deployed in the Persian Gulf and was
engaged by two Exocet missiles red from an Iraqi Mirage ghter with the loss of 37
crewmen, 2 of whom were lost at sea. These losses brought into focus the Administration’s
decision to accept the Kuwait request to “re-ag” Kuwaiti commercial shipping and to
provide protection in the Gulf.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome your interest in recent events in the Persian Gulf and, in turn, this opportunity
to discuss our future actions in this crucial region.
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US Interests
One prefatory comment is in order: the strategic, economic, and political interests which
intersect in the Gulf not only make it an area of great importance but also pose very
complex policy problems for all involved parties. In dealing with this part of the world,
there are no simple or perfect answers. This is particularly true of the United States.
As a superpower and the leader of the Free World, we must reconcile our past policies
with our wider global responsibilities. Against this backdrop, I defy anyone to construct
a simple policy for the region or one which will put us on the right side of every issue
under all circumstances.
I believe that there is some consensus as to our fundamental goals in the Persian Gulf:
• We have a vital stake in seeing that the region’s supply of oil to the Free World
remains unimpeded.
• In turn, we have major political interests in the non-belligerent Gulf states, both
in their own right and because of their inuence within the Gulf and beyond.
Washington’s relationship with this group of nations affects the economic health
of the entire Free World.
• In a similar vein, we have a vested stake in peace and stability in this volatile
region, as we do in other troubled areas. Clearly, we have not succeeded in pre-
venting hostilities, but we must persevere with our efforts to prevent the Iran-Iraq
War from spreading and hopefully to bring that conict to an early close.
• Throughout, the strategic importance of the region and the foregoing interests
compel us to attempt to deny the Soviet Union either direct control or increased
inuence over the Gulf and its littoral.
US Historical Involvement
As you are aware, the great powers have been colliding with each other in the Gulf region
for centuries. So, today’s difculties are not unprecedented. Our military involvement
began when the Middle East Force was established in 1949 to demonstrate American
interest. With the British departure in 1972, the Middle East Force, as the only remain-
ing Western military presence, took on a new signicance. I won’t dwell on the details.
You are familiar with the increasing role oil has played in our lives and the traumatic
supply disruptions of 1973-1974 and 1978-1980 caused by OPEC [Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries]. To say the least, all of America suddenly became aware of
the importance of the Persian Gulf. Today, there are uncountable numbers of American
commercial concerns operating in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Kuwait,
Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. We estimate there are some 34,000 American residents
and dependents living in the region. Militarily, we have assisted all of these countries to
one degree or another in building defense establishments. For instance, at this moment
there are 500 American airmen in Riyadh and Dhahran assisting the Saudi Arabian
government to create an AWACs capability. All told, we have over 2,000 Service personnel
detailed to Gulf countries.
The 1979 revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan merely reinforced
an American sense that the Persian Gulf was too important to be ignored. In response
to these events—and with encouragement from our friends—the US government decided
to deploy a carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean at frequent intervals. We are still
there. With the beginning of the war between Iraq and Iran, the Middle East Force was
expanded. We have some eight ships assigned to that force today. While we have no formal
treaty commitment with any nation in the area, we clearly have established long-term
important relationships with a number of countries that have worked to the benet of all
concerned. Moreover, I am convinced that our military presence over the long term and
recently during the Iran-Iraq War has had a moderating inuence, worked for stability
in the region, and helped limit the spread of conict.
The road, of course, has not always been smooth. For example, events in Lebanon
and Syria, Congressional actions on proposed US arms sales, and recent developments
regarding Iran have given some of our friends cause to doubt our consistency. Many in
the region take exception to our close ties with Israel. Nevertheless, anyone who has lived
in the area, as I have stated, is constantly impressed by how many Arab friends we have
and how resilient our ties with the Arab world are. That is not to say that we don’t have
to nourish those relationships—we do. It is to say that we have a lot going for us if we
are willing to stand by our friends.
Given the recent media attention devoted to the Gulf, I believe a quick word about the
maritime environment is appropriate. Since 1984, both belligerents—Iran and Iraq—have
mounted random or selective attacks on shipping at sea. But we must keep this picture
in perspective. Right now, on any given day there are around 400 ocean-going ships in
the Gulf. Of some 26,000 voyages that have been made in that small sea since 1984,
less than 1 percent have been involved in attacks and no large merchantmen have been
sunk—damage and lost lives, yes, but not sunk. Similarly, there are always underway
a mix of warships: from littoral navies, British frigates, French men-of-war, and Soviet
navy escorts, in addition to our own. It is also important to note that for some months
now Middle East Force has been escorting US ag ships sailing in the western Gulf—this
trafc runs four to ten ships per month. With the exception of the USS Stark, none of the
non-belligerent naval units has been hit. Commercial air trafc, with some slight route
changes, has continued to all the littoral countries.
The Gulf today is an uncertain place and can be dangerous, but it is not a war zone
in the accepted use of the words. Air and sea trafc continues apace. There is even some
seaborne intercourse between Iran and the UAE and Oman; drilling rigs are operating
normally and Iranian oil exports are running at the rate of about 2.2 million barrels per
day. Commercial insurance rates, after a sharp initial increase, have receded and today,
while higher than normal, are in no sense prohibitive. The Gulf is not a no man’s land;
in fact, it is still a thriving and bustling commercial crossroad.
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USS Stark Tragedy
The recent attack on the USS Stark graphically illustrated that the Gulf can, on occa-
sion, be threatening. Most important, the Stark tragedy has raised American sensitiv-
ities as to our involvement in the Middle East and prompted many to call for a reex-
amination of our presence—in some cases to suggest a withdrawal of our ships. I am
persuaded, however, that the Iraqi pilot did not realize he was threatening an American
ship—in other words, that it was an accident. In my view, the ship had the weapons
systems and sensors to put up a credible defense, but why they were not brought into
play is a proper subject for a formal investigation. As you know, such an investigation
is now in train.
As to the larger questions, I believe it is important to keep in mind the everyday
environment in the Gulf and not to be stampeded by overly dramatic accounts. The
Stark incident has brought home in a painful way that we must remain constantly alert,
and we are now working out with Baghdad some procedures to avoid a recurrence of an
accidental attack. The Iranians have the same capabilities they did a month ago, and the
inhibiting pressures on their policies and resources remain. Since the Stark attack, we
have not as yet seen any change in Iranian conduct at sea—in fact, they appear to be even
more cautious than previously. While this situation could change quickly, I would suggest
that we base our judgments and actions on tangible evidence rather than conjecture.
As to the suggestion that the United States should withdraw from the Gulf, I not
only believe that it would be a grave mistake to do so, but that rst we should answer the
question of what would happen should we leave. How would our retreat affect the course
of the Iran-Iraq struggle? There is a high probability that our absence would lead to Iran
realizing its goal of regional dominance. While that conclusion may be debatable, there
is little doubt in my mind that a US departure would thrust our Arab relations into deep,
and perhaps irreparable, disarray.
Future
Looking ahead, the Administration, after reviewing the history and political imperatives
in the region, has made a decision to respond positively to the Kuwaiti request to reag
its tankers and to accept responsibility for escorting those ships through the Gulf. The
JCS believe that we can carry out this mission. Of course, there are no absolute guar-
antees that such an operation will be casualty free or that Iran will not escalate the sea
war, which will present us with further difcult choices. On the other hand, we have the
capability to keep the oil line to Kuwait open, to assure our Arab friends of our commit-
ment, and to keep the risks low.
I am sure you are interested in some of our detailed views on the threat and our abil-
ity to carry out this mission, as well as how we would deal with Iranian counter actions.
However, Mr. Chairman, I believe these are more properly subjects for a closed hearing.
That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonies, US SOUTHCOM
Quarry Heights, Panama | June 6
It is a privilege to participate in this ceremony and to bear witness to the transition at
the helm of this rst-rate command and in honoring both the departing and arriving
Commanders. I admit at the outset, of course, that I eagerly take any opportunity I can
to travel outside the Washington beltway. There is folk wisdom that it is a dog eat dog
world there, and I wear Milk Bone Dog biscuit underwear.
But my personal burdens aside, it is a special pleasure to be here to preside today.
It is gratifying, rst of all, to speak directly to the men and women of USSOUTHCOM
and to bring to them personally the message that leaders in our nation’s capital greatly
appreciate their daily contributions to peace and development in this hemisphere.
I have served many years out on the battlements around the globe. I know all too well
that, for people in the eld, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied with
its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. Let me assure you, however, that your
efforts here, serving the best interests of the United States and its friends, are universally
admired as indispensable to the peace and the growth of democracy and the economies
in this key region.
I spend a good deal of time back home talking about the role of America’s Armed
Forces in the world we face. Simply put, it is that our military strength operates every day
to shield the accomplishments and aspirations of our citizens—and those of millions of
hopeful people around the globe. From every point all over the world, the Nation’s forces
work unceasingly day and night to assure the Free World’s vitality and safety.
The service of the people in this command, alongside the forces of neighboring coun-
tries, is a ne example of what I’m talking about. It is a very special challenge: not really
war in the way our citizens understand it, and not really peace, either. Nonetheless, this is
an engagement that the leaders of the Free World must take up vigorously and the family
of nations in this hemisphere join us to assure democracy now for our next generation
or pay a higher price in the future.
Some years ago, it was fashionable for critics to say that the United States employed
its forces in a way that placed us on the wrong side of history. But in this region that
assertion has been proved false, and it is clear that the wave of the future here is democ-
racy, the cause you serve, not despotic alternatives.
You and our friends in the region have much to be proud of. The job isn’t nished, of
course. Moreover, given the nature of the challenge, we are engaged in a contest that is
a marathon, not a sprint. But you have set a strong pace and have shown that persistent
hard work can bring success.
Here, as elsewhere, there is no substitute for enlightened leadership. And the second
reason why this ceremony is such a pleasurable event is that, as we say goodbye to a
leader of Jack Galvin’s caliber, we welcome another commander of equal talent—Fred
Woerner—who will step up to take his place.
In the three decades prior to his taking charge of USSOUTHCOM, General Jack
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Galvin’s career was marked by distinction in an array of jobs: Infantry command at all
levels from platoon to Corps, combat leadership in Vietnam, and key positions in other
headquarters around the globe. He also became an articulate writer about the history of
his profession. In the book entitled The Minutemen, he examined the military institutions
of colonial America, the people and forces that rst defended our freedom and won our
independence. His work at USSOUTHCOM has advanced that grand tradition appre-
ciably against challenges our forefathers could not have anticipated. I am sure that the
Minutemen of Massachusetts would be as proud as we. On behalf of the President and
the Secretary of Defense, I am very pleased to congratulate him on his achievements and
to wish him well in the future assignment as CINCEUCOM. Also, I personally thank his
lovely wife. She has been his partner serving alongside with a warm heart, enthusiasm,
prowess and good humor.
You leave big shoes for General Fred Woerner to ll. But I can think of no one better
suited to the task. General Woerner, you take these responsibilities with our fondest
wishes. From the parade grounds and soccer elds of West Point, to the battlegrounds
of Vietnam, to the treacherous terrain of the Pentagon, this Infantryman has succeeded
at everything he tried. Along the way, he accumulated impressive credentials in this
region: study at the Uruguayan General Staff College, civic action duty in Guatemala, and
command of the 193rd Infantry Brigade at Fort Clayton, Panama. He is an accomplished
warrior who also knows the challenges of troubled peace. The men and women of the US
Southern Command are getting a very ne and multidimensional leader.
Alongside this outstanding commander will be his wife, Gennie. The Woerner team
has enjoyed great success over the years. As an old (but not too old) eld commander
myself, I truly envy the opportunity that lies ahead of you. I urge you especially to take
the time to smell the roses far from the Washington agpole.
When we depart these proceedings today, there are three reasons why we ought to feel
good about our nation and about its prospects. The rst is that the change of command
we are witnessing demonstrates not change of direction or resolve, but reafrmation
and rededication. It displays, for all to see, the continuity of talented leadership that has
become, thankfully, characteristic in America’s Armed Forces.
The second reason for optimism and condence is the evident strength and cohesion
of this command, and ultimately the capabilities and commitment of its people.
And a third is the progress friendly nations have made behind the shield of strength
you have helped to raise.
As these are reasons for justiable pride, they are also signals to friends and enemies
alike that America’s position as defender of the Free World’s hopes remains strong and
determined. In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, I wish General Galvin, General Woerner, their families, and all the people of this
ne Command fair winds and following seas in the days ahead.
Remarks at the Navy Memorial Foundation Dinner
Washington, DC | June 23
I have to tell you at the outset that I’m not used to being treated so well by a Senator—or,
for that matter, by a Chief Petty Ofcer. This is an intimidating experience for me. When
I was invited, they didn’t tell me the full details of the program tonight. I’ve been in the
Navy forty-ve years, and I’m sort of embarrassed I’ve never been in a movie. I was even
turned down for the television program Real People. They said I didn’t qualify.
That doesn’t mean that I haven’t been in some dramatic productions. I’m doing that
every day. Today, I just had a discussion with the Senate. Senator [John] Warner and
I attended together, and I felt as I came off the Hill like the man I saw in the television
program Cheers the other night. Someone said, “How’s it going, Norm?” He said, “It’s a
dog-eat-dog world out there, and I’m wearing Milk Bone underwear.” I’m beginning to
appreciate every day the reason for Harry Truman’s observation—if you want a loyal
friend in Washington, you’d better go buy a dog.
I really do have something serious to say here. I think the cause that really draws us
all together, which was highlighted by the lm that you just saw, has infused this event
with a spirit, a unique spirit, a spirit that’s a little different than the one I experience
in Congress occasionally. It’s a transcendent feeling of solidarity, and I’m sure that you
would agree with me, it is pure and simple—the spirit that pervades us tonight—a deep
affection and appreciation for the Naval service. That’s what we’re all about here.
I believe the Navy men and women have a great deal to be proud of and, in turn, that
our country should share this pride. In essence, for two centuries American sailors have
labored, served, fought, and died so that others might have a better life and freedom and
peace; and in the process, they have created the world’s most respected Navy.
Certainly, tonight’s tribute, and this Memorial, coming literally from the heart of
America, will serve to remind future generations of the magnicent history and traditions
forged in both peace and war by the US Navy—Traditions of achievement, of gallantry,
of service, of sacrice and above all, of victory. Using the past, I would suggest that this
Memorial will prod the future to excel and further tighten the bond between our Navy
and our citizenry. It is something special indeed.
As I look over the Memorial’s design, my eye has been drawn unfailingly to the gure
of the “Lone Sailor.” In more than forty years of service, I have acquired a host of memo-
ries—some good, some bad—of missions, grand events, ships, duty stations, and exotic
sights. But the dominant image in my mind is always of shipmates and friends sharing
the joys, the rigors and the perils of a lifetime in the Service. And I believe that the “Lone
Sailor” represents all of my comrades over the years.
If you will forgive me for just a moment, I’m going to tick off some of my nostalgic
memories, since I have a captive audience. I will always remember Chief Gunners Mate
Wood. I think all of us have a Chief Petty Ofcer in our past that we worship and have
ne memories of. I was an Ensign, and as a result of some things I didn’t understand,
I’d been made the Gunnery Ofcer of a destroyer. I’d never even seen a 5-inch gun re.
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The Chief said, “Don’t worry, Boss. Just walk around like you know what you’re doing,
and I’ll take care of the rest.” He was true to his word.
I remember serving on a submarine that lost propulsion and was descending out of
control below test depth. A calm and cool First Class Electrician by the name of Marti-
nez from Brownsville, Texas, on his own initiative, hastily completed a jury-rig to restore
power. His skill saved the ship.
I remember many Navy wives whose husbands were deployed from eight to nine month
stretches—sometimes back to back. I saw them manage families without complaint,
support the Navy vigorously, and welcome their husbands home with a smile.
I remember having the mid-watch on a submarine one night when I asked the lookout,
“What would you do if a man fell overboard?” And he said, “I’d holler, ‘Man overboard,
starboard side.’” I said, “What would you do if an ofcer fell overboard?” There was a long
silence, and he said, “Which one?” That would have been funny if he had been kidding.
I remember being a passenger in a helo in Vietnam that suffered a major casualty.
The young pilot of twenty-one managed to keep control under great odds and auto-rotate
into a rice paddy just as if he was going to the bank. His name was Spence Robbins.
I remember watching a submarine wife, who had just lost her husband at sea, face
the press. She told them that—this was two days after he was lost—she would be proud
to have her newborn son serve in the Navy.
I remember four sailors and two Marines who rushed into a collection of burning
huts in Vietnam in order to save eight children; they spent the next three hours ghting
to keep those small children alive until medical help arrived.
I remember right after we were married, my wife saw the magazine All Hands on the
coffee table. She asked me what it was and I said, “Well, it’s a Navy magazine. It tells you
about affairs and events in the Navy.” She thought a moment and said, “All Hands, that’s
a good name for a sailors’ magazine.” You have to think about that a little.
I have a particularly vivid memory of watching television as Captain Jerry Denton,
who was a Naval Academy classmate of mine and later a senator, exited an airplane in
the Philippines after eight years in prison in North Vietnam. He announced to the world
that he was proud to make such a sacrice if it would help his country. He ended by
declaring, “God bless America.”
I don’t know how the Navy attracts such people, but it does, and our world is better
because of it. It’s those kinds of men and women who make the Navy an exciting, stim-
ulating, worthwhile career and way of life. As I speak tonight, Navy men and women are
carrying on the proud traditions that we cherish all over the globe: living out the drama
depicted just a few moments ago in these lms, making new memories for a rising gen-
eration of sailors.
In Asia, the Seventh Fleet patrols an endless stretch of water, totaling fty million
square miles, from the Bering Sea to the Straits of Malacca and to the Indian Ocean.
The Atlantic Fleet similarly guards an area from the Arctic ice cap to the Cape of Good
Hope. As they stand watch, three erce wars are raging over the horizon, and the Soviet
Fleet is always nearby.
In the Mediterranean, on the vital southern ank of Europe and never very far from
the turbulence and terrorism of the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet displays American
commitment and strength for all to see. And last year it graphically demonstrated to
Muammar Gadda that the American government would not stand by while its citizens
and innocent people were murdered around the world.
Buttressing these efforts are submarines on patrol, land-based air prowling ahead
of the eet, dozens of ships making independent transits, holding training, conducting
search and rescue or drug interdiction—all the tasks that fall to the professional sailor
at sea. And there are as well the vital activities ashore concerning logistics and training,
without which no operations could take place.
These are the images represented in the “Lone Sailor”—that captivating symbol of
the heart of the Naval Service and the Navy way of life. For him, and all who wear his
uniform, I congratulate those who have brought this magnicent project so close to
fruition, and I thank you for remembering how it is in the Navy, how it was in the Navy,
and how it always will be.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony at Headquarters, US European
Command
Stuttgart, Germany | June 24
It is a privilege for me to represent Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in this ceremony transferring the helm of European Command and honoring the
departing and arriving commanders.
I admit at the outset, of course, that I enjoy all my trips away from Washington. Our
nation’s capital can be a really tough town at times. So I always welcome the opportunity
to travel to more civilized surroundings.
However, this occasion is truly a special one. For today we have the opportunity, on
the one hand, to honor General Bernard Rogers, America’s senior soldier, one of the free
world’s most accomplished leaders, and a man who has signicantly advanced Ameri-
can and allied security interests in his time as SACEUR and commander of US Forces
in Europe.
On the other hand, we mark the beginning of General Jack Galvin’s tenure in this
critical post, as he returns to Europe from another theater in which he has commanded
with great distinction and grappled with some of the most difcult and thorny challenges
that face free societies today.
It is also gratifying for me to be able to speak directly to the men and women of the
European Command and to tell them how much their leaders in Washington—and the
citizens of our country—value their work. I know from my own experiences that this is
true but also that sometimes people like yourselves, out where the real work is done, can
feel a bit neglected, while Washington seems absorbed in all sorts of other concerns, and
while our fellow citizens lose themselves fully in the activities that your efforts protect.
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Let me assure you, however, that your contributions are warmly admired and regarded
as indispensable to the keeping of the peace. In my travels around the United States, I
nd our citizens more supportive of the military than I can remember in years, thanks
in large part to the prominence of your ne example and that of your Commanding
General. For myself I might add, your faithful service has been a never-ending source
of inspiration and strength as I have gone about my duties as Chairman. I draw upon
those wellsprings of spiritual sustenance literally every day.
Another source of support and comfort has been the knowledge that here, at the
center of the Free World’s defense posture, we have had the nest of leaders in General
Bernie Rogers. I don’t propose to recite all of General Rogers’ accomplishments; you know
them well. Sufce it to say that under his leadership NATO’s military structure has been
made stronger, collective defense needs and interests have never lacked a forceful and
persuasive advocate, and our troops deployed here are more ready for their missions in
this great coalition for peace than they ever have been. Secretary Weinberger and three
JCS Chairmen have all benetted immensely from General Rogers’ straightforward advice
and sage counsel.
Speaking for Secretary Weinberger as well as for myself, I am pleased to congrat-
ulate him on his many achievements, a lifetime of service, and to thank him for a job
well done—wishing him and his wife every blessing from our nation, as bets a soldier’s
fa mily.
The Rogers team will be hard to replace. But if anyone can do it, Jack and Tinny
Galvin can. This command is losing a multidimensional leader in General Rogers, yet
it is certainly gaining another in General Galvin. (In fact, if you look at things from a
certain angle, you’d almost think General Galvin’s middle name had to be Rogers. But
then, his middle name is Rogers.) His skills as a commander were tempered in combat
and later proven on the far-ung battlements of a troubled peace. He has seen all faces of
the threat that we face as a nation. He has had key staff posts shaping the Army’s future
and also helping to lead the Joint and combined defense effort here in Europe. A noted
student and scholar of the American military, he has also worked side-by-side with the
forces of other nations to preserve the peace against determined aggressors.
We are indeed fortunate to have gifted leadership like his in the European Command.
It is a great responsibility but Jack Galvin’s shoulders are broad. And there is no doubt
that the other half of the Galvin partnership will help immeasurably to carry the load—
while retaining that famous good humor that has become her distinctive trademark.
When we depart these proceedings today, there are three reasons why we ought to
feel good about our nation and about its prospects.
• The rst is that the change of command we are witnessing demonstrates no
change of direction or resolve, but reafrmation and rededication. The cause
which has joined our effort so successfully with that of European friends energizes
us now as it did decades ago.
• The second reason for optimism and condence is the evident strength of the
traditions from which these two men have emerged. This ceremony displays for
all to see the continuity in talented leadership that has become, thankfully, char-
acteristic in America’s Armed Forces.
• And the third is the self-evident strength and cohesion of this command, and the
capabilities and commitment of its people.
As these are reasons for justiable pride, they are also signals to friends and enemies
alike that America’s position as leader of the free world’s defenses remains strong and
determined.
In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, I wish Gen-
eral Rogers, General Galvin, their families, and all the people of this ne Command fair
winds and following seas in the days ahead.
Remarks at the Activation of US Forces Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia | June 29
It is a genuine privilege to participate in this ceremony welcoming Forces Command to
our family of Unied and Specied Commands.
I admit at the outset, of course, that I eagerly take any opportunity I can to travel
outside the Washington beltway. An old Navy saying has it that any duty outside Wash-
ington is good duty, and I take it that no one here would disagree.
With that folk wisdom, I must put my personal burdens aside, because it is a special
pleasure to be here today, and for several reasons. It is gratifying, rst of all, to visit a
community having such venerable and strong ties between civilians and the military. The
presence here of prominent citizens from the area attests to the vitality of that important
bond today. I have often remarked that this nation’s military strength depends ultimately
on broad roots of support among the public. We in the Armed Forces can only be as good
as our citizens want us to be.
As we inaugurate this important new Forces Command, it is comforting indeed for
me, immersed as I am in the Washington swirl, to be reminded once again that the civ-
il-military tie that has built and protected this nation for two centuries and more is still
alive and well-tended in Atlanta.
The second reason why this visit is a welcome event for me is the opportunity to speak
directly to the men and women of this command, and to bring to them personally the
message that leaders in our nation’s capital greatly appreciate their daily contributions.
I have served many years out on the battlements around the globe. I know all too
well that, for people in the eld, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied
with its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. Let me assure you, however, that
your efforts here have been universally admired, and your designation as a new Specied
Command reects the trust and condence the Nation’s leaders have in the people who
have made this organization go. I know the history that you and your predecessors have
forged will prove genuinely sustaining in the days ahead.
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I do not have to tell those assembled here that the military challenges this nation
confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude and diver-
sity. Over the last thirty years, every one of my predecessors has expressed concern
about the evolving Soviet worldwide threat and the state of the overall military balance.
Admiral Jim Watkins, the former CNO, used to say we live in a time of “violent peace.”
Any newspaper, on any day of the year, attests to the accuracy of that observation. In
that environment, the demands placed on our military forces have continued to grow,
especially in the realm of joint operations. As we move toward the close of this century
and the opening of a new one, that trend is certainly going to gain momentum, and the
new roles assumed by this command will only grow in importance.
To set the effort off on the right foot, we are indeed fortunate to be able to call on a
commander of General Joe Palastra’s caliber. He has led Infantrymen in combat with
great distinction and has commanded our readiest forces in peacetime. His broad-gauged
capacities have been proven in an array of key positions in Washington (even in the State
Department) and in eld headquarters—and particularly in the joint arena. No one could
be better qualied to take on this new challenge than General Joe Palastra.
It is with great pride that I participate in these ceremonies formally charging him
with his responsibilities as the rst Commander in Chief of Forces Command. In that
spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and my comrades in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, I extend our very best wishes to him, his family, and all the men and women of
this command as you move forward in your new and important roles.
Statement on his Nomination for an additional two-year term before the Senate
Armed Services Committee
September 29
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am honored that President Reagan has asked me to serve a second term as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The responsibilities of this ofce are very demanding for any incumbent. Over the
last two years, however, I have been privileged to serve in a superb military establish-
ment. I am constantly impressed by the dedication, skill, and enthusiasm of the men
and women serving in our Armed Forces. They remind me that great nations produce,
rst and foremost, great people.
As principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security
Council, and the President, I am blessed with a very able Vice Chairman, a good orga-
nization, a talented staff, and rst-rate support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For this, I
am grateful not only to framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act but also to the many civil-
ian and military leaders who helped to facilitate and ease the implementation process.
At this juncture, I also must report that the strategic direction of the US Armed Forces
continues to be a very challenging process for all concerned. Essentially, we are trying
to develop a more forward-looking and fully integrated military strategy, maintain the
deterrent capabilities of our Combatant Commands, realign our forces as required by
potential breakthroughs on the arms control front, and work within a Defense budget
which refuses to settle down at any level of spending.
Seldom has it been more difcult to plan ahead. In this uid situation, I have no blinding
insights on how to reduce risks to our national security at less cost to the US taxpayer except
to continue to increase efciency and productivity. However, I do renew a pledge made two
years ago—that I will work closely and candidly with this committee and with civilian and
military leadership of the Executive Branch in securing the defense of our nation.
As always, I value your advice and counsel.
Remarks at the Dedication of the US Navy Memorial
Washington, DC | October 13
Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy, a veteran of war and a Naval hero,
spoke to the Brigade of Midshipmen at Annapolis and said: “… any man who may be
asked in this century what he did to make his life worthwhile … can respond with a good
deal of pride and satisfaction: ‘I served in the United States Navy.’”
Those words admirably express the spirit that pervades this ceremony today: a pure,
simple, and abiding affection for the Naval service. Not only in this century but in the
two hundred-year history of our country, American sailors have labored, served, fought,
and died so that others might have a better life in freedom and peace. In the process,
they have created the world’s most respected Navy.
Navy men and women indeed have a lot to be proud of, and in turn the country should
share this pride. This memorial will remind our fellow citizens and future generations
of the magnicent tradition forged by their naval service—a heritage of achievement,
gallantry, sacrice, and above all, victory.
As I have looked over the memorial’s design, my eye has been drawn unfailingly to
the gure of the Lone Sailor. In my career of more than forty years, I have acquired a
host of memories—some good, some bad; memories of missions, grand events, ships,
duty stations, and exotic sights. But the dominant image in my mind after all this time
is that of shipmates and friends sharing the joys, the rigors, and the perils of a lifetime
in the Service. The Lone Sailor, for me, shall always symbolize my comrades. They will
be in my thoughts as the statue is unveiled. At this very moment, Navy men and women
all over the globe are carrying on the proud traditions of the past and adding a history
of their own. In Asia, the Seventh Fleet patrols an endless stretch of water, fty million
square miles from the Bering Sea through the Straits of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. The
Atlantic Fleet similarly guards an area from the Arctic Ice Cap to the Cape of Good Hope.
In the Mediterranean, on the vital southern ank of Europe and never very far from the
turbulence and terrorism of the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet displays American strength
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and commitment for all to see. And in the Persian Gulf, American sailors—shoulder to
shoulder with people from all the other Services—are at work every day to protect the
interests of peace and freedom. Alongside these efforts are the submarines on patrol,
the land-based aircraft going ahead of the eet, dozens of ships making independent
transits, carrying on training, conducting search and rescue or drug interdiction—all
the tasks that fall to the sailor at sea.
And there are, as well, the vital activities ashore concerning logistics support, recruit-
ing, and training, without which no operations could take place. These are the images
represented in the Lone Sailor, that captivating symbol of the heart of the naval Service
and the Navy way of life. For him and all who wear his uniform, I congratulate those who
have brought this magnicent project to fruition, and I thank you for remembering how
it was, and is, and always will be, in the Navy.
Remarks to the Royal College of Defence Studies
London, England | October 27
Thank you for that kind introduction. It is a privilege for me to be with you today. I must
admit at the outset, of course, that after having spent two years in my present post, any
respite from the rigors of Washington is most welcome. There is an old saying in the Amer-
ican military that any duty outside Washington is good duty, and I can’t say I disagree
with it. I now work in the Pentagon, that famous building with ve sides—on every issue.
And I have to deal with Congress frequently; it is not always a pleasant experience. The
other day someone asked me: if pro is the opposite of con, does that mean progress is
the opposite of Congress? I didn’t answer that question. Like our former President Harry
Truman, I was raised on the great American prairie. I am more and more persuaded of
the wisdom of one of his more celebrated observations: that in Washington, if you want
a good and loyal friend, you’d better go buy a dog.
For all those reasons, I am happy for the opportunity to escape, if only briey, and to
collect my thoughts in these more civilized surroundings. As you know, I am here visiting
the British forces, but I have a long and personal relationship with this country dating
back to the time when I was a graduate student doing research in London. In the course
of those months, I accumulated a great many stories about British life and, particularly,
her Armed Services. One of my favorites comes from a speech given by Lord Mountbatten.
It has to do with service rivalry and is particularly appropriate given my current “joint”
responsibilities in the United States:
The British Isles are made up of four peoples: The Welsh who “pray”
on their knees and their neighbors; the Scottish who keep the peace and
anything else they can get their hands on; the Irish who don’t know what
they’re for but are willing to ght for it; and the British who are all self-
made men thereby relieving God Almighty of a tremendous responsibility.
In a more serious vein, let me say how much I admire the Royal College of Defence
Studies and envy the time you are spending here. It’s hard to overstate the value of this
experience, to you personally and to your nation. The security challenges that democ-
racies face these days are diverse and complex, with interrelated political, economic,
social, international, scientic, and military dimensions. More and more, leaders who
make or shape national policy need to understand the nature of these relationships and
the requirement for a broadly integrated approach to strategy.
I mentioned my graduate research earlier—my project was a study of British naval
policy in the period between 1946 and 1963. In the course of my inquiry, I was par-
ticularly struck by the way in which the British Navy had accommodated to evolving
postwar realities, and in turn, the manner in which her leadership adjusted to the new
imperatives. It was not easy for military professionals to modify and expand their forms
of reference in order to operate in a variegated world—in fact, it was often painful—but
a successful adjustment was ultimately accomplished.
An important feature of this transformation was the quality of the relationship
between civilian ofcials—the civil service, the political leadership—and the profes-
sional Navy. That partnership was clearly a cornerstone of British naval policy in an era
of great change. A similar reformation has taken place in our own Services. It is exactly
the purpose of the Royal College to study the developments and to prepare you for future
change. I can think of no better way to contribute to the cause of national defense in
our time. In a very real sense, the larger payoff will be long-term: in years to come, the
associations and widened outlook you have gained here will generate countless dividends
in the important and multifaceted role this nation plays on the world scene.
I say all this knowing, of course, that the academic adventure has its own frustra-
tions. I must warn you to view your professor with a certain amount of skepticism. When
I was growing up, my teachers used to insist that a man becomes what he thinks about;
that was designed, of course, to encourage studiousness and high thoughts. But I later
discovered it was somewhat misleading. If it had been true, by the time I was eighteen,
I would have become a girl. But I survived that disillusionment, just as I am sure you
will surmount any you might encounter in the coming years, however unruly the “real
world” might prove to be.
I understand that my appearance here coincides with the beginning of the allied
defense phase of your course. I thought it might be interesting for you if I took a few min-
utes to outline, rst, some large themes concerning the security challenge as Washington
sees it around the globe, and then some principles dictating our responses—including
one of the rmest pillars of our strategic approach, coalition deterrence and defense. My
observations will, of necessity, be generalized, and I will have to leave some important
subjects and many details to our question period. I know there is a wealth of curios-
ity—and expertise—in this audience, and I look forward to addressing your questions.
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The International Security Environment
Let me start by surveying how military planners in Washington generally see the emerg-
ing international security environment. As I noted earlier, that environment has many
aspects that need to be understood as a whole. But here are the military features I think
are particularly important. From my perspective, such a survey has to begin with the
nature of Soviet military power. You are familiar with the statistics documenting the size
and continuing expansion of the Soviet military apparatus. But beyond those gures
and the inevitable static comparisons, how do military planners in the Pentagon look at
the dynamics of this burgeoning phenomenon?
In the broad sweep, rst of all, the Soviet threat is different than any the United States
or other free nations have previously faced. Granted, pre-war Germany was a formidable
power in Europe and Japan in Asia, but the two never successfully integrated their efforts
on a worldwide basis—witness Japan’s unilateral attack on Pearl Harbor and Berlin’s
unhappiness because Tokyo would not engage the Soviets in Asia. In contrast, the Soviet
Union is a military power of global reach and can, moreover, coordinate military forces
and economic and political structures to an impressive degree. Any US strategy must
confront that reality.
A second point has to do with our attitudes about how the Soviets might put that
strength to use. Free societies are naturally suspicious of totalitarian regimes, of course,
and particularly wary of their military power. History is an important teacher here, and I
think the evidence clearly shows that the Kremlin has used its military muscle brutally
and directly when the calculus has seemed to be in their favor. Further, with that raw
power as a backdrop, the Soviets have again and again displayed a proclivity to intimi-
date peaceable states, to foster instability, to exploit surrogates, to promote terrorism, to
support small but erce regional conicts, and to encourage anti-Western regimes in a
variety of ways and places. If nothing else, they are patient and persevering in this regard.
That is the record they themselves have fashioned. But in democratic societies there
is always a good deal of debate, much of it useful, about how the Soviets will behave in
the future. And we can’t overlook Mr. Gorbachev’s Glasnost policies and his reformist
stances on internal social and economic matters. In time, they could conceivably bring
about some moderation in the harsher—and historic—Soviet approaches to world affairs.
But what is not likely to change in Moscow is the Party’s control over the Soviet Union’s
immense war-making potential—the economy, the industrial base, civil air transport,
merchant marine, labor supply, and so on. This central direction in peacetime greatly
facilitates mobilization and transition to a war footing.
In turn, ever since the Revolution, the Soviets have had a fascination with numbers.
As Lenin once remarked: “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” They have never departed
much from this principle in building industrial centers, setting goals for military pro-
duction lines, or elding nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces. They always err
on the side of building too many rather than too few, forcing us constantly—until they
change, if they ever do—to look for ways to offset their numerical superiorities with better
concepts, doctrines, training, technologies, leadership, and personnel. Though it is clear
that the Kremlin’s emphasis on military strength at the expense of every other sector of
the economy has carried with it enormous burdens, I see no sign at this juncture that
their system will forego nor cannot sustain such an effort. As former US Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown was fond of saying: “When we build, they build. When we stop,
they continue to build.”
On the other side of the coin, we know that the Kremlin worries about its own
vulnerabilities: a very long border and a vast airspace to defend, natural choke points
constraining their access to the open oceans, an inefcient industrial plant, and the
questionable steadfastness of their East European allies. Some of these disadvantages
can be exploited by the United States and free world planners, if we are thoughtful, and
it would be foolish not to do so. In fact, these Soviet weaknesses can help redress our
own numerical deciencies. Still, there is no avoiding the reality that their huge defense
buildup has altered the East/West balance markedly in the strategic deterrent, in con-
ventional forces across the board, and in capabilities for what is popularly known as low
intensity conict.
The likelihood of a major Soviet assault on Western Europe is perhaps remote, thanks
in large part to the continued success of the collective deterrent represented in NATO.
But the coercive danger of Soviet military power will loom over the Eurasian continent
for many years to come and still represents our highest priority threat. At the same time,
the Soviet government has never departed from the philosophy that its allies and sur-
rogates in the so-called Third World must march in step with Moscow and that the rest
of the globe is an open eld for destabilizing actions. And the success of our deterrent
policies—and NATO, in particular—has created new challenges, forcing Moscow to look
for opportunities on the periphery of traditional areas of interest and to explore new ways
to use its power besides overt aggression.
Overall, then, the fundamental lesson that Pentagon planners take from this is that
the strategic competition we are engaged in is one for the long haul—a marathon, not a
sprint. In my view, that thought has to be the centerpiece of the American and, indeed,
the free world outlook, but I would be the rst to admit that it is a difcult idea to get
across to peace-minded democratic peoples.
Complicating the future threat picture as seen from Washington is a whole host of
challenges that do not raise the prospect of global war or direct conict with the Soviets,
but that nevertheless will continue to jeopardize important interests worldwide: terror-
ism, regional instabilities, localized conicts, and a range of low-level confrontations
that blur the distinction between peace and war. These, too, are going to place new and
evolving demands not only on the military forces of the United States but on those of all
nations whose interests and activities span the globe. Indeed, they already have: in Cen-
tral America, in the Middle East, in Africa, in South and Southeast Asia, and of course
in the Persian Gulf right now.
These kinds of problems are especially taxing for military planners and operators.
National objectives are limited: worst case scenarios will most likely entail only partial
mobilization, and such operations unavoidably have a high political content. The enduring
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challenge in such cases is to develop strategies and tactics that resolve all the conicting
interests yet still enable the military commander to bring force to bear under advantageous
conditions. This is, in effect, the underside of strategy—the side that many Americans are
not comfortable with. It’s unfamiliar territory in many ways, and often the stakes just don’t
seem to justify the effort. Further, it certainly demands a new breed of warrior, at least in
the American system, and not everyone is comfortable with that. But it’s these efforts that
give the best prospect for avoiding truly large and costly wars, and I think it’s clear the
future will give us little respite in this regard.
The US Response
The military strategy Washington has developed attempts to take bearings from those
realities, and within it the role of US military forces is shaped by national security pol-
icies which have remained essentially unchanged since the 1940s. We have sought, in
short, to:
• Preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial integrity of the United
States;
• Support US and allied vital interests abroad, and
• Encourage an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institu-
tions can prosper.
Additionally, since World War II our military posture has been characterized by sev-
eral enduring principles:
• We seek to deter wars rather than to ght them.
• We hope to make free world defense capabilities greater than the sum of its parts,
through collective security arrangements, forward defenses, and security assis-
tance programs.
• We keep strong central reserves capable of global mobility, recognizing that real-
world deterrence requires a credible ability on our part to respond to a distant
threat, deal with it, and withdraw just as quickly.
• And, in tandem with the effort to maintain a posture of strength, we seek equita-
ble, effective, and veriable arms reduction agreements with potential adversaries.
Within that general framework of goals and principles, the Pentagon derives its mili-
tary strategy and generates requirements for armed forces. Given the built-in pluralism
of the American system and our constrained resources, it can be very difcult to bring all
these policies and principles together. But such is the stuff of our business in Washington.
The Role and Impact of Alliances
Now let me expand on the role and impact of alliances in our approach, since that subject
is particularly relevant to your curriculum. If there is one strategic lesson that stands out
from all the others in the postwar world, it is that the United States can no longer go it
alone. For much of America’s history, we tried hard—and successfully—to stay clear of
military alliances outside of true crises. But the circumstances undergirding that aloofness
have long vanished. Order requires political and military cooperation among nations that
share our traditions and aspirations. The rather elaborate structure of Free World security
alliances created since the 1940s responds to that imperative. The Pentagon sees the NATO
coalition as the centerpiece of that structure, both militarily and politically. We know that
the successful defense of Western Europe is vital to the security of the United States, and
we have worked for decades to link our strength credibly and effectively to that of our allies.
Changing conditions—notably developments in the threat and in our own capabili-
ties—have complicated that effort at times. But I would argue we have done reasonably
well in maintaining healthy security linkages. By itself, NATO’s longevity says a great
deal about strategic success. Sometimes we lose sight of our achievements in all the
talk of issues and burdens and challenges. A host of crises have come and gone over the
decades: Berlin (repeatedly), Suez, France’s withdrawal from the integrated command,
and controversial INF deployments.
The bottom line remains: Not only does the United States depend on a coalition strat-
egy, and on the NATO alliance as its central pillar, but we count that policy as a great
success despite its complications and frustrations. There are, of course, special challenges
and constraints associated with multilateral defense arrangements. Any participant in
them necessarily sacrices some freedom of action. Otherwise, they are not meeting the
obligation they have undertaken. They require constant political tending and often costly
transfusions in the form of new initiatives. NATO is famous for this: in just the last decade
or so, Washington has seen several such thrusts. Also, participation in defense coalitions
frequently requires compromises that can confuse the military equation. No doubt many
of you know from experience that planning, operating, and ghting with foreign forces
can present a host of burdensome problems. Frankly, from the US perspective, it has
never been easy to t some of our forces into the common NATO denominator, particularly
when we want them to have global utility under a variety of conditions.
These types of problems are constant, thorny, and often result in considerable invest-
ment. At the same time, it is indisputable that the character of our alliances is currently
under considerable pressure. The postwar recovery and afuence of America’s partners
has changed the balance of inuence within coalitions, increasing our allies’ voice and
diminishing the US role. Clearly, today our partners need and expect more give and
take among friends—in short, consultation. Conversely, our allies do not want America
to realign or reduce its participation nor for Washington to insist that a louder voice
must be accompanied by increased investments. Perhaps most frustrating, some allies
expect responses to crises outside the traditional area to be shouldered by Washington
alone. This suggests a reluctance to come to grips with reality, and it seems to me that
all parties have had trouble adjusting to the new circumstances.
Nevertheless, Washington remains convinced that, on balance, our great emphasis on
security coalitions is well worth the time, resources, and effort we spend on them. And
in the end, we believe cooperation among NATO subscribers is the key to a safer world.
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The Future
Having outlined the attitudes governing our strategic stances, let me say just a few words
about the future.
At home in America, we are going to face the continually challenging task of getting
adequate support for defense in the resource allocation process. When I spoke last year
at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), I observed that we had encountered a much
different mood in the Congress than was the case a few years ago. That is still the situ-
ation. In the early 1980s, rising Appropriations enabled us to undertake an impressive
modernization program that has gone some distance in revitalizing our armed forces—in
personnel, readiness, sustainability, force structure, and every parameter. Today, the
American military is sound by any commonsense measure, and enhancements that
have already been placed in the pipeline will continue to upgrade our capabilities over
the next several years, even if we must live with attened or decreasing appropriations.
But several years of declining funds would throw us back to the 1970s.
Clearly, we have our work cut out for us to maintain the scal support the Pentagon
needs for the more distant future. Recent stock market developments will lend greater
emphasis to this point. In last year’s remarks, I also noted that it is very difcult, espe-
cially when you travel west of our Allegheny and Appalachian mountains, to persuade
our citizens of the need to continue their sacrices on behalf of peoples who live much
closer to the Soviet Union and still have a long way to go to build adequate defenses for
themselves. Make no mistake: a strong current of isolationism is still pressing below the
surface in the Midwestern United States.
In NATO, and also in other key alliances, we have worked hard to encourage defense
enhancement efforts similar to our own and to promote cooperation that gets the most
defense out of our combined resources. The anticipated INF agreement will give those
efforts even greater urgency. There has been progress, but the response has been uneven,
and I don’t think there is any dispute that there is a great deal more to be done before the
West can face the future with genuine condence. But barring untoward developments
in overall alliance relations, for example, a complete breakdown in consensus, I do not
believe the American electorate will fundamentally alter the course it has held for the last
four decades. The United States will remain strong and will grow stronger in an up and
down fashion. And the American commitment should remain a cornerstone of the West’s
military power. Most of our people still believe in an instinctive way what the wars in the
rst half of this century proved: that aggression can’t be contained if America stays home.
Clearly, arguments about scaling back commitments will be a prominent feature of the
strategic landscape in the United States, and watchful critics are going to prod us to do
better. But let me stress again that NATO nations themselves—and their approaches to
alliance defense—will have a lot to do with whether those arguments gather momentum
or remain in the background.
Undoubtedly, the ongoing arms control efforts will impact alliance—unity or division,
as the case may be. Even with the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] agreement
behind us, I foresee protracted dialogue including START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks], DSLT [Defence Science and Technology Laboratory], CW [Chemical Warfare], the
conventional balance and, ultimately, SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces]. Every free world
nation will have a stake in these negotiations, and they will undoubtedly inuence future
NATO strategy and force orientation. It will be imperative to strive continually for some
kind of consensus as we march forward. But it will not be easy, and the possibilities for
fracturing alliance unity will be there.
We have already seen how difcult it is to fashion a unied party in the INF negoti-
ations—the least challenging. I am not optimistic that we can digest such an ambitious
menu and keep the alliance healthy, but we must try. I can assure you that the current
and foreseeable American Administration are determined to seek meaningful arms
reductions—especially nuclear. You may nd that comforting or discomforting, depend-
ing on your ideological view.
Let me say just a few nal words about American global commitments and their impli-
cations for Washington’s allies. The United States is heavily committed worldwide, and
as I suggested earlier, there is little prospect that those demands will subside. Frankly,
many strategists contend that our greatest challenges in the next decade will be in the
so-called Third World, and unquestionably, the center of gravity of our international trade
is gradually shifting westward into the Pacic, dictating continued and increasing US
military involvement in the East Asian region.
Washington, of course, believes that promoting stability in these areas serves our
allies’ interests as well as our own. Admittedly that policy may be difcult to implement
and often impossible without risks, e.g., the Persian Gulf. We have thought for some time
that NATO in particular, but not only NATO, must develop the capacity to look outward,
but many allies have been slow in coming to that conclusion and reluctant to support
actions external to Western Europe. I think there’s no question that the future will require
us to nd ways, together, to adapt our coalition to the reality of diverse challenges at
what some regard the geographic margins of their interests. In my RUSI remarks last
year, I argued that accommodating to this fact of life and developing a realistic policy
for supporting out-of-area efforts will be one of NATO’s greatest challenges in the next
decade. I’ve seen nothing since then to change my mind.
A second point has to do with the internal division of labor in our partnerships. We
have had a sort of informal contract about these matters for decades. Like all contracts,
these understandings have to be honored if the larger security arrangements are to suc-
ceed, but they are hardly immutable. Indeed, it would be foolish to treat them as such,
given the shifting conditions surrounding them.
The general outlines of the bargain are reasonably clear. Few of our allies have a
nuclear deterrent of their own, and in the postwar years many stressed local ground, air,
and naval capabilities rather than long-range power projection in their defense planning.
Thus, in the overall scheme of coalition defense, the United States must place a high
priority on its strategic nuclear umbrella, global maritime superiority, and strategically
mobile ground and air forces. In turn, a fair division of labor requires manpower con-
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tributions and heavy ground forces from allies, plus contribution of specialized func-
tions. Managing this apportionment of burdens into an evolving future will take all our
determination, energy, foresight, creativity—and statesmanship. But those qualities are
precisely what have brought us to this point, and there’s no reason to think they won’t
move us forward in the future.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me just recap a few points. The military threat Washington and like-
minded capitals face is diverse and growing. By and large, the strategy we have deployed
has coped with it remarkably well. You can measure our successes in many ways. Per-
haps one of the most important recognizes not only signicant events but some non-
events as well, notably—no nuclear holocaust involving the superpowers or anyone else
and no great war sweeping across Europe and Asia. In Washington, we think these say
a great deal about the efcacy of peace through strength as a winning policy for the
American people and the world at large.
But there are, as always, serious challenges looming in the future. Meeting them will
require continued collaboration and also adaptation. We all want the benets produced
by coalition strategy. That desire, surely, will remain constant. But the mechanisms we
have adopted will as surely require modication as we move ahead. It remains to be seen
whether we can meet that challenge.
My own view of history argues that we should go forward with condence in our
capability and exibility. I remain essentially an optimist, I guess. Considering how long
I have been in this game that makes me an incurable optimist.
It will take hard work, but in this regard I nd it comforting to recall what that great
American philosopher Paul Harvey says that in times like these, it is important to remem-
ber that there have always been times like these.
I thank you for the opportunity to visit the Royal College of Defence Studies, and now
I will be pleased to take your questions for the remainder of our time together.
Remarks at the Dedication of the Crowe Global Hat Display
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | November 10
Thank you for that ne introduction. As many of you know, Shirley and I are always
pleased to come home to Oklahoma. The warm welcome we receive here never fails to
make us look forward to the next chance to return. Tonight is no exception. In effect, I
suppose you could say: “We’d ‘Sooner’ be here than anywhere else”.
I am not a Sooner born, but I am a Sooner bred. I’ve always been proud that my
grandfather was one of those hardy souls who made “the Run” on April 22, 1889, and
my mother was born in Oklahoma Territory. In turn, their legacy to me was a deep pride
in and affection for this wonderful prairie state.
And in growing up here, I acquired very early another prominent Oklahoma trait: a
lively spirit of national patriotism and sense of appreciation for the country’s military.
When I left Oklahoma University to go to the Naval Academy to prepare for a lifetime of
service to the country, it seemed a completely natural thing to do. Since then, in all my
years of following the ag around the globe, my Oklahoma heritage and patriotic spirit
have been truly sustaining.
This dedication gives me special pleasure and not just because it clears off some
shelves in my house. For one thing, each of these hats carries with it some distinc-
tive memory for the Crowes, and all together they represent a lot of years and also the
kindness of many friends in places all around the globe. Indeed, the whole collection
symbolizes graphically the fun, good fellowship, and far-ung challenges of a life in the
Service—all the psychic rewards of the career that Shirley and I have shared. We’re
gratied to be able to display them for others to enjoy as we have.
I admit I let them go with mixed feelings, however. In part, that’s because of nostalgic
attachment. But also it’s because I wonder if future browsers will react to the exhibit like
the Duke of Wellington once did to the scene in Parliament, after 19th century reforms
opened the legislature to a more diverse group of legislators outside the nobility. In amaze-
ment, he said simply: “I never saw so many shocking bad hats in my life.”
I don’t know what Wellington would think of these hats, but I’m sure it’s a good thing
he never had to see our national legislature—the world’s greatest deliberative body. Of
course, Wellington was probably wrong to judge people so quickly by their headgear.
John Barrymore is supposed to have said that “The only reason why a man should pay
the least attention to a hat is that it is something one tips to a lady.” I certainly hope the
exhibit proves more interesting for my fellow Oklahomans and other visitors than that,
although I must say, I understand the basic point very well.
There is something else to be said about this exhibit, too, and our celebration of
Veterans Day tomorrow makes these observations particularly appropriate. If you think
about it, the collection’s diversity—and its global scope—says a great deal about the
worldwide interests of this country and also about the role of America’s Armed Forces in
protecting and advancing them. Moreover, the ones that were given to me as small tokens
of friendship and remembrance speak volumes about the value that many societies place
on their relationships with the American military and on the presence or proximity—and
the steadfastness—of America’s military power. They reect rm bonds, not just between
individuals but also between governments and societies. And those bonds were built and
are solidied every day by the work of America’s people in uniform.
All around the globe, American military men and women fortify the battlements of a
troubled peace by efforts which are invisible to most of their countrymen but which are
absolutely necessary to safeguard the Free World’s achievements and aspirations.
Our soldiers stand watch along the DMZ in Korea in the freezing cold of winter and
in the heat of summer. In the wider Pacic, sailors of the Seventh Fleet patrol an area
totaling fty million square miles from the Bering Sea to the Straits of Malacca and
on to the Indian Ocean, twenty-four hours a day. Young Marines guard our embassies
everywhere, at a time when the threat of terrorist attack is the highest it has ever been,
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and omnipresent. Air Force crews stand ready at a moment’s notice to strike back at
all aggressors, just as those F-111 crews did last year, when they ashed 3,000 miles
through the night to strike against a Libyan terrorist infrastructure that had claimed,
time and again, innocent and unsuspecting American lives.
They and their predecessors have done this for generations, often serving far from home
and without the amenities other professions might have brought them. In times of war
and crisis their contributions have been celebrated, or at least widely appreciated. In more
tranquil times, however, the tendency is to overlook what their quiet strength means for
the daily lives of all Americans in an uncertain world. In its own way, this exhibit of hats,
some of the modest trappings of one Serviceman’s career, recognizes all this. I hope visitors
who see it in years to come will think of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines whose
efforts over the decades have brought us the peace we enjoy, and will also be reminded of
those who carry on that long and proud tradition of national service today.
For people who give their lives to a military career, and for their families, home lit-
erally is “wherever you hang your hat.” But all of us have another home, too. The one
memorialized in the old adage that places you forever where your heart is. Though Shir-
ley and I have never been able to come back to Oklahoma for more than a few days at a
time, we have always thought of it as home. There just isn’t a more tting place for us to
hang all these hats, to sort of make things ofcial about where our heart lies no matter
where we go. And we are profoundly grateful to John Kirkpatrick and others for making
it possible to do that.
Thank you all very much, for your kindness and support.
Remarks at a Dinner Honoring Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
November 16
Good evening.
Welcome to all, as we honor the Weinbergers. I can think of no more appropriate place
to express our appreciation than in these hallowed halls. All around us are reminders
of our country’s military history and of men who played signicant roles in that past.
Tonight we express our thanks to a man who has added another distinguished chapter
of achievement to these annals. Everyone in this room has had an opportunity to watch
Cap Weinberger deal with the trials and tribulations of Washington.
It can be a tough town known for shifting political winds and for people who act like
weather vanes. But Cap hardly ts that stereotype. He is a forceful advocate with rm
ideas and a fetish for consistency. Some people say he’s stubborn, but I just think he went
to Harvard. They say you can always tell a Harvard man, but you can’t tell him much.
It’s an old joke but so are most of us here.
I would have had the Secretary say grace tonight, but I was afraid he would have
started with a list of non-negotiable demands. Like all Harvard men, he’s a great seeker of
truth. With Congress, his motto has always been: Ye shall know the truth and the truth
shall make you mad. Unfortunately, I’m usually sitting beside him when they get mad.
Despite his tenacity, the one personal trait that impresses all who work with and for
him is his courtesy and gentle humor. Somebody said: “To be born a gentleman is an
accident; to die one is an achievement.” He has stayed on the road to that accomplish-
ment. Will Rogers observed that: “It’s great to be great, but even greater to be human.”
Cap Weinberger’s a direct example. He disproves that old adage that being a gentleman
is a handicap in an argument or in positions of heavy responsibility.
Clearly, he’ll be both missed and remembered with affection by all of us. But these
are only personal observations. His record of professional achievement truly marks him
as exceptional. There may not be a more widely experienced gure in American public
life. He soldiered in World War II as an Infantryman, a survivor of a tour with MacArthur.
Won distinction on the fast track in peace: from Harvard, where he was a conservative
even as a student, to a prestigious law practice to a senior executive of Bechtel. Also, he
found time to dabble as a media and journalism star. He hosted a TV show and wrote a
column on California government which may explain the reason he is always treated so
kindly by the Press today. In California, he was a prominent activist in State government
and Republican politics as legislator, nance chief, and Party ofcial. This experience was
followed by many years of Federal service at HEW, OMB, FTC, and, of course, in DOD.
The only place he hasn’t served is the Supreme Court. He may be called yet to that body
if he can pass the marijuana test.
Everyone in this room remembers well the state of our defenses eight years ago: aging
equipment, sagging morale, “hollow” forces, all while the Soviets built steadily and the
threat diversied. Likewise, we know where we stand today: improved in every param-
eter, with more in the pipeline. The job isn’t nished. It never is. It will still take hard
work. But clearly, Cap Weinberger’s legacy to us reaches far into the future, in the form
of better operating capabilities, renewed spirit, increased teamwork among ourselves,
and greater partnership with the public at large.
Mr. Secretary, I speak for many in saying thank you: For citizens who are safer and
whose prospects are better as a result of your personal efforts. For my colleagues in the
JCS, our Unied and Specied Commanders and Agency Chiefs, but most of all I speak
for young soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen all over the world, the people who man
the battlements of freedom every day. They are now better equipped, trained, more appre-
ciated than ever before. Your legacy will live a long time in their hearts.
For myself: I bid farewell to an admired superior, a valued colleague, and a trea-
sured friend.
Walter Lippman once said: “The nal test of a leader is that he leaves behind him
in other men the conviction and the will to carry on.” By that denition you are a striking
success. Not only are we indebted to you for reviving American strength but you leave
behind a military leadership totally determined to carry on in your footsteps.
We wanted to give you a memento that would recall your days in the Pentagon,
that would remind you of the esteem in which your colleagues hold you, and at the
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same time, that would be useful. Since you have devoted so much of your energy and
talent to standing up for the military, we settled on a stand-up desk. We can never
compensate you for the blood, sweat, and tears you have shed in our behalf, but we
hope it will serve at least as a symbol of our gratitude to you for standing up for us so
consistently and effectively.
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SELECTED WORKS
Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the INF Treaty
January 25
Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to participate in your second set of hearings
devoted to our national security strategy. Certainly, this year’s focus on NATO defense
and the INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty is most timely.
My testimony is organized in four parts. First, I will present an overview of our experi-
ence with the alliance. Next, NATO’s military objectives and strategy will be reviewed. My
statement then turns to the INF Treaty, including an assessment of its impact on NATO
defense and the rationale for strong endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, I
will address the question of preparing the United States and its coalition partners for
the future.
NATO Overview
To begin, allied security interests are set forth with remarkable clarity in the 1949 North
Atlantic Treaty and in a 1974 review of these interests by the North Atlantic Council.
Basically, the allies seek to:
• Safeguardthefreedom,commonheritage,andcivilizationoftheirpeople;
• Promotethestabilityandwell-beingoftheNorthAtlanticarea;
• Unitetheireffortsforcollectivedefense;and
• Preservepeaceandstabilityintheworldatlarge.
Over the years, however, NATO has often found itself in disagreement over how to
marshal the resources necessary to support these policies. In the 1974 declaration, for
example,thealliesheldthatarmedforcesshouldbemaintainedandimprovedinef-
ciency. Yet, they also stressed the importance of reducing the burden of arms expendi-
tures on their people. This ambivalence about resources has continued to the present day.
The alliance has changed dramatically since the end of World War II. Initially, an
enormously powerful United States moved swiftly to support a devastated and frightened
WesternEurope,providingeconomicaidundertheMarshallPlan,favorableaccessto
the US market, integration of forces under the NATO umbrella, extended aid under the
Mutual Security Act, and so on.
The remarkable success of this effort can be seen in the situation today: two nearly
equal pillars in the alliance, one European and another American. These pillars have
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much in common: each with over 200 million talented and energetic people, exceptional
prowess at the high frontiers of technology and manufacturing, heavy dependence
upon international trade to provide the necessary raw materials, and lines of commerce
stretching to every corner of the world.
In other ways, the European pillar is much different than the American one: a bloody
history of continental wars, more directly exposed to Soviet military power, little defense
indepthagainstaconventionalassaultbytheWarsawPact,andnotmuchpotentialto
tradespacefortimeontheeldofbattle.Moreover,itisfarmoredifcultforthethirteen
nationsofWesternEuropetocoordinatedefensepoliciesthanitisforanationoffty
united states. Still, geopolitical factors do not relegate NATO Europe to a position of per-
manentinferiorityversustheWarsawPactorenormousdependenceuponarmedforcesof
the United States. To the contrary, Western Europe has a long history of producing great
militaryleaders,highlyprofessionaltroops,andrst-ratemilitaryhardware.Moreover,
within the European Economic Community, the European Space Agency, the Western
EuropeanUnion,andtheEurogroup,Indconvincingevidencethatwherethereisa
will, our NATO allies can be remarkably effective in the business of integrating policies
and resources. Insofar as the American pillar is concerned, economic support for the
industrial allies no longer is necessary or desirable. Yet, our political and military par-
ticipation in NATO still makes a crucial difference.
Certainly, the US strategic nuclear umbrella is vital to NATO, especially for allies pos-
sessing no nuclear arsenals of their own. In my experience, they want us to maintain a
credible nuclear deterrent, shield them from nuclear blackmail and coercion, and engage
theSovietsinadialogueaimedtowardamutualandveriablereductioninnucleararms.
In recent years, the “grass roots” sentiments favoring nuclear arms cutbacks as opposed
tolimitationshavegrowninWesternEuropeaswellastheUnitedStates.Partandparcel
of European expectations is the linkage between continental-based conventional forces,
theater nuclear weapons, and strategic systems. In general, this requires a credible, visible
mix of both short- and long-range systems suitable for holding at risk massed forces and
militarilysignicanttargetsintheWarsawPact,includingtheSovietUnion,andthus
providing the deterrence that has kept the West free of war for almost four decades.
Similarly, the allies are deeply interested in preserving trans-Atlantic couplings. Our
military presence in Europe of more than 300,000 troops is a central part of this process.
Among other things, this commitment tells both the Europeans and the Soviets that
Americantroopswouldbeamongthersttoght.Equallysignicantisourmaritime
strength in the Atlantic, especially capabilities to contain or counter a major break-out
of air and naval units of the Soviet Northern Fleet. This forward deployment also makes
surprise attack against NATO far less likely.
Additionally, global economic activities and partnerships have led members of the
North Atlantic Alliance to acquire a considerable stake in international peace and secu-
rity. In a practical sense, this means that on occasion the Western nations must deal with
the world’s troublemakers, attempt to keep small crises small, and shore up trembling
military balances which could turn to their disadvantage.
I would argue that the US role in shoring up international peace and security con-
tributes heavily to NATO’s well-being and that members willing to put their forces on the
line in the common interest must receive more credit in the realm of strategic burden
sharing. From a military perspective, US mobility units (air and naval) and light ground
forceswhichcanprojectpowerarenotonlyasignicantelementofourcontributionto
the Alliance but perform a service which no other member can match.
Military Objectives and Strategy
NATO’s general military objectives have remained constant and consistent from the
outset:
• DeteraWarsawPactassault;
• Defendforwardifattacked;and
• RestoretheterritorialintegrityofNATO.
The strategy for achieving these objectives has, however, undergone some dramatic
shifts since 1949. In the early days, NATO drifted structurally to a heavy dependence
on the United States and especially on the doctrine of massive retaliation. Washington
possessedanuclearmonopoly,globaldeliverysystems,andanafuencethatpermitted
an across-the-board investment in weaponry. All of this formed a ready-made counter to
Soviet superiority in manpower and conventional weaponry at minimum cost to the allies.
Ultimately, time and circumstances eroded the underpinnings of this strategy. The
SovietUnionrstacquiredatomictechnologiesandthen,duringAmerica’spreoccupa-
tion with Vietnam, proceeded to build up its nuclear arsenals not only to “parity” but in
certain areas to “superiority.” The passage of years led both superpowers into ballistic
missile weaponry, cancelling out the US advantage in air-breathing delivery systems.
Suddenly, nuclear deterrence wasn’t as compelling in warding off limited attacks as it
had been in the 1950s.
Flexible Response
NATO revised its basic strategy in January 1968 with adoption of MC 14/3, which was
designed to provide a more credible replacement for the deterrent threat of “massive
retaliation” and to wean the Alliance away from an overdependence on nuclear retaliation
that weakened the commitment to conventional defense. The new doctrine was known
as“exibleresponse.”
The general principles of MC 14/3 are well understood in the public domain. No one
proposed to fold the US nuclear umbrella, but much more emphasis was placed on direct
defense by conventional forces and the selective and discriminate use of theater nuclear
weapons before contemplating a general nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Alliance pol-
icy did not prescribe the mix of conventional, theater nuclear, or strategic nuclear forces
required for deterrence and defense. It did describe the conditions necessary to ensure an
initial defense of NATO: regular consultations, adequate conventional and dual-capable
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forces, a high state of readiness, full use of available warning time to augment forward
deployedforces,andsufcientlogisticssupportandsustainability.Inturn,itstressed
thatthesefactorswillinuencethetimeNATOcanresistaPactattackwithoutresort
to nuclear weapons.
Clearly, such a strategy, to be successful, depends on constant and adequate invest-
ments across the spectrum of weaponry from conventional to strategic. Otherwise, it
becomes a high risk policy—as its predecessor was—because of its excessive reliance on
nuclear ordnance should deterrence fail.
The Balance
Asisalwaysthecaseinmilitarymatters,theevolvingbalancecanbeinuencedby
either side. For its part, the Kremlin continued its policy of steady improvements and
expansion at all levels and over time confronted NATO with not only strategic parity but
a degenerating balance in theater nuclear forces, an increasingly negative conventional
balance, and adverse trends in many of the major weapon categories.
The Joint Chiefs have for a number of years been disturbed about the military bal-
ance. Their major concerns have been in the area of conventional weapons, where NATO’s
defense capability needs great improvement. Although the United States has since 1981
been effectively modernizing and upgrading its conventional forces in Europe, Soviet
spendingandNATO’ssometimesaggingperformancehavepreventedasatisfactory
resolution of the problem.
Of special concern to the JCS is the low level of sustainability items and munitions
supporting NATO formations. This trend has, in turn, lowered the nuclear threshold and
raised the risk of general escalation. This state of affairs hardly accords with a strategy
designedtoallowselectivityanddiscriminationintheprocessof“exibleresponse.”A
number of others have expressed similar views as to whether NATO is relying too much
on nuclear weapons and not doing enough in the conventional arena, e.g., General Rog-
ers (former SACEUR) and Ambassador Abshire (former US Ambassador to NATO). To
date,theNATOnationshavenotseenttoincreasetheirspendinglevelssufcientlyto
reverse these curves.
Arms Control
Effective arms control agreements could, of course, relieve these problems. For some
fourteen years, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) has attempted to redress
the conventional imbalance, but has had no success even in reaching agreement on the
baseline from which future reductions should be measured. It is important to note that
these talks focused on personnel rather than weapon systems.
Concurrently, the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreements imposed some
constraints on strategic weapons (i.e., rough parity maintained at high weapon invento-
ries) but did not address other critical areas of the Soviet military buildup. To prove the
point, the Soviets proceeded to deploy intermediate range missiles capable of striking
every nation on and around the Eurasian continent. Shortly, the United States found
countries in both Europe and Asia deeply concerned that the SALT process had not
captured the SS-20s. By the late 1970s, many of our allies were urging Washington to
proceed directly from SALT II to a treaty limiting intermediate range missiles. That, of
course,wasanintegralpartofthe“dualtrack”decisionreachedbyNATOinDecember
1979. These decisions ultimately resulted in INF negotiations, a “global solution,” and
the treaty we address today.
The INF Treaty
This brings me to the treaty itself. First, a few general observations are in order.
Each party to the INF agreement (US and USSR) has agreed to eliminate all of its
intermediate and shorter range missiles and related support structures and equipment.
That includes ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500 to
5500 kilometers. Existing classes of missiles to be eliminated by the parties are speci-
edbytypeinthetreatytext,i.e.,PershingII,PershingIA,BGM109G(cruisemissile),
SS-20, SS-5, SS-4, SSC-X-4, SS-12, and SS-23.
Overall, nothing about this accord makes Europe “safe” for another conventional war.
Nor does it eliminate the risk of a nuclear war. Yet, this agreement does:
• Reverseaforty-yearbuildupduringwhichEuropehasbecomethemostmilita-
rizedregionintheworld;and
• Eliminatecompletelyseveralclassesofverydestructivenuclearweaponssystems
which offer neither East nor West much in the way of warning time.
Tactical Perspective
Obviously, Moscow would not have signed a treaty conferring enormous military advan-
tagesontheUnitedStatesanditsallies.Nonetheless,therearesubstantialbenetsfor
the United States and NATO.
The Soviets agree to give up missiles capable of carrying over 1600 deployed warheads
asopposedtoabout400fortheUnitedStates,Thisasymmetricalreductionissignicant
frombothamilitaryandpoliticalperspective;itisaveryvaluableprecedentforfuture
arms reductions negotiations. There is, of course, a great deal more to this agreement
than asymmetrical numbers. Equally important is the military impact on both sides.
In this connection, SACEUR surrenders the ability to hit some important targets with
ground-launchedmissiles,inparticular,aimpointsdeepinsidetheWarsawPactandin
the Soviet Union itself. There is little doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing
thePershingsbecauseoftheirrapiddeep-strikecapabilityandthatwasaninuential
element in moving them toward a double-zero approach.
On the other hand, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian
theaters. In Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to:
• HitwiththeaterballisticmissilesGreatBritain,Spain,France,Italy,andalarge
partofTurkey;or
• Strikewiththeseweaponsmanyofourpre-positionedmajorequipment(POMCUS)
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sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe.
Incidentally, we have always been extremely concerned about the Soviet’s ability to
cover our shallow support area in Europe. To threaten these targets in the future, the
Soviets will have to use their dual-capable aircraft or their strategic weapons.
Today, most of those aircraft are concentrated on a few main operating bases. They
are not dispersed over the countryside like land-mobile missiles and consequently are
vulnerable to counteraction.
Next, this agreement excludes all strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United
Kingdom and France while eliminating the intermediate and shorter range missile threat
to these systems. As many of you know, this was a sticky issue on the Soviet side, but
the United States steadfastly refused to consider British and French systems. We had
no license to do so.
Additionally, we have long been worried about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO
Europewithchemicalweapons.Westillare,butatleasttwoofthesignicantshorter
range delivery systems (SS-12s and SS-23s) will fall out of the Soviet order of battle as a
resultofthistreaty.OureldcommandershavealwaysconsideredtheSS-23apartic-
ularlyworrisomethreattoportsofentryandairelds.
Finally, a key factor is the global reach of this treaty. With the SS-20s, the Soviets
haveacapabilitytoholdatrisknearly500targetsintheAsia-Pacictheater.The
SS-20 can range virtually all of mainland Asia plus Japan, Taiwan, the northern
Philippines,andaportionofAlaska.TheSovietsalsohavenearly300shorterrange
missiles (SS-12s and SS-23s) in the Far East. Our Asian allies are deeply concerned
about this threat and greatly relieved that this treaty will eliminate it. This Soviet con-
cessionwasextremelydifculttonegotiateandrepresentsoneofthemoresignicant
strengths of the agreement.
Verification
Withrespecttovericationofcompliance,thisagreementreliesontwobasicmethods.
National Technical Means (NTM) will be the principal method of monitoring total elimina-
tion of intermediate and shorter range missile systems, related support facilities, and the
means of producing such weapons. In this regard, the parties have agreed not to interfere
witheachother’sNTMsandtotakespecicstepstoenhancetheotherside’sabilitytomon-
itorbyNTM.Anotherimportantmeansofvericationisestablishedbytheunprecedented
rightofon-siteinspections(OSI),setforthintheInspectionProtocol.Suchrightsinclude:
• Baselineinspectionstohelpverifytheinitialexchangeofdata;
• Close-outinspectionstoverifythattreaty-prohibitedactivitiesactuallyhave
ceasedatmissilesupportfacilities;
• Eliminationinspectionstoobservethedestructionofmissilesandlaunchers;
• Short-noticeinspectionsofaspecicnumbereachyearfortherstthirteenyears
thatthetreatyisinforce;and
• PortalmonitoringoftheSS-25nalassemblyfacilityatVotkinsk,whereSS-20
missiles formerly were assembled.
ASpecialVericationCommissionwillbeusedtoresolvequestionsrelatedtocom-
pliance and agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the
viability and effectiveness of the treaty’s provisions. Routine or special communications
between the parties will be routed through Reduction Centers.
Later this week, Secretary Carlucci and I will be testifying on these provisions before
theSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence.Sufceittosay,thetotalwebofallintelli-
gence sources, including our national technical means and on-site inspection procedures,
provideshighcondencethattheUnitedStatesgovernmentcandetectbreachesoftreaty
provisionsbytheSovietUnionbeforesuchviolationsbecomemilitarilysignicant.
Thus, the JCS have unanimously concluded that, on balance, this treaty is militarily
sufcientandalsoadequatelyveriable.Inturn,theybelievethatthisaccordisinthe
bestinterestsoftheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandstronglyrecommenditsratication
by the US Senate.
Further Implications for NATO
At the same time, it is important to understand what the INF Treaty does not do.
Astoarmscontrol,itisonlyarststep,ifwearetoredressthedangerousimbalance
betweenEastandWest.Whiletheroleofarmscontrolcouldbepotentiallysignicantin
reducing the risk of war, we must understand that this process is a two-edged sword: it
presents both challenges and opportunities.
The Soviets view arms control as an instrument for competitively achieving political
and military objectives vis-à-vis the Free World. They clearly would like to divide NATO
andtoundermineitsmilitarycapabilities.RestrainingtheSDI,eliminatingNATO’sthe-
ater nuclear response (an essential element of Alliance deterrent strategy), limiting Amer-
ica’s ability to exploit its technological advantages in conventional weapon systems—all
of these are high on the Kremlin’s priority list. If these goals could be achieved without
redressing the conventional balance, the Soviets would have gained the unchallenged
superiority they desire.
On the other hand, if the West can keep its arms reduction policy consistent with the
NATOstrategyofexibleresponse,wecanmaintainthesecurityweseekatreasonable
levels of investment—not to mention reducing the risk of nuclear devastation. To succeed
in this endeavor, we must exploit key areas where we enjoy potential long-term techno-
logical advantages…. Under these conditions, arms control could become an instrument
for furthering NATO’s long-term objectives.
ThetreatyhasnoimpactonNATO’sfundamentalstrategy.WhilethePershingsand
GLCMs will be eliminated by the agreement, the United States retains a full spectrum of
capabilitiestoexecuteselectivelyNATO’sstrategyof“exibleresponse”:short-rangemis-
siles, nuclear-capable artillery, dual-capable aircraft, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles,
and strategic nuclear systems. As indicated earlier, both the theater and strategic nuclear
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systems of Great Britain and France remain outside the scope of this agreement. It does
not erase all of the imbalances which plague the Alliance today—especially the short-range
nuclear, conventional, and chemical warfare imbalances. Without further efforts by NATO,
the adverse conventional balance will continue to force excessive dependency on nuclear
use should deterrence fail. In this regard, the United States did make certain that the INF
Treaty would leave the door open for NATO to exploit fully emergent technologies in the
modernization of strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.
Preparing for the Future
Looking ahead, it is imperative for the Alliance to take stock of its military posture and
to reassess the way it is preparing for the long haul. As noted earlier, the strategic envi-
ronment in both NATO and countries outside the treaty area has changed a great deal
since 1949 and is continuing to do so. What sort of future can we anticipate?
The West
OnNATO’spart,wecanexpectatordecliningnationaldefensebudgets,shrinking
demographic trends that create manpower constraints (especially in the Federal Republic
of Germany), and increased emphasis on further arms reduction negotiations. In a simi-
larvein,allmembersoftheAlliancefacemorepressuretomergeeffortswithsignicant
Free World players outside NATO (Japan, Brazil, Australia, and others) and the necessity
to deal with Third-World crises and problems.
In the near term, NATO clearly needs to do more to keep up with the Soviet building
programs and improvements in their theater nuclear and conventional postures. As noted
above, this widening gap has been of concern to members of NATO for some time. Thus,
1983 became the year of nuclear force modernization and 1984 the year of conventional
force improvements.
Nonetheless, a number of factors on both sides of the Atlantic have been working
against NATO’s military posture: the public diplomacy of Gorbachev, diminished con-
cernaboutaPactattackontheWest,euphoriaonthearmscontrolfront,atangledweb
ofeconomicuncertainties,chronicFederalbudgetdecits,andtheallureofdistantas
opposed to current military technologies.
The Warsaw Pact
AsfortheWarsawPact,wemustrecognizethattheylikewisefaceseriouschallenges
and do not necessarily look at themselves as we do. NATO’s investments in conventional
defense may look erratic to us, but they have made a deep impression on Soviet leader-
ship.WhileMoscow’sconventionalcapabilitiesremainformidable,therearesignicant
elements of pessimism in Soviet circles about their ability to defeat NATO rapidly and at
low risk. If our deterrent policy is to remain healthy, we must continue to nourish this
air of uncertainty.
Moreover, there is growing apprehension in the Soviet military that rapid changes
intechnologyareplacingthematadisadvantage,particularlyintheeldofautomatic
data processing—an area crucial to the effective use of emergent technologies. This
concern is, of course, linked to the overall Gorbachev effort to foster general economic
reform and to place his nation in a more competitive position. I genuinely believe he
hascometotheconclusionthathisnationcannotremainarst-ratepowerwitha
second-rate economy. The Kremlin has also demonstrated a rising concern about
NATOmaritimestrengthalongtheirperiphery;weseethisattitudemanifestedin
recent Soviet proposals to curtail naval activity, under the guise of “military detente”
in northern European waters. The Soviets realize that Western maritime strength is
a principal barrier for the global strategic objectives which are essential to their pre-
ferred strategy.
As in the West, the Soviets are heavily involved in the Far East, South Asia, Middle
East, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time, the Kremlin continues to face major
uncertainties concerning the reliability of Eastern European allies which would, in turn,
constrain military operations against the West.
With these changes, the Soviet threat has become more subtle and multifaceted.
Clearly,theKremlinprefersmuscleexing,intimidationofsmallerstates,andthe
employment of surrogates to obtain its political ends. But as Afghanistan demonstrates,
Soviet leaders are still not above the use of direct force when they believe their interests
are served by it.
The key point here is to emphasize that in addressing the Alliance’s future, we must
factor in Soviet concerns, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities. In short, they have serious
problems too, which NATO can and should exploit.
Progress in NATO Councils
Clearly, there is unease in the Alliance about the future, and a great deal of thought has
beengiventothesubjectinBrussels.TheDefensePlanningCommitteeandtheMilitary
Committee are working hard to prepare NATO for the future. The Conceptual Military
Frameworkof1986reectsasolideffortbycivilianandmilitaryprofessionalstoexam-
ine the potential of emergent technologies and to produce a more forward-looking and
fullyintegratedconceptforNATOdefense,especiallyonethatistiedmorespecicallyto
budgets and resources.
In1987,theMinistersgavethiseffortadditionalimpetusbyreafrmingendorsement
oftheConventionalDefenseImprovements(CDI)program,whichlaidoutninecritical
decienciestobetranslatedintoforcegoalsandcorrectedbythemembernations.As
othershavenoted,theCDIdoeshavedrawbacks:noplanofactionormilestonestocor-
recttheciteddecienciesandnosenseofprioritiesforwhathasturnedouttobeavery
resource constrained environment.
Still,theCDIreectsacommonawarenessthattechnologyisNATO’sstrongestcard.
Exploited collectively by the Alliance, recently developed and evolving technologies can
substantially—even dramatically—improve capabilities to blunt an initial assault by the
WarsawPactandattackfollow-onforces.Equallyimportant,suchstepsreinforcethe
uncertainty already present in the Kremlin.
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Inturn,IndsomeveryimpressiveworkbytheConferenceofNationalArmaments
Directorstopursuethesetechnologiesasacommonresearchanddevelopmenteffortand
to broaden the base of procurement. Noteworthy projects encouraged by the Nunn-Warner
Amendment and already in train include:
• Improvedantiarmorandantitankweapons,e.g.,theMultipleLaunchRocket
System,AdvancedPrecisionGuidedMissiles,andInfraredMAVERICK;
• Areaandlocalairdefensesystems,suchascombinedpurchasesofAWACs,an
interoperableIFF[Identication,FriendorFoe]system,andafamilyofsurface-
to-airmissiles(PATRIOT,ROLAND,andRAPIER);
• TheAnti-TacticalMissileSystemnowbeingpursuedbytheUnitedStatesandthe
FederalRepublicofGermany;and
• TheNATOfrigatereplacementprogram(NFR-90).
Overall, programs of this type are strongly supportive of NATO’s need to enhance its
force posture. The traditional and lingering question remains, however: whether NATO
EuropeiscollectivelypreparedtomovefromcommonR&Dtothemoreexpensivebusi-
ness of acquiring and deploying weapon systems required by the common defense. In
essence, this is a critical moment in the Alliance. Never has there been greater need for
bold and creative leadership within NATO councils.
US Contributions
As a leader of the Alliance, the United States likewise must address the crucial issues
confronting NATO, and there is no better time than now as we implement the INF Treaty.
AsIpointedoutearlier,theJointChiefshavebeendissatisedwiththeNATOforce
balance for several years. Admittedly, we have made considerable improvement in our
posture since the late 1970s, and we know that these steps have reinforced uncertainties
in the minds of Kremlin planners. But the Soviets continue to run fast and to match our
efforts. While the Chiefs endorse the INF Treaty, you should not conclude that they will
besatisedafterthetreatyisimplemented—itspeaksonlytoasliceoftheirconcerns.
In their view, allied sustainability and conventional imbalances especially undermine
NATO’ssecurity.TheChiefsbelievethatthesedecienciesmustbecorrectedifdeterrence
is to remain credible as we move into the 1990s.
What the Chiefs prefer, of course, is to develop an integrated concept for the future
that will strengthen all of NATO that lays out a course for our representatives to pursue
in Alliance councils, that guides US investment strategy, and that receives the strong
support of the Congress. Throughout, the US defense effort and strategy for NATO must,
of course, be part and parcel of our worldwide strategy. That is a tall order, but I assume,
Mr. Chairman, that you intended for these hearings to contribute to that goal. Today, we
areworkinghardtobringtogethersuchaconceptinthePentagon.Obviously,wewant
to build upon productive work that has already been completed in NATO: the Conceptual
MilitaryFramework,ConventionalDefenseImprovements,andCommonResearchand
Developmentprograms.Theseeffortsrepresentanexcellentbridgetothefuture.
Our approach to NATO’s conventional defense, of course, is conditioned by some sober-
ing military realities. We will never engage the Soviets with the same number of tanks or
aircraftorpeople.Thisconclusionisreinforcedbycurrentscalrealities.Norcanwebe
ascondentasweoncewerethatourforceswillprevailontheeldofbattlesimplyby
exacting high exchange ratios in one-on-one engagements, i.e., tanks versus tanks. All of
these factors drive us to think about how to use our enduring strengths to exploit endemic
weaknesses of the Soviet Union and to concentrate on high leverage weapons systems. That
isthecentralthrustofrecentworkbythePentagonon“Long-TermCompetitiveStrategies,”
a policy designed to get the most out of our acquisition process.
Secretary Carlucci’s report to Congress on support for NATO strategy in the 1990s
clearly notes that “Competitive Strategies” is not a substitute for NATO Conventional
DefenseImprovements.Thealliesmustmoveforwardtocorrectcriticaldecienciesin
infrastructure, munitions, C3, sustainability, and a host of other areas. We should press
ourNATOfriendstoseetheCDIthroughtocompletion.Still,thetwoeffortshaveone
thing in common: both call for the exploitation of new technologies to blunt the initial
attackandcounterfollow-onforcesofthePact.
The initial cases we have studied apply “Competitive Strategies” to the acquisition of
systems related to the NATO Central Front. They address Soviet concepts for overrun-
ning NATO—the initial air offensive, the rapid penetration of NATO forward defenses,
and the central coordination of forces massed for the seizure of large chunks of NATO
territory. These concepts are the heart of current Soviet military strategy in the contin-
gency of a large-scale conventional attack in central Europe. They also point to endemic
orstructuralweaknessesontheSovietside.Wecaninnitelycomplicatetheirproblem
byconcentratingoncountereffortsinthosespecicareasofweakness.Thestudythen
considers how new technologies can be used to exploit these weaknesses effectively and
disrupt or shatter the Soviet timetable of attack.
Overall, the proposed solution relies heavily on conventional stand-off missiles and
supportingbattleeldandrearareasurveillancecapabilities(greatsimilaritytoFOFA
[follow-on forces attack]). Many of the missiles can be found in present cooperative
research and development programs of NATO. A number of the surveillance systems
are well along in the US research and development program, e.g., intelligence-gathering
cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles. Obviously, all of these must be designed in
range to comply with the INF Treaty.
Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs are insistent on continuing the nuclear moderniza-
tion efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress. For
the most part, the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems permitted by
the treaty:
• ATacticalMissilesystem(follow-ontoLANCE),MultipleLaunchRocketSystem,
andArtilleryFiredAtomicProjectiles;plus
• Air-to-surfacemissile(TASM)toenhancetheeffectivenessofdual-capableaircraft
and provide greater survivability.
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Again,youwillndthatthesesystemsbuilduponcommonR&Defforts,examples
ofwhichwerecitedearlierinmystatement.Dependinguponwarheadselection,these
systems can be used as theater nuclear forces or to strengthen conventional forces, or
both. In this connection, the Chiefs will be proposing a relaxation of legislative restric-
tionsonthenumberofArtilleryFiredAtomicProjectiles.
Likewise, the Joint Chiefs are examining the disposition of our current forces which
will survive the treaty to see if they make sense in the new circumstances.
Overall,theDepartmentofDefenseistryingtogetasmuchdeterrenceanddefenseas
possibleforNATOoutoftechnologiesembeddedinthecoalition’songoingR&Deffort—
essentiallymaturetechnologieswhichcanbeeldedoverthenextfewyears.Everyone
must understand, however, that given a fragile balance, military risks are related more
directly than ever to time in the acquisition process: time to make the political decisions,
examinetrade-offswithinnogrowthbudgets,musterthenancing,lettheproduction
contracts,andeldthenecessarysystems.Wecannotaffordbusinessasusual.
Beyond these efforts, designed to improve our capabilities in the near future, we
must look further ahead and we must place our NATO-related efforts into the context
of worldwide threats and alliances and US global interests. We need a longer-term
view because weapon systems we are now developing will have to serve our strategy at
leastintotherstdecadeofthetwenty-rstcentury.Asyouknow,aFederalAdvisory
Committee, the independent bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,
recently has completed its report addressing these broader long-term issues. I note that
the Commission strongly endorses our coalition strategy and US nuclear guarantees for
the common defense, while stressing that reliance upon theater nuclear forces must be
both discriminate and selective.
Moving Ahead with Confidence
To put all of this into perspective, we should be candid about the leadership challenges
confronting the United States in NATO Councils. Certainly, we cannot leverage our allies
into doing more by threats of pulling out of Europe—that would be thoroughly counter-
productive. At the same time, we are not positioned to take up the slack when and where
the European allies decide to shed commitments or trim back on conventional force
improvementprograms.Insomefashion,wemustgettheideaacrossthatthebenetsof
collective security go hand-in-hand with the burdens of a common defense. In my view,
that is not too much to ask on either side of the Atlantic.
Next, I believe that we deserve credit in NATO councils for dramatically improving
our conventional force capabilities and readiness over the last eight years. We continue
todosowithadefensebudgetamountingtoabout6percentofGrossNationalProduct.
Over the next few years, of course, we will be spending less than previously planned for
national defense in a combined effort with other agencies to reduce the Federal budget
decit.ButIwouldargueverystrenuouslyinNATOCouncilsthatahealthyUSeconomy
is vital to the Alliance as a whole.
Further, I am convinced that American leadership remains crucial to allied solidarity
and resolve, particularly in dealings with the Soviet Union. In this regard, the allies have
presented us with a very full platter: further the process of detente, engage the Soviets in
asymmetrical arms reductions, exploit cultural and economic openings to the USSR, and
do all of this without eroding public support for a strong deterrent and credible defense.
IfrminourdealingswiththeSovietUnion—andwithouralliesintheeldofburden
sharing—I believe the United States can meet this challenge. If we ever vacillate or seem
unsure of ourselves, experience tells me that the allies also will waiver.
Finally, I believe that it is extremely important for the United States and its NATO
allies to prepare for the mid-1990s and beyond. If this time is allowed to slip away, the
Alliance could end up with neither a credible deterrent nor a viable defense. Conversely,
ifthistimeisusedwiselyandproductively,Iamcondentthatwecanachievethefour
objectivesstressedinthePresident’sReportonNationalSecurityStrategy:narrowthe
gap in conventional capabilities, enhance deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and
reduce the risks of Soviet miscalculation.
Remarks at the Opening of the National Prayer Breakfast
Washington Hilton, Washington, DC | February 4
TheNationalPrayerBreakfastbeganin1953asagatheringofleaders—President
Eisenhower and members of Congress—each of whom had, over the course of a lifetime
of service, found strength in a relationship with God. Together they desired to make a
conspicuous renewal of their dedication to abiding principles that unify mankind.
Now, this institution and all it represents has an honored place in the life of this
nation.Today,thereisacorridordedicatedtoDwightEisenhower’smemoryinthePen-
tagon,justoutsidetheofceoftheSecretaryofDefense.Notsurprisingly,athemethat
emerges unmistakably from the exhibit is his enduring faith. In the course of my duties,
I walk past those displays nearly every day.
Overlooking the Eisenhower gallery from a nearby stairway is a painting that res-
onatesdeeplywiththatthemeoffaith.Thesceneisachapel:anAirForceierkneels
at the altar with his young family. Their heads are bowed in devotion, hands folded in
prayer. The inscription below the portrait is a passage from Isaiah (6:8) in which the
voiceoftheLordaskswho,inaworldfullofiniquity,canbesenttoadvanceHiscause.
“WhomshallIsend,”Heasks,“andwhowillgoforus?”
The scriptural response, engraved there and in the hearts of all who serve the Lord
intheirlives,issimpleandeloquent:“HereamI;sendme.”Itisamilitaryscene,andan
American one, but its message is broader. For it depicts mankind’s best and constant
hope to align earthly endeavors with a higher design. It points to principles which are
the ultimate source of guidance and strength for all peoples. And nowhere is the true
purpose of public service—and of leadership in general—better portrayed. In all walks
of life, in all cultures, across all the boundaries that divide our temporal pursuits, the
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words—“who shall go for us”—have challenged every generation as it grappled with the
afictionsofanimperfectworld.
Unfailingly,menandwomenofgoodwillhaveresponded.Selessly,theyhavegone:
toquiettumultandconict,torightallmannerofwrongs,tobattleagainstdiseaseand
ignorance and poverty. They have gone despite privation and heartbreak and discour-
agement,conqueringmortalfearsanduncertainty.Theyhavegonewithcondencethat
those purposes are virtuous, trusting their fate to God.
In that recurrent drama there is one great imperative—unspoken but real—passed
down through the ages to those who lead. Send me, it says, in the interests of justice and
humanity. Send me, in the service of all men’s search for peace and brotherhood. Send
me,inthehopethatmywork,myexample,andifnecessary,mysacrice,willbringus
closer to God’s intent. “I am here. I will go. Send me.”
Thismorning,itisttingthatwewhosharetheresponsibilitiesofleadershipin
America and other countries should pray, together, for the wisdom and vision to see how
God’s design can be realized in this world, and how we can lead our people toward that
exaltedend.Pleasejoinmeinprayer:
HeavenlyFather,wehavecometogetherthismorningtoreafrmourdedicationto
your teachings. We still strive to give your commandments life in our time. We still yearn
for that peaceful concert of peoples, that order of justice and liberty in which all men can
pursue their rightful aspirations in tranquility. We still seek that transcendent unity in
which all can share in the world’s bounty. We know these things are the heart’s desire,
and the birthright, of every individual on earth. Grant us the wisdom to see the way
to these ends through clouds of division and discord. Make us strong against worldly
weaknesses,andvigilanttondandredressourownshortcomings.
Helpustoseeyourimageinothers,andtounderstandtheirwaysofservingandsearch-
ing for your path. Let all understand that to serve You is to hasten the day when nations
without exception shall lay aside rivalries and feuds, and embrace one another as brothers.
This we ask, on behalf of all your children, and in your name, Amen.
Excerpts of an Interview with Mike Wallace on “60 Minutes,” CBS network
television
Washington, DC | March
Q: Chairman of the JCS, the senior military advisor: You are the senior military advisor,
top military man in the United States, but if you command no troops, if you control no
budgets, then all you can do is offer advice. Well, at Reykjavik Summit—your opposite
number, Marshal Akhormeyev—there was some big dealing going on and the top military
manintheUnitedStateswasnotthere.Howcome?
A: Well, I think a deliberate decision was made many years ago that the arms control
dialogue or process would be handled by the civilian side of the government. It’s a
decision I happen to agree with, and it has been traditionally and historically done
that way. We—being the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also myself as the senior advisor,
since I’ve been in this post—we have been in on all the preparations for every meeting,
summit or otherwise that concerned arms control negotiations. Now, that was true of
Reykjavík as well. Everything that was done to prepare to go to Reykjavík, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were consulted and I represented them at the meetings, etc., etc., where
these matters were discussed.
Q:Evenwhensomeofthesethingswerehappeningovernight—whenthePresidentwas
with Gorbachev?
A: Now that doesn’t matter. I have a representative on the scene, and there were some
decisions taken at Reykjavík that were not discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at
the time. You have to appreciate, of course, that the Commander in Chief not only has
an obligation to do things in a thoughtful way, but I would hope that on major decisions
with a high military content that he would consult with the Chiefs. We feel that our
people have a lot of expertise and a lot to offer. But the Commander in Chief also has an
obligationtotakeadvantageofopportunitieswhentheyarise,andIthinkthePresident
saw that at Reykjavík—at least in his mind as an opportunity—and he grasped it. I don’t
have a lot of quarrel with that.
Q: You have said that you were never informed while the Iran-Contra affair was going
on. Why not? Why was Bill Crowe “out-of-the-loop,” so to speak?
A:NowI’vetestied,ofcourse,thatIopenlydidlearn—severalmonthsintotheaffair—
that something was going on, but no, I was not at the outset informed.
Q: Shouldn’t you have been?
A: I wished that I had been. I think that it matters—particularly that it had a military
content, and that in this instance, they were talking about the transfer of arms, and
of course, that is a military question to a certain extent. I personally would like to be
informed and would like to have the opportunity to make a considered judgment as to
whether that’s a wise idea or not on transferring arms.
Q: Why would they want to hold it so close? Why shouldn’t the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff know about that? Why shouldn’t the Joint Chiefs know it and advise?
A: I would like to be informed, of course. Obviously, they felt it was a high risk proposition
and that widening the circle would jeopardize the operation, because of the political stakes.
Now, incidentally, the command authority in this country has that privilege—they can
reduce the distribution of something when the stakes are high, if they make a calculated
decision to do so. You know, I’ve lived a long time by the premise that I want to know what
concerns me and not the things that I don’t have business knowing or I don’t want to know.
Now, whether this is one of those matters or not—that’s a matter for judgment, and obvi-
ously, the judgment was made that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be brought into it.
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Q:IsOliverNorthanationalhero,AdmiralCrowe?ThePresidenthassaidso;theVice
Presidenthassaidso.
A:Well,you’vequaliedthatstatementnowofthelastwordyou’veread,oftheword
“hero.” I think Oliver North is a very attractive man—I don’t know him very well, but
from what I’ve seen, he’s a very attractive young man, and I know he has many, many
sympathizers in this country. But you put the appellation “hero” on the end there, I would
quicklydeneaheroassomebodythathasdoneexceptionallywell,andhasperformed
someserviceorsometaskagreatdealbetterthantheaverage.He’sdoneagoodservice
for his boss, for his organization, and managed responsibilities in a very exemplary man-
ner, and has kept his boss informed—made sure that his boss was informed of what’s
going on. I don’t think I would use the word “hero.”
* * * * *
I think the American people have a rather high regard for the integrity of military
ofcersingeneral.It’sinterestingtonote—I’mnotgoingtomakeaself-servingstatement
here,Mike—butthelasttwoyearstheGallupPollhasfoundthattheUnitedStates
military is the most admired organization in the United States as opposed to other
institutions.
* * * * *
I believe that we are required as military men—not only not to lie and to be honest
in the performance of our duty but also, frankly, we have to have higher standards than
most professions. In managing military operations, it’s absolutely imperative that you
knowwhat’sgoingoninthesceneevenifitdoesn’treectgloryorifitdoesn’treect
that everything was done right, etc. The Commander must know: he must have an
honest appraisal of what’s going on. There are countless examples throughout history,
particularly in autocracies, where the Commanders didn’t report accurately and disaster
followed.Westressthatfromtheveryrstdaythatwebringpeopleintooureducational
institutions.Weinsistonthat—we’renotawless.Imean,itdoesn’talwayswork,butwe
do insist on it and we work very hard at it.
Q:Theperformanceofyourfellowadmiral,JohnPoindexter:wanttogiveusanestimate
on it?
A: Well, I think he was in a very tight position, and I’ve had an opportunity to see those
pressuressinceI’vebeeninmypresentresponsibilities.Hewaspushedandpulledin
many directions—heavy responsibilities—lots of pressure, tough job to reconcile vested
interests that are not necessarily compatible, and he chose a certain way to react to it. I
don’t agree with everything that he did.
Q:ShouldamilitaryofcerbethePresident’snationalsecurityadvisor?
A: I’m on the record as opposing that.
Q: Why?
A: BecauseIfeelthatitputshiminaverydifcultposition,withhisloyaltiestothe
military and also then throwing him into the political cauldron. The national security
advisorisinthepoliticalcaldronandheisforced,rightfullyso,intoputtingthePresi-
dent’sinterestsrightthererst.AndIalwaysthoughtthatthatwaspartoftheproblem
withJohnPoindexter.Ontheotherhand,thePresidentshouldhavetherighttochoose
or select whomever he wants.
Q: Can you see the circumstances, Admiral Crowe, in which you would resign rather
than carry out an order?
A:Ofcourse.Ithinkanymilitaryofcer—throughoutyourcareer—atleastifyoudabble
inhistory,whichIdo,andIcanseeorderscomingdown,thenanofcerwouldhaveto
make the choice.
* * * * *
Now,thatchoicewasoftenposedthatifyouresign,yousacriceyourlife,soI’mnot
proposingthatinGermanyitwasaneasychoice.Don’tmisunderstandme,Ithinkthat
thekindofchoicethatwouldfaceanAmericanofcermorelikely,andbringupthesit-
uation you are referring to, is whether he felt very strongly that a certain course should
be taken—either an operational course or more money or perhaps an administration
comesinandcutstheServicesdramaticallytothepointwheretheofcerfeltthathe
must oppose, publicly, that course of action. Then I think the resignation is in order. But
as long as he’s in the system and he is working for the National Command Authority
andforthePresident,Idon’tthinkhehastherighttoopposeitpubliclyinavigorous
way. But he does have a right to leave his post, and then he has the same freedom of any
American citizen to carry his case to the public.
* * * * *
Comments with Lesley Stahl on “Face the Nation,” CBS network television
April 24
Welcome to “Face the Nation”:
I’mLesleyStahl.AnIraniangunboatredadisablingrocketataSaudioiltankerinthe
PersianGulfthismorning,onlyhoursafterPresidentReaganwarnedIranthatcontin-
ued attacks on neutral parties like Saudi Arabia would be costly. Iran’s new provocation
came despite its already costly defeat on Monday by US forces. Joining us this morning
isAdmiralWilliamCrowe,ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff.Admiral,letmerstask
you about the expanded rules that apparently now cover neutral ships, neutral oil tankers
liketheSaudiArabiantankerthatwashitthismorning.Dothenewrulesrequirenow
that the United States retaliates for that attack?
Crowe: Well, Lesley, you’ve seen some commentary in the press, which you’ve just referred
to. Obviously, after an incident like last Monday’s, we will be reviewing the guidelines that
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wehaveforourcommandingofcers.Wedonotdiscussrulesofengagement,butweare
obviously trying to keep them appropriate and timely. We have not made any decisions
yet on the new rules, but there is a consultation process going on right now.
Stahl: Can you tell us if this line of attack on neutral merchant shipping in any way
inspires our government to take an action against Iran for what they did this morning?
WeheardthePresidentyesterdaywarnIranoverradiothatiftheycontinuetheirattacks,
it would be very costly to them.
Crowe:Odd;buthemadeitclearthatwearenowreturningtonormaloperationsinthe
Gulf;weconsiderourresponseonMondayarestrainedresponsefortheindiscriminate
mining;andwedonotcontemplateanymoreviolenceunlessIrancontinueswhatwe
would say is an indiscriminate and threatening action.
Stahl: What was that they did this morning?
Crowe: Well, of course, they have been doing that for quite some time. But these rules
are under review right now.
Stahl: Well, do you see it as their thumbing their noses at us? I mean, we destroyed half
theirnavyeet,andinsteadofhunkeringdownandrunninghome,theycomebackand
attack another ship, right away.
Crowe: I think your report is apt. Of course, it has something to do with that. On the
other hand, their warships, except those Boghammers, are in port. We have not heard
a peep out of the Iranians since the attack.
Stahl: So those speed boats you take as something different.
Crowe: The level of violence is much less. And, as you saw in the report from the tanker,
they did not feel that they had been heavily damaged. And we will certainly keep those
events in the calculations of this review.
Stahl: All right, there is a story on the front page of today’s New York Times saying that
thePentagonandtheAdministrationarecontemplatingsendingCoastGuardvesselsin
to help the patrols for what now everybody is assuming are expanded rules. In fact, the
reportsaysthatthePentagonnotied—Ithinkyoumayhavebeenoneofthem—notied
Congress that you were expanding these rules of engagement. Is it possible that you will
send Coast Guard vessels in to help the mission?
Crowe: You are trying to connect the two, and I’m not so sure it’s an appropriate connec-
tion. We have attempted, ever since the outset, to be open-handed: in other words, “What
are they doing? What are we doing? What is an appropriate force mix to be in the Gulf?”
And, yes, we are considering those kinds of things. The Coast Guard has a patrol boat
that is particularly appropriate for those types of operations. And we are looking at the
wisdom of it—the parameters, the cost—and we could very well make such a decision.
But the decision has not been made yet.
Stahl: What are you going to say when Congressmen come to you and say “What about
ourwaragainstdrugs?”HowcanyoutaketheCoastGuardvessels—andtheCoast
Guardbudgethasalreadybeencut,andourbudgettoghtdrugshasalreadybeen
cut—how can you take the Coast Guard——
Crowe: But these are ships that are not being employed in that effort.
Stahl: So it will in no way affect——
Crowe: We do not believe so. And if it did, I think that would severely complicate the
calculus.
Stahl: Well, what about the resources that are taboo? I’ve read that you are not in favor
of the expanded rules because of the enormous expense, which I understand is some-
thinglikeamilliondollarsadaytoruntheshipswealreadyhaveinthePersianGulf.
Crowe: Expense, of course, would be a factor, but we are looking at a number of things, and
we believe we can do it inside our present force and cost estimates— if we choose to do it.
But I stress—you insist on implying that these decisions have been made, and they have not.
Stahl: Let me ask you to tell us what’s in your own mind about these tit-for-tat retalia-
tory measures or policy, if you are not concerned that it increases the likelihood of more
direct confrontations with Iran in the Gulf, and where you think that’s going to lead us.
Crowe:I’malwaysconcerned.Pleasedon’timplythatI’mnotconcerned.Ifollowour
operations and I worry about our operations. On the other hand, I think the response
which we mounted this week was measured, was appropriate—and I don’t know of an
operation where so much effort was put in to keeping the loss of life small and trying
to control and constrain it. We warned the platforms, we warned every ship that was
engaged—and as you mentioned earlier in your lead-in, the decision by Secretary Car-
lucci on the Sabalan. This was a very interesting operation from that standpoint, and of
course,itreectsthevaluesofourowncountry,thatwehavenowtremendouseffortsto
makethisjustexactlywhatthePresidentsaid—ameasuredresponse.
Stahl: Are you worried, though, that Iran wants to draw us into more confrontations? Is
there evidence that that is in fact what they are trying to do?
Crowe: I’m not on expert on what’s in the Iranian mind. We spend a great deal of time
speculatingonit—andIsuspectthere’ssomefactionalisminIran;inotherwords,there
is not a consensus. And we never know, for example, whether the Revolutionary Guards
are receiving their orders from Tehran or from somewhere else. They would like to see
usoutoftheGulf;theywouldliketopushusout,andtheywillpresstothelimit.ButI
don’tbelieve—particularlyafterlastMonday—theywantanexpandedconictintheGulf.
Stahl: Well, let me explain why I ask you that question. That is because I’ve heard a theory,
which is they are trying to goad us into confrontation so they can kill a lot of American
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soldiers, the idea being that we will run—we will turn tail and run. And they look at what
happened in Lebanon after 243 Marines were killed, and that’s their goal. They want to
hit a ship, hit two ships, and sort of make us turn around and get out of the Gulf.
Crowe: Well, I’ve heard a variety of theories. I would think that theory might have been
discredited this week. We demonstrated rather graphically that we can take care of our-
selves at sea.
Stahl:LetmeaskyouabouttheSilkworms.Haveyougottenanymoredenitiveword
on what those missiles were that went after the Jack Williams?
Crowe: We are trying to reconstruct those events, and there was some confusion in
reporting.Wedonothaveanyevidenceatthispointthatcanleadustoconrmtheuse
of Silkworms.
Stahl: Doyouhaveevidencethattheyweren’tSilkworms?
Crowe: We have some confusing signals that we are trying to sort out, but we have never
been able to identify those electronic signals with Silkworms.
Stahl: Why did the ship’s crew think that it was? Was there some kind of radar signal?
Crowe: There was a missile in the air. And I think in the heat of combat and confusion,
people label things very quickly. And of course, the Silkworm was the most intense threat
they could face, so it’s sort of wise to say it’s a Silkworm and attempt to deal with it.
Stahl: What else could it have been if it wasn’t a Silkworm. It must have looked like—is
there a Russian made——
Crowe: They have acquired some other missiles that may be at sea or may not. We don’t
know yet.
Stahl: ButnowtellusaboutourpolicyontheSilkwormmissile:itisidentiedasa
Silkworm. Are we in some way bound to knock out the Silkworms that are on the land,
that are stationed there?
Crowe: You are asking me a hypothetical question, and I don’t want to deal with what
we are going to do in the future. Obviously, it would be a very serious escalation of events
in the Gulf.
Stahl: Can we go back for a minute and explain exactly what our policy is right now in terms
of protecting ships? What we will respond to, what we won’t respond to, what the mission is?
Crowe: Well,asIsaidearlier,wedon’ttalkaboutspecicsoftherulesofengagement.
I should say in regard to rules of engagement, however, so there’s no mistaking in any-
body’smind,thattheguidelinesthatwegiveourcommandingofcers,nomatterwhat
the circumstances, allow them the latitude to protect themselves, and to do it effectively
and adequately.
Stahl: But, what’s the mission, what’s the policy, what are the American people supposed
to understand from what we are doing there?
Crowe: Of course, what we are doing is using military force to support our foreign policy,
andthatistoincreaseourinuencewiththosenationsintheGulfthatareWestern-ori-
ented, oil-bearing countries. You know, 60 percent of the world’s oil reserves are in that
area, and the future of the Free World depends in large part not only on the access to
thosereserves,butalsoourinuenceinthatpartoftheworld.
Stahl: Letmeaskyouonenalquestion—I’mreferringtotheprocessindecidingto
retaliate: was the fact that the Kuwaiti hijacking was under way, did that have any role
in the decision to retaliate?
Crowe: Not particularly. I would like to say one thing before we conclude, if I can.
Stahl: Please,youmay.
Crowe: I was extremely impressed with the professionalism of the response this Monday
and of our people in the Gulf. It was exactly correct. And our weapons, which are often
criticizedfortheirsophistication,workedwell,extremelywell.Wewereverysatisedwith
whatweareoftenmalignedon:ourcommandset-up.Itwasshort,exible,andresponsive.
And I think it proved that we do have the right command set-up in that part of the world.
That’s my commercial, Lesley.
* * * * *
News Briefing at the Pentagon on the Iranian Airbus Tragedy
July 3
Editor’s Note: On Sunday morning of 3 July, Aegis Cruiser USS Vincennes passed the
Straits en route to Bahrain to support the USS Montgomery. It then found its helicopter
underreandturnedinsupportofitsaircraft.Bothshipswereauthorizedtoreturn
reagainstmultiple“Boghammer”Iranianattackboats.TheUSSVincennes engaged
and destroyed what was thought to have been an attacking Iranian F-14 but was in fact
a civilian Iranian Airbus. The following press conference ensued.
Good afternoon.
AfterreceivingfurtherdataandevaluatinginformationavailablefromthePersian
Gulf, we believe that the cruiser USS Vincennes, while actively engaged with threaten-
ing Iranian surface units and protecting itself from what was concluded to be a hostile
aircraft,shotdownanIranianairlinerovertheStraitofHormuz.TheUSgovernment
deeply regrets this incident. A full investigation will be conducted, but it is our judgment
that,basedontheinformationcurrentlyavailable,thelocalcommandershadsufcient
reasonstobelievetheirunitswereinjeopardyandtheyredinself-defense.
The sequence of events commenced when a Vincennes’helicopterwasreduponby
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Iraniansurfaceunitsat10:10AMlocalGulftime(2:10AMEDT),approximatelyfortymin-
utes before the air action. Subsequently, the VincennesidentiedtheIranianringunits
and closed to engage. The Iranian gunboats turned toward Vincennes at high speed and
wereengagedat10:42AM,withgunrefromthecruiserandthefrigateElmer Montgomery.
While so involved, the Vincennes detected an aircraft over Iran at about 10:47 AM,
again local time. This aircraft headed toward the Vincennes and commenced closing
at high speed. The Vincennes immediately began assessing this new threat. The sus-
pect aircraft was outside the prescribed commercial air corridor. More important, the
aircraft headed directly for Vincennes on a constant bearing at high speed—approxi-
mately 450 knots.
A warning was sent on both military and civilian distress frequencies beginning at
10:49 AM. This procedure was repeated several times, but the aircraft neither answered
nor changed its course. There were electronic indications on Vincennes that led it to
believethattheaircraftwasanF-14(therehavebeenanumberofF-14ightsinthearea
overthelastfewdays).Giventhethreateningightproleandthedecreasingrange,the
aircraft was declared “hostile” at 10:51 AM local. At 10:54 AM, when the aircraft was
about nine miles away, Vincennesredtwostandardsurface-to-airmissiles,atleastone
ofwhichhitatanapproximaterangeofsixmiles.Duetolimitedvisibility,theaircraft
was not visually sighted until the missile impacted.
In understanding this incident, it is important to appreciate the total context in which
our ships operate. The US government emphasized from the outset that committing
militaryunitstothePersianGulfmissionwouldinvolverisksanduncertainties.This
conclusion has been reinforced by several incidents, e.g., the Bridgeton mining, the Stark
tragedy, and the Samuel B. Roberts mining. A decision was made early in the commit-
menttogiveourcommanderssufcientlatitudetoprotecttheirpeopleandequipment
when hostile intent was manifested. They do not have to be shot at before responding.
ThroughoutourinvolvementinthePersianGulf,theIraniangovernmenthasrepeatedly
threatenedandreduponUSforces.
In September 1987, as a result of the attack on the USS Stark and other incidents,
theUSissuedaNoticetoAirman(NOTAM)whichadvisedallaircraftinthePersianGulf
region that US Navy ships were taking additional precautions and of the need to identify
themselves and to state their intentions. Additionally, they were advised that failure to
respondtorequestsforidenticationandintentions,ortowarnings,andoperatingin
a threatening manner could place the aircraft at risk by US defensive measures.
As to the recent environment, we have alerted our forces of indications that Iranian
units might attempt to carry out attacks against our forces over the July 4th holiday period.
Wearestillintheprocessofreconcilingandcollatingallthedata.Anofcialinves-
tigation of the incident will be conducted by Rear Admiral William N. Fogarty, USN, of
the US Central Command.
Excerpts from News Conference Welcoming Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev,
Chief of the General Staff of the USSR
The Pentagon | July 11
It’s a genuine pleasure for me to welcome Marshal Akhromeyev to the United States.
Itistherstvisitofmycounterpart,orratherarstcounterpartvisittothiscountry
by a Chief of the Soviet General Staff, since World War II. In that sense, I believe it is
an historic occasion. It comes from a dialogue between our two nations that has been
expanding in many dimensions, and I think it is appropriate that we also look for
ways to amplify or to increase the communications links between our two militaries.
This, of course, carries with it the prospect not only of better understanding between
our Services, but ultimately and hopefully of contributing to the process of reducing
tensions between our two nations.
Marshal Akhromeyev and I come from vastly different backgrounds and systems,
but as military men we share many common experiences. We both know the rewards of
a life of service dedicated to our country, the frustrations of a nomadic military life, as
well as an appreciation of the horrors and devastation of war, as Marshal Akhromeyev
sawrsthandfromhisexperienceinWorldWarII.
I hope that at the end of this week’s visit the Marshal and his party will have a better
idea of the strength, honesty, and cultural diversity of our nation, as well as appreciating
the extraordinary capabilities of our Armed Forces. No American military leader wants
war, and I suspect that is true equally on the Soviet side. This visit is, in my view, another
important step in the mutual endeavors of our two countries to insure that the terrible
prospectsofconictarelessened.
Again Marshal Akhromeyev, welcome to America
Joint Statement with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev
Washington, DC | July 11
The US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Soviet Chief of General Staff in their
discussions indicated their intent to pursue policies and actions which will assist the
Armed Forces of the US and the USSR in the avoidance of engagement in dangerous
military activity in the vicinity of each other and in the immediate termination of such
activity, should it arise. To this end, the sides will also ensure the appropriate training
and preparation of their respective armed forces.
Additionally, they indicated that they intend to establish a US-Soviet military-to-mil-
itary working group, to operate under guidance which they shall provide, to explore the
issue of dangerous military activity in greater detail and make recommendations.
Among other things, the working group will review the two sides’ respective capabilities
to communicate expeditiously with elements of the military forces of the other country for
the purpose of preventing dangerous military activity from occurring or continuing between
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elements of those military forces. In addition, the working group will consider whether there
aretypesofdangerousmilitaryactivitywhichcouldarisethatarenotsubjecttospecic
existing arrangements, which should be made the subject of appropriate arrangements.
The two senior military representatives also indicated that there is no intention on
their part to replace or derogate from existing agreements such as the 1972 Agreement
onthePreventionofIncidentsonandovertheHighSeasorthe1947HuebnerMalinin
Agreement on military liaison missions. Their intent is simply to improve their profes-
sional relationship so that members of the military forces of the US and USSR are less
at risk when operating within the vicinity of each other.
News Conference with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff
of the USSR
The Pentagon | July 11
Good morning. When Marshal Akhromeyev began his visit to America last week, I said
that my goal was to have him meet the people of this country and especially the young
men and women who serve in uniform. I believe there was no better way for him to under-
stand the great strength of this country than to meet its ordinary citizens.
We have now reached the last day in the Marshal’s stay in the United States, and
we have reached agreement on several issues which will be of substantive help in
increasing our military-to-military contacts in the future and hopefully in reducing
the possibility of dangerous incidents between our Armed Forces. At the end of this
session, we will be releasing the text of a joint statement and the exchange of letters
between us on military contacts.
However,themostsignicantaspectofMarshalAkhromeyev’svisithasnotbeenthe
militaryequipmenthehasseen,asimpressiveasthatis;rather,itistheopportunitythat
he has had in the last day to take the measure of the people who operate that equipment,
young men and women who love their country and their way of life. I would hope that
this would be his enduring impression of his visit with us.
Marshal, if you would like to make a few comments.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Ladies and gentlemen of the mass media, our visit, the
visitoftheSovietmilitarydelegation,isdrawingtoaclose.Whenwerstmetafew
days ago, I told you that we had three tasks before our visit. It is my judgment that,
thanks to Admiral Crowe, who so earnestly prepared the visit, we successfully com-
pleted the visit and we have carried out all those three tasks.
As Admiral Crowe correctly mentioned here, we made effective the plan of mili-
tary-to-military contacts between the Soviet Armed Forces and the US Armed Forces
for the years of 1988 to 1990.
We also agreed on a joint statement on formation of a joint Soviet–American working
group which would address the questions of reducing the risk of dangerous military
activities when the forces are operating in the vicinity of each other. As the Admiral said,
these documents are going to be released shortly.
Then I should tell you that we spent dozens of hours with the Admiral discussing a
variety of issues. Those were not just conversations of military topics. The Admiral actu-
allytookhistimeinordertoeducatemeinmanyways.Hewastellingmeabouthow
theAmericannationdeveloped.HealsotoldmehowtheAmericanmindbecameasit
is, and I have never read anything like that in any books. Well, naturally, we took some
time in order to discuss the military issues.
We did not engage in negotiating the outstanding military issues here because we
have not received the respective instructions from our political leaders—from the General
SecretaryandfromthePresidentoftheUnitedStates.Butwehavemadeaverythorough
analysis of our concerns addressed to each other.
Let me assure you, those discussions were extremely candid and open, and I’m sure
theyaregoingtobringsomeprotsforbothofusinthefuture.
The second task before us was to get acquainted with the American Armed Services.
We familiarized ourselves with military equipment and naturally with the Servicemen
of the US Services.
We received complete freedom of interviewing anybody in the American Armed Ser-
vices. We received the opportunity to put up any questions. And I have recently met with
thePresidentoftheUnitedStates,andItoldhimthatthehumanrightsinthisregard
have never been violated because, I have received the answers to all of my questions. And
we came to understand that the Americans are supportive of the promises pursued by
thePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandtheGeneralSecretary.
The third task before us was to get acquainted with the American people, to get
acquainted with the cross section of the American society. Thanks to the gracious offer
from the Admiral, we managed to complete this program of ours as well. We met with
hundreds of Americans. We interviewed them. We answered their questions. What we
felt was that the civilian Americans also support the work of the US administration
and of the Soviet government, headed by our political leaders in developing the rela-
tionship between our two nations. We have come to know a lot of new things about the
American society and about the ordinary Americans. I think it is going to be useful
for our professional duties as well. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you.
Crowe:Letmejustsay,Ithinkitwasanetrip.MarshalAkhromeyevwasavery
neguest.Today,we’llbebiddinghimadieu,andIwishhimverywell.
Marshal Akhromeyev: Well, in closing, I would like to say that in Admiral Crowe, I
saw an admirable host who did his best in order to make this visit a success.
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Press Conference Statement on the Vincennes and Iranian Flight 655
The Pentagon | August 19
Secretary Carlucci has just informed you of the action he has taken on the Vincennes
investigation.Iforwardedmyadviceyesterdaytohimandwillgooverbrieysomeof
the major points of my review. Admiral Fogarty’s investigation was conducted with
complete independence from any preconceived notions of culpability or non-culpability.
Theinvestigation,afterfourweeksofwork,submitteditsndingsoffact,opinions,and
recommendations to the Commander in Chief, US Central Command.
The main recommendation of the investigation was that no disciplinary action should
be taken against any US naval personnel associated with this incident. I concurred and
sorecommendedtotheSecretary.Letmebrieytouchonthehighlightsofmyreview.
An examination of the events on 3 July leads quickly to the conclusion that Iran
must share the responsibility for the tragedy, and the investigation so found. By any
measure, it was unconscionable to ignore the repeated warnings of the United States
andtopermitanairlinertotakeofffromajointmilitary/civilianaireldandydirectly
intothemidstoftheongoingsurfaceactionintheStraitofHormuz,whichtheIranians
themselves had initiated.
These tragic events of 3 July did not occur in a vacuum. They happened in an area where
thirty-seven American sailors on board the USS Stark had been killed by an air attack in
May1987andwhereourmilitaryhasbeentestedbyretimeandagainoverthelastyear.
The actions of Captain Rogers and the Vincennes crew must be judged in that context.
The investigation paints in vivid terms the history of our commitment, Iranian
threats,intelligencereports,andthecommandingofcer’sfundamentalresponsibility
to protect his ship and people. It also describes in detail the stress which surrounded
events on the VincennesinJuly.DuringthecriticalsevenminutesthatFlight655was
airborne, Captain Rogers and his CIC team were conducting a surface action, tracking a
multitude of contacts, coordinating US units, and trying to sort out friend from foe with
spottyinformation.Hehadagenuinedilemma.Inthemidstofallthis,thethreatening
aircontactwasclosingatvetosixmilesaminute,andhefeltifitcontinuedtopresent
adanger,heshouldrebeforeitgotmuchcloserthantenmiles.
Thevillainsofthepieceweresixsignicantproblems,whichplaguedthecaptainand
which he could not control or discount:
• Vincennes was engaged in an intense surface action with Iranian gunboats.
• The“unidentied,assumedhostile”contacthadtakenofffromanaireldused
by military aircraft.
• TheightwasheadingdirectlyatVincennesanditsrangewasrelentlesslyclosing.
• Theunknownaircraftradiatednodenitiveradaremissions,soeventheVin-
cennes warnings went unacknowledged and unanswered.
• Thecompressionoftimegavehimanextremelyshortdecisionwindow—lessthan
veminutes.
It was only prudent for Captain Rogers to assume that the contact was related to his
engagement with the Iranian boats—until proven otherwise. The proof never came. Given
thetimeavailable,thecommandingofcercouldhardlymeethisobligationtoprotect
his ship and crew and also clear up all of the possible ambiguities. It is not unusual in
combattohavetodealwithuncertaintiesandconictinginformation.
Althoughitmightnotseemfair,commandingofcersdonothavetheluxuryof
reconciling all such questions before committing themselves. They have to go with
the weight of evidence and their best judgment. These are the realities of combat.
Andthecommandingofcer,ifheistobeeffective,mustbegiventhelatitudetodeal
with them.
Admiral Fogarty’s investigation also revealed that mistakes were made on board Vin-
cennes that day. That, in itself, is not surprising to anyone who understands the stress of
hostileactioninalife-or-deathsituation.Nomilitarycombatoperationisawless—even
when there is a successful outcome. The more important question in this case is whether
those mistakes were critical to the tragic result.
OurearlyWashingtonbriengsoftheaccidentwerebasedoninformationreceived
from the ship shortly after the action, some of which was found by the investigation to
beincorrect.Letmecommentonthesignicantitems.
Admiral Fogarty’s probing revealed that the IFF emission from Flight 655 was Mode
III, which a commercial aircraft normally uses. The Vincennes also detected a contra-
dictory Mode II military squawk and mistakenly concluded that it came from Flight 655.
That detection did lead the CIC team to declare the contact an F-14. Much has been made
ofthaterror.However,thisdecisionmustbeunderstoodinthetotalcontext.Itwasnot
acrucialelementinCaptainRogers’ultimatedecisiontore.Militaryaircraftonattack
runs can disguise their identity using civilian IFF signals or, on occasion, no IFF signal at
all,e.g.,signicantly,IranianF-4soperatingagainstUSunitson18Aprilweresquawk-
ing only Mode III. Under standard procedures, even had the F-14 designation not been
made,theplanewouldhaveremaineddesignatedan“unidentied,assumedhostile,”
and would have been treated as a potential threat by the captain and crew.
Questions have been raised about the ship’s initial report that the aircraft was outside
of the air corridor. This report was wrong. Whether or not an aircraft is in a commercial
aircorridorisaperipheralpointtoacommandingofcerengagedinhostileaction,par-
ticularlywhenthecorridorcoverstheareaofengagement.ThePersianGulfisblanketed
bycommercialaircorridors;theycoverover50percentoftheGulf.
CaptainRogerstestiedthat,inhisexperience,commercialairlinerstriedhardto
stayonthecenterlineofthecorridor.Hedidnotfocusonthefactthatthecorridoris
twenty miles wide, but rather that the contact was three to four miles off the median. The
COinterpretedthatasunusual.Perhapsthemostpuzzlingmistakewastheultimate
call of Flight 655 as descending instead of climbing. The investigation concluded that
therangeandaltitudeinformationpassedtothecommandingofcerwascorrectuntil
theAirbusreachedarangeofapproximatelyfteenmiles.CaptainRogershadalready
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receivedpermissiontorefromhisimmediatesuperior.Oneoftheradaroperators
reported at eleven miles that the aircraft was no longer climbing and the altitude was
decreasing—a report that was not supported by a review of the AEGIS tapes.
Two other reports of descending altitude may have been made at ten and nine miles.
Thelastreportwasapparentlyannouncedafterthedecisiontorehadbeenmade.In
fact, the investigation concluded that the time between the initial report of decreasing
altitudeandthedecisiontorewasintheneighborhoodoftwentytothirtyseconds.Itis
impossibletosaywithassurancehowthosetwoinputsboreonthecommandingofcer’s
naldecision.ButitisimportanttokeepinmindthattheCOhadthisinformationfor
only twenty-thirty seconds and that during this interval he was involved in preparing to
re.Theinvestigationmadethepointclearlythatthiswasonlyoneconsiderationamong
many in the CO’s mind.
Singly, these errors or mistakes were not crucial to the fateful decision. Even cumu-
latively, they do not appear to change the picture in a decisive way. The commanding
ofcerneverreceivedtheclearevidencethathefeltheneededtoestablishthattheIranian
aircraft had not come to participate in the ongoing surface action. Our past experience
in the Gulf, the intelligence available to the ship, and the rules of engagement all sup-
ported such a judgment.
I believe that, given the operating environment, Captain Rogers acted reasonably
and did what his nation expected of him in the defense of his ship and crew. In all good
conscience,IconcurwithAdmiralFogarty’sndingthattherewasnoculpableconduct
displayed onboard the Vincennes.
This regrettable accident—and it was an accident—was a by-product of the Iran-Iraq
War and saddened all Americans, most of all the crew of the Vincennes.
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Special
Subcommittee on War Powers on the War Powers Resolution
September 23
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
It is a distinct pleasure for me to appear before you this morning in response to your
interestinreevaluatingtheefcacyoftheWarPowersResolutionof1973.
I must begin by characterizing my views as those of a professional military man, and
notthoseofaconstitutionalscholarorlawyer.Iwouldliketoofferthebenetofmyown
experiences and observations, particularly from the perspective I have gained over the
last three years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the outset, I want to state for the record that I agree with Secretary Carlucci’s
statement and have consciously attempted to avoid a duplication of his comments.
I strongly share the desire for consultation between the Executive branch and Con-
gress on important issues and policies, especially decisions to commit our Armed Forces.
AsaresultofmyownexperienceinVietnam,IinitiallysupportedtheWarPowersRes-
olution because I believed it would not only facilitate consultation but assist in building
supportforourghtingmenwhenevertheywerecommittedindangeroussituations.
Consequently,IhavefollowedtheuseoftheWarPowersResolutionwithgreatinter-
est, and my present responsibilities have brought me directly in touch with the overall
process. Unfortunately, this experience has led me to revise my original views. I now
believethattheWarPowersResolutionhasnotfunctionedasoriginallyenvisionedand
hasdenitelyhadsomeunanticipatedadverseimpacts.Onbalance,Iwouldstrongly
recommend that the Congress search for other ways to achieve these high purposes.
I do believe that consultation has two healthy effects. First, it is my impression that
the Congress has been kept better informed than in the past. Moreover, I suspect it has
made those on the Executive side think more deliberately about planned actions. This
does not mean, however, that consultation has been a total success.
Thereisnodenition,eitherformallyorpracticallyspeaking,ofconsultation,andit
means different things to different people. In turn, it is used for a variety of purposes,
some of which have little to do with the substance of the issues.
InoticedthatGeneralScowcroftemphasizedthisdeciencyandelaboratedon
the unresolved questions in his testimony. I would certainly associate myself with his
commentsinthisregard.ThebottomlineisthatitisnotclearastowhataPresidentis
expected to do or as to what the character (particularly limits) of Congressional involve-
ment should be.
Similarly, it is graphically clear that the Resolution’s reporting scheme and the
attendant debate has not produced the desired consensus. The Congress speaks with
a relatively uniform voice in favor of Congressional-Executive Branch partnership with
respecttothecommitmentofourArmedForces.However,whenthedebatewasfocused
onthePersianGulf,therewasaloudchorusofcriticismorpraiseoftheExecutive’spolicy
butlittleefforttocometoanalagreeddecisionastowhetherornotthepolicyshould
be pursued. To be blunt, too many members of Congress were content to debate about
theWarPowersprocessandwerehappytoavoidbeingheldaccountableforapprovalor
disapproval of the policy. I do not see this as helpful to the decisionmakers or the country.
In fact, it may be counterproductive. I think this is best illustrated by the effect such
a contest has on two groups outside the United States: our allies and our adversaries.
ThereisnoquestioninmymindthattheWarPowersResolution,andinparticularits
automatic withdrawal provision and the heated debates conducted in its name, have had
a deleterious effect on our relationships with our friends. It has inevitably created a con-
text for their doubts about our ability to maintain a consistent and continuous course of
action with regard to matters concerning their and our vital interests. This debate tends
to have a subtle, but nonetheless real, effect.
We tend to see the robust give and take of our political system as one of our greatest
strengths,anditis.Butwhensuchdebatescenteronspecicforeignpolicyinitiatives,
and when the presence and/or the utilization of our Armed Forces is a central focus of
suchdebate,thenthe“automaticwithdrawalprovision”oftheWarPowersResolution
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formsabackdrop,whichmakesitverydifcultforourfriendstointerpretsuchdebates
as anything other than a lack of resolve.
ThatbringsustotheeffectsoftheWarPowersResolutionuponthosewhoarenot
ourfriends.WhetherornotthereisaWarPowersResolution,therewillbeextended
political comment and discussion in our country regarding any commitment of US
troops.Nevertheless,theconfrontationalformatoftheWarPowersResolutioninsures
a partisan political debate on every aspect of the crisis and a time window for action
which encourages our opponents to use the US political process for their own ends. In
otherwords,theWarPowersreports,orlackthereof,anddebatebecomepartofthe
adversary’stacticalcalculusandmaygivehimaleverforinuencingUSpoliticalwill.
Forexample,theexistenceofaWarPowersResolution,withtheattendantdebate,may
encourage those who wish us ill to test whether we will confront them. By this, I mean
the political dialogue may provide an additional reason to perceive us, however wrongly,
as a nation that is tentative or groping. This can be crucial at the outset of a crisis, when
the prospect of decisive action could deter a further spread of hostilities.
OnceUSforceshavebeencommitted,theWarPowersdebatesmaypushouropponents
to make a maximum effort at the outset with the objective of either eliciting a congressio-
nally mandated withdrawal or preventing the formation of public and legislative support
for the commitment beyond the running of the sixty-day limit on such involvement.
Ontheotherhand,theWarPowersdebatemighthaveanoppositebutequallydamaging
effect. Our enemies could perceive a great advantage to themselves in delaying any decisive
engagementonthebattleeldwhileUSdomesticdebatewasallowedtofester,andagain,
the running of the sixty-day limit brings us closer to a domestic political crisis. It is import-
ant to realize, however, that the reporting provisions of the resolution may also impact our
own military tactical dispositions and initiatives. While I don’t believe this affects the major
decisions to commit, once our forces are deployed, there are often supporting military steps
that could be taken to improve our position. If these actions could be interpreted as putting
people at risk, the potential necessity to notify Congress formally inevitably becomes part
of our operational decision-making. If the deployment has been politicized, then provoking
further congressional controversy may tend to outweigh military judgment.
This outcome, of course, may be what some desire, but I don’t believe that discour-
aging moves that could improve the US military position (and perhaps save American
lives)waspartoftheoriginalrationalefortheWarPowersResolution.Certainly,from
my perspective, this is an unfortunate by-product.
IamcondentthattherearewaystoensurethattheCongressisadequatelyinformed
withoutalloftheaccompanyingbaggagewhichtheWarPowersResolutioncarries.I
would strongly recommend that you focus your efforts on working with the Executive
BranchtoensureaowofinformationtotheCongressonmilitarydeploymentsofmajor
policysignicance.Iwouldexpectthat,oncetheinformationissueisseparatedfromthe
withdrawalprovisionsoftheWarPowersResolution,amoremeaningfulandfocused
debate on the policy issue can ensue, if such is necessary, without unduly jeopardizing
the operations themselves.
Excerpts from Remarks at a Reception held for the World Board of Governors of
the USO [United Services Organization]
Washington, DC | September 28
Thank you very much. It’s a genuine pleasure and privilege to be able to speak to this
group for a few minutes this evening, to say—on behalf not only of myself as Chairman
but also all our men and women in uniform and their families—how much we appreci-
atetheworkoftheUSOandthesupportofallthepeoplewhohavestoodwiththatne
organization. I’m particularly grateful for the opportunity to express my thanks to you
all as devoted supporters and leaders of the USO.
* * * * *
I know it will be hard for you to believe, but I’m old enough to remember the year 1941
well, and to recall the galvanizing impact of World War II on all Americans. Since that
time, not only through wars but through all the vicissitudes and distractions and frus-
trations of a troubled peace, the USO has been a prominent—and indispensable—feature
of military life in America, providing much-needed support and spiritual sustenance for
generations of servicemen and women who have followed the Stars and Stripes to far-
ungcornersoftheglobe.
Since coming to Washington, I’ve talked a great deal to many audiences about the
great American civil-military partnership—the bond between citizens at home who use
their freedom so well in a vast range of productive pursuits, and their colleagues in
uniformwhodevote—andsometimessacrice—theirlivestosecurethefruitsofthose
activities. In its many programs that display the appreciation of Americans for their
Armed Forces and the concern of people at home for military families in posts, camps,
and stations around the world, the USO literally makes that bond come to life. The USO
has made a special place for itself in the hearts of everyone who wears the uniform: a
touchofhome,whenhomeisonlyamemory;ameaningfulgestureoffriendshipand
thanks, reaching out to us when friends seem hard to come by and it is all too easy for us
tofeelforgotten;adeepreservoirofunderstandingandhelpwhenourpeople,especially
our young people, must deal with new and unfamiliar challenges.
The United States has a great deal to be proud of in its Armed Forces, by every mea-
sure—inourheritageofcourageandvictoryonthebattleeld;inthekeypresent-day
missionswetakeon;inourneequipment,logistics,training,andsoforth.Butinmy
view, the real jewel in our crown is the talent and spirit of the young American men and
women who have chosen to serve in the Armed Forces, foregoing many of the amenities
that other professions might have brought them. They are the ultimate source of this
nation’s strength.
Each of you can be very proud of your role on that team, and on behalf of the Joint
Chiefs and all the men and women of America’s Armed Forces, I thank you and wish you
well in the days and months ahead.
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Remarks on Receiving the Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award of the
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Washington, DC | November 14
Iamtrulygratiedtobeheretonight,andtohavebeenselectedtoreceiveyourdistin-
guished service award, for several reasons.
I have long admired the work of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA)—an organization that takes the need for a strong national defense as its charter
purpose, and which works hard to stay informed on defense issues and to advance public
understanding about them.
Iknowthatsomeofyouarey-inparticipantsthisyear,andothersmayhavetaken
part last year when I spoke to you. That sort of interest and engagement is exactly what
we need in our democracy, and says a great deal about JINSA and its members. To keep
our defenses strong, I’ve always believed that it is vital for us to nourish a genuine civ-
il-military partnership in this nation. America’s armed forces can only be as good as our
citizens want them to be, and we need to devote constant effort to sustaining a public
meeting of the minds about US interests in the world, about threats to our interests, and
about what we need to do to cope with those dangers.
So while I may have been chosen as your award recipient this year, I’d like to turn
the tables at the start and thank you for your hard work in improving public dialogue
on these important subjects. It’s a true national service that you are engaged with every
day, and I applaud your efforts.
There’sanotherdimensionoftheseproceedingsthatIndparticularlygratify-
ing—that is, for you to recognize a man in uniform. This has important meaning for
me, because I am proud to stand here tonight as the representative of all the men and
women who serve in our country’s Armed Forces. They are the ones who man the distant
battlements, who patrol freedom’s frontiers, and who stand ready at a moment’s notice
to defend our security. They are the ones who have answered the call again and again,
in remote places and frequently forbidding circumstances, to help friends who rely on
America’s strength in a troubled world.
I think about them every day as I go about my business here in Washington, explain-
ing what they do and what they need. This distinguished service award you give to me
sendsanimportantsignalofafrmation,onaverypersonallevel,tothem,andImight
addtothoseathomeandabroadwhobenetdailyfromtheirservice.Restassuredthat
Iwillcarrybackwithmeyourclearmessageofencouragementandsupport.Ourne
people richly deserve to hear it.
Finally, I am truly proud to receive an award commemorating Senator “Scoop” Jack-
son’s legacy to America. That legacy has, of course, greatly enriched our tradition of pub-
lic service generally. Many would echo the columnist George Will’s observation that the
Senatorwasthenestpublicservanthehadeverknown.Butmorespecically,Scoop
Jackson’s example left us a way of thinking about the world, and about imperatives for
the United States, that was grounded in mainstream American principles—essentially
in the fundamental outlook not only of Everette, Washington, but of Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, and indeed of Main Street America.
Hewasabelieverinhumanrightsandtheinstitutionsofdemocracywhoknewthat
those precious values must be defended as well as proclaimed. For him, the lessons of
historyandtheeventsofhisownlifetimereinforcedcommonsenseonthatpoint.He
knew, moreover, that since the world could be a threatening place for struggling democ-
racies, America, as the strongest free nation, had a special interest, indeed a duty, to
encourage and protect their achievements and prospects.
And he believed that American strength and steadfastness, in concert with the
efforts of friends and allies, was the key to a peaceful future for the Free World. It was a
profoundly internationalist outlook, yet it was also quintessentially American. No won-
der those who understand it can claim that politics really does—or should—stop at our
own borders. And in my view, much depends on our ability to stay the course with that
perspective.
Israel, of course, had a special place in the Senator’s outlook. It rested on a variety of
grounds, including what Scoop Jackson saw personally at the end of World War II. But in
Israel he also saw a society that hewed to democratic traditions despite all the attendant
domesticfrustrationsandinthefaceofconsiderableexternaldangers.Hesawapeople
whose fundamental values resonated with America’s. And he saw an alliance grounded
notonlyonsuchafnities,butonthehopesofallpeoplesforpeace.
TheSenatorworkedtirelesslyforthatMiddleEastpeace,asWashingtondoesnow.He
couldbepassionateinhisspeechesabouttheopportunitiescreatedbytheCampDavid
Agreement. And that sentiment still animates us. Four times in the last eight months,
Secretary of State Shultz has travelled to the Middle East, visible testimony to the inten-
sityofUSeffortstondawaytorealizethefullpromiseofCampDavid.
But in all its dimensions, the Scoop Jackson legacy has indeed been formative for
those who lead in Washington, and I am proud to be associated with it in these proceed-
ingstonight.Hisexamplehassetahighstandardforus,andyoucanbesurethatmy
uniformed colleagues and I will do our best to live up to it as we go forward.
Letter to the Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Washington, DC | November 21
DearMr.Secretary:
As the next administration develops its approach to arms reduction negotiations, it·is
important in my view to look at our organizational structure.
I am persuaded that there are a number of reasons why greater military involvement
in the process would help us advance our negotiating objectives.
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As we get deeper into START and commence serious conventional arms talks, techni-
cal military questions will assume a larger role and require even more military analysis,
expertise, and judgment.
We should look for ways to facilitate those inputs into the policy levels. Similarly, when
thepointcomesfortheChiefstoadviseonratication,itisimportantthattheyhave
condenceinthenegotiatingprocessthatbroughtustothatpoint.Lastly,mydiscussions
with Marshal Akhromeyev led me to believe that the Soviets would regard more visible
militaryparticipationasasignicantindicationofUSseriousness.Ifwecanengineer
such participation without upsetting the principle of “civilian control,” I believe it would
strengthen our overall credibility with both the Congress and the Soviet Union.
The following are suggestions concerning how we might increase the military role.
It is not clear at this juncture if the Bush administration intends to appoint a principal
advisortotheSecretaryofState(andthePresident)onarmscontrolmatters—inthe
samefashionthatPaulNitzeserved.Ifthatistheintent,Iwouldrecommendthata
seniorretiredmilitaryofcerbeselectedtoactashisdeputyandassociate.We,ofcourse,
wouldhavetoattractanofcerofsufcientstatureandwithsuitableabilities.(Iamwell
awarethatnotallmilitaryofcersacquirethenecessaryexperienceortalentsforthis
type of work.) I am thinking of men of the prominence, caliber, and experience of former
CNO,AdmiralJimWatkins;formerDeputyCINCEURsinEurope,AirForceGenerals
WillieY.SmithandDickLawson;orpossiblyourcurrentSACcommanderandformer
PM[PoliticoMilitary]Director,AirForceGenera1JackChain.Ihavenotconsultedany
oftheseofcersandcannotspeaktotheiravailability,butusetheirnamesillustratively.
Iwouldplacethehighestpriorityonsuchanappointmentandamcondentwecould
ndasuitablecandidate.
Inasimilarvein,Iwouldsuggestthataqualiedmilitaryofcer(retiredoractive)
shouldbeconsideredtoheadtheSTART(andDefenseinSpace)negotiations,orinthe
alternative, to act as deputy to the head of delegation (as we have occasionally had in
the past). Frankly, this practice would seem to recommend itself for all our arms control
delegations who are negotiating with the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the Service Chiefs need to identify more closely with the negotiators and
hence to play a more prominent role in the process. To achieve this, the Chairman and
Vice Chairman could be included in summits and perhaps also in ministerial-level
delegations. If this suggestion was adopted, it would be important to accord our senior
military representatives status and access equivalent to that of Akhromeyev or his suc-
cessor as Chief of the General Staff.
It also would be useful if individual Chiefs periodically visited Geneva and spent a
week or so there while arms control negotiations were in session.
Their presence would demonstrate high-level military interest in the negotiations,
and more important, add to their grasp of the complex political-military issues that
negotiators face. I can, of course, easily arrange this if the administration is agreeable.
If you concur that these suggestions are worth exploring, I would be most happy to
elaborate further on them with you and Jim Baker, or whomever you suggest.
Remarks at the Dedication of the USS Okl ahoma Exhibit
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | December 7
I am deeply honored, as an Oklahoman and as an American, to participate in these ceremo-
nies dedicating the USS Oklahoma exhibit. And as a man whose generation can remember
theeventsofDecember7,1941,well,theseproceedingshaveveryspecialmeaning,indeed.
For one thing, it’s gratifying to experience, once again, the strong patriotism—and
genuine respect for the Armed Forces—that is so characteristic of the citizens of this
great state. That sentiment has always been an important source of spiritual strength
for Oklahomans who serve their country in uniform. This exhibit will stand as a prom-
inent example of that pride in America and that admiration for the achievements of her
defenders. But beyond that, I am truly proud to help commemorate an event that says
somuchnotonlyabouttheUSArmedForcesandtheirsacricesforty-sevenyearsago,
but also about America and about her potential for the future. For a few minutes this
morning,I’dliketoelaborateonthosepointsbriey.
AsIewherefromWashington,ItriedtoenvisionwhatPearlHarbor—thatbeautiful
locale, which I remember fondly from later, peacetime years—looked like as Japanese
attackers descended on it nearly half a century ago.
All accounts indicate it was a glorious morning—the sun was warm, the clouds were
high,andtherewasjustaslightbreeze.Ninety-sixshipsofourPacicFleetwereinside
the harbor or patrolling outside the entrance.
On the Arizona, coxswain James Forbis had a working party on the fantail, rigging
the ship for church services. Fleet Chaplain William A. Maguire commented to his assis-
tant that this was a day for the tourists. Men on duty seemed to agree. On ship after ship
they were eating breakfast, getting ready to go ashore to attend church services. Others
were looking forward to a day of swimming at Waikiki, while some planned to go to stores
downtown—therewereonlyfteenshoppingdayslefttoChristmas.
The calm and serenity of that quiet Sabbath was shattered at 0755 as some 360
Japanesecarrier-basedbombers,divebombers,andghtersinatwo-waveattackstruck
targets throughout the island of Oahu. They hit a number of bases, but the enemy’s main
objectivewasthePacicFleet,especiallytheeightbattleshipsmooredalong“battleship
row,” next to Ford Island in the center of the harbor.
Theywerelikesittingducks,andtheskyliterallyrainedhavoconthem.Beforeve
minutes had passed, a direct hit exploded the Arizona’sforwardpowdermagazine.Hun-
dredsofmenwerecutdowninasingleash,andultimatelyArizona went down with
more than 1100 men trapped in her hull.
Severalhundredyardstothesouth,vetorpedoesstrucktheOklahoma’s port side.
HeavybombsandtorpedoesrippedthebattleshipWest Virginia, which settled to the
bottom,hersuperstructureawashintheoil-shroudedwater.Whenalargereragedout
of control, she was abandoned, as was the California.
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On the New Orleans,ChaplainHowellForgydidhisbesttoencouragemenwhowere
laboring below decks without lights, passing ammunition from magazines to the guns. In
the process, he coined a phrase that was to be memorialized in song and become famous
asaWorldWarIIbattlecry,“PraisetheLordandpasstheammunition.”
The Nevada, shaken by explosions, attempted to clear the harbor. The Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Tennessee were also hit and fought to stave off the destruction, which
engulfed their sister ships. On the other side of Ford Island, the target ship Utah, blazing
from several bomb hits, slipped beneath the surface and disappeared. All told, eighteen
ships were either sunk or damaged and most of the Oahu-based Army and Navy aircraft
were destroyed or badly crippled.
Talesofheroismandtragedyonthatdayarelegend,inallServices.AtHickamField,
airmen had to shoot off the locks to their aircraft and load bombs by hand while being
strafed.Onesoldiersetupamachineguninaparkedbomberandkeptringuntil
amesengulfedtheplane.
Second Lieutenants George Welch and Ken Taylor jumped in a car and rushed to
Haleiwaauxiliaryeld,wheretheymanagedtogettheirP-40sintotheair.Rangingall
over the skies, and landing at least three different times for ammunition, together they
bagged seven of the eleven planes shot down that day by Army pilots, and in turn they
receivedtheDistinguishedServiceCross.AtEwaMarineCorpsAirStation,Marines
dragged damaged but unburned planes off the runway and mounted machine guns on
themtoreatattackingaircraft;otherscrouchedclosetothegroundandanswered
enemyraiderswithwhattheyhadathand—theirries.
ButPearlHarborwasattheheartoftheholocaustthatday.Andasenemyplanes
swarmed like hornets above the columns of dense smoke rising from battered and
exploding ships, the men of the Oklahoma wrote their own stories of indomitable brav-
ery into our annals. The Oklahoma was moored outboard of and starboard side to the
Maryland, bow pointed toward the harbor entrance, an ideal target for the attacking
planes, which dashed in low over the submarine base, dropped their deadly torpedoes,
and darted away. When the attack alarm was sounded, Lieutenant Commander William
M.Hobby,thesecond-rankingofceronboardtheOklahoma, immediately ran topside
tobegreetedby“adinofgunreandexplosionsfromalldirections,”andhefelttheship
shudderdeeplyasthersttorpedohit.Immediately,thewoundedwarshipbeganlisting
to port. A second torpedo hit, and then three more in quick succession tore open what
was left of her port side.
Streams of men poured topside through the hatches, gathering on the starboard side
as the ship leaned farther to the left. As the listing continued, so did the explosions and
fuel oil spewed out onto the water and splashed in streams over everything and every-
one topside. Finally, the Oklahoma rolled over on her side. In the words of one onlooker
on Ford Island, it happened “slowly and stately, as if she were tired and wanted to rest.”
Shekeptrollinguntilshewasbottom-up,onlyeightminutesafterthersttorpedohit.
Hundredsofmenhadmadeitupfrombelowandhadworkedtheirwayalongtheside
and the bottom as the ship keeled over.
Many swam through the oil slick to the Maryland, or to the Ford Island landing, or to
boats that were shuttling back and forth picking up survivors. There were many cases of
men aiding others to swim, and in some cases actually towing their stunned or injured
comrades through the waters.
LaterCommanderHobbyremarkedontheircalm—andonhowtheyallseemedtobe
thinkingofhowtogetbackintotheghtratherthanofseekingsafety.Oklahomaofcers
and men who got aboard the Maryland ran to help that ship’s antiaircraft battery. Others,
on the dock, asked where they could go to join the battle, and some clambered aboard a
tanker that needed more men to help in getting under way. Still others manned rescue
boatsintheburningharbor.AMarinesergeantnamedHaileyvolunteeredforamission
inasmallunarmedplanetolocatetheJapaneseeet.Uphewent,rieinhand,still
wearing only the oil-soaked underwear he wore from the Oklahoma.
Looking back from our perspective decades later, it’s hard to think of a more stirring
illustrationofthevalorandreexivecomradeshipofAmerica’sServicepeopleintheface
of truly desperate combat circumstances. But the drama didn’t end when the attackers
hadleft.Theship’sexecutiveofcerCommanderJesseKenworthy,CommanderHobby,
and others went back out to the Oklahoma’s hull and tried to locate and save survivors
trapped inside. Ultimately, thirty-two men were recovered alive, and their stories are truly
inspiring. Trapped in the dark, immersed in water and oil, many of them were unaware
that the ship had heeled over and were uncertain of their location inside her. Some were
trapped in groups and had to watch their friends die as they took turns in searching
unsuccessfully for a way out. The air grew fouler, and the water rose higher, with the
passage of the hours. In one case, a man found a way out—a submerged porthole—but
he was himself too large to get through it and was left behind as smaller men escaped.
More than four hundred others would perish in similar manner, entombed in that over-
turned hull. Rescue crews worked feverishly outside, listening for sounds from the lower
compartments, poring over blueprints, tapping and waiting for responses, and following
directions of the few who managed to escape. Thirty-six hours after the attack, the last
survivor was brought out from the wrecked battleship.
ThirteenNavymenearnedtheCongressionalMedalofHonorfortheiractionson
December7,1941.SixtyNavyCrosses,sixty-veSilverStars,andfourDistinguished
Service Crosses were awarded for gallantry. But every sailor, soldier, Marine, airman,
and civilian who answered the call to duty on that day was a hero.
Today—and all days hence at this exhibit—we will honor these heroic deeds and
thousands more like them. In a larger sense, however, the more than 2200 Americans
whogavetheirlivesonDecember7,1941,serveasareminderforfuturegenerationsthat
freedom is not free, but demands recurring payments of courage, dedication, and service.
Soaswepausetorelivetheactsofheroismandhonorthecourageandsacrices
of the crew of the USS Oklahoma, it’s also important that we remember this date in its
broadercontext.ForPearlHarbormarkedanimportantturningpointinworldhistory.
Inasymbolicsense,astheeetatPearlHarborstaggeredandcaughtitsbalanceinthe
months following the attack, American power rose from the depths of ambivalence and
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isolationism. All doubts were thrust aside, and for better or worse the United States was
thrust into the role of a great power. There was no turning back.
Thedefeatof7Decemberrivetedourcountrytogetherasnoothereventcould.Pearl
Harborbecamearallyingpointforourpeople.Nolongerwouldwesitonthesidelinesas
tyranny engulfed Europe and Asia. As Admiral Yamamoto, Commander of the Japanese
Fleet,feared,theattackonPearlHarborawakenedasleepinggiant.Americabecame
onecountry—enraged,unied,anddetermined.
Only those of us who lived through that period can truly understand the meaning of
these words and how unforgettable it was to see our great nation totally engaged in the
pursuit of one common aim. It’s unfortunate that we cannot better convey to our children
what that means and how awesome America’s strength is when it is genuinely energized.
The commitment of the American people was vividly illustrated in factories across the
country. The magnitude of our war effort was truly staggering. By June 1944, we were pro-
ducing 100,000 aircraft a year. We tripled our ship production in twelve months. Between
PearlHarborandnalvictory,Americanindustryturnedout87,000tanks,315,000artil-
lery pieces, and almost three million trucks. In all, the United States produced 50 percent
of the total allied armaments used against Germany and Italy and 86 percent of those
employedinthePacictheater.Theterm“ArsenalofDemocracy”wasnotanidleboast.
AtPearlHarbor,theeffortwasequallyremarkable.TheWest Virginia, California, and
Nevadawerereoatedandsenttoshipyardsonthemainland.Allthreewereultimately
repairedandsawactioninthePacic.TheMaryland, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania were
returned to service by early 1942. The quick action and dedication of salvage crews and
repair teams allowed most of the ships damaged during the attack to rapidly rejoin the
eetandtakepartinthewar.
These outstanding efforts on the home front complemented our uniformed men and
women,whocarriedthememoryofPearlHarborintobattlewiththemthroughoutthe
world. Over sixteen million Americans rallied to the colors. They fought in every clime,
every ocean, and every corner of the globe. On land, on sea, and in the air, from Midway to
thegatesofBerlin,ourservicemenprovedthatAmericacouldandwouldghtwithvalor
and unswerving determination when its fundamental ideals and institutions were at stake.
WhatstartedhereinPearlHarborasatragedyproducedacrusadethatculminated
four years later in victory. The three totalitarian regimes which threatened freedom
throughout the world had been decisively defeated. Moreover, the planet would never be
the same again. Many of the shackles of the past had been thrown off.
By the end of the war, a new international order had arisen. The United States stood
as the undisputed leader of the Free World. The nationalism that in postwar years created
overonehundrednewnations;thephilosophicalmovementsofthe1950sand1960s
formedtoghtracism;thesurgeforwardincommunicationsandtechnology,which
broughtthewholeworldclosertogether;themarchintospace;thetremendousstridesin
modern medicine—all of these great forces were spawned in the dark days of World War
II and nourished by returning warriors as they hammered their swords into plowshares.
PearlHarborwas,indeed,awatershedinAmericanandworldhistory.
Walter Lord closes his book Day of Infamy with a moving chapter describing the people
andsightsaroundOahuasDecember7drewtoaclose.Rumorsofeverydescriptionwere
rampant. Uncertainty, shock, fear, and anger were common. As evening colors sounded,
all work stopped. Men and women snapped to attention and saluted—the simple cere-
mony taking place as always, despite the day’s disaster.
ForEnsignEdJacoby,trudgingtothebogafterlosingtheghtagainstWest Virginia’s
res,thatritualremindedhimthathiscountrylivedon—thatithadsurvivedblowsin
the past and could do so again. Nurse Valera Vaubel joined others at the naval hospital
in a spontaneous cheer. At least this sundown she was still free. It says something about
America that the thoughts of the survivors would at the end of that horrible day dwell on
their country and their freedom. They were right, of course. Our nation, its principles,
and its values do have a life of their own.
TodayisatimetosalutethosewhogavetheirallatPearlHarbor—theyaremartyrs
intheirownright.Letusneverforgetthattheirsacricesweremadeinthenameof
our way of life. More important, let us never forget they, as free men, “voluntarily” made
sacricestopreservetheirwayoflife.Thatmemoryisespeciallyappropriatetodaywhen
we are often posed with a tradeoff between the quality of our life and our security. A way
of life that espouses the dignity of the individual, that opposes aggression and oppres-
sion, that believes, no matter what the obstacles, men and women should never willingly
relinquishtheirfreedom.ThisistheheartofPearlHarbor’slegacytous.Inturn,this
magnicentlegacychallengessucceedinggenerationstopickupthetorchandtoinsure
thattheameoflibertyneverdies.
This morning, our young people from the Naval ROTC unit at Norman read out the
names of those who died on the USS Oklahoma. May their generation and those which fol-
low always cherish that memory and honor all that this exhibit commemorates. And may
the ringing of the bells across this state, which we have just completed, always resound
intheheartsofOklahomanswiththegreat,enduringlessonofDecember7,1941.
Remarks at the National Defense University
Washington, DC | December 14
Thank you. I’m not so sure how comforting it is to have a Chairman with all those dead-
end jobs behind him. I’m afraid you’ll break whether you like it or not. I couldn’t help
thinking as I was walking down the corridor to come in to the auditorium, as you see
the artifacts that have been gathered by previous college classes in their travels, that I
was always a little surprised that when Neil Armstrong descended on the moon, there
wasn’t a plaque there that said “The National War College.”
Anyway, that’s the only spot I knew of in the entire solar system that doesn’t have
one.Iamgenuinelypleasedtobeheretoday;Itrytocomeannually.Ithinkit’salittle
more nostalgic today because, according to some transition stories in the local papers, I
ought to be grateful that I’m still in Washington at all. That is courtesy of George Wilson.
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This tour can be an amazing place at times like this. It’s really feverish about who’s
going to do what, where, and when. I am not heavily involved in that process, but like
many of you I suspect, you follow the newspaper reports closely. My everyday problems
go on, however, just as usual, whether it’s the transition period, or even whether it is
Christmas or not.
Asyouareaware,IworkinthePentagon,andthat’sabuildingwithvesides—one
for every issue. And we see most of those sides in the Joint Chiefs. As Chairman, I sit
unfortunately in the middle of controversy a great deal of the time. For example, right
now the Air Force wants me to move toward strategic systems. The Army wants me to
move toward forward deployments. The Navy wants me to move out of town. It would be
a lot funnier if I was joking.
I apologize for the state of my health. It is bad. I just came back from a trip yesterday.
My wife says that growing old takes courage.
Someone asked me not too long ago how in the world I came to be the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs. I said, “I don’t know, it just happened. I don’t blame anyone.”
I think the Christmas season in Washington is both a time of joy and of trauma. The
joy comes from the congressional recess, and the trauma, of course, comes from the
necessity to do Christmas shopping and other exciting circumstances. Just the other
day, I had a saleslady try to interest me in a teenage doll that has something to do with
myfamily.Itwasateenagedoll;youwinditupanditresents.
I don’t mean to scare those who may be headed for jobs in Washington. I suspect many
of you have already suffered that ordeal. I just suspect that perhaps you don’t realize
how lucky you are to spend a year in refuge, in a place that is devoted and dedicated
to ideas and learning. I hasten to add that I know the War College environment has its
own frustrations. On visits like this, I am often reminded, of course, of my own academic
experiences. At the very least, I advise a certain amount of cynicism where your profes-
sors are concerned. I learned early in my academic career that teachers are not always
direct, and maybe you must be careful of what they say. In my early days, several of my
teachers used to insist that a man becomes what he thinks about. This was designed, of
course, to encourage studiousness and high thoughts, but I later discovered that it was
somewhat misleading. If it had been true, then by the time I was eighteen I would have
been a girl. I hope that doesn’t offend anyone.
Such disillusionments aside, I truly envy the opportunity that you have this year to
widen your horizons, to study your profession, and to exchange ideas with your peers from
all of the other Services, and other government agencies as well. Further, you are attending
an institution that was in the forefront of the jointness movement, something that is sort
of close to me. It was in the forefront of that movement even before there was one. I can
assure you, that trend is only going to grow in importance over the coming years.
Obviously, you arrived here experienced in the affairs of your individual Services,
and surely also with the esprit that the Service training gives you, gives all of us. These
are extremely important, and there’s no way that they won’t be important for, in the end,
theyaremainstreamskillsandattitudesthatwillalsoplayacentralpartinwarghting.
Our deterrent strategy requires that we be able to plan, operate, and lead in a truly
integrated, cross-Service fashion. Further, budget constraints, which clearly loom on the
horizon,forceustomakedemandsforefcientuseofourresources,andinmybook,
thattranslatesintojointness.Iencourageallofyoutogetallofthebenetthatyoucan
concerning the joint perspective from your studies. The Nation as a whole and the Ser-
vices individually will be the winners if you do.
Since the prevailing mood has been so caught up with the end of one administration
and the arrival of another, what I’d like to do today is to survey some geostrategic land-
scape that I see emerging, and some of the resulting challenges that we will confront,
oratleastinmyview,thatwillconfronttheincomingadministration.AndyouasNDU
graduates will also face those problems.
Let me just say in a prefatory fashion that my remarks will be, of necessity, highly
compressed, but I would be happy to expand on them in the question and answer period.
Iknowthere’sawealthofcuriosityoutthere.AtleasttherewaswhenIcame;maybe
I’ve killed it already. But I’m looking forward to both hearing from you and addressing
your queries.
First, let me say a few words about what the strategic landscape looks like from where
I sit as Chairman. There are a number of general trends in world affairs that have devel-
oped over the last decade, which are molding the international community. I suspect
that many of you have had the opportunity to examine them in your studies here and
elsewhere.
They include the ever–increasing economic interdependency among nations, the
growing dispersion of economic power, the globalization of commercial networks and
capitalmarkets,ourowndecitproblems,theloomingdebtsofthedevelopingcountries,
and the fact that we are literally standing on the threshold of nothing less than another
industrial revolution, which will produce a host of new technologies, materials, processes,
and products.
No one can say for sure how these developments will eventually turn out or what
this globe will look like as they unfold, but they have already had a profound impact on
the international community as well as on the calculations of political leaders. In turn,
they have greatly complicated the calculus of defense, thrusting military personnel into
a large spectrum of disciplines and communities, both in and out of the government.
In my view, this trend puts a high premium on the ability of our Services to attract
and to retain competent personnel who can deal with the sophistication of the modern
world. I foresee no change in these trends or in this reality. It also will greatly test rising
leaders like you to prepare themselves for responsibilities at the top, which are not easily
compartmentedaccordingtowarghtingspecialtiesoraccordingtoServiceexperiences
or even according to our status as military professionals.
PresidentKennedyonceadmonishedtheJointChiefsthathewantedthemtobemuch
more than military experts when they rendered advice to him on national security affairs.
That guidance is even more relevant today and certainly will apply as you rise in the
Service ranks. Apart from those broad trends and their indications for your generation,
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I can give the picture as seen from my post a little more shape and a brief overview of
the world’s geographical regions.
TurningtoAsiarst,Ithinkwendanupbeatstoryongoinginthatkeypartof
theglobe.Iwouldbehard-pressedtondanotherregioninwhichourlong-termpoli-
cies—economic,political,andsecurity—havebeensosuccessful.Herecommunismis
an economic and social model clearly on the wane. The Soviets have fallen miserably in
penetratingtheAsianmarketplace.Democracyhassteadilyspread,thoughnotevenly,
andtherecenteconomicprogress,asIamcondentyouareaware,isinmanyrespects
mindboggling.
From the military perspective, furthermore, I would argue that the postwar Asian
history has been most satisfying, Vietnam notwithstanding. Washington has worked
closely with our friends over the years to provide the security shield that has protected
their advancements and aspirations, and it has permitted them to develop in their own
fashion and at their own pace.
WhenIwasCommander-in-ChiefPacic,Asianleaderscontinuallyemphasized
this theme to me and pronounced that US forces should remain forward deployed in
thewesternPacic.Butthereisnoquestionthattheregionnowpresentsusanewset
of economic and foreign policy challenges. Indeed, in many ways, Americans are now
confronted with the consequences of their success: energetic economic competitors and
livelydemocraticsocietiesthatareexingtheirmusclesandredeningtheirrelationships
with the United States. Those dynamics are going to need statesmanlike tending in the
coming years, and we are already engaged in those issues.
Likewise,themilitaryrealitieswillstillrequireattention.ThereachofSovietPacic
naval and air power has expanded annually, as does the order of battle at Cam Ranh
Bay, and retaining access to bases in the area, I suspect, will be an issue for some time to
come. But nevertheless, by and large, from the macro view, from the military perspective,
our Asian problems do seem to be manageable. Certainly the progress and stability of
East Asia are powerful testimonies to the wisdom of a forward deployed strategy.
In Europe, however, I would suggest or argue that the story of success has similar
themes, yet our long-term strategic picture is less clear. America’s economic center of
gravitymaybeshiftingtowardthePacic,andIarguedthatitwaswhenIwastheCom-
mander–in-ChiefPacic,butourprimaryforeignpolicyfocuswillremaininWestern
Europe for the foreseeable future, primarily because that is where the most demanding
threatandstrategicenvironmentstilllooms.Theuxthatwehavewitnessedinrecent
years promises to continue, and in my view, will complicate matters far beyond what we,
Washington and our allies, are accustomed to handling. And let me tell you why.
The free nations of Europe have continued to integrate their markets and have come
together on many economic and social issues, all of which may be setting the stage for
astronglyEuropeanavorwithinNATO.Certainlythatwillbeadesirableoutcome.
Unfortunately, the day is still some time off. In Moscow, meanwhile, General Secretary
Gorbachev,whohasconsumedmuchofourheadlines,ispursuinginternalreforms;
makingoverturestotheWest,includingtradeandnancialinitiatives;andmodifying
somewhattheKremlin’straditionalforeignpolicies.PerhapsIshouldn’thavesaid“some-
what”—fundamentally modifying the Kremlin’s traditional foreign policies, totally: engi-
neeringthetroopwithdrawalinAfghanistan;joiningwithPresidentReaganinaserious
armsreductioneffort,namely,INF;andnowpubliclycommittingtotroopreductionsand
to force restructuring in both Europe and Asia.
The world is rightly curious as to what is inspiring these rather remarkable develop-
ments. My own view is that Gorbachev and his supporters, incidentally including some
ofhismilitaryleaders,havecometotheconclusionthattheUSSRcannotbearst-rate
poweraslongasitisplaguedwithathird-rateeconomyandanossiedbureaucracy.He
understands that Moscow’s global interests in the long run require a better support base,
and at least some of the effort they devote to maintaining large oppressively clustered armed
forcesandtosustainingdifcultexternaladventurescouldbeputtobetteruseinternally.
To achieve these goals, he needs time, a stable international climate, and foreign
capital.Hisrecenttroveswillcontributetoallthree.Itisnotsoclear,however,that
theGeneralSecretarycansellthenecessaryexchangesandsacricesassociatedwith
domestic restructuring to his countrymen.
InEasternEurope,similarly,thecommunisteconomicmarvelisspartan.People
have grown restive under party rule, and powerfully, there is increasing receptiveness to
systemic change. For some time I have believed that these nations have been unreliable
allies for Moscow, and if the Kremlin’s military presence really does decline in Eastern
Europe over the next few years, their desire for autonomy will more than likely become
more pronounced.
ManyintheWestwillndthiscomforting,anditmaywellbe.Butitmaywellsignalan
era of great uncertainty and instability, which in our business can be rather unsettling. It
isn’t yet clear where all these developments are taking us. Out amidst all the stirring there
is one persistent reality that can’t be denied: the Soviet military strength that looms over
the continent is still most formidable, still defensive in character, still backed by a vigor-
ous modernization commitment, and even if the promised reductions and restructuring
materialize, the Kremlin retains a large advantage on the conventional scales.
There has been a lot of discussion, including Marshal Akhromeyev and myself—the
Marshal just retired this week, and I noticed this morning in the newspaper an article
astohisrelief—alotofdiscussionaboutmodicationsoftheSovietmilitaryleadingtoa
defensive posture. Some of the changes Gorbachev outlined in his UN speech to address
these concerns, notably the intention to withdraw forces that are positioned to facilitate
quick cross-border thrusts against NATO—armored forces, and bridging capabilities and
so forth. If he keeps his promise, it will be a most welcome development and will modify
the military calculus fundamentally in Western Europe.
In the meantime, my counsel has been that the best attitude for professional strat-
egists in the West is to be watchful and wary, waiting for the deeds that the General
Secretary has said will follow his words. The full impact that we are looking for—force
structure, doctrine, and so on—clearly will take time to manifest itself, and Marshal
Akhromeyev made that point most emphatically to me. After all, we are talking about
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changes to central features of an organizational structure, the most organized structure
the world has ever known. In other words, I don’t think we should be readying ourselves
quiteyettoputoutanotherversionofSovietMilitaryPower.Ontheotherhand,Iwould
counsel that we must be patient, and I do mean patient, as well as healthily suspicious.
But in the face of these developments, the challenge—and it will be a very, very imposing
one—willbetopreserveourownstrength,tokeepouralliesunied,andtostayforward
abroad until the Soviets can demonstrate in a concrete fashion that they are pursuing
these new defensive themes seriously and for the long haul.
HereIamfranklytalkingaboutpoliticaltasksratherthanmilitaryones.Thatadvice
or prescription for the future will be easier to say than to do. Unfortunately, Gorbachev
is complicating the problem with very astute and disguised appeals to European public
sentiment.Hisinitiativesarereinforcingthealways-presenttendencyofmanyEuropeans
to discount the threat and to lay down the need for military strength. In security issues,
NATO leaders today are sharply divided on the danger, the cost, the need for a foreign
presence, environmental concerns, training inconveniences, and so on. This tendency is,
frankly, the real heart of our problem, and it spells trouble for the alliance as we proceed
with a very large agenda, which includes, among other things, dangers that we will adjust
the ways that we share military responsibilities and burdens.
Overcoming these challenges and managing the coalition consensus, or obtaining
coalition consensus, will require statesmanship and imagination of a very high order. I
hope we are up to it. Clearly, from my tone, I am not as optimistic as perhaps I should
be. I hope it’s the water.
For some time now, strategists in the United States, in government and in academia,
have known that it is in the Third World that perhaps the most likely and direct threats
to US interests will arise. Of course, we are seeing that today in our military deployments.
Globalinterdependencepluspersistentproliferationofhightechweaponshavemodied
these dangers. A sample listing illustrates the point.
Tensions and age-old hatreds in the Middle East persist, with the prospect of war
and episodes of violence as part of everyday life in the region. The Near East cauldron—
Pakistan,IndiaandAfghanistan—continuestoseethe.Accesstooverseasoilwillclearly
preoccupytheworldnationswellintothenextcentury;witnessourcurrentoperations
inthePersianGulf.InLatinAmerica,whichIreturnedfromlastnight,weconfrontan
insidiousdrugtrade,self-styled“liberation”movementswithbuilt-inanti-USavorand
Soviet, Cuban, or Nicaraguan backing. The threat of terrorism and low-intensity con-
ictcontinuestoexpandaroundtheglobe.Thesefewexamplesmakethepointthatthe
likely military gauntlet that we will have to pick up in the coming decade will be regional
instabilities which threaten our foreign and economic policies, as well as the survival of
many of our friends and allies.
We have been steadily enhancing our capability in the counterterrorism area and our
abilitytomountspecialUSoperations,buttheseareonlyrststepsaswelearntodeal
with this mushrooming threat. It will require different development, training, tactics,
and approaches than traditional warfare. For these kinds of scenarios, furthermore,
America’sresponsedependsonagreatdealmorethanjustwhattheDepartmentof
Defensecancontribute.
Also important are a range of factors concerning public and congressional attitudes,
and I’m talking about public education, capabilities of other US policy tools (diplomatic,
economic, and so on) and the attitudes of the nations whose interests may be endangered
by these low-level threats.
Frankly, there are some very complicated security problems that will continue to
arise behind the grand eternal shield that we have erected toward the Kremlin. But to
develop and integrate a balanced approach to these issues will be a major test for the
newadministration,particularlyasscalpressuresgrow.
In addition to these international developments, defense planners in the next decade
arealsogoingtofacesomeburdensomeresponsibilitiesathome.Thersthastodowith
the fact that the military dimensions of daily international affairs tend to be reserved
forcitizensofthedemocracieswhoareenjoyingarelativelyafuentandplacidlife.That
certainly characterizes our own. And in our republic, that tendency can be sometimes
quite pronounced for defense-related considerations to compete successfully with other
compelling priorities on the Nation’s agenda. In war, we remember the Alamo, the Maine,
PearlHarbor;ingoodtimes,weforget.Asamatteroffact,becauseofforgettingwehave
paid an extremely rich price four times within the last hundred years. We forget the stra-
tegic accord and the political goals which unify us, and we lose sight of the real dangers
of international life and the need for strength to keep them at a distance.
DuringmytenureintheChairmanship,I’vebeenwrestlingwiththeeffectsofsome
of these peaks-and-valleys cycles. In the early years of the Reagan administration, we
saw, and you and I experienced, a marked revival of military capabilities that had been
neglected in the 1970s. But now our resources have been constricted by negative real
growth in budgets for four successive years, and I am constantly told by congressmen
that realities, quote unquote, whatever those are, and they never amplify, will dictate
decreasingDefenseappropriationsfortheforeseeablefuture.Notmanyofthem,however,
have much to say to me or to our citizens about overseas threats, international conditions,
the status of our forces, or what I would call, in general, the military realities, particularly
those that do not conform to their views of the political climate.
This inability to consider strategic questions in a reasonable and consistent manner
isbothinefcientanddangerous.Iamafraidthatthebottomlineisthatyouarecon-
demnedtoworkinginaninefcienteconomicenvironmentwhereeconomicconditions
will continue to expand and contract arbitrarily.
Thispracticemakessteeringastraightstrategiccourseextremelydifcult.Military
leaders are constantly criticizing it, but with very little success. The important point is
that you should continue to prepare yourselves to function in a pluralistic and conten-
tious policymaking system that is pushed and pulled by many vested interests outside
of yours and mine, the military. It will be frustrating, and I am sure that many of you
have already sampled that frustration, but the Nation needs you to continue to engage
these windmills and not to withdraw from the fray. There was a line on the new TV sitcom
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“Roseanne,” which I only watched once—not because I didn’t like it, but because I don’t
gettheopportunity—thatinasensespeakstolifeinthePentagon.Roseanne’shusband
told her about friends of theirs who were getting a divorce. She said she wished that that
couplecouldndawaytostaywithit,downinthemaritaltrenches,sluggingitouton
thebattleeld,likealltherestofuswhobelievein“truelove.”
Now life in the military, or for the military in a democracy, isn’t much like a honey-
moon, but if you stay in the trenches and slug it out good-heartedly, you can win a few,
and on occasion, life can be very rewarding. Most important, the stakes are high, and the
struggle you are engaged in has to do ultimately with the survival of the republic. And
while I am on that subject, let me say something a little more general about serving and
leading in this perplexing and often frustrating job. A few days ago, a friend explained to
me the difference between a politician and a statesman. A politician makes the possible
necessary, and a statesman makes the necessary possible.
Now, this simple witticism is designed to amuse, but it points to what I consider
the most urgent problems in government today. While there is no dearth of sound
ideas,inthiscountryandinthiscityandinthemilitaryandinthePentagon,thereis
denitelyascarcityofleaderswhocanrecognizeatrulyworthwhileproposal,eshit
out after someone had the idea, drive it through our complex bureaucracy, overcome
itsnaysayers,andultimatelydevelopsufcientpublicandcongressionalsupportto
make it a reality.
Now, that’s a tough job. That exercise takes a special brand of leader beyond what
we are familiar with in the military’s operational environment. It takes intellectual and
communication skills as well as a broad knowledge of the mechanical side of our govern-
ment, and also a special kind of courage and perseverance. These traits are not always
soimportantwhenweserveineldcommands,wherepeoplestrainintheutmostto
worktogetherandtorespondtothecommander’sdirection.Youwillndneitheroneof
those tendencies in Washington.
I believe our professional experience and schooling often slights this aspect of
government service. We are often seeking for the good idea instead of teaching and
trying to get across how you turn the good idea into a practical, actual, everyday pol-
icy. Many of our people are never exposed to this problem until they at least reach the
war colleges or come face-to-face with the prospect of a Washington assignment. Yet
translating thought into action in a modern republic will take up a good deal of your
time in the future.
If I could give you some home-cooked advice, I would strongly recommend that when
you join organizations engaged in that sort of endeavor that you identify the front runners
in the organization—those people, not necessarily the front runners, but those who you
see in the organization who can make the necessary possible in a bureaucratic environ-
ment. Study their experience, make their techniques your own, absorb their knowledge
andtheirwisdom.Youandthecountrywillprotfromthateffort.
Inasimilarvein,anothersetofdomesticproblemsforDefenseissueswillarise—and
itwillnotbeforthePentagontomakeitself,buttobesurethatitcontinuesasacredible
player in our bureaucracy. Simply put, it is imperative that we retain the trust of the
President,theCongress,andthepublic,andwemustcontinuetomakestrenuousefforts
toimproveourefciencyandmanagement.
Now,likeeverythingelse,IbelievethatPentagonmanagementisnotasbadasthe
critics say it is, but I also believe it is not as good as some of the defenders say it is. Nev-
ertheless, we are going to require strong leadership and fully committed followership to
implement a wide variety of reforms, which are probably long overdue. Some of these will
be legislated, some will be self-generated. But the target is, the bottom line is, we’ve got
to improve our way of doing business.
Now, I know you are familiar with many of these initiatives, probably more than I am.
In the military realm, we see a number of them go toward the rubric of jointness, but
there is also a range of improvements under way on the civilian management side. Some
are further along than others, but there’s no question that in all cases our performance
will be closely scrutinized by civilian leaders and by a public which is increasingly con-
cerned that we make the best use of the resources they provide us. This challenge, too,
will be a major feature of the policy landscape in your professional lifetime. I urge you to
give it your fullest attention.
Let me close my remarks with this brief note, lest you think I have painted a picture of
nothing but indeterminate challenges abroad and frustrations at home. It is well to keep
inmindwhatthatfamousMidwesternphilosopherPaulHarveysaidonthesubject,“In
times like this, it helps to recall that there have always been times like these.”
The challenges I have described are part of my everyday business, and before too long,
probably a lot sooner than you think, they’ll be a part of yours. We should not underesti-
mate the problems, but on the other hand, our history suggests that we can manage them
successfully if we exercise persistence, imagination, and professionalism. I am optimistic
in this regard. With my Washington travels, I guess that makes me an incurable optimist.
It will take great determination, energy, and above all, consensus-building talents and
the help of the Congress and the public. With persistence, I think we can keep Western
civilization glued together.
You will be served well in that task by the year you are spending here at the National
DefenseUniversity.Iwouldalsosuggestthatyouwouldbeservedwellifyoucanmake
a career-long commitment for the study of your profession, the study of our government,
and above all, the study of successful practitioners within our government. You will also
be enhanced by the associations you are developing here with colleagues who will arise
alongside you to senior leadership posts. I truly envy your challenge and opportunity. I
thankyouforinvitingmeandallowingmetosharethesereectionswithyou.
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News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci on the Downing of
Libyan Planes in the Gulf of Sidra
The Pentagon | January 4
Secretary Carlucci: Good morning.
The Chairman and I are here to present the facts of the Libyan incident as we understand
them at this point—and let me emphasize that. These are preliminary reports. Prelimi-
nary reports are never 100 percent accurate. There are always changes in detail. But in
the interest of getting to the American public and the world in general the information
that we have, we’re going to present a statement based on that information. But I urge
you to take into account the fact that preliminary reports sometimes do change.
This morning at about 5:00 AM Eastern Standard Time, or 12:00 AM local time in the
Mediterranean, two Libyan MIG-23 aircraft were shot down in self-defense by American
F-14s with air-to-air missiles. Two parachutes were sighted, and a Libyan search and
rescue helicopter was later detected headed for the area.
The US Navy aircraft were operating from the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy,
which was off the southwest tip of Crete and about 127 miles north of Tobruk, Libya. At
the time of the incident, both the ship and its aircraft were conducting training operations
in international waters. The two F-14s were providing combat air patrol approximately
fty miles south of the Kennedy, which is some seventy miles north of the northeast
Libyan coast. The MIG aircraft were detected shortly after they left Al Bumbah aireld
at about 4:50 AM EST and were tracked as they closed on the two F-14 aircraft.
The F-14 pilots maneuvered to avoid the closing aircraft. They changed speed, alti-
tude, and direction. The Libyan aircraft continued to close in a hostile manner. At about
fourteen miles, the US section leader decided his aircraft was in jeopardy and they could
wait no longer. One MIG-23 was shot down with a Sparrow missile. The second MIG was
shot down by a Sidewinder missile at six miles.
These Sixth Fleet ships and aircraft were operating in international waters and inter-
national airspace at the time of the incident and posed no threat to Libya. These routine
operations are of the same type that have been conducted in the same area many times in
the past. The Sixth Fleet operations had no connection whatsoever with Libya’s newly con-
structed chemical facility. These operations were conducted over 600 miles northeast of the
plant, had nothing to do whatsoever with that plant. We now consider this matter closed.
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Admiral Crowe and I are now prepared to take your questions.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what were the indications of hostile intent? You’ve mentioned the fact
that the Libyan planes continued to close. What else, if anything, was there that told the
pilot the Libyans had hostile intent?
A: Bear in mind what I said earlier, that these are preliminary reports. The pilots are
being own to Naples for a detailed debrief, so we will not know the actual maneuvers
that took place until we’ve had the detailed debrief from the pilots. Based on our current
information, and I emphasize that point, the pilots descended in altitude from approxi-
mately 15,000 feet to 4,000 feet and they took some ve different evasive actions. Each
time the Libyan aircraft sought to put their nose on our aircraft. They also accelerated.
So the hostile intent seems to be fairly clear.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what were the rules of engagement that were in place?
A.: Normal peacetime rules of engagement. There has been no change in the rules of
engagement.
Q: There were no communications required then between the F-14s and the Kennedy?
They didn’t have to go back to the Kennedy and ask for weapons release authority or
anything like that?
A: The lead pilot has the authority to make his judgment on his own.
Q: Did the lead pilot re both missiles, Mr. Secretary? Did he re both the Sparrow and
Sidewinder?
A: I think both aircraft red. I think the lead pilot was the one that hit.
Crowe: It’s clear both aircraft red. One was hit with a Sidewinder; one was hit with
a Sparrow. We think they both came from the lead aircraft, but both aircraft did re
missiles.
Q: A total of four missiles?
Carlucci: Yes.
Q: Libya has been bloodied in the past by confronting US planes and ships. Why would
they do this?
A: You will have to ask them, not us.
Q: They said they expected the US to attack Libya because of this chemical weapons plant.
A: All I can do is emphasize that these were routine carrier maneuvers. Our carrier
battle group has been in the Mediterranean steadily. We’ve had them there for years. It
was on a normal training mission. It is en route to port. It will continue en route to port.
This has nothing whatsoever to do with all the speculation, and if I may say excessive
speculation, that has existed with regard to chemicals.
Q: We in no way provoked them or drew them into this?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: Mr. Secretary, how long had the carrier actually been in the general vicinity, within
a 100 or 120 miles of Libya?
A: It had been steaming eastward in the Mediterranean. I don’t know how long it had
been in that vicinity. Bill?
Crowe: Since the Christmas vacation.
Q: Had it been conducting ight operations on a continuing basis during that time?
Crowe: A few hours each day.
Carlucci: Yes.
Q: Mr. Secretary, have the activities of the Libyans been normal? Have they been checking
out US aircraft a little more than routine lately?
A: We had not noticed any abnormal activities until this incident.
Q: Mr. Secretary, does that Libyan chemical plant pose any eminent threat to the region?
And what, if any, threats to US interests?
A: The State Department has indicated that we are greatly concerned with that chemical
facility, and I don’t think it would be appropriate to go beyond that statement.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned excessive speculation when you’re talking about this
Libyan chemical plant. What has been excessive? What is your concern about that?
A: I’ve seen all kinds of details and speculation come out in the press. I know you all
have your sources and you all think your sources are infallible, but quite frankly, they
are not. I’ve seen a number of details come out in the press that are not accurate. I’ve
seen a number of reports of what the Pentagon is thinking—thinking that has never
been brought to my attention. So in my judgment, the speculation has been excessive.
But let me emphasize, we do not comment on military contingency plans.
Q: That was triggered by President Reagan’s own statements that he was considering a
military option.
A: I don’t think that’s what the President said, if you go back and look at his actual
statement. But in any event, the reports I’m referring to are reports you all have been
putting out from the Pentagon.
Q: Were the planes capable of making an attack on the so-called chemical weapons plant?
A: If we’re going to make an attack on the chemical plant, you would not position your
carrier some 600 miles away. I think that’s self-evident.
Crowe: Nor use F-14 aircraft.
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Q: Mr. Secretary, were there any indications when the MIGs were going to re?
A: I’ve indicated that by their maneuvers they were clearly acting in a hostile fashion.
Q: Did they lock on with their radar?
A: Once again, let me emphasize the point. We have some preliminary information that
radars were turned on. We do not know the nature of the radars. Until we debrief the
pilots, it is really not appropriate to get into that kind of detail.
Q: Mr. Secretary, other than the MIGs that were shot down, were there any other Libyan
forces in the area that you are aware of?
A: Not that we’re aware of.
Q: Mr. Secretary, could you describe any plane-to-plane conversations between the
Americans and the Libyans or perhaps any other——
A: That’s the level of detail that we shouldn’t get into until we’ve had the debrieng of
the pilots.
Q: We understand they were warned. Can you tell us how they were warned?
A: I’m not aware of any warnings.
Q: In the previous week, or ten days, had there been any reports from the area of suspi-
cious or threatening behavior by the Libyans of any kind?
A: No, not to my knowledge.
Q: We had reconnaissance planes up over the past week or ten days around the carrier, and
they were never challenged or threatened in any way by the Libyans until this morning?
A: There have been the normal challenges. This activity took place in what is called
a “ight information region,” where you do have these kinds of challenges to identify
aircraft. This has no legal standing. It’s a regulation, but these kinds of challenges are
normal. We do it ourselves. But that has nothing to do with carrier training operations.
Q: What you’re saying is, if the Libyans had behaved the way they behaved this morning
a week or two weeks or three weeks ago, we would have shot them down then, too?
A: Any time an aircraft demonstrates clear hostile intent, and on the basis of our pre-
liminary information this is certainly the case here, our aircraft are entitled under the
rules of engagement to defend themselves.
Q: What happened after this incident? Was there any scrambling of Libyan jets? Any
Libyan activity that followed this incident?
A: Other than the SAR operation, search and rescue operation, I have no indications of
any other Libyan activity.
Q: Mr. Secretary, could you clarify. Earlier you said you considered the case closed. Does
that mean we’re back to business as usual; there’s no further military action under way?
You just go back to where you were?
A: That is correct. We will continue with our training operations, and the carrier will
continue its course into port.
Q: Mr. Secretary, the Navy is saying the planes were warned in English to break off. Are
you saying there was no such warning, or you’re saying——
A: I know of no warning. Once again, we will debrief the pilots, but at this point, we know
of no warnings.
Q: You said the Kennedy had arrived in the area around Christmas time and had begun
operations at that point, is that correct?
Crowe: It arrived in the area. It had been in port over the holidays and then left port to
go to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Q: When was the last time, prior to that, that it had conducted training operations in
this region?
Crowe: I don’t know about the Kennedy, but we were in this specic area in October.
Remarks in Farewell for President Reagan
The Pentagon | January 17
Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, it is truly an honor for the men and women of America’s
Armed Forces to be able to pay tribute to you this morning. As you stand at the thresh-
old of new and different challenges—and we all know that life in California can present
some really different challenges—we are proud to mount this public demonstration of our
respect for your leadership and to thank you for the legacy of strength you are leaving to
our next Commander in Chief. We celebrate those contributions not in their own right
but for what they have meant, and will mean, to the United States and indeed to millions
of hopeful people around the globe.
Mr. President, the men and women of America’s Armed Forces are proud of their role
in the defense of the American way of life. We know that you set the conditions for their
readiness and that you let the American example of liberty and free enterprise ourish.
Yet, that defender’s role can be a thankless one at times that seem tranquil to a
peace-minded public. Many in this audience have served through more than one of those
depressing periods, when our ability to live up to our citizens’ expectations and needs
eroded badly. Such was the case in the years before you became Commander in Chief.
But if the Nation can stay on the course you charted and led, it will not be so again. All
that this society stands for will be safer as a result, and I can’t think of a better measure
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of a man’s accomplishment than that. But there is one other thought we’d like to leave
you with.
Mr. President, eight years ago, your rst Inaugural address urged our citizens to
believe in themselves and to work hard together to make America perform as only this
country can.
You quoted from the diary of a soldier, Marvin Treptow, who had been killed in action
during World War I. In it he said: “America must win the war. Therefore, I will work, I will
save, I will sacrice, I will endure, I will ght cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue
of the whole struggle depended on me alone.” You observed that not all Americans will be
called upon to make the sacrices of soldiering. But in their own lives, they could well
take a lesson from the spirit of seless commitment and hope that had animated Marvin
Treptow. The colors and the riemen and women gathered to honor you this morning,
Mr. President, are part of that tradition.
Please know that, with you as our Commander in Chief, we have been genuinely sus-
tained by your appreciation of our sacrices and our service and the spirit of which you
spoke in your past eight years; and, we look to the future of this country with condence.
As for your future, Mr. President, you will leave Washington with our greatest respect
and affection. We wish you and Mrs. Reagan Godspeed and, if my non-Navy colleagues
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff will pardon the nautical idiom, on their behalf, I wish you
fair winds and following seas in all your future endeavors.
Remarks at a Luncheon for Medal of Honor Recipients
Washington, DC | January 19
I’m pleased to be able to host this luncheon today and to talk with this group of genuine
American heroes. Of course, I have to admit at the outset that I’m always grateful for
even brief respite from my workaday travails in this town.
It’s been especially interesting lately—transition frenzies about who’s going to occupy
what jobs have been a major preoccupation for many people. Frankly, I haven’t been
heavily involved, but it has made life even more interesting than it usually is. And as a
rule, life around here can be pretty testing.
Furthermore, as Chairman I’m embroiled in controversy every day. The Air Force
wants me to move toward strategic systems; the Army wants me to move toward forward
deployments; the Navy wants me to move out of town. Someone asked me the other day
how in the world I got to be Chairman, and I said: “I don’t know, it just happened; I don’t
blame anyone.”
In any event, it’s a real pleasure to be able to spend time in more tranquil surroundings,
and also to meet with people whose contributions to the nation’s interests have been liter-
ally enduring and not dependent on Washington’s unique and often eeting fascinations.
I might add that your presence here during Inaugural activities is a tting reminder
that the institutions of democracy being renewed in these days have had to be defended
again and again, and that Americans have been called upon not only in battle but
also throughout a troubled peace, to lay their lives on the line to secure our way of life.
Moreover, each of you symbolizes a bedrock commitment to comrades and country that
every public servant, in uniform and out, can take bearings from. The kind of courage
you displayed in war is still, in its own way, contagious, and helps to sustain us in our
own daily activities. And I can attest from my own experience about how your inuence
works to great effect out in the country at large.
A few years ago I had the honor of dedicating a memorial to one of your brethren, a
World War II Marine PFC from Oklahoma named Albert Schwab, who had been killed
in the Easter Sunday assault on Okinawa in 1945. Schwab was a amethrower opera-
tor whose company became pinned down in a valley by a Japanese machine-gun nest
on a high ridge to their front. Under a murderous hail of bullets, he scaled the cliff and
attacked and eliminated the gun with his amethrower, only to be taken under re by
a second machine gun. Though he hadn’t had time to replenish his supply of fuel, PFC
Schwab advanced again and single-handedly wiped out the second enemy position—but
not before a nal burst had wounded him fatally.
They gave Albert Schwab’s Medal of Honor to his toddler son on Memorial Day 1946,
back in Tulsa, Oklahoma, his hometown. Almost four decades later, as I ofciated at his
memorial’s dedication in Oklahoma City, the state capital, it was touching to see how his
memory had been cherished—down through the years—by grateful Oklahomans from
all walks of life, and how his story will always remind future generations in the heart of
America’s heartland that freedom isn’t free.
Each of you has left a legacy of similar reach, and it’s an important message indeed
in our republic. Tomorrow will mark the departure from ofce of a President who made
that message a prominent feature of his tenure. And I thought I’d share with you some
brief reections about what that has meant to the profession you have shaped so lastingly.
You may recall that in his rst Inaugural address, the President urged Americans to
believe in themselves and to work hard together to make this country perform as only it
can. Signicantly, he found the right spirit expressed in the diary of a World War I soldier
who had been killed in action, quoting an entry which read: “America must win the war.
Therefore, I will work, I will save, I will sacrice, I will endure, I will ght cheerfully and
do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone.”
In effect, right at the start of his presidency, Ronald Reagan held up the military’s
tradition of service and sacrice as the model for our citizens. And as he prepares to leave,
I can report to you that that proud heritage has been enlivened under his leadership.
You are no doubt familiar with the Defense revitalization President Reagan has led,
and of the achievements of his policies that sought peace through strength. With justiable
pride, he highlighted those contributions in his farewell speech to the Nation last week.
But make no mistake, for the men and women of the Armed Forces, maybe his most
important accomplishment was in the spiritual realm, in his highly visible appreciation
for our daily labors in posts, bases, camps, and stations around the globe. He made
activist patriotism fashionable again. And he made our citizens see the profession of
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arms as attractive and honorable once more. As he put it in his farewell remarks to us,
the luster has been returned to the reputation of America’s ghting forces.
The results can be seen in our recruiting statistics; in the high quality people we
have been able to draw to, and retain in, the Services; and in the spirit that pervades the
entire establishment. We truly owe Ronald Reagan a great debt for his encouragement,
for his recognition of our place in the Nation’s life, and for the attention he has given to
our problems.
What was particularly striking was that all this truly came from his heart, and it
showed through again and again. I remember vividly a ceremony I attended in 1984 when
I was CINCPAC. President Reagan was the major attraction. He was departing Hawaii en
route to his historic visit to China, and he took time to speak to our honor guard and to
many military dependents who had come to see him and pay him homage.
But instead, he turned the tables on us. As he neared the end of his prepared remarks,
he set his text aside and added these comments: “You know, many years ago, in one of the
four wars in my lifetime, an admiral stood on the bridge of a carrier watching the planes
take off out into the darkness bent on a night combat mission, and then found himself
asking, with no one there to answer, just himself to hear his own voice, ‘Where do we
nd such men?’” A decade or so ago, after spending an evening with the rst returning
POWs from Vietnam, Nancy and I found ourselves, as the evening ended and having
heard the stories of horror and brutality from men who had been conned as prisoners of
war longer than any other ghting men in America’s history, found ourselves asking the
same question—“Where do we nd such men?” After posing that question, the President
answered it quickly. He said, “We nd them where we always nd them when we need
them. We found them where we found you—on the main streets and farms of America.”
You can imagine how uplifting it was for us to hear that praise from the Commander
in Chief; to be identied with authentic, even legendary, American military heroes. And
it is just that sort of support that the President constantly gave us.
You can see the effects every day, especially among our young people. The United
States has a great deal to be proud of in its Armed Forces, by every measure—in the
heritage of courage which you exemplify, in our tradition of victory in battle, in the key
everyday missions we take on, in our ne equipment, logistics, training, and so forth.
But in my view, the real jewel in our crown is the talent and esprit of the young American
men and women who have chosen to serve in the Armed Forces, foregoing many of the
amenities that other professions might have brought them. They are the ultimate source
of this nation’s strength.
I have seen them in peace and war, in times of stress and boredom, in good times
and in bad. Unfailingly, they give 110 percent to meet every challenge. And as a result, I
have no qualms about this country’s defenses. They’re in good hands.
Our people out on the battlements are on my mind daily as I go about my business in
this town—the young soldier crouching in the darkness of night along the DMZ in Korea;
the sailors of the Seventh Fleet crisscrossing an area totaling fty million square miles,
from the Bering Sea to the Indian Ocean, twenty-four hours a day; young Marines guard-
ing our embassies around the globe at a time when the threat of terrorism is omnipresent;
Air Force crews ready at a moment’s notice to respond to the President’s call anywhere in
the world; men and women of the Coast Guard, vigilant at sea and in the skies to shield
us against close-to-home dangers. I often think, too, of the young Navy wife I saw face
the press three days after she had lost her husband at sea. She announced she would
be proud to have her six-month-old son choose the Navy as a career.
In recognizing the contributions and tending to the needs of these people, our Com-
mander in Chief has rendered signal service to this nation’s security interests. And those
who come forward to wear the uniform in the future will benet greatly from that legacy.
They’ll share in the renewed professional pride, and they will be able to look to the future
of this country with great condence and hope.
As we bid the President goodbye, I don’t know of a better measure of a man’s achieve-
ment than that yardstick. And that’s the thought that will be uppermost in my mind, as
we watch another Commander in Chief take the helm tomorrow.
In conclusion, let me just say that, as you are well aware, no military leader in this
nation desires war. Those who have seen combat, as you have, know that keeping the
peace must be our fundamental mission, and that the primary measure of our success
is the ability to deter conict.
But as a nation, we must remember that freedom requires constant effort and vig-
ilance and, at times, sacrice—the kind of sacrice for which our republic is famous.
Many great societies have stressed freedom but neglected their security and are now
histor y.
We need both freedom and security. That’s what you stand for; that’s the idea that
animates every man and woman in America’s Armed Forces; that’s the message that
President Ronald Reagan has communicated so well to our citizens for the past eight
years. And in my view, that theme will mark out a lasting place in this country’s history
for him. I can assure you that all our servicemen and women have been proud to help
write his chapter in the drama, and we feel well prepared to contribute to the next one.
In fact, as you did, we relish the opportunity.
Thank you for letting me share these thoughts with you today, and I wish you well
in all your future endeavors.
Guest Appearance on “Cheers,” NBC network television
February
Sam. Hey, guys, you are never going to guess who I brought back with me. Admiral Wil-
liam J. Crowe, Jr., in full dress uniform, enters.
Woody. Sam, how’d you do it? The doorman at the Ritz-Carlton! Cliff jumps off his stool
and snaps to attention.
Cliff. Oh my Lord! That’s Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, himself!
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Woody. Wait a minute. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff! The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is a doorman at the Ritz-Carlton? Boy, no wonder they charge you
so much over there.
Sam. No, Woody. This really is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was at the
dinner. Turns out he’s a big baseball fan and knew of me.
Admiral Crowe. Yep. No one could give up a towering home run like Sam Malone.
Sam. Thanks.
Admiral Crowe. I wish we had missiles that ew that high.
Cliff, in awe. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.—Promoted to Admiral, 1974; Commander,
US Pacic Command, 1983; 1985, appointed eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; wife—Shirley.
Admiral Crowe. I’m impressed, young man. How do you know so much about me?
Cliff. Simple, sir. I’m an American. (He holds out his hand.) Clifford Clavin, US Postal
Service. (Cliff shakes hands with the Admiral.)
Admiral Crowe. Nice to meet you, Mr. Clavin. Were you ever in the Navy?
Cliff. I wanted to be, sir. But that darn asthma of mine kept kicking up, so I joined the
Post Ofce. I gured, if I couldn’t serve, I should at least deliver draft notices to those
who could.
Rebecca. Admiral, I’m Rebecca Howe, manager of Cheers. It’s truly an honor to have you
in our bar. Is there anything I can do for you? Anything at all?
Admiral Crowe. Go out with this Malone fellow.
Rebecca. Couldn’t you ask me to do something more enjoyable ... like say a commando
mission in Libya?
Admiral Crowe, to Sam. I tried.
Carla. Hey, Admiral, I’m Carla Tortelli LeBec. Listen, could you do me a favor? If you’re
ever on the USS Lexington, could you nd out why nobody has ever called, or dropped
a card, or sent a note?
Frasier. My, my, who’s this?
Norm, matter-of-factly. Oh, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Frasier. Uh-huh. I’m Dr. Frasier Crane. Here’s my number. I’ve treated Napoleon, Teddy
Roosevelt, and I think I can help you.
Crowe. No, no, I really am the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Fraiser, humoring him with a salute. Aye, aye, Admiral.
Norm. Sir, I was a proud member of the United States Coast Guard.
Crowe. Where were you stationed?
Norm. On a beach towel in Fort Lauderdale, which, you may recall, stayed under our
ag the entire time I was guarding it.
Crowe. Nice work.
Cliff. Sir, I hope you’re not falling for any of that “Glasnost” balloon juice. A Ruskie is a
Ruskie, and you can’t trust the lot of ‘em.
Crowe. Well, we all have to live together. The US military is more interested in peace
than war.
Cliff. You really believe that? I don’t know if I can sleep well at night, knowing you have
that kind of attitude.
The man who said Sinatra enters from the hallway and spots the Admiral. Crowe!
Crowe. I don’t believe it. Captain Rosen! My very rst commanding ofcer.
Sam: He was your commanding ofcer?
Scene dissolves. …
Interior of bar a little later. The Admiral is at the bar, surrounded by our regulars.
Cliff. Now here’s what separates my new submarine concept from everyone else’s—mine
has wheels on it.
Crowe. Why would a submarine need wheels?
Cliff. Detection is everything, isn’t it? Where are they going to be looking for submarines?
The good Admiral has heard enough of this.
Crowe. Well, it’s getting late, and I’ve got to get back to Washington.
Everyone ad libs. Nice to meet you, Good Luck, Thanks for coming, etc.
Crowe. Nice to meet you, Sam, and thanks again for the autographed ball.
Sam. Hey, if the President wants one, he knows where he can nd one.
Cliff. Sir, about those plans I have drawn up for the new assault vehicle—where can I
send them to you?
Crowe. Just send them to the Pentagon.
Cliff. I’m a little worried. If they’re just sent to the Pentagon, they could get lost.
Crowe. Right. Send them to Washington. The Admiral exits.
Statement before the Senate Budget Committee on US Military Posture
March 14
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate this opportunity to testify on America’s military posture in connection with
your hearings on the rst Defense Budget of President [George H. W.] Bush.
As you know, the President has modied Defense scal guidance previously issued
by President Reagan and initiated an interagency review of our national defense strat-
egy. In turn, the Department of Defense is reworking programs to square with the new
scal guidance. Until this work is nished and approved by the President, I will not be
prepared to address in detail the Defense budget for FY 1990-1991.
I will proceed to discuss continuities, changes, and uncertainties in the global security
environment, all of which will have a considerable impact on the strategic review. Addition-
ally, I will go over the strategic and structural factors which led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
strongly recommend that spending for Defense resume modest real growth by FY 1991.
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Military Strategy and Posture
To begin, our national military strategy is designed to safeguard and promote enduring
national interests:
• The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation;
• A healthy and growing economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity
and a resource base for our national endeavors; and
• A vigorous alliance relationship to bolster forward defense of the United States
and collectively maintain peace with freedom in the world at large.
These interests also describe our success as a nation: a representative government
freely elected by the American people; a land bountiful in human and natural resources;
a strong and diverse industrial base; a vast market for consumer goods; and the world’s
largest gross national product. No other country in the world has a better economic and
competitive environment for pursuing individual and national endeavors.
Basic Objectives
In early 1988, President Reagan submitted to Congress a report on national security
strategy, and within this report, you will nd two fundamental objectives:
• Maintain security of our nation and our allies by deterring aggression, repelling
or defeating any attack should deterrence fail, and ending the conict on terms
favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies; and
• Respond to the challenges of a global economy by heeding economic factors that
affect our national security, tending to foreign sources of supply in critical areas,
and limiting the vulnerability of our supply lines.
These objectives remind us that America cannot choose between military security
and economic security. To underscore this point, our economy is irreversibly intertwined
with a global network of communications, nance, petroleum, metallurgy, and merchant
shipping—not to mention imports of industrial materials and machinery. To maintain
a healthy and growing economy, we must use our military establishment to nurture a
secure and supportive international environment.
Today, the United States is engaged in a complex array of international relationships
and negotiations designed to promote a more stable world community and enduring
peace, to reduce the level and lethality of world armaments, and to resolve festering
regional conicts. In some areas, we are making progress, but sound and durable
agreements inevitably will require protracted and occasionally frustrating negotiations.
This challenge undoubtedly will tax our initiative, resolve, and wits. I would argue as
well that to maximize the prospects of success the President should be able to deal
from strength.
Military Posture
Meanwhile, our global military posture is designed to keep the peace, prevent small
crises from becoming big ones, and deter major hostilities. In practice, we strive to
maintain a healthy strategic and theater nuclear capability, eld forces of high quality
to offset numerically superior adversaries, exploit total force planning with our allies,
and limit war reserve material to the time required by industrial mobilization. To
effectively manage risks, this posture must be supported by a durable consensus on
expenditures for Defense.
Customarily, we do not keep all of our forces ready for combat on an everyday basis.
Depending on the situation at hand, we plan to activate our Reserves and, if confronted
with a major crisis, draw upon the full resources of our nation. Even with full mobiliza-
tion, we are not positioned to defend Western Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacic Far
East simultaneously against a major assault by the Soviet Union and its allies. Instead,
we plan to deal with the various theaters sequentially, depending upon circumstances
and priorities at the time. These limitations obviously call for close collaboration with
our European and Asian allies.
Soviet Military Power
Cutting across the strategic landscape is a more complex and challenging array of conti-
nuities, changes, and uncertainties associated with the evolution of Soviet military power.
Legacies of the Past
Legacies of the past include a Soviet military posture designed to defeat every possible
coalition apt to oppose the Communist state—plus strong military attachment to the
principle that a good defense of the homeland will always require a strong offense ter-
minating in a crushing defeat of the enemy. With this kind of thinking, it is not at all
surprising that the Soviet Union has built the largest military establishment in the world.
Enduring elements of Soviet military power are well-known: robust capabilities in
space, strategic and theater nuclear forces with intercontinental range, conventional
ground and air forces capable of power projection across the entire Eurasian continent,
naval forces poised for the denial of Western sea lanes, and heavily armed surrogates
near many of the world’s oil elds and maritime choke points. Any US military strategy
must confront these realities.
The Soviet Union also towers above all other nations in the production of military
equipment. Quantity is not the only worrisome part of this picture. For the last two
decades, the USSR has been steadily closing the gap (relative to the West) in military
technologies. For example, the Soviet Union is on a qualitative par with the United States
in such deployed systems as surface-to-air missiles, antitank guided missiles, tactical
ballistic missiles, short-range naval cruise missiles, communications, and electronic
countermeasures. They hold an edge in antisatellite systems, artillery, chemical weap-
ons, and mines.
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Underlying Pillars
On the other hand, the underlying political, social, and economic pillars of Soviet mili-
tary power are not in good shape. Part of the problem lies in 20 million members of the
Communist Party trying to govern the everyday lives of 280 million people and not doing
a very good job of it. Lack of political cohesion also can be seen among ethnic minorities
occupying territory and clinging to cultures predating the Communist revolution by 1,000
or more years. Many of the nationalities are not emotionally attached to or inspired by
the “Socialist Fatherland.”
Today, Soviet leadership is beginning to understand that the nation’s future depends
largely on the productivity, initiative, and satisfaction of 130 million workers—not just
Party functionaries. In turn, state planners must improve the quality of consumer goods
and services available to the Soviet people as a whole.
Compounding these problems is the Kremlin’s central budget decit, concealed
from public view for many years. Investment increases are required in the energy sector
to sustain economic growth, in food production to keep pace with population, in the
machine tool industries to exploit new manufacturing processes, and in a wide range
of government services, including pensions, housing, and medical care. On top of these
demands, the Kremlin is confronted with previously unprogrammed costs associated
with disaster relief for the people of Chernobyl and Armenia. Yet, state revenues have
sagged in the face of falling world oil prices (a major export).
Given these resource problems (more of which seem to surface every day), I was not
surprised by unilateral force reductions announced by General Secretary Gorbachev
last December. I was impressed by the size of these reductions (500,000 troops) and the
time frame (two years) within which he intends to accomplish them. I suspect he must
now let the internal wounds heal before going further, but I do anticipate more initiatives.
Meanwhile, the Soviet military faces challenges of a related but different order. Today,
Minister of Defense Yazov and an increasing number of other leaders seem genuinely
concerned about sagging patriotic support for the “Socialist Fatherland,” recruits not
prepared for the moral and physical rigors of compulsory military service, ofcers lack-
ing “fatherly concern” for the troops, poor operational and technical discipline within
the ranks, too much damage to combat equipment in the eld, and lack of candor in
readiness reporting.
Overall, the Soviet military establishment is having a tough time insulating itself from
political, social, and economic problems cutting across the nation as a whole. By admitting
that these problems exist, however, the Kremlin has taken the rst step down a long and,
I suspect, difcult road of shifting from quantity to quality in the structure of the Soviet
Armed Forces. How this will affect their net military capabilities remains to be seen.
Net Assessment
Moving on to my annual net assessment, some preliminary words are in order about
force reductions announced by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.
At the moment, the USSR and its allies are focusing on ground forces. If carried out,
these reductions will affect the balance of land power in Europe and Asia. Opposite
NATO’s Central Front, Warsaw Pact reductions also represent a good down payment on
Gorbachev’s pledge to move toward a less offensive posture. We must, of course, verify
and satisfy ourselves that these reductions actually occur in the time frame and on the
scale promised by the Kremlin.
It’s also important to note that much of the global military picture remains untouched
by these Soviet reductions—for example, activities in space, strategic nuclear forces,
strategic mobility, and support for states who sponsor terrorist acts. It is not clear yet
whether maritime units will be included. Further, military balances in the Third World
will be affected more by Soviet arms transfers than by reductions they plan in the Far
East, Southwest Asia, or the regions opposite NATO.
Overall, I am less inclined than usual to predict the future military balance. However,
the latest net assessment does provide a relatively complete picture of where we and our
allies stand today in comparison with the Soviet Union and its allies. While covering
this ground, I will mention demands placed upon our combatant forces as well as their
preparedness to deal with these demands.
Maritime Defense
As a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States is pledged to defend the
Atlantic and Mediterranean as a whole. This commitment is most challenging in the Nor-
wegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Soviets contemplate a campaign
of sea denial. We are confronted with similar problems in the Pacic, where Soviet naval
power overlaps lines of communication to the Republic of Korea and Japan.
Today, we would fare well in this contest: a product of our nuclear attack submarines,
carrier battle groups, maritime patrol aircraft, surface action groups, and replenishment
units—plus support provided by our allies in the form of choke point control, mine clear-
ance, land-based tactical aircraft, and especially naval escorts. All of this presumes high
readiness and sufcient warning time to reach assigned operating positions before the
outbreak of hostilities.
What happens in the Atlantic and Pacic remains very sensitive to our ASW posture.
While making substantial investments in nuclear propulsion, quieting, and stand-off
weaponry, the Soviets have not cut back sharply on their force of attack submarines—still
over 300 in number. To conne this threat to home waters and to establish the needed
control over vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) will require an all-out effort by
the bulk of our Atlantic and Pacic Fleets. Throughout, we must achieve high exchange
ratios in the design and operation of our nuclear attack submarines. We also are count-
ing heavily on our maritime patrol aircraft, Active and Reserve, to monitor approaches
to the mid-ocean SLOCs and to the United States itself.
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On balance, the mobility and capability of our naval forces represent one of our
greatest advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its surrogates. They will be useful in
containing the Kremlin to a land campaign and in confronting the Soviets with a wide
and unpredictable number of threat axes. Similarly, they buttress our ability to com-
municate with our allies and to project our own air and ground power in either major
or limited hostilities or peacetime crises (e.g., the Persian Gulf). This is a exibility the
Soviets do not enjoy to the same degree.
Strategic Mobility
The United States maintains strategic mobility forces to underwrite overseas treaty
commitments and, at times, to keep small crises from getting out of hand in the Third
World. For rapid deployment of troops, we depend largely on airlift. For tactical mobility
on the ground (helicopters and vehicles), we rely on a mix of pre-positioned equipment,
wide-bodied air transports, and sealift. Most of the follow-on ammunition and fuel will
go by sea. Overall, we are well postured for contingencies short of a major war.
Soviet reliance upon strategic mobility forces is driven, in part, by the vast size of the
country, marginal road and rail lines linking Russia to the Far East, and reliance upon
regular military forces to deal with internal security problems. Both sealift and airlift
support a steady stream of Soviet arms transfers to clients in the Third World. As seen in
the Afghanistan campaign, Soviet air transports also can be used to project signicant
military power to adjacent countries.
Given a crisis involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union would have an
initial advantage in reaching Western Europe due to short distances and a developed
road and rail system. The Kremlin also has an advantage in merchant shipping which
can be commandeered easily for military purposes. In contrast, we would have a tough
time mustering the ships necessary to reinforce Western Europe in accordance with
our goals—a consequence of insufcient capacity as well as ownership, ags, and ship
crews shifting away from NATO to semi-industrial and nonaligned nations of the world.
Once hostilities commenced, the Soviet merchant eet would nd itself conned to
home waters, bottled up in neutral ports, or otherwise out of action. In contrast, their
strategic airlift provides a robust wartime capability to swing forces between the Euro-
pean and Asian theaters—all within Soviet airspace. This capability will improve sub-
stantially with the new AN-225 air transport, which can lift some 500,000 pounds of
cargo—or twice that of our C-5B.
One other aspect of our mobility deserves comment. If scal realities were to require
force reductions both at home and overseas, our mobility assets would become even more
crucial. We would expect any scaled down forces to be able to deploy quickly and effec-
tively throughout the globe, but this could only be achieved with adequate modernized lift.
Space
Over time, the United States and the Soviet Union have acquired a hefty reliance upon
the space environment for communications and intelligence in peace, crisis, and war.
By most measures—infrastructure, launch boosters and payload, numbers of space
vehicles and sensors, and activities and time in space—the Soviet Union has a pro-
nounced lead over the United States. In technical sophistication, miniaturization, and
satellite reliability (or the time before normal decay in orbit), the United States still enjoys
a comfortable lead. Thus, we do not have to launch as many satellites to keep the same
number in orbit during peacetime.
In crisis or conict, our chief concern is with Soviet antisatellite systems, which
place some of our communications and intelligence at risk. This is a main element of
the military balance where we nd ourselves lacking a deterrent. Yet, the credibility of
our strategic deterrent and the effectiveness of our general purpose forces increasingly
depend upon a secure position in space.
Overall, America does not need to match the Soviet Union by increasing its space
launches four-fold or its time in space three-fold. The United States, however, does require
signicantly improved space launch capabilities. Moreover, we cannot tolerate a marked
Soviet advantage in capabilities to destroy or disable satellites. Thus, I fully support a
larger and less constrained investment in antisatellite systems by the US government.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
With respect to the strategic nuclear balance, neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union have neglected investments in strategic warning systems, and both have a reliable
and credible capability to detect preparations for an all-out nuclear strike, although our
warning system is more sophisticated.
Each side does approach strategic nuclear parity in a different way. For its part, the
Soviet Union has more balance in strategic offensive and defensive systems. Their triad
of land-based missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and bombers is complemented by
substantial investments in leadership survival, strategic air defense, antisatellite devices,
and the world’s only ABM system. In the Krasnoyarsk radar, they have gone beyond
limits of the ABM Treaty.
Additionally, Soviet strategic offensive forces are more dispersed and hardened than
those of the United States. In the case of ICBMs, they have exploited government control
of vast lands within the Soviet Union and placed most of their missiles in very hardened
silos or on mobile launchers. When it comes to military targets, our computer-supported
analyses always show that Soviet ICBMs give the Kremlin a relative advantage in “damage
expectancy.” This lead means little, however, in the overall nuclear calculus.
For its part, the United States must maintain general nuclear parity with the Soviet
Union by means of strategic modernization programs set in motion over the last decade:
more repower in the Trident class submarine, improved accuracy and hard target kill
capability in the submarine-launched D-5 missile and the land-based Peacekeeper mis-
sile, and the long range and high accuracy of air-launched cruise missiles.
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These strategic modernization programs are “vital” as the Soviets continue to improve
their active and passive defenses, especially, as we move into a START regime. Beyond
these weapon systems, our most pressing current problem is to resolve the mobile missile
issue. Put bluntly, a healthy strategic deterrent is the cornerstone of our overall defense
posture and compensates to a real extent for some of the shortcomings in our theater
nuclear and conventional forces. It serves a similar function for many of our allies.
Further, research on the Strategic Defense Initiative serves warning that the United
States will not allow the Soviet Union to monopolize the eld of antiballistic missile
systems and shows considerable promise for an ultimately nonnuclear defense posture.
Theater Nuclear Forces
Starting in the mid-1960s, NATO became increasingly dependent upon theater nuclear
forces to compensate for conventional shortcomings and provide options short of a stra-
tegic nuclear exchange. The USSR responded in kind and eventually outnumbered the
United States in intermediate and shorter-range missiles. The INF Treaty will eliminate
these types.
Major asymmetries continue in short-range nuclear missiles, favoring the USSR.
Additionally, NATO’s practice of relying upon dual-capable tactical aircraft raises wor-
risome questions about the survivability and attrition of these assets at the outset of a
conventional war. In part, we can hedge this risk by relying more on rear area bases or
seaborne platforms (TLAM), but SACEUR genuinely needs a modern nuclear battleeld
system as seen in a follow-on to Lance. I also believe very strongly that NATO and the
Pact have a shared responsibility to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe.
Conventional Forces
Today, America’s conventional strength around the world is relatively adequate to deal
with a wide spectrum of peacetime crises and limited contingencies. The most stressful
and worrisome challenge, however, would be a full-edged conict with the Soviet Union
and, in turn, the task of defending NATO Europe alongside our allies.
NATO/Warsaw Pact
As a founder and member of NATO, America is committed to the forward defense of
Western Europe and, if necessary, the restoration of allied territory. Only forces of the
Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, threaten the territorial integrity of NATO Europe.
Over the years, no region in the world has been subjected to more military assess-
ments than the Central Front of Europe. Results are fairly consistent—the deterrent
stance of NATO forces has worked for forty years. Deterrence is, of course, a complicated
and uncertain calculus with a high political and psychological content. In Europe, I
believe it is fundamentally a product of allied political cohesion (who wants to declare war
on sixteen nations), America’s global strength, the Free World’s predominant economic
position, internal problems in the Soviet Union, and the cutting edge of NATO forces
positioned on the Central Front.
If deterrence fails and the initial defense falters, allied forces will face an unsatisfac-
tory outcome: possible loss of considerable territory or, in the alternative, the prospect of
resorting to theater nuclear weapons. In turn, we want to make conventional defenses
as strong as possible to lessen the need to use nuclear weapons.
Countless studies and programs have addressed measures to enhance the conven-
tional defense of NATO and reduce the prospects of a nuclear spasm. But today NATO is
still not able to mount a genuinely effective conventional defense against a determined
Soviet campaign. In the nal analysis, only adequate conventional forces can offer an
assurance against both aggression and the prospect of nuclear war—i.e., large numbers
of well-trained forces, weapon systems capable of yielding high exchange ratios, tactical
expertise in combining arms, adequate inventories of modern munitions, and sufcient
combat logistics support.
At the moment, NATO defense planners are looking at high leverage technologies and
a host of other measures to more effectively blunt the initial attack. Obviously, this is the
rst order of business for an alliance long preoccupied with deterrence. When it comes
to defense, however, NATO’s Central Region does not have the number of troops and
weapons nor the inventories of preferred and common munitions necessary to prevail in
a high intensity conict of several months or more with the Warsaw Pact.
Of great concern is the possibility that NATO may not make the investments neces-
sary to correct this situation. Perhaps unilateral Soviet reductions or conventional arms
negotiations will redress the balance, but it is much too early to rely on such judgments.
In fact, experience would argue that the best way to bring the Kremlin’s leaders to the
table is to enhance our own strength. The most frustrating aspect of this picture is
that the United States cannot solve this problem alone. Without allied cooperation and
willingness to spend more, a successful conventional defense of Western Europe will be
extremely difcult to mount.
Put simply, the most glaring weakness in our global posture is our inability to ade-
quately defend Western Europe conventionally. This shortcoming does not necessarily
mean that Europe is in immediate jeopardy or that our deterrent policy will be ineffec-
tive. As mentioned earlier, deterrence has a number of elements besides sheer military
strength. It does mean that we should look closely at our overall policies and insure that
we are realizing the highest return on our investment in terms of deterrence. This is
especially important today as we confront the prospect of little or no growth in defense
appropriations.
Having stressed NATO in order to note our most pressing military challenge, the
following comments address other regions of special US interest.
East Asia and the Pacific
In the Pacic, forward defense of the United States (Alaska, Hawaii, and the Marianas)
is bolstered by our alliance with Japan. In turn, we are committed by treaty to the terri-
torial integrity of Japan and by another agreement to peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula. To maintain a favorable balance of power in the region, we must protect lines
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of communication to China as well as Northeast and Southeast Asia.
Today, I judge the posture of US and allied forces in the Pacic sufcient to deter the
Soviets from a major attack in that theater and, if deterrence fails, prevent them from
achieving their military objectives. The Republic of Korea is similarly equipped to deal
effectively with any threat from the North that does not involve either the Soviet Union
or the People’s Republic of China.
Two words of caution are in order: First, the Soviet Union has been increasing the
reach and repower of its air and naval forces in the Pacic and supporting a general
upgrade of tactical air forces by North Korea and Vietnam. Second, we are confronted
with political pressures on bases in the Philippines. In short, we must sustain our air
and naval strength in the Western Pacic and, at the same time, remain exible on base
options. This is not an easy situation to manage.
Southwest Asia
In Southwest Asia, US security interests are tied closely to energy objectives—namely,
access to oil at reasonable prices. The Persian Gulf has more reserves than any other
region in the world, and no producer can lift petroleum out of the ground at less cost
than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Should the Soviet Union ever decide to co-opt the Gulf oil elds, their divisions and
tactical air forces could overwhelm the regular troops of Iran, but they always have to
worry about what happens next. Our gaming suggests, for example, that the Central
Command (CENTCOM) can contest a Soviet military foothold in Iran and probably main-
tain some access to the Persian Gulf. When stiff resistance by the Iranians, multilateral
responses by the West, and support by the Gulf Cooperation Council are added to the
picture, the Soviets would be confronted with even more serious problems than they
encountered in Afghanistan.
Again, the Kremlin cannot overlook the fundamental global strength of the United
States. Even if successful in Iran or the Gulf, their progress would be limited to the
water’s edge, and America’s ability to project power would severely hamper Soviet use of
captured oil facilities.
Latin and Central America
Turning to Central America, the situation is in a state of change. The ve Central Amer-
ican countries recently have concluded an accord designed to bring democracy to Nica-
ragua and disband the Nicaraguan Resistance or “Contras.” We are assessing the impact
on the region and on our overall objectives. Up to now, Nicaragua has worked against
peace with freedom in the region, virtually ignoring terms of the Arias Peace Plan. The
burden of proof is still with the Sandinistas. Above all, they must respect human rights
within their own country and stop interfering with their democratic neighbors.
Meanwhile, the United States is faced with a crisis in Panama and sagging condence
in leadership of the Panamanian Defense Force. A resolution will be painful and probably
protracted as Panama sorts out its political and economic problems.
Concurrently, we are confronted with the illicit trafcking and production of narcotics
in Latin America, posing a threat not only to the integrity and stability of governments
to our south but also to the social fabric of the United States itself.
Against this background, I much prefer to see a bipartisan agenda for the region and
an enhanced security assistance program keyed to the everyday threat of low-intensity
conict within the region. Over the next several years, however, America will have to
rely primarily on its own forces to protect US lives and property, improve air and sea
surveillance of the Caribbean, fend off coercive moves by Cuba and Nicaragua, bolster
US commitments under the Rio Treaty, promote regional stability generally, and support
the drug interdiction program. We are competent to do this, but it will take persistence,
time, and some reordering of our priorities.
International Terrorism
Cutting across the international scene is a persistent threat of state-supported ter-
rorism as seen in assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings. While the
Kremlin professes to have no interest in this form of coercion, some of its allies and
surrogates remain deeply involved in the training, covert passage, and arming of ter-
rorist groups.
In response to this threat, an ounce of prevention by civil authorities is worth much
more than a pound of military cure. But it’s very tough to provide a point defense of
every public meeting place or conveyance. Thus, when and where it is possible to do so,
we depend heavily upon our Special Operations Forces. In this regard, I can vouch for
their professional expertise, but I cannot promise success in every instance. In fact, some
acts of terrorism are so disastrous and conclusive that there is not much anyone can do
to help after the fact.
Given these realities, I believe we must make terrorism more costly for the nations
who support it. Our Special Operations Forces have a role in this process. In practice,
we also depend upon our conventional military forces to send a strong message to states
known to have a role in specic acts of terrorism, Libya being a noteworthy example.
Sometimes the international community has accused us of being heavy-handed, but this
must be weighed against no deterrent whatsoever to this form of aggression—normally
conducted against innocent civilians.
Preparing for the Future
At this point, many members of this Committee may be wondering how the US govern-
ment cut $300 billion from the ve-year defense plan contemplated in Fiscal Year 1985
and still managed to end the decade with a position of considerable military strength.
Three factors account for this transition: First, President Reagan placed a high pri-
ority on the strategic modernization program, alliance commitments, and the everyday
excellence of our combatant forces. Second, the military Services postponed conventional
force goals planned in the early 1980s, slowed down modernization programs, and cut
back on the buildup of war reserve material. Third, our combatant forces continued to
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receive new ghting vehicles, combat aircraft, and naval warships funded during the FY
1979-1985 defense buildup.
In essence, you may like many aspects of the foregoing assessment of current capa-
bilities, but you must understand that this assessment is largely the product of Defense
investments made during the early 1980s. What happens in the 1990s is a function of
spending for defense today. Consider, for example, the implications of 2 percent versus
zero or less real growth in spending for Defense over the next ve years.
Two Percent Real Growth
With 2 percent real growth, as proposed by President Reagan, we could continue on course
with our strategic modernization program, maintain a balanced conventional force, nour-
ish research and development programs, and protect a combatant force of high quality.
We would not be able to replace major items of combat equipment on a one-for-one basis.
This means, in effect, that the United States will be moving toward a smaller conventional
force throughout the next decade. Granted, newer generations of combatant equipment
may be more effective than the last, but we would not have the numbers of today.
Substantial trade-offs will be required in the aviation sector. The Army would have
to reduce its helicopter eet from 8,500 to 6,500 platforms; the Air Force would go from
37 to 35 tactical ghter wings; the Marine Corps would be cutting back on AV-8B and
MV-22 (Osprey) procurement; and the Navy would rely on Reserves to man 2 of its 15
carrier air wings.
With respect to naval combatants, we would have to defer achievement of an amphibi-
ous lift capability for one Marine Expeditionary Force plus a brigade until the late 1990s.
The Fleets would remain short of AAW destroyers throughout the next decade, and we
would go below 100 nuclear attack submarines while moving ahead with the new SSN-21.
Further, we will be right at the margin when it comes to protecting a force of high
quality: military compensation barely keeping pace with ination (not comparability
with the private sector), more deferral of depot maintenance, a growing shortfall of base
facility maintenance, and depletion of war reserve material in the interest of peacetime
training and exercises. Obviously, these practices could not continue as an open-ended
proposition. These and other implications of 2 percent real growth can be found in the
last annual report of Secretary Carlucci.
No Real Growth or Less
No real growth or less would pose even more serious and risky choices between competing
priorities within the Defense budget. For example, if we place a high priority on strategic
modernization, advancing military technologies, and the everyday quality of our com-
bat forces, we will have in turn to cut back sharply on conventional force structure or
current modernization programs. In either case, overall conventional military strength
would go downhill.
All of this would occur at a time when we are trying to become less, not more, reliant
upon nuclear weapons to deter on the Central Front of Europe and other forward areas.
Further, we would not be able to stand fast while negotiating a reduction of conventional
forces in Europe—unless, of course, we are prepared to accept a marked and adverse
shift in the Pacic balance of power.
Alternatively, we could try to nourish a supportive global security environment, hold
the line on current commitments, and protect conventional force structure. In this case,
we would have to postpone strategic modernization programs, cut back on research and
development, and allow further depletion of our war reserve materiel.
Slashes of this type would translate into an aging triad of strategic offensive forces
and lower investments in the SDI—not a good combination in terms of deterrence or
our leverage in START. Moreover, we would not be investing as much as we should be in
conventional military technologies and our Defense industrial base. Yet, we know that
America’s prowess in high technologies is the best hedge we have against uncertainties
surrounding the evolution of Soviet military power.
Simply put, we cannot get more defense for less money. In fact, we are at a point
where even small cuts in Defense outlays will translate into disproportionate reductions
in current or future military capabilities.
Amended Defense Budget for FY 1990–1991
Against this background, President Bush has issued new scal guidance to the Depart-
ment of Defense calling for no real growth in FY 1990, followed by 1 percent real growth
in FY 1991-1992 and 2 percent in FY 1993. About $16.2 billion will have to be cut from
the FY 1990-1991 budget submitted by President Reagan and over $60 billion from the
ve-year plan as a whole.
As you are aware, President Bush places a high priority on strategic modernization.
Similarly, he agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders that
we must nourish the everyday excellence of our military establishment. Thus, managing
the initial decrement of $16.2 billion will require deeper trade-offs between conventional
force structure and modernization.
Pending the strategic review ordered by President Bush, some argue that we should
protect conventional force structure and take the cuts in procurement accounts. The
resultant impact, however, will be less upfront funding and fewer benets from multiyear
procurement. More important, we will be confronted with further slippage in critical
aircraft and missile modernization programs, as well as additional backlogs in depot
maintenance, etc.
If we concentrate the cuts on force structure, the question is where and how to do it.
Some believe that we should stand fast in the forward areas and focus on our CONUS-
based forces. Others argue the opposite case. In any event, saving money requires us to
eliminate altogether some Active units.
These simple examples illustrate the complexity and difficulty of the choices.
Complicating the picture are the uncertainties in the international picture. Are we
condent that Gorbachev will succeed, that he will survive, that START is a done deal,
that regional instabilities will not persist, that the drug problem is in hand, that third
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country terrorism is on the wane? I submit that it is premature to reach any of these
ndings. On the other hand, just as our “peace through strength” policy is beginning to
bear fruit, there are those who would jump to these conclusions in order to save money.
A much more thoughtful way to do business would approach the problem carefully
and scale down as our condence increases. Most important, if we are forced to take
substantial force cuts, the Congress would be well advised to dovetail these with progress
in the arms reductions talks. It is with these kind of thoughts in mind that President
Bush has ordered a broad-based strategic review to examine our approach to the whole
panoply of problems. This review is being conducted to make recommendations not only
to the Executive Branch but also to the Legislative arm.
It is clear at this point that with decreasing funds we cannot be strong everywhere,
and we cannot continue to do what we do today effectively. This reality portends change
perhaps in force structure or modernization or both. Certainly, to drop below the rec-
ommended budget for several years will require signicant rollbacks and would mark a
decreased departure from present security policy. Such a decision should not be taken
lightly. Consequently, to get the most for our investment both in economic and strategic
terms, we will be well advised to move gradually and to coordinate these moves with the
international climate—i.e., Soviet moves, arms control progress, and allied relationships.
To ignore these factors and to slash Defense appropriations precipitately would be ill-ad-
vised at best and disastrous at worst.
Conclusions in Sum
America will enter the 1990s spending little more than 5 percent of its Gross National
Product on Defense. This is a very modest investment considering the size of this product,
the worldwide spread of commitments, the global foundations of our economy, the impor-
tance of a stable and secure international environment, diverse and recurring threats
to the national interests, lingering concern about the evolution of Soviet military power,
and a strong American interest in promoting freedom and democracy in the world at
large. Every day, our nation benets from a military establishment respected by friends
and adversaries alike.
Over the last four years, the United States has worked out a relatively reasonable
balance between our various global responsibilities. In the process, however, our forces
are tightly stretched and the level of our capabilities involves more risk than the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would prefer. Specically:
• All of our Active and Reserve forces will not be ready on an everyday basis to
defend NATO, Southwest Asia, or the Pacic Far East against a major threat from
the Soviet Union;
• In the unlikely event that deterrence fails and we engage the Soviet Union world-
wide, we will have to sequentially reinforce and defend the various theaters; and
• On NATO’s Central Front, we may be forced to trade space for time or to consider
resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Neither option is very palatable.
Concurrently, the United States is challenged to maintain a credible nuclear deter-
rent, a secure position in space, a supportive maritime environment, and strategically
mobile ground and air forces.
While the time seems right to develop a more stable and sustainable relationship with
the USSR, the United States and its allies must remain wary of Soviet military power.
Even after unilateral force reductions announced by Gorbachev, the USSR will have an
active military establishment in the neighborhood of 4.6 million personnel. Granted, the
Soviets seem anxious to follow the INF Treaty with a START agreement and conventional
force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals, but little has occurred that we can rely
on. Further, it remains to be seen whether the Soviet process of substituting quality for
quantity in Armed Forces structure will translate into reduced military capabilities. This
is a critical transition we will have to watch and measure throughout the 1990s.
Today, the Department of Defense is challenged to provide more forward looking, fully
integrated, and scally constrained advice to the President and the Congress. Yet, civil-
ian and military leaders in the Pentagon will never be able to deliver the goods without
a durable consensus on spending for Defense.
At this point, we cannot get more defense with less money. With the scal guidance
of President Bush, we can move into the next decade with much of the military strength
we have today. Granted, we may have to ease toward a smaller conventional force, but
this will occur in a gradual fashion—not as a precipitous decline apt to undermine our
alliance relationships, reduce our leverage in international negotiations, and cause mas-
sive turbulence in our military establishment.
At any level of spending for Defense, we must protect a force of high quality—the
backbone of our military strategy, our strongest card in crisis management, and the best
hedge against uncertainties surrounding the evolution of Soviet military power. Quality
requires more than the exploitation of advancing technologies; we must as well nourish
the everyday excellence of our combatant forces and people.
In essence, Mr. Chairman, I have tried to arm you with my best estimate of what various
spending levels will do to our military posture. You may decide that you want to spend less
than President Bush has proposed, but I would urge you rst to consider the entire picture.
Remarks at the Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island | March 30
I’m genuinely pleased to be here at Newport today. Of course, I admit that any trip outside
Washington is a good trip.
We may be living in the era of jointness, and I know Admiral [Ronald J.] Kurth has
emphasized that in your curriculum here, but the Pentagon is still the building with ve
sides, on every issue. As Chairman, I sit right in the middle of all those controversies,
every day. The Air Force wants me to move toward strategic systems. The Army wants me
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to move toward forward deployments. The Navy wants me to move out of town. Not long
ago somebody asked me how in the world I got to be Chairman. I said, “I don’t know, it
just happened; I don’t blame anyone.”
I suspect that some of you don’t realize how lucky you are to spend a year in a real
sanctuary for ideas and learning. I hasten to add that I know the war college environment
has its own frustrations. On visits like this, I’m always reminded of my own academic
experiences. At the very least, I advise a certain amount of skepticism where professors
are concerned. I learned early in my academic career that you have to be careful of what
teachers say.
When I was growing up, my teachers used to insist that a man becomes what he thinks
about. That was designed, of course, to encourage studiousness and high thoughts. But
I later discovered it was somewhat misleading. If it had been true, then by the time I was
eighteen, I would have become a girl.
Such disillusionments—and frivolity—aside, I appreciate the invitation to talk with
you today. I truly envy the opportunity you have in this year to widen your horizons, to
study your profession, and to exchange ideas with Navy colleagues and peers from other
Services. That experience, and the many friendships you acquire here, will enrich your
lives in countless ways, wherever you go.
You arrived at Newport tested and proven as operators and leaders in your war-ght-
ing specialties. And no doubt each of you has been infused with the strong esprit that
service training and experience give us. That technical excellence and fundamental
bonding have always been—and will always be—central attributes of ne military forces
and successful operations. Today we also need military ofcers who can plan, operate,
and lead in a truly integrated, cross-Service fashion.
The nature of modern warfare, the demands of our deterrent strategy, and the bud-
get constraints that loom on the horizon force us to make the most efcient use of our
resources. I would suggest that translates into a strong jointness imperative. It doesn’t
mean we’re going to give up Service loyalty or all the positive things that our early training
brings us. But it does ask our leaders to develop a better balance, to equip themselves
to function in a multi-service environment, to appreciate the merits—and problems—of
other services, and to bring an open mind to joint responsibilities.
I encourage you to get all the benet you can concerning the joint perspective from
the remainder of your studies here, as well as from your colleagues in other Services.
The rewards for you as individuals and as military professionals will be substantial, but
ultimately the Nation will be the real winner.
The second clear need that your War College experience meets is to go beyond war-ght-
ing and to broaden your knowledge of national security affairs. Believe me, preserving the
peace in today’s rapidly changing world is a challenge of the rst order. I suspect that you
have had the opportunity in your classes and discussions to reect on a number of trends
and pressures that have been remolding the international community in recent years.
They include the ever-increasing interdependency among nations, the growing disper-
sion of economic power, the globalization of commercial networks and capital markets,
our own decit problems, the looming debts of the developing countries, and the fact that
we are standing on the threshold of nothing less than another industrial revolution. No
one can say for sure how these developments will eventually sort out or what our globe
will ultimately look like as they unfold, but they have already had a profound impact on
the calculations of political leaders. In turn, they have greatly complicated the defense
calculus, thrusting military people into a wide spectrum of disciplines and communities,
both in and out of government.
This trend puts a high premium on men and women who can comprehend and deal
with the sophistication of the modern world. I foresee no change in this reality. Your
generation must prepare to assume responsibilities which are not easily compartmented
according to war-ghting specialties, or according to service experiences, or even accord-
ing to our status as military professionals.
My message—and appeal—is that you should strive to develop such a broad-gauged
view of your profession as you rise in rank. It should govern your personal preparations
and inuence your thinking about future assignments. Even more important, let it inform
the way you counsel and develop your people.
President Kennedy once admonished the Joint Chiefs that he wanted them to be much
more than military experts when they rendered advice to him on national security affairs.
That guidance is even more relevant today. I urge you to give it your best shot as you move
ahead. With those remarks as background, what I’d like to do for the next few minutes
is to survey some major features of the geostrategic landscape that I see emerging, and
some of the resulting challenges ahead for Washington in the 1990s.
Of necessity, my observations will be highly compressed, but I would be happy to
expand on them in the question period. I know there’s a wealth of curiosity out there—at
least I’m sure there was when I started a few minutes ago. I’m looking forward to both
hearing and addressing your queries.
Turning to Asia rst, we nd an upbeat story unfolding in that key part of the globe. I
would be hard-pressed to nd another region in which our long-term policies—economic,
political, and security—have been so successful. Here Communism is a discredited model
clearly on the wane. The Soviets have failed miserably in their attempts to penetrate the
Asian marketplace. Democracy has steadily spread, though unevenly, and the region’s
economic progress has in some respects been mind-boggling.
From the military perspective, furthermore, I would argue that the postwar Asian
story is a relatively satisfying one, the Vietnam War notwithstanding. Washington has
worked closely with our friends to provide a security shield that has permitted them
to develop in their own fashion and at their own pace, without external interference or
intimidation. And they know our help has been crucial. When I was CINCPAC, Asian
leaders continually emphasized this point to me and urged that US forces remain for-
ward-deployed in the Western Pacic. But there is no question that the region presents
us a new set of economic and foreign policy challenges. Indeed, in many ways Americans
are now confronted by the consequences of success: energetic economic competitors and
lively democratic societies that are exing their muscles and redening their relations
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with the United States. Those dynamics are going to need statesmanlike tending in the
coming years. Our dealings with Japan on the FSX illustrate these complexities well. [The
FSX was envisioned as a successor to the F-1 support ghter aircraft; it was never built].
Likewise, the region’s military realities will still require attention. The reach of Soviet
Pacic naval and air power has expanded annually, as does their order of battle at Cam
Ranh Bay. While the long-term outlook for balance on the Korean peninsula remains
favorable, the North’s current force modernization, historic hostility, and continuing
unpredictability highlight the importance of close cooperation between Seoul and Wash-
ington. Moreover, throughout the region, retaining access to bases will be an issue for
some time to come—even in the Philippines.
From a “macro” perspective, however, the security dimensions in Asia seem to be
manageable—within the context of a forward-deployed American strategy. And I think
the past successes of that policy provide strong incentive to maintain it in a region whose
importance to the United States is growing steadily.
In Europe, however, I would contend that while the story of success has similar
themes, the long-term politico-military picture is less clear.
Washington’s primary strategic focus will likely remain on Western Europe for the
foreseeable future, because that is where the most demanding threat still looms. Yet the
ux that we have witnessed in that region in recent years promises to continue, and in
my view will complicate matters far beyond what we are accustomed to handling. Let me
tell you why. The free nations of Europe have continued to integrate their markets and
have come together on many economic and social issues, all of which may be setting
the stage for a stronger European pillar within NATO. Certainly that will be a desirable
outcome, but that day is still some time off.
In Moscow, meanwhile, General Secretary Gorbachev is pursuing internal reforms,
making highly publicized and often favorably received overtures to the West (including trade
and nancial initiatives), and fundamentally modifying the Kremlin’s earlier foreign poli-
cies—notably in engineering the troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, joining with President
Reagan in a serious arms reduction effort, and publicly committing to troop reductions
and to force restructuring in both Europe and Asia. Gorbachev has also announced cuts
in military production and the redirection of defense plants to civilian output.
Make no mistake, these are signicant steps, and they move in directions we’ve
been encouraging for years. In the military realm, if carried out, they will impact on
the balance of land power in Europe and Asia, virtually eliminate the surprise attack
option for Soviet ground forces, and more generally provide a down payment on a shift
to a less-offensive posture.
The world is rightfully curious as to what is inspiring these remarkable developments.
My own view is that Gorbachev and his supporters—including some of his military lead-
ers—have come to the conclusion that the USSR can’t be a rst-rate power as long as it
is plagued with a third-rate economy and an ossied bureaucracy.
He understands that Moscow’s global interests in the long run require a better sup-
port base, and that at least some of the effort they devote to maintaining large Armed
Forces and to sustaining external adventures would be put to better use internally. To
achieve these goals, he needs time, a stable international climate, and foreign capital. His
recent moves make gains on all three fronts, but it is not so clear that he can sell the nec-
essary changes and sacrices associated with domestic restructuring to his countrymen.
In Eastern Europe, similarly, the communist economic model has sputtered, people
have grown restive under one-party rule, and probably there is increasing receptive-
ness to systemic change. For some time, I have believed that these nations have been
unreliable allies for Moscow, and if the Russian military presence really does decline in
Eastern Europe, their independent tendencies could become more pronounced. Many in
the West are nding this comforting, but it may also signal an era of great uncertainly
and instability, which in our business can be rather unsettling.
It isn’t yet clear where these developments are taking us. But amidst all the stirring,
there is one persistent reality: the Soviet military strength that looms over the continent
is still most formidable and is, moreover, largely untouched by Mr. Gorbachev’s promises.
Even if his declared reductions materialize, the Soviets would still have some 4.5 million
men under arms, vastly superior numbers in nearly every category of ground weapons
systems, plus a massive strategic arsenal, impressive naval power, and a burgeoning
space capability. Those facts will remain for strategists of the 1990s to confront.
In the meantime, my counsel has been that the best attitude for the West is to be
watchful and wary, while awaiting the deeds that the General Secretary has said will
follow his words.
The full impact that we are looking for clearly will take time to manifest: after all, we’re
talking about changes to central features of an organizational culture that may be the
most rigidly structured the world has ever known. In other words, I don’t think we should
be readying ourselves quite yet to publish the next edition of Soviet Military Power on a
3-by-5 card. But in the face of these developments, the challenge—and certainly it will
be an imposing one—will be to preserve our strength, to keep our alliances united, and
to stay forward-deployed abroad until the Soviets can demonstrate that they are pursu-
ing their new “defensive” philosophy seriously and for the long haul. Here I am, frankly,
talking about political tasks rather than military ones, and my capsule prescription will
be a lot easier to say than to do.
Unfortunately, Mr. Gorbachev is complicating the problem with very astute appeals
to public sentiment, reinforcing the always-present tendency of many Europeans to
discount the threat and to play down the need for military strength. On security issues,
NATO electorates increasingly debate the danger, the costs, the need for a foreign pres-
ence, environmental concerns, training inconveniences, etc. Speaking candidly, this
tendency is the real heart of our problem. It spells trouble as we attempt to keep the
Alliance healthy for the future.
For some time now, strategists in the United States—in government and out—have
known that it is in the Third World that the most likely and direct threats to US interests
will arise. A sample listing illustrates the point. Tensions and age-old hatreds in the
Middle East persist, with the prospect of war and episodes of violence part of everyday
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life in the region. The Near East cauldron of Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan continues
to seethe.
Access to overseas oil will preoccupy Free World nations well into the next century;
witness our operations in the Persian Gulf. In Latin America, we confront an insidious
drug trade, self-styled “liberation” movements with a built-in anti-US avor and Soviet,
Cuban, or Nicaraguan backing. The threat of terrorism and low-intensity conict con-
tinues to expand around the globe. These few examples make the point. The most likely
military challenge in the coming decade will be regional instabilities which threaten our
foreign and economic policies as well as some of our friends.
We have been steadily enhancing our capability in counterterrorism and special oper-
ations, but these are only rst steps as we learn to deal with this mushrooming threat.
It will require different approaches, equipment, and tactics than traditional warfare.
For these kinds of scenarios, America’s response depends on a great deal more than
just what the Department of Defense can contribute. Also important are a range of fac-
tors—for instance, public and congressional attitudes, the capabilities of other US policy
tools (diplomatic, economic, etc.)—and the staunchness of nations whose interests may
be endangered by these low-level threats.
Developing an integrated and balanced approach to these threats will be a major
challenge for the bureaucracy, particularly as scal pressures grow—witness Panama
and our drug problems. In addition to these international developments, defense planners
in the next decade will continue to face a troublesome climate at home.
The rst has to do with the fact that the military dimensions of daily affairs tend to
be obscured for citizens of democracies who are enjoying a relatively afuent and placid
life. In our republic, that tendency is sometimes quite pronounced. It is often difcult
for defense-related considerations to compete successfully with other priorities on the
Nation’s agenda. In war, we remember the Alamo, the Maine, Pearl Harbor; in good times,
we forget—we lose sight of the real dangers of international life and the need for strength
to keep them at bay.
During my tenure in the Chairmanship, I have been wrestling with the effects of one
of those peaks-and-valleys cycles. In the early years of the Reagan Administration, we
saw, and you and I experienced, a marked revival of military capabilities that had been
neglected in the 1970s. But now our resources have been constricted by negative real
growth in budgets for four successive years, and in spite of what the administration now
plans for Defense (level with ination this year and slow growth later), I am constantly told
by congressmen that “political realities” will dictate decreasing Defense appropriations
for the foreseeable future. Not many of them, however, have had much to say—to me or
to our citizens—about overseas threats, international conditions, the status of our forces,
or what I would call the “military realities.” Unfortunately, it is hard to accommodate
both views, and political imperatives will most often prevail.
This is an inefcient and often dangerous way to approach security issues. But I’m
afraid that you are condemned to working in an environment where appropriations will
continue to expand and contract arbitrarily. This practice makes steering a straight
strategic course rather difcult. Our DOD leaders have constantly criticized it—but
with little success. This, again, emphasizes the need for you to prepare to serve in a
policy-making system that is pushed and pulled by many vested interests outside the
military. It will be frustrating, but the Nation needs you to continue to engage these
windmills and not to withdraw from the contest.
A few days ago, a friend explained to me the difference between a politician and a
statesman. A politician makes the possible necessary; a statesman makes the necessary
possible. That’s a simple witticism designed to amuse, but it points to what I consider the
most urgent problem in government today. While there is no dearth of sound ideas in this
country, and in Washington, there is denitely a scarcity of leaders who can recognize a
truly worthwhile proposal, esh it out, drive it through our complex bureaucracy, over-
come its nay-sayers, and ultimately develop sufcient public and congressional support
to make it a reality.
Now, that’s a tough job. It takes a special brand of leadership. It takes intellectual
and communication skills, a broad knowledge of the mechanical side of our government,
and also a special kind of courage and perseverance.
I believe our professional experience and schooling slights this aspect of government
service. We are often seeking the perfect answer instead of teaching how you turn the
good idea into practical, actual, everyday policy. Yet translating thought into action in a
modern republic will take up a good deal of your time in the future.
If I could give you some home-cooked advice, I would strongly recommend that you
identify the people in your organization who can make the necessary possible in a bureau-
cratic environment. Study their experience, make their techniques your own, and absorb
their knowledge and their wisdom. Both you and the country will prot from the effort.
In a similar vein, another set of problems for Defense leaders will arise from the need for
the Pentagon itself to remain a credible player in our government. Simply put, it is impera-
tive that we retain the trust of the President, the Congress, and the American public, and
we must continue to make strenuous efforts to improve our efciency and management.
Like everything else, Pentagon management is not as bad as the critics say it is, nor
is it as good as some of its defenders say it is. Nevertheless, we are going to need strong
leadership to implement a wide range of reforms which are long overdue.
You are familiar with many of these initiatives on the military and civilian sides of
DOD. Some are farther along than others, but there’s no question that in all cases our
performance will be closely scrutinized by politicians and the public alike. This challenge,
too, will be a major feature of the landscape in your professional lifetimes.
Let me close my remarks with this brief note: lest you think I’ve painted a picture of
nothing but indeterminate challenges abroad and frustrations at home, it’s well to keep
in mind what an old philosopher, Paul Harvey, said on the subject: “In times like these,
it’s helpful to recall that there have always been times like these.”
The problems I’ve described are part of my everyday business, and before too long
(probably a lot sooner than you think), they will be part of yours. We should not under-
estimate the problems, but on the other hand, our history suggests that we can manage
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them if we exercise persistence, imagination, and professionalism. I am optimistic in
this regard. With my Washington travails, I guess that makes me an incurable optimist.
On your watch, it will take great determination, energy, and consensus-building tal-
ents—and the help of Congress and the public—but it can be done. You will be served
well in that task by the time you are spending here at Newport.
I would also suggest that you make a career-long commitment to studying your
profession, your government, our history, and above all, successful practitioners within
the government.
Remarks to Welcome Mr. Dick Cheney to Duties as Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon | May 8
It is a pleasure for me, on behalf of my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all
forces, to preside at this ceremony ofcially welcoming Mr. Dick Cheney to his duties
as Secretary of Defense, and we are proud also to extend warm greetings to his wife,
Lynne, herself a widely respected leader in Washington. Together, this couple constitutes
an impressive partnership, and we in the Department of Defense are privileged indeed
to begin an association with them.
Though we are rendering this rst welcome salute to the new Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Cheney has, of course, been on the job with us for some weeks and has already had to
endure an extended welcome of quite a different sort—the low-budget variety, so to speak of.
And as he himself has admitted, it has been a learning process, even at times an emotional
roller coaster, with some confusing ups and downs—especially on his Pentagon elevator.
Somebody said that for years Mr. Cheney strode the corridors of the White House and
Congress with distinction and aplomb, but he quickly discovered that it’s easy to lose
your way in the Pentagon. He knows his way around, now. In fact, since taking ofce he
has adeptly handled an array of formidable and pressing national security problems:
• Maintaining cohesion among strong-minded allies;
• Dealing from strength with long-time adversaries; and
• Participating in dialogue with observers of various contending persuasions.
And all that’s just in twenty-four hours!
Incidentally, I should make it clear that if my remarks about Mr. Cheney seem some-
what understated to you, I’m operating under some mild constraints today. Despite his
impressive beginning as Secretary, he said I shouldn’t try to predict how he’ll do in the
long term. Something about hazarding guesses being hazardous business.
Mr. Cheney comes to DOD at a particularly interesting and signicant time. As
America’s Armed Forces formally mark the opening of Cheney’s tour at the Defense
Department, they can be proud of what they have accomplished in securing this coun-
try’s global interests and promoting international stability. Yet it is also true that when
our civilians look out on the world, they see an international scene that seems to be in
considerable ux.
For a decade and more, after all, the pace of change has been genuinely mind-bog-
gling: with an ever-growing dispersion of economic power; emergence of the Soviets exing
their muscles on the world stage; for the rst time, burgeoning technologies that propel
us into a future that literally has no road map, and not only is there no map for what
lies ahead but as Americans look out on the global stage, they see continuing political
turmoil, terrorism, and regional conict; and they know that potentially hostile military
forces loom over whole continents and threaten vital lines of communication. At the
same time, they see their nation involved in a more complex spectrum of international
relationships and negotiations, with more riding on them than ever before.
Additionally, while they watch democracy and free enterprise take root among devel-
oping nations and thrive everywhere, they also witness the agonies and frustrations inev-
itably attending that phenomenon. Among our long-time adversaries, they see stirrings
that suggest signs of hope, including military changes—moves have come belatedly and
slowly, amidst the defensive shifts. They also see political shifts but only on the margins
of a huge military establishment. Many of our citizens scan that horizon of emerging
opportunity coupled with perplexing uncertainty and of promise coupled with the legacy
of a troubled past and two major lessons emerge.
The rst is that the favorable prospects we may nd in our potential adversaries
have not developed fortuitously or naturally. They are in large part the consequences of
successful policies the United States has pursued, in conjunction with many allies and
friends, for more than forty years. This can be cause for great satisfaction and condence.
But the second lesson argues against complacency. It has taken a great deal of
American effort, sacrice, engagement, and leadership to get us to this point. In partic-
ular: it has taken sustained, determined effort in the security arena to deter aggression;
the internal craftsmanship to forge a bulwark of our countries; and the projection of
strength behind which countries can seek economic and political maturity in their
own fashion and at their own pace; and the creation of a world order in which free
institutions can ourish.
Indeed, it is a plain fact of international life that America’s Armed Forces, strong and
forward-deployed, have been an indispensable pillar, not only of our freedom and afu-
ence but also of the liberty and prosperity of many hopeful peoples around the globe.
That international strength has been the umbrella under which all our cards have been
played. That same power, arrayed against evolving threats, will have much to do with how
the future unfolds: Our leadership knows in the years ahead we will need clear-sighted
vision to sustain the posture to explore opportunities for great geostrategic security, while
also attaining the defenses that bring those opportunities within reach, and to master
change, while also keeping a weather eye.
It is indeed fortunate that a leader of Dick Cheney’s caliber will be at the Pentagon’s
helm during this time. He brings wide experience and special central qualities to the job.
He has been a long-time student of and participant in war-gaming, rising to the top levels
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in both the Executive and Legislative Branches. He has seen the multiple burdens of the
Commander in Chief up close, as a key advisor to two Presidents. In Congress, he rose
quickly to leadership posts and won the enduring condence of colleagues on both sides
of the aisle. Moreover, this former congressman from Wyoming remains closely attuned
to the heart of America as he grapples with the most demanding issues of international
security and strategy.
On the governmental process, I can attest personally to his keen mind, his capacity
for hard work, his fair-mindedness, and his thoughtful approach to addressing the long-
term national interest.
All these assets will stand you in good stead, Mr. Secretary, and they augur well
for our future. But I would add just a few more entries to this general catalogue of the
resources available to you—and to the President—as you move forward. You can:
• Depend on the skill and commitment of the men and women in America’s Armed
Forces, and on their faithful service on the battlements every day.
• Be sure that they are led by talented commanders well-prepared for their missions.
You can look to the concerted efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the soundest
military advice we can muster.
• Be certain that no potential adversary can lightly contemplate any direct challenge
to the aggregate strength we represent.
Unquestionably, we are a formidable team. And speaking for all our people in uniform,
I can say that we are gratied to have the opportunity to serve with you as we address
the challenges that lie ahead.
Remarks at a DOD News Briefing for the Admiral’s Upcoming Trip to the
Soviet Union
June 6
Good morning.
A number of journalists inquired about my trip to the Soviet Union, and since time did
not permit me to meet individually with them to discuss the forthcoming visit, I thought
it might be helpful if I, just for a few moments, spoke to you collectively.
I will be leaving Thursday evening and arrive in the Soviet Union on the 12th. This is
in a very real sense an extension, or a return visit, to the call that Marshal Akhromeyev
made last summer. It is an extension of the military-to-military contacts program which
he and I agreed to. We both concurred, in our discussions last summer, that since the
courage of our political leaders was bringing our countries closer together, and they were
seriously engaging the issues that divide us, that it was incumbent upon our two mili-
taries to look seriously for ways to contribute to this process. That is the main purpose
of my return visit to the Soviet Union.
I will, of course, attempt to establish a relationship with General Moiseyev, who is my
host. I hope to see rst-hand, close-hand, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. I will
be visiting installations in every Service. Likewise, I anticipate the opportunity to talk to
many Soviet citizens, as Marshal Ahkromeyev did in our country last year. I will have
discussions in Moscow which will address, I believe, the mutual concerns of our two
militaries, and we will be, in an informal fashion, looking for ways to advance on those
problems. With that, I’ll be happy to submit myself to your questions.
Remarks on the Signing of the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement
Moscow | June 12
The signing of this agreement culminates nine months of hard work by the joint working
group Marshal Akhromeyev and I established last year to examine ways of lessening the
risk to our Armed Forces that may arise when they operate in proximity to one another,
and of preventing tensions that may be created by certain military activities. In the entire
history of our countries’ relationship, this was the rst direct military-to-military consid-
eration of these matters at the top level of uniformed leadership. From that standpoint
alone we, should mark this ceremony as a signicant event. And of course, because
such a development was unthinkable only a few years ago, it signies as well how far the
courage of our political leaders has brought us toward developing a more sustainable,
larger relationship between our countries.
Setting aside history and the broader context, however, the agreement is important on
its own terms. I congratulate General [George Lee] Butler and General [Anatoly] Bolyatko,
and all the others who contributed to the effort, for promising a document from which
their comrades-in-arms will benet for years to come. From all of them, on both sides,
you have earned a hearty, “Well done.”
On a very personal level, I might add, this event is a most satisfying one for me. Near
the end of a career that has brought me unexpected opportunities to serve the interests
of peace, I have been proud now to participate in developing these procedures intended
to diminish tensions and dangers associated with military activities. After all, the fun-
damental mission of our Armed Forces is to prevent war. This agreement rests on that
very proposition. That we have found such common ground and outlined practical ways
of cooperating augurs well for the future of our professional relationship.
General Moiseyev and I have already had the opportunity to discuss these and other
important issues, and I look forward to further discussions as my program here in the
Soviet Union proceeds.
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DOD Press Release Regarding the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement
An executive agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the preven-
tion of dangerous military activities was signed at 8:45 AM (EDT) today in Moscow. The
agreement represents the rst direct military-to-military consideration of these matters
at the top level of uniformed military leadership. The signatories on behalf of the US and
Soviet governments are Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman, JCS, and General Mikhail
Moiseyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff.
The signing ceremony culminates a nine-month process of discussions and nego-
tiations by a joint working group set up by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet
General Staff. The working group has been coordinated on the US side by Major General
George L. Butler and on the Soviet side by General Major Anatoly Bolyatko. The Ameri-
can team brought to the negotiating table a group of experts from William J. Crowe, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, the various
military services, the Ofce of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department,
who, along with their Soviet counterparts, explored issues and concerns of each side
concerning military activities, which have the potential for creating tensions between
our two countries. The agreement commits both nations to seek to prevent four kinds of
dangerous military activity. Dangerous military activities, for the purposes of this agree-
ment, are certain activities of one party’s Armed Forces when such Armed Forces are
operating in proximity to Armed Forces of the other party during peacetime. Specically,
the unintentional or “force maneuver” (emergency) entry into the national territory of
the other side; the hazardous use of laser devices; the disruption of military operations
in a mutually agreed upon “special caution area” (an area of high tension such as the
Persian Gulf, where both sides have forces in close proximity); and interference with the
command and control networks of either side.
The agreement also contains stated procedures for establishing communications
necessary to prevent dangerous military activities, to resolve incidents peacefully, and
to exchange and discuss information regarding such activity or incidents as may arise.
Finally, the agreement contains a provision to set up a Joint Military Commission, which
will meet periodically to explore and evaluate issues relating to dangerous military activ-
ities. The executive agreement is of indenite duration.
Remarks on “The US-Soviet Military-to-Military Relationship” at the Voroshilov
General Staff Academy
June 13
It is a high honor for me to visit your country at the invitation of General Moiseyev and
especially to speak to the staff and students of the renowned Voroshilov General Staff
Academy. The program has already been lled with memorable events and warm Russian
hospitality. But no military man could fail to be impressed—indeed, profoundly moved—
upon entering this academy’s beautiful marble hall and seeing the names inscribed here:
many graduates of this academy have risen to positions of national leadership, and all
followed in the footsteps of a long and distinguished line of professionals dedicated to
serving their nation.
That sense of heritage, that proud history, clearly is well-tended by those who will
lead the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union tomorrow. In the American Armed Forces, we
too nd strength and sustenance in our traditions of serving our republic and its people.
We are, of course, brought together today by more tangible and immediate events.
The very fact that I am here attests to the drama and promise of recent developments in
our larger bilateral relationship.
Depending on the international climate, we have known each other at arms-length—
as in the years of hostility and suspicion that others dubbed the Cold War, and with arms
linked—as in that historic moment in 1945 on the Elbe River, when tired American and
Soviet troops met and celebrated their mutual cause and triumph.
In my professional lifetime, we have been allies in a grueling war, then wary adversar-
ies in a troubled peace, and now we are challenged to collaborate with national leaders
advocating new courses to promote peace and mutual security. You and I are literally
members of a transitional generation—re-examining the way our two societies have
thought about and dealt with one another for many years.
Today I would like to devote my prepared remarks to observations about the mili-
tary relationship between our two great nations—about its past, about the realities of
the present, and about the promise of the future. In our question and answer session
I will be happy to address those subjects—or any others you would like to pursue—in
greater detail.
Our military-to-military relationship was born in a time of trial, when the United
States extended lend-lease assistance to the Soviet Union during World War II, your Great
Patriotic War. During that association, many US and Soviet Servicemen grew to know
one another well, and some of the Americans even joined in Soviet military operations.
For instance, our sailors and merchant seamen struggled with yours to maintain the
supply lines to Murmansk and Archangel; some rest there today as testimony to that
joint undertaking. Our pilots worked together to ferry bombers between allied-controlled
Western Europe and airelds in the USSR. There were other joint supply operations
between Alaska and Siberia, and military cooperation in the Balkans, as well. And of
course, there was that joyous linkup at the Elbe.
The memory of that cooperation, limited as it may now seem to have been, and the
respect American Servicemen came to have for their Soviet counterparts have endured
through the passing years and through the vicissitudes of international life.
The time of friendly, face-to-face collaboration was short-lived, of course, and replaced
by the postwar era of confrontation in a divided Europe and elsewhere. But I think it is
noteworthy that even in those times people in uniform on both sides played important
and constructive roles in a host of tension-reducing activities in:
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• Establishing military liaison missions in divided Germany, for instance, and ini-
tiating dialogues between US and Soviet commanders. Contacts which persist to
this day;
• Making arrangements for routing trafc in the Berlin air corridor;
• Negotiating and subsequently implementing the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement;
• Arms reduction talks and risk reduction measures;
• The SALT, START, and conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna;
• The 1975 Helsinki Agreement and the 1986 Stockholm accord;
• The Standing Consultative Commission; and
• The vital INF verication mechanisms in both countries.
Overall, this brief historical overview argues that, despite the unevenness of devel-
opments in the past, there is a great deal for us to build on in the present. Moreover, it
tells us that there have always been eminently good reasons for military ofcers to be
involved in the international endeavors to promote peace and stability.
Certainly, there has never been a time when it was more important than today for our
Armed Forces to appreciate their role in larger events. Without dwelling on the historical
pressures that shattered the wartime bond between our two governments, the fact is that
the military strength of both sides is part and parcel of the circumstances that divide
us. The imposing nuclear arsenals, advanced space technology, extensive conventional
forces, and the global military reach of the Warsaw Pact and NATO cast long shadows.
Each side believes its strength to be necessary for its own security. Similarly, each per-
ceives the other’s power to be a serious threat which cannot be ignored.
Likewise, the increasing sophistication and reach of our weapons steadily reduces the
room for error and raises the level of uneasiness all across the globe. More important, a
steady stream of political, environmental, social, and economic problems are crying for
attention, and solutions are hindered by the drain large forces place on our pocketbooks.
Make no mistake: the challenges presented by our history are immense as we attempt
to satisfy the current social and economic pressures without jeopardizing our safety.
But that should not discourage or deter us. The political leaders of our two great nations
clearly are determined to confront this challenge squarely. Due to the political courage of
Chairman Gorbachev and President Reagan and now President Bush, America and the
USSR are engaging seriously the great issues which divide us. In turn, it is incumbent
upon the Armed Forces of our two nations to look for ways to contribute positively to this
effort. It was in that spirit that I invited Marshal Akhromeyev to the United States last
year to visit our Armed Forces and to meet our citizens.
On that path-breaking journey, he held long and detailed discussions with Ameri-
can military leaders. He went to sea on a newly commissioned aircraft carrier, visited a
nuclear missile silo, witnessed a eld exercise, and then toured a bomber base. He had the
opportunity—indeed, he seized many opportunities—to interact with a broad spectrum
of young Service men and women. That trip was unprecedented, in both the itinerary
and the discussions, which were full, frank, and directed to fundamental issues. He
and I had long conversations about our respective homelands and instructive exchanges
laying out our individual security perspectives.
We reached several general conclusions. First and foremost, it is imperative for our
two militaries to search for ways to contribute to the larger process of reducing tension
between our two governments and promoting stability. As Marshal Akhromeyev said last
year, “You can’t accomplish the paramount task of today, the prevention of war, without
the military. This is why leaders are active as never before in the process that should
lead to the prevention of war….”
We agreed that one of the prominent roadblocks to improved relations was the “mis-
trust” between Moscow and Washington that had developed in the postwar era. Genuine
progress requires that we promote mutual understanding and nd ways to attenuate
resentment and suspicion. It is essential for each side to have as clear an understanding
of the other as possible—free of stereotypes and reexive suspicions.
With that goal in mind, we were able to agree on a program for further military
contacts. This framework provided for two paths: a Joint Working Group on “dangerous
military activities,” and a two-year schedule that includes reciprocal visits by military
leaders, historians, warships, medical workers, and sportsmen.
I think it is important to note that the Joint Working Group is the rst direct mili-
tary-to-military exploration of these matters coordinated at the top level of command. The
group has recommended a number of actions and procedures that will put the members
of our Armed Forces at less risk when operating near each other in peacetime. Their
work resulted in the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities that
General Moiseyev and I signed yesterday.
The two-year program of exchanges has also proceeded apace. I am very pleased
with its success, and I hope that when we review it together in 1990 we can continue to
expand the areas of exchange and cooperation.
In a similar vein, I believe the Marshal and I came to the conclusion that arms reduc-
tion initiatives are fundamental to improving our relationship. Such efforts to succeed
will require the wholehearted support of our two Armed Forces. There are many technical
questions to be sorted out which can only be answered by those with arms expertise.
Moreover, it is imperative that negotiated draw-downs be made in a fashion that offers
each party a suitable balance and a dependable level of security throughout. Here again,
sound judgments by our military leaders will be essential.
To facilitate progress, we agreed on the necessity for a frank exchange of views and
a better understanding of each other’s doctrine and goals. We recognized that there are
limitations on such contacts. All nations naturally have unique perspectives—due in
part to different histories, locations, and strategic circumstances.
Secretary Carlucci touched on this subject last year, and I think it is useful for me
to reinforce the point. The Soviet Union is an enormous country with huge reserves of
natural and human resources. Military professionals in the USSR, charged to defend
far-ung borders encompassing a vast expanse of land, naturally emphasize territorial
integrity.
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The United States, by contrast, is a nation whose welfare has always depended heav-
ily on international intercourse. In Washington, planners think primarily in terms of
assured access to the sea lanes that are our lifeline, and also of the safety of our allies,
friends, and trading partners abroad.
In turn, each country’s forces and capabilities will be shaped by those realities.
Understanding these limitations will help us to accommodate differences in view.
Lastly, the Marshal and I readily acknowledged that the tasks ahead are daunting
ones. It will take a great deal of time, patience, persistence, and thoughtfulness before
all the obstacles can be overcome. But the stakes are immense and justify extraordinary
effort. We must not ag or become discouraged—there simply isn’t any responsible alter-
native in our age.
Personally, I am optimistic as to the ultimate outcome and as to the positive role our
respective Armed Forces can play in this drama in the coming years. Turning to the
future of our relationship, both Moscow and Washington will need to ponder carefully
how to move our military-to-military dealings forward. Appropriate areas for discussion
and exchange must be carefully dened in alignment with security interests and in light
of real world developments.
There is no gainsaying, of course, that there are important questions yet to be
answered and differences to manage. Last August, in his speech at this academy,
then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci outlined some of the trends and uncertainties we see
in Washington. He focused particularly on the evolution of your military doctrine toward
a more defensive posture. I had similar discussions with Marshal Akhromeyev, and—as
you might imagine—this subject remains of great interest not only to Americans but to
many others around the globe. Acknowledging this interest, your leaders have counseled
patience and urged that we continue to watch for proof of that shift.
We have, indeed, been very attentive, and some changes have been visible. From our
standpoint, however, we occasionally see contradictory indicators which we hope time will
sort out satisfactorily. In that regard, the force reductions and restructuring announced
by Chairman Gorbachev at the United Nations last December provided an additional
glimpse of what the formula “reasonable sufciency” might mean. If the basic programs
are carried to fruition, they will represent an important step in addressing some of our
long-standing concerns about the preponderance—the sheer weight—of your forces, and
especially their posturing for the offensive, including surprise attack.
You must understand as well the way we look at the unilateral proposals of your gov-
ernment. As we see it, these draw-downs will affect only the margins of Soviet military
power. Granted, they focus on units that ght the theater war, but even after the antici-
pated reductions, you will still possess the world’s largest active military establishment,
as well as a larger inventory of military hardware than all of NATO combined in many
categories of equipment.
Speaking candidly, it is rather difcult for Americans—and those in many other
countries—to see how such a massive array of power is mandated by the legitimate
needs of defense.
It is fundamental for you to understand as well our professional concern regarding
current asymmetries in the arms balance. Take for example the European case. Beyond
what anyone may believe about the intentions of your leaders or the character of your
strategy, the simple arithmetic that describes your capabilities leads inescapably to the
conclusion that if NATO is serious about defending Europe—and let me assure you that
we are—then the alliance cannot prematurely sacrice key weapons systems, notably
our air power and theater nuclear capability.
Similarly, your vast preponderance in numbers tells us that we must have strong
maritime capabilities to keep open the sea lanes in order to reinforce and sustain
potential battleelds. There just is no other responsible position for us to assume. I am
persuaded that if you sat in my chair or in NATO councils you would be inuenced by
the same imperatives.
In other words, absent the addressing of those asymmetries which have always
troubled us, it is unreasonable to expect Washington—and me as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff—to jeopardize our ability to reach Western Europe and to meet our
NATO commitments. In this regard, I consider the recent Soviet CFE [Conventional Forces
in Europe treaty] offer as most encouraging, since the principle of parity is explicitly
accepted. Details, of course, remain to be sorted out, but when combined with President
Bush’s recent intervention, we are seeing prospects for genuinely modifying the European
military landscape and encouraging stability.
The same approach, of course, governs our reading of what is required in the realm
of strategic weaponry, which underwrites our entire deterrent posture. Please bear in
mind that I am expressing an American point of view. I fully appreciate that you have
legitimate concerns to resolve about our intentions and capabilities, that these issues
must be hammered out in dialogue, that we need to know more about each other, and
that both sides will have to exercise imagination and statesmanship before we can reach
common ground.
Make no mistake: your American counterparts welcome the announced shifts in
Soviet military thinking and structure. We will watch closely as these changes unfold,
and we genuinely want the momentum to continue. On this visit, I hope to learn a great
deal about your new perspectives on defense. Certainly, a continuing program of contacts
can help to clarify uncertainties on both sides. For my part, a fundamental objective
would be to convey to the Soviet government and people the basic goals of America’s
defensive strategy, and above all to emphasize that our purpose is to resist aggression,
never to initiate it.
As we confront these issues, it is wise that we develop a more comprehensive under-
standing of each other’s systems. To be candid at this point, Americans have a limited
understanding of how your military and political authorities interact in determining
Soviet policies. We watch with great interest, but from a distance, the process of political
reform under way in the Soviet Union today. I have no wish to intrude in your internal
discussions. Indeed, my countrymen since 1776 have rmly believed that every society
has the right to choose the form of government it thinks best. So let me instead simply
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describe a system I know much more about—the American one—and how one ofcer
sees the military’s relation to the political system.
The central feature of all policymaking in the US government is its pluralism—i.e., a
large number of voices have a say in every major decision. This is especially true in the
security area, where civilian involvement is extensive. Most striking is the public debate
which accompanies every signicant issue. National security ofcials, accountable to
the Congress and the American citizenry, must publicly explain their programs. In turn,
the press, academics, and think-tank experts all have and freely state a broad spectrum
of views on military operations, strategy, investment and budget questions, as well as
military personnel matters. Predictably, these opinions run the gamut of wisdom and
can occasionally prove most taxing for the professional who bears the responsibility
for translating policy into weapons and units. Unquestionably, this system puts great
demands on our top commanders who must function in this inquisitive environment.
On the other hand, the freedom to intervene is built into our souls and despite its
frustrations usually brings wider and deeper deliberation into the process. One advan-
tage of this public deliberation is that there is an opportunity for the political process
to balance military and non-military objectives against each other—as has occurred,
for example, when environmental complaints are raised against basing plans for mil-
itary activities.
Complicating the equation, the US Constitution gives our Congress several crucial
powers—e.g., responsibility to advise and consent on treaties, to raise and support
armies and navies, to mobilize reserves, and to declare war. This means that key defense
decisions are made not only by a process that is complex and searching but by one that
is formal and open. Congressional budget authority, for example, permits constant and
widely publicized inquiries, investigations, and studies into our business.
From the Service viewpoint, legislative activities sometimes become too intrusive
and too detailed and may unduly limit our ability to manage efciently. On the other
hand, legislative inquiry and scrutiny assist in making our policies understandable and
in developing a political consensus within the Congress and the citizenry. This process,
however, requires a public and comprehensive Defense budget—one which acknowledges
the real costs of defense and articulates the benets—for all to see and often to criticize.
For instance, I personally have to explain and defend our budget submissions before con-
gressional committees every year—sometimes it seems like every week. In this regard,
I believe that this openness pays off. For a strong power, secrecy is counterproductive
because it breeds suspicion in others and requires them to seek a wider margin of safety.
In sum, satisfying Congress produces its own set of frustrations, but on balance the
benets are great: more comprehensible, legitimate, carefully thought-out policies reect-
ing the purposes of the American people, serving their needs by means that conform to
fundamental precepts they support, and integrating their defense with the whole panoply
of societal requirements.
Completing the civil-military relationship in the US system, our President is by de-
nition the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This constitutional device reects
our founders’ desire to insure “civilian control” of military operations and at the same
time to empower a single authority who can act with decisiveness and energy.
It is not, however, a wholly independent power. Inevitably, the President and Con-
gress dispute the limits of each other’s jurisdiction, especially in foreign affairs. From
the outside, this may appear confusing at times. But the crucial fact is that both the
President and the Congress are elected by the people. In the American system, civilian
control means democratic control of the military. The President has the power to act
quickly when circumstances require it, but the people can second-guess his judgments
and call him to account.
Democratic control of the military, despite some inconveniences, is the most important
principle of the American system. From the military’s own point of view, it enhances the
prospects that our policies enjoy public support and legitimacy. Equally important, our
soldiers—all of whom are volunteers—are linked to the roots of power—our citizenry.
Because elections ensure that our civilian authorities enjoy the consent of the gov-
erned, civilian control of the military is not a matter of one bureaucracy asserting its
priority over another. As James Madison wrote, “the people are the priority, original
fountain of all legitimate authority.” Democratic leaders make tough choices, sometimes
leading public opinion, sometimes adjusting to it; but the fact that their authority comes
from the people’s explicit choice is their most valuable asset.
That consent, in the end, “begets the public spirit” necessary for a military to function
in a democracy and signals to friends abroad that our military policies will reect the
electorate’s desires. Clearly, this is the cornerstone of our system. Again, it puts a pre-
mium on the ability of our political and military leaders to balance all these competing
considerations while simultaneously fashioning effective and efcient Armed Services.
Believe me, it is a tough balancing act.
This is only a brief description, which I would be happy to elaborate upon in the
question period. I hope it gives you some feel for the politico-military interface between
our Armed Forces and the citizenry and of the complexities of my own duties. It also
explains in part our approach to important issues in our bilateral relationship with your
government, such as arms control issues. It is a perplexing structure, which is perhaps
more awkward and time consuming than many would prefer. But in today’s modern
world, with such high stakes riding on the way strength is employed, we believe its merits
outweigh its demerits.
No leader in the United States, military or civilian, desires war. We have always
believed what both President Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev stated: that a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought. To keep the peace is the fundamental
mission of our Armed Forces, and the primary measure of our success is the ability to
deter conict, nuclear or nonnuclear.
Speaking as an ofcer whose forty-seven years of service spans the entire postwar
era, and who has served at the highest levels in European and Asian commands as well
as in Washington, I have never seen or heard of any US planning to initiate aggressive
war against the Soviet Union. It is that fundamental truth which I hope our contacts
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can reinforce in your minds, with a condence grounded in rst-hand exposure to our
leaders and our people.
If the political relationship between Moscow and Washington continues to improve, I see
vast potential for more extensive military contacts than those of the past. They would be
governed by a mutual intent to ensure crisis stability, and condence in each other’s desire
to avoid conict. Through open and fundamental discussion about the nature of military
strategy, the sharing of information on such issues as budgets and procurement schedules,
the expanded exchanges of our personnel, the further development of regimes for verica-
tion of arms reductions, and the evolution of condence- and security-building measures,
we will be able to help our governments construct a more sustainable relationship overall
and enhance the prospects for avoiding conict. We hopefully can become collaborators
in the interests of international peace and stability and the welfare of our two peoples.
Marshal Akhromeyev, General Moiseyev, and I have taken the rst steps in that project.
It will be up to you, and American ofcers like you, to take the next steps into the future.
Let me conclude with one nal, more or less, personal note. In preparing for this
address, I looked at a book of famous photos taken by your combat photographers
between 1941 and 1945. One scene in particular caught my attention. The picture was
taken in the late Fall of 1941 as the photographer journeyed throughout the hinterlands
to chronicle the course of the war, hoping to nd a way to express its enormous conse-
quences and its stakes. In this scene, he found what he sought, and it is no wonder that
the grainy black-and-white photo that resulted, and others like it, helped literally to galva-
nize your people and to stir your forces to meet the great sacrices that were still ahead.
He found his subjects not among your embattled troops, not amidst gallant cavalry or
tenacious infantry, not in the ranks of the battle-scarred wounded. He found it in a mother
and her children, raggedly wrapped against a driving wind, shufing through frozen elds
away from the invading enemy and on to some safer place. I suppose many of you have seen
the photograph. The mother cradles a bundle—an infant, perhaps—and clasps tightly the
outstretched hand of a young girl. A boy walks beside her, leaning in, following her lead.
Their ngers are swollen with cold, their faces etched in fatigue and anxiety. It was a mes-
sage about inseparability, about the determined strength that carried families through the
ravages of war. I have no doubt that the image of that family spoke directly to the hearts of
every one of this nation’s defenders, animating and sustaining them in that time of trial.
Your American colleagues understand that message. We know its importance to you,
and that it will always inspire you. But we want you to know that we, too, share in its
sentiment. It is what, in the end, has inspired us to devote our own lives to the defense of
our Republic. I believe that in that motivation there is much that can draw us together.
I am proud to be the rst Chairman to speak at this much-respected academy. I would
like to thank General Moiseyev for the opportunity, and I know I speak for my government
and the men and women of my Armed Forces when I say that the leaders of your generation,
on both sides, must seize future moments like this—for all our children and all the heirs
of that strong and universal family in the old photograph from your Great Patriotic War.
Joint News Conference with General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet
General Staff, as translated from Russian
Moscow | June 21
Good morning. I have just concluded a ten-day visit to your country. I am here, of course,
at the invitation of General Moiseyev. I had the pleasure last summer of hosting Marshal
Akhromeyev in the United States, and I am, in a very real sense, returning that visit. I
have had the opportunity to visit your Armed Forces and to speak to the men and women
of your military.
We visited the rocket forces and your air force; I had a wonderful day at sea with the
Northern Fleet, where I was aboard the Kirov cruiser, as well as went through one of your
nuclear submarines, Belorussia, and then did some touring. We have had the opportu-
nity to be in ve of your hero cities. We later witnessed army eld exercises in Minsk and
Volgograd, and then went through central Asia, both Tashkent and Samarkand. And
yesterday we completed our touring with a day in Sochi.
It has been a genuine learning experience for me, and a full and most interesting
schedule. I have discovered—of course, I knew intellectually, but had to discover again
emotionally—that the Soviet people and the American people are a great deal alike. Their
main interest in life is their family, their home, their children; they want their children to
be better off in the future and to have a secure and happy life. They love their country.
They live in a vast land, which they appreciate. All of these are attributes and values that
Americans cherish and admire.
I repeat, the Soviet people impress me as being a great deal like Americans. The men
and women of your Armed Forces, similarly, are a great deal like the men and women who
serve in my own military. They are competent, skilled, well-trained in the fundamentals of
their art. They are durable, determined, and very patriotic. They have a good sense of humor.
They are personable. And I see all of these things at home when I visit my own military.
I will return to the United States with great admiration for the Soviet Armed Forces.
All-in-all, it has been a full week, and I want to thank General Moiseyev for inviting me
and for the hospitality which he and the Soviet people have extended to my party. We
leave both knowing more about each other, and certainly better off than when we came,
and we leave very, very happy with our visit. With that, I will be happy to address any
questions you might have.
Moiseyev: Ladies and gentlemen, comrades. We have just come here with Admiral
Crowe from a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.
There Admiral Crowe shared his experience regarding the visit to the Soviet Union; what
he saw during his program, what he saw in the various branches of our Armed Forces.
He saw our hero cities: Murmansk, Leningrad—well, of course, Moscow, Minsk,
Volgograd. He saw not only our military activities but he also met our Servicemen and
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women. He learned of their needs and their opinions. Admiral Crowe’s visit to the Soviet
Union is nearing its end. In this connection, I would like to say a few words about some
of my opinions.
During this visit, a lot of intensive work has been done as regards the development
of political dialogue between the leadership of our countries. You know that, following
the instructions of our governments, we have signed a very important document, an
agreement to prevent dangerous military activities. This paper, in our view, corre-
sponds to the spirit of the time and lays down new norms in the relations between
the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the United States and, above all, is aimed
at preventing dangerous military activities. In this regard, the agreement can help
considerably in improving Soviet–American relations and bettering the international
situation on the whole.
Well, what was learned during the visit? I must say that while we do not know each
other, opinions can be very contradictory about each other and about the activities of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. But as we
came to know each other better, as we tried to understand each other, we have found
better contacts in many elds—and not only in the military eld. We have a plan of
contacts between the Armed Forces for 1989-1990. We, with Admiral Crowe during
his visit, discussed proposals and made constructive suggestions in order to build our
relations on a long-term basis. We believe that this will give a promising prospect to
our relations.
We also discussed other issues, including military doctrines, specic features of build-
ing the military forces, the issues of arms. Of course, we discussed the Vienna talks and
the status of affairs there. Well, naturally, we did not reach mutual understanding on all
the issues, but on many major issues we have an understanding and common language.
I would like to note a constructive and well-wishing atmosphere during our meetings
and during the entire visit. I have already said that the American delegation had an
opportunity to learn more about our Armed Forces. We visited a missile facility and a
modern eet facility. Admiral Crowe has visited a nuclear submarine, the cruiser Kirov.
He also learned about the everyday life of the Servicemen, talked to the sailors.
And in one of his visits, he said that today we better understand each other. He also
had an opportunity to visit Leningrad, to see the sites of Leningrad, including the Petrod-
vorets Palace in Belarus. He saw tactical trials, including the arsenal of various arms on
each of the sides. And we wanted to show that we comply with our defensive doctrine,
which corresponds to the spirit of the time and to the spirit of our defensive doctrine.
If we sum up the results of the visit of the American military delegation headed by
Admiral Crowe, I must say that this visit gives us a very good impression, and we would
like to hope that this visit would serve the development of trust, which we so badly need
and we which we lack so far; that it would improve relations in the military eld; that it
would contribute to greater understanding between our military ministries; that it would
make military activities of our Armed Forces more predictable; and that it would help in
searching points of contact on other military issues.
This conclusion, as regards the visit, I link with the condition of Soviet–American
relations, which have been developing positively of late, which corresponds to the inter-
ests of both the Soviet and the American peoples as well as to the interests of European
peoples and the interests of the entire world. Thank you.
Speech at a Dinner Hosted by the Veterans of Foreign Wars
Las Vegas, Nevada | August 21
And also at the American Legion National Convention
Baltimore, Maryland | September 7
A lot has happened during the last few years. It has been an exhilarating and an educa-
tional experience for me. From the start, it was heightened by the fact that my nomination
as Chairman was so unexpected—most of all, unexpected by me. I told Colin Powell, my
appointed successor, that I enjoyed one advantage he doesn’t have, and that is, when I
came into the post, nobody had ever heard of me. Someone asked me how in the world I
got to be the Chairman. I said, “I don’t know, it just happened. But I don’t blame anybody.”
I am extremely pleased to be addressing you today. I grew up in a veteran’s house-
hold. I feel a great attachment for your organization. My father was a Second Class Radio
Operator on the battleship Pennsylvania in World War I. He was extremely proud of his
war service.
In 1920, he moved to a small town in Kentucky to practice law in partnership with
his uncle. After a few years, he ran for county attorney against a man who had lived all
his life in the community and who campaigned on a motto of “Vote for the Home Man.”
My father countered with his own slogan: “My opponent is the Home Man—Home Before
the War, Home During the War, and Home After the War.” I’m sorry to say, he lost the
election but he got the veteran vote, and he loved to tell that story until the day he died.
My generation, of course, owes a large debt to the American Legion and the VFW.
In my view, the 1944 GI Bill of Rights is the most important piece of legislation pro-
duced by our Congress in this century. It bridged the huge gap between peace and war
and put our country on a rm and stable course for the crucial postwar era. It was an
act initiated, sponsored, and sold by the American Legion. This, of course, is only one
of the many notable achievements of your superb organization, whose civic-mindedness
and activist patriotism has ranged from veterans’ hospitals to scholarships to baseball
teams, and most recently, to your highly visible efforts to protect the symbol of our nation,
the ag.
Furthermore, I can assure you that the Active military is extremely beholden to you
for your enthusiastic and staunch commitment to a strong defense. Your everyday efforts
have greatly enriched the dialogue between the military and civilian communities and
the continuing debate about what emphasis Defense should receive. On behalf of all our
men and women in uniform, I extend truly heartfelt thanks.
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As you might imagine, my impending retirement from active service has been much on
my mind lately. As I have contemplated that transition, I have spent some time thinking
not only about my own length of Service, but about the role of the military in our nation’s
life and the picture from where the Chairman sits.
If you will pardon me, I want to depart from my prepared remarks for just two sen-
tences. The one thing I will miss the most, as I leave the Service, is the opportunity
to work and serve every day with young American men and women. It is the greatest
reward of a professional career in the military, and let me tell you, no matter what you
might read to the contrary, my experience tells me that the future of our country is in
very good hands.
Putting that aside, I thought I might share with you some of the thoughts today that
have crossed my mind concerning the large return we have gotten over the years on our
Defense investment and concerning Defense imperatives for the future. As I look back
over forty-seven years of service, the clearest example of our productive military policy is
the US contribution to NATO, by every measure the most successful coalition in history.
Above all, this investment has brought us the longest uninterrupted period of
peace in European history. Our Armed Forces in Western Europe have likewise played
a crucial role in buttressing the political unity of the Atlantic Alliance, in cementing
Washington’s leadership role in the Free World, and in signaling to friends and foes
alike that the United States is willing and able to invest our manpower and treasure
in support of our ideals.
A similar phenomenon has transpired in the Far East, although in a somewhat different
context. For many years our forward-deployed forces in the Western Pacic, in Japan, and
on the Korean peninsula have provided a security shield for our Asian allies and friends.
Our strength has deterred outside intimidation and allowed the free market countries
of the region to advance in their own fashion, at their own pace. The result has been
unprecedented afuence and the steady spread of democracy and political stability.
When I was Commander in Chief, Pacic, this theme was repeated to me time and again
by leaders in the area, who emphasized that their progress would have been impossible
without American forward-deployed forces in Asia. In the last few years, we have seen
additional examples, on a smaller scale, of how the military can be used to further US
ends. Grenada, Libya, Honduras, El Salvador, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East today
demonstrate that our Armed Forces can often contribute in a measured and constructive
fashion to achieving our foreign policy goals. Incidentally, these examples also suggest
that we are becoming more adept in meshing national, diplomatic, and security efforts.
In a similar vein, our Services have turned their attention to a number of new mis-
sions, which have recently climbed onto the national agenda—counterterrorism, limited
intensity conict, and drug interdiction.
Every day, we are becoming better postured to give the President a wider choice of
tools in dealing with these threats to our society and the American way of life, and this
was graphically demonstrated this week in the President’s remarks where he addressed
the drug problem.
Perhaps the recent events in Soviet Russia are the most persuasive argument for our
policy of peace through strength. For several decades, we were threatened, vilied, and
bullied by an aggressive Kremlin that continuously proclaimed the coming demise of
capitalism and proceeded to build the world’s most formidable military establishment.
Today, we are seeing hopeful signs of a basic reappraisal in Moscow and the rst turns
toward a less offensive stance.
While this reversal has been brought about by a range of factors, including the near
collapse of the communist economic system, I am convinced in my heart that a major
contribution was the West’s determination not to succumb to intimidation and to erect
its own defenses. I would be the rst to admit that this policy has been expensive and,
at times, painful for our people, for our government, and for our allies. But the payoff is
well worth the sacrice. Our world is still free and prospering. Millions of people around
the globe are turning to Washington and to the West for hope, and today pluralism, not
communism, is the wave of the future.
In the face of such evidence, no one can convince me that our security investment
has been misplaced. Yet after a few years of increasing defense appropriations in the
early 1980s, we are seeing the historical pendulum swing once again. Since 1985, the
Congress has steadily cut our funds—some 12 percent, actually—and I am told that this
is just the beginning. I hear talk of massive cuts for the next ve years. I cannot help
but be severely disturbed by such a prospect. My concern has been reinforced by the
current budget struggles on the Hill, in which not only the total amount of our request
is in jeopardy but the details of our programs are being selectively rearranged to meet
the political interests of special strategic notions of a few legislators.
In the Pentagon, we agonize to produce a budget request often in accord with instruc-
tions from the Congress, that balances competing priorities to best accomplish our
national objectives. When our work goes to the Hill, it may very well be treated as a
legislative grab-bag. All too often, the nal result is more pork than a coherent strategic
package. Four times in the last century we have entered major wars unprepared because
we failed to fund Defense properly in peacetime. In each instance, we paid a terrible price
in blood and treasure—a price, incidentally that could have been avoided with more
forethought and wisdom. I heard a wag once say, “In war, we remember the Alamo, the
Maine and Pearl Harbor; in peace, we forget.” Will we never learn?
It is curious that just as our policies are beginning to bear real fruit in Moscow, we com-
mence whittling away at them with a vengeance. I am not opposed to Defense drawdowns if
the threat and international conditions justify it, but I do not see a national or congressional
debate in depth about the threat, about foreign policy, or about the future of regional insta-
bilities. I see no meaningful strategic discussion of events in Central and Latin America,
Afghanistan, China, Cambodia, southwest Africa, Syria, Lebanon, or Iran, all of which are
currently racked by problems that could escalate and ultimately involve us militarily.
To the contrary, when I testify on the Hill, I am told that I don’t appreciate the political
realities. No one denes those for me. Instead of the emotionalism that such talk often
stems from, I would prefer to see some clear-eyed analysis of the truly hard questions
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that must be answered if this country is to remain secure and to continue leading a
free world. Do we want to reduce our commitments? Do we want to change our overall
strategy? Do we want to replace the triad with a dyad—and so on?
I would argue vigorously that it is preferable to decide where we are going and why
before we arbitrarily and irreversibly slash the Defense budget, thus precipitating the
wholesale disassembly of the very security structure which has guaranteed the peace
for the past forty years plus. That doesn’t strike me as too much to ask.
That brings me to my second subject, our relationship with the Soviet Union. I am
told that recent events in the USSR are what led many to conclude that the require-
ment for strong defenses is disappearing. In my view, we need to look carefully and also
thoughtfully at this proposition. Certainly, in my time as Chairman, nothing has been
more remarkable than the emergence of General Secretary Gorbachev with his dramatic
policy changes in Moscow.
When I took my present post, I had no idea that the political climate in the US–Soviet
relationship would ultimately permit my Russian counterparts and me to open up a
direct dialogue or to inaugurate a systematic program of contacts between our Armed
Forces. Nor did I expect to watch Marshal Akhromeyev testify before the House Armed
Services Committee. Imagine: a Soviet Marshal addressing the Congress of the United
States. Who could have dreamed such a thing forty-seven years ago when I entered the
military, or for that matter, four years ago, when I became the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. I told the Marshal that I thought that it was appropriate that he suffer some of
the things I suffer and go up to the Hill, that he share the misery with me. I told him that
if Moses had gone up to Capitol Hill instead of Mount Sinai, the tablets he brought back
would have been aspirin instead of the ones we read about in the Bible.
Yet all those unexpected events have occurred in just the last two years, and the
momentum is continuing. To say the least, these have been interesting times, as we
have tried to understand what Gorbachev’s intentions and prospects are, and what his
efforts might mean for the future, especially in the military realm. Indeed, for the full
span of my professional lifetime, the global reach of Soviet military power has been the
main concern of defense planners in the United States and among Washington’s allies
in Europe and Asia, and with good reason.
I don’t need to rehash that history here. Sufce it to say today that the basic charac-
teristics of that power are still impressive by any yardstick. The Kremlin has the largest
military establishment in the world—the formidable legacy of a strategy designed to
defeat every possible opposing coalition and of a long-time cultural belief in numerical
military superiority in both peace and war. On the other hand, it has been clear for some
time that the underlying political, economic, and social pillars of Soviet society are not
in good shape—they are close to bankruptcy—and that the Kremlin’s postwar security
policies have imposed enormous burdens on the Russian people and severely limited
their future prospects.
Gorbachev has outlined those woes in detail himself, in his writings and public utter-
ances. In turn, he has launched perestroika, glasnost, and democratization, in the hope of
reshaping his country for entering the twenty-rst century. In addition to those domestic
difculties, a number of international trends have moved unfavorably for the USSR. Prob-
ably foremost is the evident success of the free enterprise system throughout the developed
world. In essence, events have refuted the Kremlin’s catechism, which condently pre-
dicted capitalism’s imminent demise. NATO responded to Moscow’s huge military buildup
not with weakness or indifference but with determination and a marked resurgence of
strength across the board in its Armed Forces. Equally important, US alliances have proved
remarkably resilient and adaptable to changing conditions, in stark contrast to Moscow’s
associates, who neither carry the load that America’s allies do nor are as reliable. We are
seeing that in our newspapers every day.
Looking out on that array of problems, Gorbachev and his supporters still hold that
defense must be the rst priority of the state, but they now claim to be reshaping the Krem-
lin’s military posture to one of reasonable sufciency. And we saw the rst manifestations
of that decision in the force reductions and restructuring plans he announced last summer.
And it is true, if in fact these and other announced moves are carried out, they will be
signicant, especially in reducing the possibility of a surprise attack on Western Europe.
Additionally, over the last few years, Gorbachev has joined with Washington in serious
arms reduction talks, and we have made some real progress. All this, of course, is as
encouraging as it was unexpected. But certain fundamental realities counsel caution
in interpreting these trends.
First is the fact that, even if reduced as announced, the Kremlin’s military establish-
ment will still number more than four million men, and Moscow will retain the world’s
largest single-country inventory of military hardware. As I told the Soviets repeatedly
during my trip there in June, it is very hard for outside observers to understand how that
massive apparatus can be justied by legitimate defense needs. Moreover, other critical
elements of Soviet military power remain untouched by the reductions announced thus
far, and that includes military activities in space, strategic offensive and defensive forces,
air defense units, naval combatants, and mobility assets.
A further cautionary note springs from the immensity and risks of the tasks the
Soviets have undertaken. It appears that Gorbachev and his supporters are sincerely
committed to some fundamental reforms, but wanting and accomplishing change are two
different things. I believe the Soviets originally underestimated the difculties associated
with perestroika and the time and effort it will take to implement such a policy.
For such an ambitious enterprise, it is impossible to lay out a detailed road map at
the outset. In a real sense, they are sailing in uncharted waters. There is an awful lot
of playing it by ear, proceeding one day at a time. Their rigid and inexible economy is
providing difculty for the military as well. Absorbing large numbers of released military
personnel into the civilian sector turns out to be a very signicant problem, and con-
verting defense industry to the production of consumer goods is not only difcult today
but it will become even more so in the future.
In this situation, to observe that they are doing ne today doesn’t tell you much about
tomorrow. Much the same can be said for glasnost. Thus far, the leadership has just put
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its toe in the water in encouraging openness. If real pluralism is ultimately achieved in
the USSR, it will involve a massive shift in attitudes throughout the society, requiring
every group to exercise extraordinary tolerance of others. At this juncture, it is simply
not clear how this will play out, if at all, or how quickly it will transpire.
Moreover, the ethnic problems that plague the Kremlin are especially thorny and
could threaten the entire enterprise. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact countries are severely
testing Mr. Gorbachev, as events at this moment in Hungary and Poland demonstrate.
All of this does not make me feel especially comfortable. I am persuaded that we are not
yet in a new era, but that we are entering a period of uneasy transition, which includes
both encouraging and worrisome signals. Put simply, there are too many uncertainties
still on the horizon to draw denite conclusions, and my assessment is that we may be
in this unsettled state for a long time.
My deepest concern is that our own impatience might tempt us to move prematurely
with broad leaps of hope and faith before we have tangible evidence of where the Kremlin
is going and what its timetable will be. It’s curious to me that many Americans profess to
know where the Soviet Union is headed when the Soviets themselves don’t know where
they are going. Moreover, it would be a great deal more rational to move gradually and
deliberately, taking reasonable steps as the horizon becomes clearer, not before. This
applies particularly to our own defense policies. In my view, to draw down our strength
prematurely and precipitously would be extreme folly.
Finally, a brief word on keeping these events in perspective. As I prepare to leave the
Chairmanship and to retire from Active Service, I am convinced that events of the last
several years have appreciably advanced mutual understanding and condence between
the US and Soviet military establishments. The climate for frank discussion of differences
and constructive work on real-world issues has markedly improved with every meeting.
If we are skillful and patient—and I stress “patient”—the remarkable changes we are
witnessing today may, at some point in the future, offer real promise for a safer and more
stable world. But such a climate is not here yet. There is a lot of hard work and trauma
ahead before we can achieve such an outcome. Moreover, it is imperative to understand
that the international community will always have differences to manage. Further, many
of the problems in the Soviet Union, and for that matter around the world, present and
future, cannot be solved simply by developments in the superpower relationship alone.
As far as the US-Soviet relationship is concerned, our systems—no matter what hap-
pens in Moscow—will remain fundamentally competitive for the foreseeable future. Even
if all the trends we think we can discern in Moscow play out in our favor, the business
of protecting the interests of Americans in an uncertain world will not be done. We will
still need strong Armed Forces to undergird our international relations and to buttress
friends and allies around the globe.
George Shultz said, “Our military strength is the umbrella underneath which all
our diplomatic cards are played.” Certainly the character, the size, and the shape of our
Armed Forces may well change, and they may become smaller. But the enduring impera-
tives of international affairs will always demand that we retain an adequate level of power.
We are seeing that fact of life assert itself today, and it will continue to plague us for
a long time to come. Maintaining an appropriate and adequate defense posture will not
be easy. It will take patience, determination, and a clear-sighted policy mix that exploits
all opportunities for peace without sacricing the strength that brings the opportunities
within reach. But fundamentally I am an optimist about our ability to walk that line,
and I guess in Washington that makes me an incurable optimist. Paul Harvey says, “In
times like these, we must always remember, there have always been times like these.” I
am convinced, however, that my optimism is not unfounded. With the proven leadership
of an outstanding President, who you are going to hear in just a few minutes, one who
understands the need for strength and who has experienced war himself—a genuine
American hero—we can and will prevail.
I can testify from personal experience that he is served by a rst-rate national secu-
rity team, in Secretary Cheney, Secretary Baker, and National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft. They work closely as a team—something that doesn’t always happen in our
government—and they are confronting the problems head-on. Moreover, my successor,
General Colin Powell, will be a superb complement to that team. He is a charismatic and
imaginative leader who brings a wealth of experience both in and out of Washington to
the post. He is an eminently exceptional and excellent choice.
I want to mention again that I am well aware of the signicant role that the
American Legion plays in defense affairs. Our nation prots from your patriotism,
from the experience and knowledge represented in your ranks, and on behalf of the
Armed Forces, I salute you. I thank you for your consistent support of our efforts,
and I urge you, which I know you will, nevertheless, I urge you to remain engaged in
the national security debate.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Transportation Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois | September 22
It is a genuine privilege to participate in this ceremony passing the baton of command of
the United States Transportation Command from General [Duane] Cassidy to General
[Hansford] Johnson.
For me, it is a particular honor, for, as some of you may recall, I was here just two
years ago at the creation of this command. I guess this occasion is proof of what my
wife says has happened over the past four years—I’ve been Chairman so long that I’m
starting to repeat myself. I’m starting to see what she means.
Although my mission today is mainly to ofciate at this formal transition, I am pleased
to have the opportunity also to recognize the many contributions of General Cassidy
and his wife Rosalie as they stand on the threshold of retirement from thirty-ve years
of active service.
The subject of retirement has been much on my own mind of late, as Shirley and I
prepare to make that transition at the end of this month. I believe there are some hard,
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cold realities out there, and it may be a traumatic experience. An episode that occurred
the other day brought this home to me dramatically. I had to take our car in for repairs,
and when I got the bill I was startled to see that the mechanic charged me $200 an hour
for his time. “Two hundred dollars,” I screamed, “I’m the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and I don’t make $200 an hour.” The guy looked up and said: “Neither did I when
I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.” (I always wondered what happened to David Jones.)
But my personal burdens aside, it is a special pleasure to be here today, for several
reasons. Today marks my third visit to this beautiful part of the country since I became
Chairman. It is always gratifying to return to a community that’s well known for its strong
ties between civilians and the military. The presence here today of so many prominent
citizens from the area attests to the vitality of that bond. The support you provided to the
Air Force and to MAC [Military Airlift Command] in the past has obviously continued with
the Transportation Command. I have often remarked that this nation’s military strength
depends ultimately on broad roots of support within the American public.
We in the Armed Forces can only be as good as our citizens want us to be. It is com-
forting indeed for me, immersed as I am in the Washington swirl, to be reminded once
again that the civil-military tie that has served as the bedrock for this nation for over
two centuries is still alive and well in America’s heartland.
Coming here is always a nostalgic journey of sorts for me. Just over a century ago—on
the 22nd of April 1889—my grandfather and his father passed through the Gateway to
the West to make the Homestead Run into Oklahoma. As I was growing up in Oklahoma
City, I inevitably turned to St. Louis as my own personal gateway to the world beyond.
I saw my rst burlesque show there, and that certainly was a world beyond Oklahoma
City. And I followed with pride the careers of fellow Sooners, like the Dean brothers and
Pepper Martin as they played ball with the Cardinals.
But more pertinent to today’s events, the second reason why this visit is a welcome
occasion for me is the opportunity to speak directly to the men and women of this com-
mand and to bring to you personally the message that leaders in our nation’s capital
greatly appreciate your daily contributions.
I have served many years out on the frontiers of freedom around the globe. I know
all too well that for people in the eld, Washington can at times seem remote and pre-
occupied with its own distinctive, and even peculiar, concerns. I know that in the past
two years, as you have labored in the trenches to establish this unied command, you
have received more than your fair share of attention and scrutiny. Let me assure you,
however, that your efforts here have been universally recognized and admired.
I do not have to tell the majority of those assembled here that the military chal-
lenges this nation confronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in
magnitude and diversity every day. This is especially true today, as we enter into an
era of uneasy transition, which includes both encouraging and worrisome compo-
nents. Put simply, there are both promises and challenges on the horizon. The role
of this strategically critical command will undoubtedly grow in proportion to these
promises and challenges.
For myself, I might add, the dedicated service of all of you associated with USTRANSCOM,
serving America’s interests on a daily basis around the globe, has been a never-ending
source of inspiration and strength as I have gone about my duties as Chairman. Another
source of support and comfort has been the knowledge that the nation’s defense establish-
ment has been led by commanders of the caliber of General Duane Cassidy.
When Duane Cassidy was taking his basic aviation cadet training in Texas in the
early 1950s, he was probably told that there was really only one standard against which
all pilots were judged. A good pilot, he was informed, is one whose log book has the same
number of landings as take-offs. He must have taken that advice seriously, for his career
of three-and-one-half decades has been marked by an equilibrium of strong take-offs
and successful landings.
In fact, his career reads like a history of the United States Air Force. He has own
B-25s as a navigator, including participation in the hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacic,
and he has piloted B-47s for the Strategic Air Command. He has amassed well over 9,000
ying hours, and commanded missiles, bombers, and airlift units.
It was after his tour in Vietnam that General Cassidy rst got into the airlift busi-
ness. Duane, did it ever cross your mind back then in the early 1970s when you were
ying the MAC Commander around, that you would someday return to that command
yourself? It may not have been to you, but it was obvious to some, even then, that you
were a “marked” man. The almost fteen years which General Cassidy has spent in the
Military Airlift Command have spanned the spectrum of the Command’s mission, as
well as spanning the globe in executing that mission.
A renowned bomber and airlift pilot, he has forged a distinguished record in command
at all levels and has also held key staff posts—all of which made him the obvious choice to
become the rst Commander in Chief of TRANSCOM. Two years ago, as General Cassidy
was assuming this command, I warned him that he would be faced with the Herculean
task of assembling a truly joint transportation system.
The condence of our nation’s leaders in entrusting this task to General Cassidy
was not misplaced. His record of achievement here speaks for itself. The award which
is to be bestowed upon this command during today’s ceremonies is in no small part a
reection of the personal and professional example from the CINC himself. Alongside
this impressive commander every step of the way has been his lovely wife, Rosalie. They
have made a great team and both will be sorely missed—missed by the Armed Forces
and by the community as well.
The uncertain future facing us means that there is much yet to be done by this Com-
mand. As we move forward into that unknown, the United States is fortunate to be able to
turn the reins of command of TRANSCOM over to General Hansford T. Johnson. General
Johnson is a bona de war hero and an outstanding leader. His career has been marked
by doing in practice what others have only dreamed about in theory. He has risen with
distinction through command and staff assignments throughout the world. His unagging
dedication and incisive intelligence are renowned throughout the defense community. I
know this special brand of leadership rst hand, for until yesterday, General Johnson was
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the Director of my staff, the Joint Staff. I can say without reservation, he is the right man
for this critically important job. H. T. and Linda Ann, I think you’ll nd this a refreshing
change from the intrigues of Washington. Certainly you’ll nd the trafc different than on
the beltway. I envy you both.
When we depart these ceremonies today, there are good reasons to feel optimistic
about this nation and its future prospects. First, we can share in a deep sense of pride
that our military establishment has produced leaders of the caliber of Duane Cassidy
and H. T. Johnson—accomplished in command and operations, at home in the world of
theory as well as practice. These are men who can stand on the bridge between those
two worlds and pull them together.
The second reason for encouragement is the health and vibrancy of this command,
and its outstanding prospects as one of the vanguards of our Armed Forces, one of our key
strategic assets. The third cause for condence is an outgrowth of the rst two: the growing
vitality of the civil-military tie throughout our nation. This is the lifeblood of our military
profession, the driving force that sustains and animates all of us who wear the uniform.
As these are reasons for condence and encouragement, they are also signals to
friends and adversaries alike that America’s defenses—and position as leader of the free
world—will always remain in capable hands.
In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and all of the men and women
of the Armed Forces of the United States, I extend very best wishes to Duane and Rosalie
Cassidy as they take up the new challenges of retirement, and I welcome H. T. and Linda
Ann to their new responsibilities in the US Transportation Command. May you have fair
winds and following seas.
Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony, US Forces Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia | September 27
It is a genuine privilege for me to participate in this ceremony passing the baton of command
of the United States Forces Command from General [Colin] Powell to General [Ed] Burba.
As some of you may recall, I’ve been here once or twice before—rst in July of 1987
when FORSCOM became a Specied Command, and more recently in April of this year
when General Powell assumed command. This occasion, in a sense, is proof of what my
wife says has happened over the past four years: I’ve been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff so long that I’m starting to repeat myself. I’m starting to see what she means.
It is a genuine pleasure to participate here today. I eagerly seize every opportunity I
can to travel outside the Washington Beltway. General Powell will assume my duties as
Chairman in a few short days and know the burdens rst hand that I have left behind
for the moment in the Pentagon. But my personal burdens aside, it is a special pleasure
to be here today, for several reasons.
First is the opportunity to visit Atlanta. It is always gratifying to return to a commu-
nity that’s well known for its strong ties between civilians and the military. The presence
here today of so many prominent citizens from the Atlanta area attests to the vitality of
that bond. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all who wear the uniform, I want to
convey our deep appreciation for your continued support.
I have often remarked that this nation’s military strength depends ultimately on
broad roots of support within the American public. We in the Armed Forces can only be
as good as our citizens want us to be. It is comforting indeed for me, immersed as I am
in the Washington swirl, to be reminded once again that the civil-military tie that has
served as the bedrock for this nation for over two centuries is still alive and well here
among the Georgia peaches.
Nothing illustrates the reality and vitality of that civil-military bond better than
FORSCOM itself. The US Forces Command, as represented on this eld before us, consists
of over one million Active, National Guard, and Reserve troops. These are the nest young
men and women America has to offer—like their forefathers, proud to be citizen-soldiers.
They represent a highly professional Total Force, composed of people from all walks of
life, deterring war by their very presence, but willing to defend our nation if called upon
to do so. We in the Nation’s capital greatly appreciate your daily contributions.
I have served for many years around the globe. I know all too well that for people in
the eld, Washington can at times seem remote and preoccupied with its own distinctive,
and even peculiar, concerns. Let me assure you that your achievements are universally
recognized and admired. Your professional and rapid response to fast breaking events
has been consistently superb—for example, in Panama, in Honduras, in the ght against
drugs, and most recently in St. Croix—whenever and wherever crises have occurred
which require troops from our strategic reserve, FORSCOM has been there.
I have to tell you assembled here that the military challenges that this nation con-
fronts in the world at large are considerable and growing in magnitude and diversity every
day. This is especially true as we enter into an era of uneasy transition, which includes
the Soviet Union and its relations with Washington. This transition has both encour-
aging and worrisome components. Put simply, there are both promises and challenges
on the horizon. The role of this strategically critical command will undoubtedly rise in
proportion to those promises and challenges.
For myself, I might add that the performance and power of this Command has been a
never-ending source of inspiration and strength to me as I have gone about my duties as
Chairman. Another source of support and comfort has been the knowledge that the nation’s
defense establishment has been led by commanders of the caliber of General Colin Powell.
In Colin Powell, we have the living incarnation of that old World War I recruiting
poster which challenged: “Don’t read history, make it!” He is rst and foremost a soldier,
a natural leader grounded in the techniques of war-ghting and peacekeeping. He’s been
tested and proven in the crucible of combat. He’s a leader in the nest traditions of the US
military. His career has been marked by doing in practice what others have only dreamed
about in theory. I think General Powell would agree that in his heart he always has been
a eld soldier. And he has the muddy boots to prove it, for he has commanded from the
Infantry platoon level up to a forward-deployed Corps and now this Specied Command.
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Despite his affection for “mud soldiers,” Colin Powell has equally impressive staff
credentials. He has served as a key advisor to this nation’s top civilian leaders and has
won widespread respect in Washington and in allied capitals around the world.
I won’t dwell on his many accomplishments here at Forces Command. He wouldn’t
want me to, and in any event, this audience knows them well. Sufce it to say that General
Powell has left a marked imprint on this country’s deterrent posture as commander of this
Command. When he was assuming his command, I told him that he would be faced with
the task of consolidating a combat ready, joint strategic reserve for the Armed Forces. I had
every condence in him, and my condence in him was obviously not misplaced.
As he mastered this task, at every step of the way has been his lovely wife. I have
heard it said that behind every successful man stands a surprised mother-in-law. Colin
and his wife are a great team, and one that we are all extremely proud of—and I am sure
that FORSCOM and Atlanta will miss you as you move to take on the responsibilities
and challenges as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But the loss is the Nation’s gain. No one
is more qualied as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than Colin Powell—no one.
The uncertain future facing us means that there is much yet to be done by this com-
mand. As we move forward into that unknown, the United States is fortunate to be able
to turn the reins of command of FORSCOM over to General Ed Burba. Ed Burba has an
impressive record of soldiering. He has led Infantrymen in combat with great distinction
and is coming to FORSCOM from command of the Combined Field Army in Korea, where
he led American and South Korean soldiers on one of the Free World’s most exposed
bastions. General Burba’s wide-ranging capacities have been proven in an array of key
positions in Washington and throughout the Continental United States, Germany, and
Korea. And he’s had a wide variety of assignments in the joint arena as well.
I can’t overlook perhaps his most important qualication for this job. Like myself, he
hails from Oklahoma, and that makes him an obvious choice for this important position.
When we depart these ceremonies today, there are good reasons to feel optimistic
about this nation and its future prospects. First, we can share in a deep sense of pride
that our military establishment has produced leaders of the caliber of Colin Powell and
Ed Burba: accomplished in command and operations, at home in the world of theory as
well as practice. These are men who can stand on the bridge between those two worlds
and pull them together.
The second reason for encouragement is the health and vibrancy of this command,
and its outstanding prospects as one of the vanguards of our Armed Forces, one of our
key strategic assets.
I would suggest that the third cause for condence is an outgrowth of the rst two:
the growing vitality of the civil-military tie throughout our nation. This is the lifeblood
of our military profession, the driving force that sustains and animates all of us who
wear the uniform.
Just as these are reasons for condence and encouragement, they are also signals:
signals to friends and adversaries alike that America’s defenses—and position as leader
of the Free World—will always remain in capable hands.
In that spirit, and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and all of the men and women
of the Armed Forces of the United States, I extend very best wishes to Colin and Alma
Powell as they take up the new challenges in Washington, and I welcome Ed and Trish to
their new responsibilities in the Forces Command. In nautical parlance, may you always
enjoy fair winds and following seas.
Remarks upon his Retirement and Departure as Chairman
US Naval Academy | Annapolis, Maryland | September 29
Mr. President, your remarks were most kind and generous. I heard a wag say once that
the difference between a eulogy and a testimonial is that in the case of a testimonial
there is one person in the audience that believes it. I won’t mention who that person is.
I knew it was time to retire last 4th of July. My wife and I were visiting Boston to ride
the Constitution for its annual turnaround. It was a lovely day and it was a great festivity.
In the course of the proceedings, a Bostonian said to Shirley, “What a wonderful ship the
Constitution is,” and what a great attachment he had for it. He said, “You know, it’s an
old relic but it’s still commissioned.” And Shirley said, “Are you talking about the ship or
my husband?” I got the hint.
I, of course, chose the Naval Academy as the site of my retirement because this is
where the trouble started, right here on this parade ground when I attempted to learn
the Manual of Arms as a plebe. I didn’t have too much trouble until they put bayonets
on those ries. I didn’t kill anyone, but I came awfully close.
My father was an enlisted man in the Navy in World War I, and very proud of his
service. As a young boy growing up in Oklahoma, I had a picture of his ship, the USS
Pennsylvania, in my room. As a result of my own inclinations and his urgings and
encouragement, I determined very early to seek entry to Annapolis; I think about the
time I was ten years old.
Now, many of my Oklahoma friends didn’t take me too seriously. I’m happy to report,
however, that today they take those ambitions a little more seriously than they did. I
should mention, of course, that there are many, many of my Oklahoma friends in the
audience this morning, and I deeply appreciate their presence.
I was not the world’s best Midshipman, but despite that hardship I didn’t lose my fas-
cination or my love for the Navy. I learned some really practical things here at the Naval
Academy; for example, to pray for rain on parade days. And I also learned that if that
didn’t work, how to doze in ranks, as I suspect some people are doing on the eld this
morning. Perhaps the most helpful skill I acquired was the ability to change uniforms
quickly. As a matter of fact, I’ve used that talent all my life, even this morning.
My affection for the Naval Academy has grown steadily over the years.
Admiral Hill, I thank you for the blood, sweat, and tears that you have put into
mounting this ceremony. And I respectfully recommend that you delete all the demerits
awarded to Midshipmen today.
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I must mention that there are many, many of my classmates here today. We all belong
to the class of 1947. It was a three-year class, and we actually graduated in 1946. I have
spent my entire life explaining that confusing phenomenon. The class of 1947 served
this country in one of its most interesting periods. Those years included a great deal
of conict and crisis. They spanned Korea and Vietnam and all gradations of troubled
peace. Two were POWs in North Vietnam for over seven years. Two [of my classmates]
are Medal of Honor winners. Thirty-four attained general or ag rank. An impressive
number are CEOs or heads of their own companies. One headed the CIA. One served as
the President of the Republic.
Now I am the last of 826 on active duty. I have always been extremely proud to have
been a member of such an exceptional and close-knit class. And I would like to ask my
classmates to please stand, please.
Mr. President, I leave the Service with good feelings about our nation and its Armed
Forces. America stands for the right things: freedom, democracy, human dignity, and indi-
vidual fulllment. Through good times and bad times, those values have served us well.
The prospects for the future spread of democracy are bright, and hopeful people, millions
of hopeful people, still look to the United States of America for inspiration and help.
In traveling about our country, I have also observed that the Republic has its feet on
the ground. And we have a President that has his feet on the ground and that has the
American spirit. We combine optimism with common sense like no other country, and
we, above all, are a patriotic people.
In fact, one of the joys of serving as your senior military leader was to see American
families encourage their children to serve their time in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or
Marines, and Coast Guard. I am encouraged as well by a grassroots consensus that there
is no real substitute for peace through strength and that we must maintain a military
establishment second to none in quality.
So long as we stay close to these principles, Mr. President, we need not fear a world
in transition or the uncertainties that sometimes cloud the horizon. As you mentioned,
sir, our military establishment is the nest I’ve seen. Nowhere—and I repeat, nowhere—
have I found more individual initiative and more pride in a job well done. American
mothers and fathers, sometimes grandparents or aunts and uncles, deserve a great
deal of credit for this happy state of affairs. But the lion’s share goes to our superb,
young, enlisted people.
Mr. President, I couldn’t bring all the enlisted people here today, but I asked the Unied
Commanders to bring representatives from their commands and all our Services from the
enlisted ranks to be symbolic of their presence. They are here today in the rst section
outside of the tent area, and I’m going to ask them to stand as well, and I want you to rec-
ognize them. Put simply, we have the best military training establishment on the globe,
and we reap our huge security benets from this establishment every day of the year.
Today, the shape and help of our Alliance is a topic of lively debate and occasional
grumbling. NATO is facing a mid-life crisis. Military burdens are not shared as well as
they should be. Some of our overseas base rights appear to be softening, and so on.
But I would argue that these problems are minor in comparison with those aficting
the USSR and the [Warsaw] Pact. All of the pull is toward the West, not the East. The
enemies of freedom have been more thwarted than successful. Their situation and their
star are in decline.
Much of this, of course, can be traced to our basic values. But I am also struck by the
fact that we have proved that Lenin and Stalin were wrong, totally wrong, when claim-
ing that the Western democracies could not be trusted to keep the peace. Even a new
generation of Soviet leaders seems to be coming around to a different view of the West.
Put simply, we have created—I repeat, created—not fallen into a world more hospitable
to our national interests, to our way of life, and to freedom and peace.
I truly believe and would argue vigorously, that our military strength has, over the
years, played an integral role in effecting that result. Now the task is to hold onto the
gains and to consolidate them for the next decade, and I have every condence that we
will do exactly that.
Over the last four years, I’ve had a unique opportunity to observe the military con-
tribution to our national life and to have a voice in security policy. In this endeavor, I’ve
been associated with an outstanding multi-service staff, which has risen to every occa-
sion. In the process, I have developed a deep admiration for the Joint Staff action ofcer,
for his energy, his determination, his professional skill, and above all, his ability to put
the joint approach above Service parochialism. In the process, they hear a lot about the
fog of war, but they’ve also learned that the fog of peacetime is rather mind-boggling as
well. There is no way I can amply extend my thanks. I do extend my heartfelt thanks.
That’s inadequate.
But as a symbol of my high regard, Shirley and I have endowed an annual award for
the outstanding Joint Staff action ofcer. And to inaugurate that tradition, I would like
now to confer this year’s award on Major Andrew Dichter of the US Air Force, who is a
member of the operations shop on the Joint Staff. If he would come forward, please, I
would like to make that award. Would you please read the citation?
Narrator: In recognition of his sustained outstanding achievements, contributions to
the accomplishment of the missions of the Armed Forces, and support to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major Andrew S. Dichter has been selected as the Admiral William
J. Crowe, Jr., Joint Staff Action Ofcer of the Year for 1989.
During the past two years, Major Dichter has been the Joint Staff facilitator in the
development and execution of this nation’s most highly sensitive conventional joint
military contingency operations. Major Dichter played a key role in the navigation in
international waters and airspace against Libyan attack, in developing contingency
options for hostage crisis situations in Lebanon, and perhaps most signicantly in the
United States operations to protect nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf, known
as “Operation Earnest Will.”
Major Dichter’s demonstrated expertise and initiative in these operations led to his
selection to play a leading part in developing the initial concept of operations for the
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United States military’s role in the Nation’s anti-drug campaign. Again he excelled,
providing imaginative, insightful advice on how the military could best accomplish this
critical new mission.
Throughout his tour on the Joint Staff, Major Dichter has displayed the highest stan-
dards of professional conduct, personal integrity, and individual initiative. His perfor-
mance in meeting the most sensitive and demanding challenges has been outstanding
and reects great credit upon himself, the Joint Staff, and the United States Air Force.
Admiral Crowe resuming: Congratulations. If you hadn’t noticed, that gave me great
pleasure.
Mr. President, I am deeply indebted to you personally for the opportunity to serve your
Administration and to have a role in protecting the interests of our great country. It has
been a wonderful adventure for me in every sense of the word. Americans are blessed to
have a Commander in Chief with your breadth of understanding and exceptional politi-
cal skill, and I have witnessed personally that it is tempered by optimism, humaneness,
and a great sense of humor, all basic American traits and qualities. I speak for all the
military when I say we’re especially grateful for the personal support you give us and
your appreciation for our mission.
Your national security team is superb and dedicated to keeping this nation safe. I
have served under three great Secretaries of Defense. And I want to extend my personal
thanks to each—Cap Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, and Dick Cheney. It was a real learn-
ing experience to watch Secretary Weinberger maneuver through the complexities of
Washington. Frank Carlucci and I threaded the rocks and shoals of the Persian Gulf.
He was a super navigator. It has been an extreme pleasure to work with and to watch
Dick Cheney pick up the reins and skillfully set a new course for the Pentagon. You’re
well served, Mr. President, by this man from Wyoming. I will always treasure the months
I worked under him.
General Colin Powell will strengthen your team. No one is better qualied to assume
the Chairmanship. He is extremely familiar with the highways and by-ways of Washing-
ton, and I leave knowing that the military is in extremely good hands. That’s one of the
reasons that I feel so good this morning.
Now the tough part. This leaves one other task. Here goes. Thirty-six years ago, when
I was courting Shirley in an effort to convince her that it was a good idea to marry me, I
was prone on occasion to exaggerate. I used to tell her that she was the most wonderful
and beautiful woman in the world, and after thirty-ve years of marriage, I’ve discovered
it wasn’t an exaggeration.
What modest accomplishments I have achieved are joint ones—we’ve done it together.
Frankly, I discovered I couldn’t do anything worthwhile without her. So she has been
there through the whole march. Whenever I was knocked out of the ring, she picked
me up, dusted me off, assured me that I was winning—although it wasn’t so obvious to
me—and sent me back into the fray.
She has given me a fantastic family, and that family literally revolves around her.
She has taught all of us to love, to care, and to hang in there, and you can’t do much
better than that. In the process, she has taught our children to stand up, stand with,
and stand behind Dad, and they do. They are here today, as usual, cheering. I suspect
they’re also laughing, because she taught them to laugh, and I wouldn’t be surprised if
they are scratching as well.
I don’t always understand Shirley, but she has made my life interesting, fullling,
and fun. Shirley, you are the air underneath my wings. Without it, I would have crashed.
I depart happy in spirit. I’ve never been prouder to be in the US military than I am
today. I wish my fellow Chiefs the best of everything. They have been a joy to work with—
Bob Herres, Carl Vuono, and Admiral Trost, Larry Welch, Al Gray, and on occasion, Paul
Yost. It’s been exciting, stimulating, and even at times fun. I wish you the very best.
When I came into the Chairmanship, few people had ever heard of me. All the press
could nd to talk about was that I had a hat collection, that I told corny jokes, and that I
was a sloppy dresser. I am happy to report that that has changed. I have given away the
hat collection. But otherwise, I leave the same, still rumpled and prone to tell stories. Those
two traits prove to be particularly stubborn ones—even publicity couldn’t change them.
I wish my many friends today the very best and many thanks for your friendship.
God bless America.
